Doug Irwin on US Trade Policy (BONUS)

Today, Doug, we’re going to start in on trade.

今天，道格，我们将从贸易开始。

What I’m going to do is toss out a bunch of arguments used against free trade, and you either give me what you think is the best rebuttal or, if you want to accept the argument, that’s fine.

我要做的就是抛出一堆反对自由贸易的论点，你要么给我你认为最好的反驳，要么，如果你想接受这个论点，那也可以。

You ready for that?

你准备好了吗？

The service sector was expanding rapidly.

服务业快速发展。

It had very high productivity growth rates.

它的生产率增长率非常高。

We usually don’t think as that being affected by the tariff per se.

我们通常不认为这受到关税本身的影响。

That’s one reason.

这是原因之一。

We had also very high productivity growth rates in agriculture.

我们的农业生产力增长率也非常高。

I’ve done some counterfactual simulations.

我做了一些反事实模拟。

If you remove the tariff, how much resources would we take out of manufacturing and put into services or agriculture is actually pretty small.

如果取消关税，我们从制造业中拿出多少资源投入服务业或农业实际上是相当小的。

It just doesn’t account for the success we had during this period.

它只是不能解释我们在此期间取得的成功。

Yes, you can build up your manufacturing sector, but if it’s a low-productivity sector or it’s not going to be very dynamic, it’s not going to enhance national income.

是的，你可以建立制造业，但如果它是一个生产率低下的部门，或者它不会很有活力，它就不会提高国民收入。

We live in this funny bubble of a world where there has not been a major war anytime lately.

我们生活在一个有趣的泡沫世界中，最近没有发生过重大战争。

If you were, say, Japan, you’re a vulnerable island.

比如说，如果你是日本，那么你就是一个脆弱的岛屿。

You actually can’t grow a lot of your own food.

事实上，你无法自己种植大量食物。

You’re easily blockaded.

你很容易被封锁。

If the Japanese have some tariffs on, say, rice, beef, and other items, it may in most years look like it makes no sense whatsoever.

如果日本对大米、牛肉和其他商品征收一些关税，那么在大多数情况下，这可能看起来毫无意义。

But the long-term payoff of keeping some autonomy in their own production of foodstuffs will make it worthwhile sooner or later and give them more leverage in foreign policy.

但在自己的食品生产中保持一定的自主权的长期回报迟早会变得值得，并让他们在外交政策中拥有更多的影响力。

True or false?

是真是假？

Then the question becomes, if that’s really a security worry, what’s the best way of promoting agriculture?

那么问题就变成了，如果这确实是一个安全担忧，那么促进农业发展的最佳方式是什么？

First of all, is rice protection really going to help them out if there’s some sort of major conflagration?

首先，如果发生某种重大火灾，大米保护真的能帮助他们摆脱困境吗？

Probably not.

可能不会。

It’s a societal choice in some sense.

从某种意义上说，这是一种社会选择。

If they want to sacrifice x percent of national income for 50 or 100 years for this — what I would think would be a relatively low-probability event — who’s to say that they’ve made a wrong choice?

如果他们想在 50 年或 100 年里牺牲国民收入的 x%（我认为这是一个相对低概率的事件），谁能说他们做出了错误的选择？

Therefore for cultural reasons, it’s often a good thing to allow more tariffs and quotas on, say, movies, television programs, linguistically designated products, possibly national heritage items that a lot of our free trade agreements allow.

因此，出于文化原因，允许对电影、电视节目、语言指定产品（可能还有我们许多自由贸易协定允许的国家遗产项目）征收更多关税和配额通常是一件好事。

What’s your view?

你的看法是什么？

Actually, I’m surprised you’re asking me that because you’ve written about the cultural diversity that you get with openness in free trade and that if you limit the ability of domestic consumers to watch foreign movies, and taste foreign food, and import foreign art, you’re losing something as a result of that.

事实上，我很惊讶你问我这个问题，因为你写过自由贸易开放带来的文化多样性，如果你限制国内消费者观看外国电影、品尝外国食物和进口外国艺术品的能力，你就会因此而失去一些东西。

So I’m not sure many countries could become this sort of net exporter of cultural products the way South Korea has.

因此，我不确定是否有很多国家能够像韩国那样成为这种文化产品的净出口国。

The population of Iceland, I think it’s about 400,000.

冰岛的人口，我认为大约有40万。

So many tourists are coming, Iceland is wondering if its own culture isn’t being overwhelmed by tourists.

如此多的游客涌入，冰岛想知道自己的文化是否没有被游客淹没。

They fear the Icelandic language will go away and that somehow the natural heritage of Iceland, or even some of the cultural aspects, are being ruined.

他们担心冰岛语言会消失，冰岛的自然遗产，甚至某些文化，都会被破坏。

In your view, can there be too much tourism?

您认为旅游业会不会太多？

And is there an appropriate policy response?

是否有适当的政策回应？

You might, believe it or not, start electing rather strange candidates, or perhaps start opposing the Chinese government in nonproductive ways.

不管你信不信，你可能会开始选举相当奇怪的候选人，或者可能开始以非生产性的方式反对中国政府。

Therefore trade policy really should be governed by making sure everyone has a good enough job.

因此，贸易政策确实应该通过确保每个人都有足够好的工作来管理。

China has done this through a rather extreme mercantilism.

中国是通过相当极端的重商主义做到这一点的。

Some people would say Germany has done it by its role in the Euro system, which gives it a currency which has arguably a permanently low value relative to German productivity.

有些人会说，德国通过其在欧元体系中的角色做到了这一点，欧元体系赋予德国的货币相对于德国生产力来说可以说永远处于较低的价值。

Do you think there’s much to this argument?

你认为这个论点有很多道理吗？

In fact, there’s sort of a theme through all of your little exceptions that you’re throwing at me — which I enjoy very much — in that the case for free trade has never been the case for laissez-faire.

事实上，你向我提出的所有小例外都有一个主题——我非常喜欢——自由贸易从来都不是自由放任的情况。

There may be cases for intervention, either overuse of certain tourist sites or you need a certain industry or sector for national security.

可能存在干预的情况，要么过度使用某些旅游景点，要么出于国家安全需要某个行业或部门。

These don’t necessitate an intervention in trade.

这些不需要干预贸易。

You don’t need tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, things of that sort.

你不需要关税、配额、出口补贴之类的东西。

There are other domestic policies that can more efficiently and more directly address the situation you’re trying to deal with.

还有其他国内政策可以更有效、更直接地解决您正在尝试处理的情况。

“The case for free trade has never been the case for laissez-faire.

“自由贸易从来都不是自由放任的情况。

There may be cases for intervention, either overuse of certain tourist sites or you need a certain industry or sector for national security.

可能存在干预的情况，要么过度使用某些旅游景点，要么出于国家安全需要某个行业或部门。

These don’t necessitate an intervention in trade.

这些不需要干预贸易。

You don’t need tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, things of that sort.

你不需要关税、配额、出口补贴之类的东西。

There are other domestic policies that can more efficiently and more directly address the situation you’re trying to deal with.”

还有其他国内政策可以更有效、更直接地解决你正在努力应对的情况。”

Regulatory standardization often lowers the cost of trade, but it also tends to bring, in many cases, more regulation.

监管标准化通常会降低贸易成本，但在许多情况下也往往会带来更多监管。

We live in this funny world where more free trade or semi-free trade and more regulation, albeit better regulation, come together.

我们生活在一个有趣的世界，更多的自由贸易或半自由贸易和更多的监管（尽管是更好的监管）结合在一起。

If you’re skeptical about there being more regulation, as I often am, but you’re favorable toward more free trade, you’re not sure always how to feel about these new trade agreements.

如果你像我一样对加强监管持怀疑态度，但你赞成更多的自由贸易，那么你总是不确定如何看待这些新的贸易协定。

Do you think the future inevitably is one where what we’re calling free trade agreement actually, on average, will be bringing, on net, more regulation to the economies they’re covering?

您是否认为未来不可避免地会出现这样的情况：我们所谓的自由贸易协定实际上平均而言会为其所覆盖的经济体带来更多的净监管？

But if you look at the big trade agreements — Trans-Pacific Partnership was this — if the US and the EU ever reach a trade agreement, there’s going to be a lot of regulatory provisions.

但如果你看看大型贸易协定——跨太平洋伙伴关系协定——如果美国和欧盟达成贸易协定，就会有很多监管条款。

Once again, I share also your view that this could go either way.

我再次同意您的观点，即这两种情况都可能发生。

One of the things that at least US trade negotiators say is that there’s a lot of regulatory protectionism out there.

至少美国贸易谈判代表所说的一件事是，存在很多监管保护主义。

This is a way of not necessarily even setting standards, but ensuring that there’s a mechanism to ensure that other governments are not tweaking their standards to favor domestic firms or to serve some special interest.

这是一种不一定要制定标准的方式，但要确保有一种机制来确保其他政府不会调整其标准来支持国内企业或服务于某些特殊利益。

Yes, it could lead to more regulations.

是的，这可能会导致更多的监管。

It could lead to standards that maybe developing countries can’t adhere to, so it has that downside.

它可能会导致发展中国家可能无法遵守的标准，因此它有这个缺点。

But it also could, not clear the decks of regulation, but prevent regulatory protectionism, which that’s a possibility as well.

但它也可以，虽然不能清除监管障碍，但可以防止监管保护主义，这也是一种可能性。

The possible conflicts between these panels and what some would say is democracy or some would say is constitutionalism — (a) to what extent does that worry you?

这些小组与有些人所说的民主或有些人所说的宪政之间可能存在的冲突——(a)这在多大程度上让你担心？

And (b), in general, do you want to see ISDS in the trade agreements we’re writing or do you feel it’s somehow gone too far?

(b) 总的来说，您是否希望在我们正在编写的贸易协定中看到 ISDS，或者您是否觉得它有点太过分了？

But I do think, on the other side, the progressive Left if you will, there’s a lot of ISDS horror stories about how it undermines democracy, it’s a terrible thing, and the US is foisting this on the international system, and other countries don’t want it.

但我确实认为，另一方面，进步的左派，如果你愿意的话，有很多 ISDS 恐怖故事，讲述它如何破坏民主，这是一件可怕的事情，美国正在将其强加于国际体系，而其他国家不希望如此。

But, in fact, it turns out a lot of developing countries insist that this is in.

但事实上，许多发展中国家坚持认为这是正确的。

Mexico just recently asked for this in, I believe, a new agreement with the EU or Canada.

我相信，墨西哥最近在与欧盟或加拿大达成的新协议中提出了这一要求。

I can’t recall where I read it.

我不记得在哪里读过它。

The reason why developing countries want it is because it’s a way of ensuring that they can commit themselves to treating foreign investors fairly.

发展中国家之所以想要它，是因为这是确保它们能够承诺公平对待外国投资者的一种方式。

They want to attract foreign investment, and they maybe don’t necessarily want ISDS, but they’re willing to go in for it.

他们想要吸引外国投资，他们可能不一定想要 ISDS，但他们愿意参与其中。

They ask for it because it’s a commitment device.

他们要求它，因为这是一种承诺手段。

Let’s see, I was reading also Canada and the EU, I think, their recent CETA, their agreement, also has ISDS.

让我们看看，我还阅读了加拿大和欧盟，我认为他们最近的 CETA，他们的协议，也有 ISDS。

Once again, it’s not something the US was pushing.

再说一遍，这不是美国推动的事情。

Many in Europe are very much opposed to these things, but it got in there for various reasons.

欧洲许多人都非常反对这些事情，但它却因为各种原因而出现。

Australia’s already a pretty open market.

澳大利亚已经是一个相当开放的市场。

Vietnam could be a big winner in the sense of getting a little bit more market access, but also liberalizing their own tariffs and quotas that they’d be forced to do.

越南可能是一个大赢家，不仅可以获得更多的市场准入，而且还放宽了自己被迫实行的关税和配额。

Their liberalization within the context of a TPP is good for them, and to the extent that they institutionalize this as a trade regime, they may attract even more foreign investment.

它们在 TPP 背景下的自由化对它们有利，而且如果它们将其制度化为贸易制度，它们可能会吸引更多的外国投资。

Certainly, we’ve seen when Mexico and other countries reach a lot of foreign trade agreements, they can become expert platforms and attract investment.

当然，我们看到，当墨西哥和其他国家达成很多外贸协议时，它们可以成为专家平台并吸引投资。

As I mentioned, this is not something that the nefarious United States is foisting upon unsuspecting other countries.

正如我所提到的，这并不是邪恶的美国强加给毫无戒心的其他国家的东西。

Other countries sometimes want this as a way of saying, “Look, maybe you don’t trust our judicial regime, but we’ll do this as a way of promoting investment.” Once again, with Canada and the EU, no one doesn’t trust their judicial regimes, but still somehow those two countries — very progressive — wanted ISDS in their agreement.

其他国家有时希望以此表达：“听着，也许你不信任我们的司法制度，但我们将这样做作为促进投资的一种方式。”再一次，对于加拿大和欧盟，没有人不信任他们的司法制度，但不知何故，这两个非常进步的国家仍然希望在他们的协议中加入 ISDS。

Certainly, when you read the memoirs of statesmen of the mid-20th century, they definitely saw that, Cordell Hull being the leading example, who’s the US secretary of state from 1933 until 1944 or ’45.

当然，当你阅读 20 世纪中叶政治家的回忆录时，他们肯定会看到这一点，科德尔·赫尔就是一个典型的例子，他从 1933 年到 1944 年或 45 年担任美国国务卿。

And he wasn’t alone.

他并不孤单。

A lot of economists, Jacob Viner and others, also saw that connection because when you had either trade protectionism or imperialism closing off markets, it led to the scramble for Africa or something like that.

许多经济学家，雅各布·维纳和其他人也看到了这种联系，因为当贸易保护主义或帝国主义关闭市场时，就会导致对非洲的争夺或类似的情况。

Instead of trading these resources freely, you had territorial acquisition as being the counterbalancing of that.

你不是自由地交易这些资源，而是通过获取领土来平衡这些资源。

What’s interesting is, just as economists have done a lot of empirical work on the benefits and costs of trade, political scientists have done a lot of work on this.

有趣的是，正如经济学家对贸易的收益和成本做了大量的实证工作一样，政治学家也对此做了大量的工作。

The empirical work is not quite up, I think, to the standards of what economists have done in terms of the economic phenomena, but partly it’s because it’s very difficult to quantify, first of all, what constitutes peace, how you operationalize this, what constitutes a trade agreement.

我认为，实证研究还没有完全达到经济学家在经济现象方面所做的工作的标准，但部分原因是很难量化，首先，什么构成和平，如何实施和平，什么构成贸易协定。

Trade is endogenous in many respects, so if there’s a lot of trade, what exactly is the consequence of that?

贸易在很多方面都是内生的，所以如果有大量的贸易，到底会产生什么后果呢？

What’s the exogenous variation where more trade leads to more peace?

更多贸易带来更多和平的外生变化是什么？

You’d like to see something like that.

你想看到类似的东西。

I’m not sure we have really hard social science evidence on it, but I think it’s a factor that we economists often overlook.

我不确定我们是否有真正确凿的社会科学证据，但我认为这是我们经济学家经常忽视的一个因素。

A lot of trade policy debates are foreign policy driven, and it’s not something we should really neglect.

许多贸易政策辩论都是由外交政策驱动的，我们不应该真正忽视这一点。

If you look today, it seems something has changed.

如果你今天再看，似乎有些事情发生了变化。

China is our largest trading partner, but many observers of foreign affairs would argue that the relationship between US and China has some reasonable chance of leading to foreign conflict.

中国是我们最大的贸易伙伴，但许多外交观察家认为，中美关系有可能导致外国冲突。

So something has changed in the structure of the equilibrium where now nations that trade a fair amount might fairly readily go to war relative to what we used to suspect.

因此，均衡结构发生了一些变化，与我们过去的怀疑相比，现在贸易量相当大的国家可能很容易发动战争。

Of course, there is a McDonald’s in Moscow.

当然，莫斯科有一家麦当劳。

There’s probably quite a few.

可能有不少。

People in Moscow eat sushi.

莫斯科人吃寿司。

They consume all kinds of American popular culture, if only downloaded illegally on the internet.

他们消费各种美国流行文化，哪怕只是在互联网上非法下载。

What do you think has changed in the structure of the problem to have made the free trade–peace connection possibly now so weak?

您认为问题的结构发生了什么变化，导致自由贸易与和平的联系现在可能如此薄弱？

This goes back to Norman Angell’s point.

这又回到了诺曼·安吉尔的观点。

Of course he’s widely misinterpreted from saying, “We won’t see wars in the future because of increased trade.” He didn’t say that.

当然，他说“由于贸易增加，未来我们不会看到战争”，这句话被广泛误解。他没有这么说。

He said it changed the cost-benefit calculation.

他说这改变了成本效益的计算。

I think it may have for China.

我认为对于中国来说可能是这样。

Just recently, watching the Ken Burns Vietnam series on PBS, there were a lot of wars in Southeast Asia beyond the Vietnamese War.

就在最近，在看 PBS 的 Ken Burns 越南系列节目时，除了越南战争之外，东南亚还发生了很多战争。

China invaded Vietnam.

中国入侵越南。

Vietnam invaded Cambodia.

越南入侵柬埔寨。

I’m not sure that that sort of local conflict .

我不确定那种局部冲突。

.

。

.

。

I don’t think it’s more likely, given the tremendous amount of commerce that’s going on and the perceived need of the governments to justify themselves by saying, “We’re providing an adequate standard of living for our people.”

考虑到正在进行的大量商业活动以及政府认为需要通过说“我们正在为我们的人民提供适当的生活水平”来证明自己的合理性，我认为这种可能性不大。

This is a question that economists raised after World War II, as well.

这也是二战后经济学家提出的一个问题。

A great trade economist such as Jacob Viner saying, “Can we really integrate the Communists and the non-Communist worlds in a trading system?” Turns out the answer was no.

雅各布·维纳（Jacob Viner）等伟大的贸易经济学家曾说过：“我们真的能将共产主义世界和非共产主义世界整合到一个贸易体系中吗？”事实证明答案是否定的。

“This is a question that economists raised after World War II, as well.

“这也是二战后经济学家提出的一个问题。

“Can we really integrate the Communists and the non-Communist worlds in a trading system?” Turns out the answer was no.”

“我们真的能将共产主义世界和非共产主义世界整合到一个贸易体系中吗？”结果发现答案是否定的。”

I guess my worry with China is, the more they push it, and they are pushing the envelope in terms of the rules of trade as we in the West see them, in terms of limited government support for firms, and things of that sort, they’re pushing things.

我想我对中国的担忧是，他们越是推动它，他们在贸易规则方面挑战极限，正如我们在西方所看到的那样，在政府对企业的有限支持方面，他们正在推动事情。

I think that we could be moving in a direction where there will be more trade conflict, even set aside Trump and all that sort of thing.

我认为我们可能会朝着出现更多贸易冲突的方向发展，即使抛开特朗普之类的事情也是如此。

Just from the point of view of Chinese economic welfare, not global welfare, but China alone, are those economically rational decisions good for the Chinese economy?

仅仅从中国经济福利的角度来看，不是从全球福利的角度，而是从中国自身的角度来看，这些经济理性的决策对中国经济有利吗？

Scientists who need the research use a VPN.

需要研究的科学家使用 VPN。

They still access Google.

他们仍然访问谷歌。

But it seems there’s much more output within the Chinese economic nexus than if those decisions had not been taken.

但与不做出这些决定相比，中国经济关系中的产出似乎要多得多。

In addition, if you were able to attract Google and other apps to produce in China, you’re adding to local capabilities.

此外，如果你能够吸引谷歌和其他应用程序在中国生产，你就可以增强本地能力。

So, foreign ownership, I don’t think, is a particular problem.

因此，我认为外资所有权并不是一个特殊的问题。

We were more interested in exceptions for ourselves to block their textiles or have a special safeguard exception rather than making firm our insistence that China not get its fingers all over their own economy.

我们更感兴趣的是我们自己可以阻止他们的纺织品或拥有特殊保障例外的例外，而不是坚定地坚持中国不要插手自己的经济。

(a) How much do you believe that result?

(a) 您对这个结果的相信程度如何？

And (b), to the extent there’s something there, how well do you feel that result is being processed by the policy community and the policy discussion?

(b)，如果有的话，您认为政策界和政策讨论对结果的处理情况如何？

There’s a huge increase in the supply of labor to the market sector in China from the 1990s and into the 2000s.

从 20 世纪 90 年代到 2000 年代，中国市场部门的劳动力供应大幅增加。

Actually, I think we’re going to have some papers in the future about the negative China shock because the Chinese labor force is going to be shrinking.

事实上，我认为我们将来将会有一些关于中国负面冲击的论文，因为中国的劳动力将会萎缩。

So it was a very particular, unique period of economic history.

因此，这是经济史上一个非常特殊、独特的时期。

If you’re thinking about bringing in hundreds of millions of people in China into the market sector, and then you’re losing one million jobs in the United States over 10 years, that’s actually a pretty small impact on the United States.

如果你正在考虑将数亿中国人引入市场领域，然后你会在10年内失去美国100万个工作岗位，这实际上对美国的影响很小。

Now, impact is particularly hard on those communities where it’s a one-factory town or something like that.

现在，对于那些只有一家工厂的城镇或类似地区的社区来说，影响尤其严重。

They’re producing furniture or apparel.

他们正在生产家具或服装。

It’s clear that that had a negative impact there.

很明显，这在那里产生了负面影响。

But there’s also a macroeconomic context to what you have to think about in terms of the China shock.

但就中国冲击而言，你还必须考虑宏观经济背景。

I don’t worry about the 1990s so much because we had a robust, growing economy then, and actually there’s some evidence that workers who were displaced from the textile industry in the 1990s were actually getting higher wages outside.

我不太担心 20 世纪 90 年代，因为当时我们的经济强劲且不断增长，而且实际上有一些证据表明，20 世纪 90 年代从纺织行业失业的工人实际上在外面获得了更高的工资。

But the 2000s is a very different situation.

但2000年代的情况却截然不同。

Even though the aggregate unemployment rate was coming down in the 2000s, the Fed was tightening.

尽管2000年代总体失业率有所下降，但美联储仍在紧缩政策。

The China shock was not a macroeconomic shock, not an aggregate demand shock in a sort of Scott Sumner point of view.

从斯科特·萨姆纳的角度来看，中国冲击不是宏观经济冲击，也不是总需求冲击。

Certain communities were hurt, but this is also a period where we had 10 percent of Chinese current account surplus and a big US current account deficit.

某些社区受到了伤害，但这也是我们拥有中国10%经常账户盈余和美国经常账户巨额赤字的时期。

So I think the problem during the 2000s was, the economy wasn’t particularly robust.

所以我认为 2000 年代的问题是，经济并不是特别强劲。

We had these big macroeconomic imbalances, which you have to understand the context during that period.

我们经历了巨大的宏观经济失衡，你必须了解那个时期的背景。

If, for example, US export growth to China had been matched or matched our import growth from China, we probably wouldn’t be having this debate.

例如，如果美国对中国的出口增长与我们从中国的进口增长相匹配，我们可能就不会进行这场辩论。

There would have been a China shock, but we’d have said, “Boy, there are a lot of alternatives elsewhere.”

中国可能会受到冲击，但我们会说，“天哪，其他地方还有很多选择。”

Yes, we were getting capital inflows and had lower interest rates because of the inflows of capital from China, but people don’t see that as much and think maybe it propped up the housing bubble and shifted resources into housing.

是的，由于来自中国的资本流入，我们得到了资本流入，利率也降低了，但人们并没有看到这一点，并认为这可能支撑了房地产泡沫，并将资源转移到房地产领域。

It’s history.

这是历史。

It happened.

它发生了。

It doesn’t cause me to rethink the case for free trade in any way.

这不会让我以任何方式重新思考自由贸易的理由。

We’ve always known there are adjustment costs.

我们一直都知道存在调整成本。

We’ve always known certain communities are going to be hurt.

我们一直都知道某些社区会受到伤害。

But I do think we can exaggerate how important that was in terms of where the US economy is today.

但我确实认为我们可以夸大这对美国经济今天的地位有多重要。

We’ve gotten more quote, unquote “investment” from that capital, but we get it in an area that’s a bit of a lemon in productivity terms.

我们从该资本中得到了更多的报价，不加报价的“投资”，但我们得到的领域在生产力方面有点柠檬。

Therefore Ed thinks trade with China hasn’t been a good deal necessarily at some margins.

因此，埃德认为，在某些方面，与中国的贸易不一定是一笔好交易。

What’s your take on that?

您对此有何看法？

For example, Smoot-Hawley, which actually should be called the Hawley-Smoot Tariff because it’s always House first and then the Senate, but the official name of that is the Tariff Act of 1930.

例如，《Smoot-Hawley》，实际上应该称为《Hawley-Smoot Tariff》，因为它总是先众议院，然后参议院，但其正式名称是 1930 年关税法案。

Either the press or the members of Congress themselves introduce the moniker to give it a little bit more cachet.

媒体或国会议员自己引入这个绰号是为了赋予它更多的声望。

But since Smoot-Hawley, all of the trade acts are not really about tariffs per se.

但自《斯穆特霍利法案》以来，所有的贸易行为实际上都与关税本身无关。

They’re about trade negotiating authority.

它们与贸易谈判权威有关。

That’s maybe a little less interesting, and so we have the Trade Expansion Act of 1973, the Trade Act of 1974.

这可能就没那么有趣了，所以我们有了 1973 年贸易扩张法案和 1974 年贸易法案。

It’s not really like there’s one or two key people on key committees who are saying, “I’m setting tariff rates here,” like a tax bill or something like that.

关键委员会中并没有一两个关键人物说，“我在这里设定关税税率”，比如税收法案或类似的东西。

I guess because they’re less interesting in that sense, they don’t get named.

我想因为从这个意义上来说它们不太有趣，所以没有被命名。

In those years leading up to the American Revolution, how high actually were trade barriers in real net-effective terms?

在美国革命前的那些年里，以实际净有效值计算，贸易壁垒实际上有多高？

Were we just a bunch of whiners?

我们只是一群抱怨者吗？

Or were these trade restrictions actually terrible?

或者这些贸易限制实际上很糟糕吗？

We wanted to have it both ways.

我们想两全其美。

We wanted Britain to underwrite our defense, but we didn’t want to have to pay for it.

我们希望英国承担我们的国防费用，但我们不想为此付费。

All the tax debates in the 1760s, we are a little bit of a whiner.

1760 年代所有的税收辩论，我们都有点抱怨。

In addition to the trade barriers, Britain was our natural trading partner anyway, and there are some commodities, such as tobacco, which were enumerated and had to go through Britain.

除了贸易壁垒之外，英国无论如何也是我们天然的贸易伙伴，还有一些商品，比如烟草，是被列举出来的，必须经过英国。

But when you look at the post-independence period, we don’t really shift away from Britain too much.

但当你回顾独立后时期时，你会发现我们并没有真正远离英国太多。

So I think the Navigation Acts have been exaggerated in popular history in terms of how much they were really constricting US commerce and harming the American economy.

因此，我认为《航海法案》在大众历史上被夸大了，因为它们实际上限制了美国商业并损害了美国经济。

We wanted our political independence.

我们想要政治独立。

We didn’t want taxation without representation.

我们不想在没有代表的情况下纳税。

We thought, long term, we’re very integrated with the British economy.

我们认为，从长远来看，我们与英国经济高度融合。

We should maintain that integration.

我们应该保持这种一体化。

There was this hope, and actually there’s some reason for the hope, after we had won the war, that Britain would be magnanimous, and we could maintain our trading status within the context of the British Empire.

有这样的希望，实际上也有理由希望，在我们赢得战争之后，英国会宽宏大量，我们能够在大英帝国的范围内维持我们的贸易地位。

But of course, the British didn’t see it that way.

但当然，英国人并不这么看。

They said, “OK, if you want your political independence, you’re going to get your economic independence as well.

他们说：“好吧，如果你想要政治独立，你也将获得经济独立。

All the privileges that you used to have, they’re out the window.

您曾经拥有的所有特权都已消失。

You’re now outside the British Empire.” I don’t think the Founding Fathers really anticipated that this would be the case, and they spent a lot of the 1780s trying to claw their way back into the British Empire and got absolutely no give from the British authorities.

你现在已经在大英帝国之外了。”我认为开国元勋们并没有真正预料到会出现这种情况，他们在 1780 年代花了很多时间试图重新回到大英帝国，却完全没有得到英国当局的任何帮助。

A lot of this had to do with the Constitution itself and the formation of the Constitution as a way of allowing 13 independent states to sort of band together and have negotiating authority against other powers, which we didn’t have during this period.

这在很大程度上与宪法本身以及宪法的形成有关，宪法是允许 13 个独立国家联合起来并拥有对抗其他权力的谈判权力的一种方式，而这是我们在这一时期所没有的。

So the Constitution is very much an outgrowth of US trade politics during this time.

因此，宪法在很大程度上是美国这一时期贸易政治的产物。

Revenue, of course, was another key consideration there since, under the Articles of Confederation, Congress couldn’t raise funds.

当然，收入是另一个关键考虑因素，因为根据《邦联条例》，国会无法筹集资金。

We had these big deficits, and the debts couldn’t be financed.

我们有巨额赤字，无法偿还债务。

So I think it was a Brexit gone badly.

所以我认为英国脱欧进展得很糟糕。

In fact, economic historians Jeff Williamson and Peter Lindert have a book just a couple years ago on American wealth over time.

事实上，经济历史学家杰夫·威廉姆森和彼得·林德特几年前出版了一本关于美国财富随时间变化的书。

And once again, the data are sketchy.

再次强调，数据是粗略的。

When you look at American wealth and income in 1776 or the early 1770s, and then you look at it in the 1790s, we’re basically, after 20 years or so, just getting back to where we were before.

当你看看 1776 年或 1770 年代初美国的财富和收入，然后再看看 1790 年代，你会发现，大约 20 年后，我们基本上回到了以前的水平。

A lot of people think this is possibly worse than the Great Depression in terms of the impact on the economic activity of the United States.

许多人认为，就对美国经济活动的影响而言，这可能比大萧条更严重。

It wasn’t just the revolution.

这不仅仅是一场革命。

The 1780s was not a good decade, partly because our trade had been so severely disrupted by being outside the British Empire.

1780 年代并不是一个美好的十年，部分原因是我们的贸易因远离大英帝国而受到严重干扰。

It’s anti–Adam Smith, in the sense that he doesn’t think that the invisible hand will lead to the right allocation of resources.

这是反亚当·斯密的，因为他认为看不见的手不会导致资源的正确分配。

It’s also an anti-physiocrat argument because, apparently, he was confronting, at the time, the argument that the wealth of nations is really based on agriculture, and manufacturing is not something we want to get into.

这也是一个反重农论的论点，因为显然，他当时面临的论点是，国家的财富实际上是基于农业，而制造业不是我们想要涉足的领域。

He said it’s actually useful for various reasons, not just defense, but possibly for productivity increases.

他说，它实际上出于多种原因有用，不仅仅是国防，还可能有助于提高生产率。

It’s producing useful things.

它正在生产有用的东西。

It’s an economic activity that we should want and not try to discourage.

这是我们应该想要而不是试图阻止的经济活动。

There are so many things to point out about that report.

这份报告有很多值得指出的地方。

The main thing is, when you look at his activities when he was Secretary of the Treasury, he did not want to keep out imports.

最主要的是，当你看看他担任财政部长时的活动时，你会发现他并不想阻止进口。

He wanted a constant flow, a large flow of imports coming in because that was his tax base.

他想要源源不断的进口，大量进口，因为那是他的税基。

He viewed the fiscal sustainability of the federal government as being much more important than any tinkering with trying to promote manufacturers here and there.

他认为联邦政府的财政可持续性比任何试图促进各地制造商的修补都重要得多。

He actually rejected proposals coming from the opposite party, Jefferson and Madison, to have embargoes against Britain or limits on trade because he wanted to finance the fiscal deficits, and he thought any sort of disruption to imports would upset those fiscal plans.

他实际上拒绝了反对党杰斐逊和麦迪逊提出的对英国禁运或限制贸易的提议，因为他想为财政赤字融资，而且他认为任何形式的进口中断都会扰乱这些财政计划。

In fact, he was so much against those plans that import-competing producers in Philadelphia and elsewhere began shifting their allegiance from the Federalists, who were thought to be in favor of a strong central government and promotion of manufacturing, to the Jeffersonian Republicans, who they saw as much more willing to impose pretty draconian restrictions on imports.

事实上，他非常反对这些计划，以至于费城和其他地方的进口竞争生产商开始将他们的忠诚从联邦党人（人们认为联邦党人支持强大的中央政府和促进制造业）转向杰斐逊共和党人，他们认为后者更愿意对进口施加相当严厉的限制。

You can either have higher tariffs or probably have higher excise taxes.

您可以征收更高的关税，也可能征收更高的消费税。

Or maybe there’s something else you’d like to put on the menu.

或者也许您还想在菜单上添加其他内容。

How do you think about that tradeoff?

您如何看待这种权衡？

What decision would you, as Rutherford B.

作为卢瑟福 B.

Hayes, have made?

海耶斯，做了吗？

The sugar tariff alone .

仅糖关税。

.

。

.

。

It’s in the book.

这是书上的。

I can’t remember off the top of my head.

我一时记不起。

The sugar tariff alone accounted for 25 percent of all revenue coming from the tariffs, maybe even more.

仅糖关税一项就占所有关税收入的 25%，甚至可能更多。

You could tax a few select commodities, have them as excise taxes.

您可以对一些精选商品征税，将其作为消费税。

That raises all the revenue that you need.

这会增加你需要的所有收入。

You don’t need heavy duties on steel rails and cotton textiles and things of that sort, which truly were protectionist duties.

你不需要对钢轨和棉纺织品之类的东西征收重税，这些确实是保护主义关税。

They didn’t raise much revenue.

他们没有筹集到太多收入。

They did block imports and helped out domestic interests that way.

他们确实阻止了进口，并以这种方式帮助了国内利益。

You may be able to find small gains from NAFTA.

您或许可以从北美自由贸易协定中获得一些小收益。

But it’s unclear what the payoff from NAFTA really has been.

但目前尚不清楚北美自由贸易协定的真正回报是什么。

If you look at the Mexican economy, there doesn’t appear to be convergence.

如果你看看墨西哥的经济，就会发现似乎并没有趋同。

They’re growing at a rate between two and two and a half percent.

它们的增长率在百分之二到百分之二半之间。

Looking backwards, what is your view of NAFTA?

回顾过去，您对 NAFTA 有何看法？

Did we, in some way, do the treaty wrong?

我们是否在某种程度上违反了条约？

Other than mere updating, how might you revise NAFTA today?

除了更新之外，您今天还会如何修改北美自由贸易协定？

“I spoke to one trade negotiator about this once.

“我曾经和一位贸易谈判代表谈过这个问题。

They said NAFTA is not a good trade agreement.

他们说北美自由贸易协定不是一个好的贸易协定。

NAFTA is an effing great trade agreement.

北美自由贸易协定是一项出色的贸易协定。

And I agree.”

我同意。”

What it did was solidify the US-Mexican relationship.

它的作用是巩固了美墨关系。

Here you’re appealing to foreign policy a little bit.

在这里你有点诉诸外交政策。

But also, you’re trying to undertake measures to strengthen the Mexican economy and have a long-term partnership.

而且，你们还试图采取措施加强墨西哥经济并建立长期合作伙伴关系。

I think it’s, on net, been very good for Mexico.

我认为这对墨西哥来说非常有利。

Once again, it hasn’t been perfect.

再说一次，它并不完美。

You recall that, within a year after NAFTA went into effect, they had a financial crisis.

您还记得，北美自由贸易协定生效后不到一年，他们就遭遇了金融危机。

They’ve had major banking and financial issues through the late 1990s into the 2000s.

从 20 世纪 90 年代末到 2000 年代，他们一直面临着重大的银行和金融问题。

Obviously NAFTA’s not a silver bullet, where it just makes the Mexican economy transformed into something great.

显然，北美自由贸易协定并不是灵丹妙药，它只是让墨西哥经济发生了巨大的转变。

There are a lot of still reforms that have to be done in Mexico, some of it macroeconomic, others not.

墨西哥还有许多改革需要进行，其中一些是宏观经济改革，另一些则不是。

But to say that we’d be better off without NAFTA, I don’t think either the United States or Mexico would be.

但如果说没有北美自由贸易协定我们会过得更好，我认为美国和墨西哥都不会。

Here’s where you get these nebulous things.

这就是你得到这些模糊的东西的地方。

John Stuart Mill talked about them, in terms of the benefits of trade.

约翰·斯图尔特·密尔 (John Stuart Mill) 从贸易的好处角度谈到了这些问题。

There is an attitudinal shift in Mexico, a much greater openness towards the world.

墨西哥的态度发生了转变，对世界更加开放。

That’s been all to the better.

这一切都变得更好了。

We’ve seen the basically one-party state dissolve into a competitive democracy.

我们已经看到基本上的一党制国家逐渐演变成竞争性民主国家。

So I think NAFTA and the greater openness that it’s brought about have been very good for Mexico.

因此，我认为北美自由贸易协定及其带来的更大开放对墨西哥来说非常有利。

There is a resurgence of nationalism, populism, whatever you want to call it, in a number of nations, including our own.

在许多国家，包括我们自己的国家，民族主义、民粹主义，无论你怎么称呼它，都在复苏。

Is there indeed a future for the WTO?

世贸组织真的有未来吗？

It’s been over 20 years since they have reached any major, multilateral agreement.

距离他们达成任何重大多边协议已经过去了 20 多年。

The argument among economists has been “Well OK, it’s not so great.

经济学家之间的争论是“好吧，情况不太好。

People are bypassing it in terms of trade negotiations, but it’s great because of the dispute settlement system.”

人们在贸易谈判方面绕过它，但由于争端解决系统，它很棒。”

But now we see the Trump administration saying, “We don’t like this dispute settlement system.” If the US undermines that, it’s really not clear what role the WTO would have.

但现在我们看到特朗普政府表示，“我们不喜欢这种争端解决制度。”如果美国破坏这一点，世贸组织将发挥什么作用还不清楚。

It wouldn’t be an efficient forum for trade negotiations, and it wouldn’t have an effective dispute settlement system if the US blows it up or walks away from it or something like that.

它不会是一个有效的贸易谈判论坛，如果美国毁掉它或退出它或类似的事情，它也不会有有效的争端解决体系。

Part of the problem with the WTO, at least in terms of negotiations, has been something that Canada identified, way back in the 1940s, which I think is in the book.

世贸组织的部分问题，至少在谈判方面，是加拿大早在 20 世纪 40 年代就发现的问题，我认为这在书中有所体现。

After World War II, we were going to set up a big multilateral organization called the ITO, the International Trade Organization.

第二次世界大战后，我们打算建立一个大型多边组织，称为ITO，即国际贸易组织。

At some point, as we were moving in this direction, Canada snuck up to the US negotiators and whispered in their ear, “You know what?

在某个时刻，当我们朝这个方向前进时，加拿大偷偷走到美国谈判代表身边，在他们耳边低声说道：“你知道吗？

It may not be a good idea to get every country talking about these things because not everyone’s on the same page.”

让每个国家都谈论这些事情可能不是一个好主意，因为并非每个人都达成共识。”

In particular, they pointed out India and Brazil and a few others, which they called the more protectionist-minded countries of the era.

他们特别指出了印度和巴西以及其他一些国家，他们称这些国家是这个时代更具保护主义思想的国家。

That’s why we went ahead with the GATT, which is a smaller, nuclear club of like-minded countries to liberalize trade, and the ITO actually never came into being.

这就是为什么我们继续建立关贸总协定（GATT），这是一个由志同道合的国家组成的较小的核心俱乐部，旨在实现贸易自由化，而 ITO 实际上从未成立。

But when we shifted from the GATT to the WTO, in 1995, we brought everyone into the room.

但 1995 年，当我们从关贸总协定转向世贸组织时，我们把所有人都带进了房间。

Now it has 160 members or something like that.

现在它有 160 名成员或类似的数量。

It operates by consensus, meaning it’s the lowest-common-denominator negotiating forum.

它以协商一致方式运作，这意味着它是最低公分母的谈判论坛。

Everyone has to agree.

每个人都必须同意。

The former director general of the WTO once said it’s like a car with one accelerator and 150 hand brakes.

世界贸易组织前总干事曾说过，这就像一辆有一个油门和150个手刹的汽车。

Any country, not quite, but almost any country can step on the brakes and stop the process.

任何国家，不完全是，但几乎任何国家都可以踩刹车并阻止这一进程。

The question is, is this a way to go forward?

问题是，这是前进的道路吗？

What you’ve seen is countries just bypassing it.

你所看到的是一些国家只是绕过它。

They’ve gone to regional, bilateral, or even sectoral sorts of agreements to avoid the whole mass of countries trying to agree on one common trade policy for everyone.

他们达成了区域、双边甚至部门类型的协议，以避免众多国家试图就一项适用于所有人的共同贸易政策达成一致。

There’s USTR.

有美国贸易代表办公室。

There’s the State Department.

有国务院。

There’s the Department of Commerce.

有商务部。

There’s OPIC.

有海外私人投资公司。

There’s a lot of different layers at which we address trade.

我们在很多不同的层面上处理贸易问题。

Should we just consolidate those into a big, supposedly consistent Department of Trade?

我们是否应该将这些部门合并为一个庞大的、据称一致的贸易部？

Or do you prefer the sprawling mess?

或者你更喜欢杂乱无章的情况？

“COWEN: There’s USTR.

“COWEN：有美国贸易代表办公室。

There’s the State Department.

有国务院。

There’s the Department of Commerce.

有商务部。

There’s OPIC.

有海外私人投资公司。

There’s a lot of different layers at which we address trade.

我们在很多不同的层面上处理贸易问题。

Should we just consolidate those into a big, supposedly consistent Department of Trade?

我们是否应该将这些部门合并为一个庞大的、据称一致的贸易部？

Or do you prefer the sprawling mess?

或者你更喜欢杂乱无章的情况？

The problem is, if you centralize .

问题是，如果你集中化。

.

。

.

。

There have been many proposals over the years, particularly in the 1980s, when we needed a MITI, just like Japan had — one negotiating arm that would do everything in industrial policy.

多年来，人们提出了很多建议，特别是在 20 世纪 80 年代，当时我们需要一个通产省，就像日本那样——一个可以在产业政策方面做一切事情的谈判机构。

You centralize power.

你集中权力。

Whenever you centralize power, it will do things that we don’t necessarily want it to do.

每当你集中权力时，它就会做我们不一定希望它做的事情。

That’s the way the process works.

这就是这个过程的运作方式。

You cannot, unilaterally, decide to raise these things by yourself.

这些东西你不能单方面决定自己提出来。

You have to wait for them to come to you, and they are coming.

你必须等待他们来找你，他们就来了。

Just be patient.

请耐心等待。

Of course, he’s not very patient.

当然，他也不是很有耐心。

We’ll see.

我们会看到的。

Other people, like Bob Zoellick, whose judgment I respect greatly, a very smart guy — he seems to think Trump could do a lot of damage in the trade realm.

其他人，比如鲍勃·佐利克（Bob Zoellick），我非常尊重他的判断，他是一个非常聪明的人——他似乎认为特朗普可能会在贸易领域造成很大损害。

Where do you stand on the spectrum of views?

您对各种观点持什么立场？

Wilbur Ross and the Department of Commerce, they’ve encouraged higher steel tariffs, in some guise, under national security, what have you.

威尔伯·罗斯和商务部，他们以某种形式鼓励提高钢铁关税，以国家安全为由，你有什么。

That report has been delayed — delayed and delayed and delayed.

该报告被推迟了——推迟、推迟、再推迟。

The reason is because there are other agencies that can weigh in, other constituencies that can weigh in and say this isn’t good for diplomatic reasons, for national security reasons, for downstream user reasons, or something like that.

原因是因为还有其他机构可以介入，其他选民可以介入并说这出于外交原因、国家安全原因、下游用户原因或类似原因而不好。

So you see the administration divided.

所以你会看到政府分裂。

The reflex can’t be activated because there are all these other parties that are getting their voice heard.

这种反射无法被激活，因为所有其他各方都在发出自己的声音。

Whereas, if you did centralize things, it might be very easy for that centralized authority to say, “This is what we’re going to do.

然而，如果你确实将事情集中化，那么中央集权机构可能很容易说：“这就是我们要做的。

It doesn’t matter if there are voices to the negative.

即使有反对的声音也没关系。

We just won’t listen to them.”

我们只是不会听他们的。”

I think you are referring to Bob’s Zoellick’s Wall Street Journal article of not too long ago.

我想你指的是鲍勃不久前佐利克在《华尔街日报》上发表的文章。

The damage is not so much in particular actions because we really haven’t seen many actions, except for pulling out of TPP, which, arguably, Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders would have done as well.

特定行动造成的损害并不大，因为除了退出 TPP 之外，我们确实没有看到太多行动，可以说希拉里·克林顿或伯尼·桑德斯也会这么做。

We haven’t seen the trade cases come to the president’s desk and higher tariffs being imposed or quotas or what have you.

我们还没有看到贸易案件被提交到总统的办公桌上，也没有看到征收更高的关税或配额之类的东西。

The damage is more the rhetoric in some sense.

从某种意义上说，伤害更多的是言辞。

You’re alienating South Korea, an ally, during a very tense time.

在非常紧张的时期，你正在疏远韩国这个盟友。

You’re getting the Mexicans to actually think about, “Gee, we could live without NAFTA.

你会让墨西哥人真正思考，“哎呀，没有北美自由贸易协定我们也能生活。

We could stick it to the Americans like we used to in the past, instead of thinking about them as a partner because we’ve got all these other free trade agreements with the EU.

我们可以像过去那样把它留给美国人，而不是把他们视为合作伙伴，因为我们与欧盟签订了所有其他自由贸易协定。

We’d keep the one with Canada.

我们会把那一份留给加拿大。

We could keep TPP.”

我们可以保留TPP。”

There’s no gain to the US from that.

美国从中没有任何好处。

We lose market access, in terms of exports, if we’re discriminated against.

如果我们受到歧视，我们就会在出口方面失去市场准入。

There is this deterioration and this rot that can set in.

可能会出现这种恶化和腐烂。

Underrated or overrated?

被低估还是被高估？

Brexit.

英国脱欧。

Then you lose the middle ground.

然后你就失去了中间立场。

The weight of the evidence, in my view, is that Britain would lose some of its market access to Western Europe.

在我看来，最有力的证据是英国将失去西欧的部分市场准入。

They’re going to lose some of their financial sector.

他们将失去一些金融部门。

And it’s not clear what they gain in terms of sovereignty, or regulatory freedom, is going to compensate for that loss of trade and investment.

目前尚不清楚他们在主权或监管自由方面获得的利益能否弥补贸易和投资的损失。

It used to be the reflex that a trade economist would bring about, saying disaster will happen if we impose this tariff.

这曾经是贸易经济学家的本能反应，表示如果我们征收关税，就会发生灾难。

To that extent, the dirty little secret might be that it’s overrated because it didn’t cause the Great Depression.

从这个意义上说，肮脏的小秘密可能是它被高估了，因为它并没有导致大萧条。

A lot of the weight that was put on it doesn’t support that.

施加在其上的很多重量并不支持这一点。

That said, it was a very bad thing.

也就是说，这是一件非常糟糕的事情。

It’s a very beautiful place.

这是一个非常美丽的地方。

It’s got the highest per capita income in the United States.

它的人均收入是美国最高的。

It’s a little bit isolated.

有点偏僻。

The winters are cold.

冬天很冷。

I worry a little about — in fact, a lot of economists in the state worry about the demographics and the business climate.

我有点担心——事实上，该州的许多经济学家都担心人口统计和商业环境。

A lot of young people are not being attracted to the state.

许多年轻人没有被这个国家所吸引。

The business climate is not as favorable as we, in the state, like to think.

该州的商业环境并不像我们想象的那么有利。

We say, “We have no income tax.

我们说：“我们没有所得税。

We have no sales tax.

我们没有销售税。

We want businesses to come here.” But the business taxes are more of a hurdle than one would think.

我们希望企业来到这里。”但营业税的障碍比人们想象的还要大。

I’m not sure exactly what New Hampshire’s big claim to fame is.

我不确定新罕布什尔州的名气到底是什么。

It’s an older state.

这是一个较古老的州。

Maybe that’s why it’s a high-income state.

也许这就是它成为高收入国家的原因。

In the Hanover area, you’ve got a lot of doctors and things of that sort or retirees.

在汉诺威地区，有很多医生和类似的人或退休人员。

I was very excited.

我很兴奋。

He was going to give a talk to people in the administration.

他打算向政府人员发表演讲。

There was some room in the Old Executive Office Building where he was going to be speaking.

旧行政办公楼里有一个房间，他将在那里发表讲话。

I made sure to get there very early and to get a good seat right out front, so I could see him.

我确保很早就到了那里，并在前面找到了一个好座位，这样我就可以看到他。

So I sat literally in the front row, right in front of the podium, anxiously awaiting his arrival.

于是我坐在前排，就在讲台前，焦急地等待着他的到来。

He comes in.

他进来了。

The crowd fills in, but I’ve got the best seat.

人群挤满了人，但我占据了最好的座位。

Of course, he was standing behind the podium, and I didn’t see anything but the top of his head for the hour that he lectured because he’s so short that he didn’t poke over the podium.

当然，他站在讲台后面，在他演讲的一个小时里，我除了他的头顶什么也没看到，因为他太矮了，没有探过讲台。

I should have sat 10 rows back and I would have seen him.

我应该坐在后面 10 排，这样我就能看到他了。

I did get to speak with him afterwards, but during his talk, I didn’t see him at all.

后来我确实和他说话了，但在他说话的过程中，我根本没有看到他。

One, he made economics very fun.

第一，他让经济学变得非常有趣。

I don’t know whether you’ve ever talked to him, but he’s always telling jokes.

我不知道你是否和他说过话，但他总是讲笑话。

He’s a great raconteur.

他是一位出色的健谈者。

He has great stories.

他有很棒的故事。

He’s laughing a lot, and that came across in his class.

他经常笑，这在他的课堂上也很常见。

Economics is a fun activity.

经济学是一项有趣的活动。

It’s a fun discipline.

这是一门有趣的学科。

It’s not just sterile theory.

这不仅仅是枯燥的理论。

I try to bring that little bit of joy and levity to economics, the way I teach it and hopefully the way I write about it as well.

我试图给经济学带来一点快乐和轻松，我教授经济学的方式，希望也是我写经济学的方式。

The other thing I learned from him is marketing.

我从他身上学到的另一件事是营销。

This is back in the pre-internet era, pre-Twitter.

这又回到了前互联网时代、前推特时代。

We wrote a paper, when I was in graduate school.

当我在读研究生时，我们写了一篇论文。

Not only was there a paper, but he got a New York Times column that we were allowed to write for the business section out of it.

不仅有一篇论文，而且他还得到了《纽约时报》的一篇专栏，我们被允许为商业版块撰写专栏。

The Economist did a box on that article.

《经济学人》对那篇文章做了专栏。

He was a master at disseminating his work, not just to other academics, but to journalists, to public policy professionals, and things of that sort.

他是传播他的作品的大师，不仅向其他学者传播他的作品，还向记者、公共政策专业人士等传播他的作品。

That’s one thing that I’ve also internalized a bit as well.

这也是我也已经内化的一件事。

You just can’t write a paper, submit it to a working paper series, and then send it to journals.

你只是不能写一篇论文，将其提交到工作论文系列，然后将其发送给期刊。

You have to market it a little bit.

你必须对它进行一点营销。

That’s much easier today, in the age of Twitter, but back then, that was considered something very unusual.

在今天，在 Twitter 时代，这要容易得多，但在当时，这被认为是非常不寻常的事情。

You got this one-off, big effect of countries that had been relatively closed to world trade really reducing trade barriers significantly, and big boost to world trade growth as a result of that.

那些对世界贸易相对封闭的国家确实显着减少了贸易壁垒，从而产生了一次性的巨大影响，并因此大大推动了世界贸易增长。

That’s a one-off thing.

这是一次性的事情。

Once you’ve cut tariffs from 30 percent to 10 percent, or 5 percent, or something, if you further cut them, you’re just not going to get the growth and trade effects that you had before.

一旦你将关税从 30% 削减到 10%，或者 5%，或者其他什么，如果你进一步削减，你就不会获得以前的增长和贸易效应。

So I think it’s a one-off effect of many developing countries entering into world trade, sometimes for the first time in a big way.

所以我认为这是许多发展中国家进入世界贸易的一次性效应，有时是第一次大规模参与。

I’m not worried by the slowdown.

我并不担心经济放缓。

Obviously, the world economy’s slowed down.

显然，世界经济放缓了。

That’s one reason why.

这就是原因之一。

But we shouldn’t expect world trade to grow at two or three times the growth of world GDP in perpetuity.

但我们不应该期望世界贸易的增长永远是世界 GDP 增长的两到三倍。

We need a big reform moment in Africa.

我们非洲需要一个重大改革时刻。

I agree with you entirely that Africa’s the big chunk of the world where there are a lot of people, and they’re still very closed to trade.

我完全同意你的观点，非洲是世界上人口众多的一大块，而且他们的贸易仍然非常封闭。

They both have trade policies and bad infrastructure that greatly increase trade costs.

它们都有贸易政策和糟糕的基础设施，大大增加了贸易成本。

So if we’re going to see big growth in the future, you’d think that’s where it’s going to be.

因此，如果我们未来要看到巨大的增长，你会认为这就是它的发展方向。

But I don’t think we’re going to necessarily have a big reform moment in Africa where there’s a simultaneous opening up.

但我认为非洲不一定会在开放的同时出现重大改革时刻。

It could be more piecemeal.

它可能更加零散。

It could be more drawn out over time.

随着时间的推移，它可能会变得更加漫长。

That’s where the growth could occur.

这就是增长可能发生的地方。

I don’t think it’s going to be a big bang, like we saw in the 1990s.

我认为这不会像 20 世纪 90 年代那样发生大爆炸。

It seems location matters more than ever before, and yet there’s more trade.

位置似乎比以往任何时候都更加重要，但贸易量却在增加。

What’s the right way to think about that apparent paradox?

思考这个明显悖论的正确方法是什么？

How optimistic are you about future series of technological breakthroughs — analogous to containerization but for services — that will make them much easier to trade and give us a fairly rapid trade boom in services?

您对未来一系列技术突破（类似于集装箱化但针对服务）持乐观态度吗？这些技术突破将使服务贸易变得更加容易，并给我们带来相当快的服务贸易繁荣？

That’s why I think the WTO has actually — I wouldn’t say failed — but there is a GAATS, a General Agreement on Trade and Services.

这就是为什么我认为世贸组织实际上——我不会说失败——但有一个GAATS，即贸易和服务总协定。

It’s a pretty, in my view, empty agreement.

在我看来，这是一个漂亮的、空洞的协议。

It doesn’t have a lot of deep commitments.

它没有太多深刻的承诺。

It hasn’t stimulated a lot of growth in trade and services in my view.

在我看来，它并没有刺激贸易和服务业的大幅增长。

It has this vague language about nondiscrimination and what have you.

它有关于非歧视和你有什么的模糊语言。

Every service sector is different — airline services, banking services, insurance services.

每个服务行业都是不同的——航空服务、银行服务、保险服务。

So these have to be addressed, not within one technology or one agreement, but it’s more piecemeal.

因此，这些问题必须得到解决，不是在一项技术或一项协议内解决，而是更加零碎的解决。

So they may be stuck in a kind of permanent rut.

因此，他们可能会陷入一种永久的陈规之中。

They industrialize to the extent they do by buying things from factories elsewhere, and they won’t ever go the same path that parts of East Asia did.

他们通过从其他地方的工厂购买东西来实现工业化，而且他们永远不会走东亚部分地区的道路。

Agree or disagree?

同意还是不同意？

The same thing can happen in many developing countries.

同样的事情也可能发生在许多发展中国家。

You can have a local, small steel industry that’s efficient, same with other things.

你可以拥有一个高效的本地小型钢铁工业，与其他行业一样。

You can still have this fragmentation of production and local production and not necessarily have everything centralized in one or two countries.

生产和本地生产仍然可以是分散的，不一定所有东西都集中在一两个国家。

There are many testimonies of other people, who go there with leftist views, but they come out thinking something else.

有很多其他人的证言，他们带着左派观点去那里，但出来时却有不同的想法。

To have that intellectual or ideological conversion in the 1930s, during the Great Depression of all periods, there must have been something going on in the classroom that is convincing people that, despite the problems we see, socialism or communism is not the correct alternative.

为了在 20 世纪 30 年代、在所有时期的大萧条期间实现这种知识或意识形态的转变，课堂上一定发生了一些事情，让人们相信，尽管我们看到了这些问题，社会主义或共产主义并不是正确的选择。

I’ve always been interested in what was Frank Knight teaching, Henry Simons, Jacob Viner that convinced people that the market-oriented system, despite its defects, is the right way to go.

我一直对弗兰克·奈特（Frank Knight）、亨利·西蒙斯（Henry Simons）、雅各布·维纳（Jacob Viner）的教导很感兴趣，这些教导使人们相信，以市场为导向的体系尽管存在缺陷，但却是正确的道路。