David Commins on Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism, and the Future of the Gulf States (Ep. 254)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I’m chatting with David Commins.
今天，我正在与大卫·康明斯聊天。
David is one of the leading scholars on Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Wahhabism.
大卫是研究沙特阿拉伯、海湾国家和瓦哈比主义的顶尖学者之一。
He has a new book out, which I enjoyed very much and learned a lot from.
他出版了一本新书，我非常喜欢这本书，并从中学到了很多东西。
It’s called, Saudi Arabia: A Modern History.
这本书的名字叫《沙特阿拉伯：现代史》。
David, welcome.
大卫，欢迎。
Thank you.
谢谢。
It’s nice to be here.
很高兴来到这里。
I have so many questions about Saudi.
我对沙特有很多疑问。
Let’s take Wahhabism, which gets a very bad reputation in the Western press.
让我们以瓦哈比主义为例，它在西方媒体中名声很坏。
If you were to steelman it for me, make the best case for it, that it’s not just something crazy and extreme, what does that case look like?
如果你要为我做钢铁侠，为它提供最好的案例，这不仅仅是疯狂和极端的事情，那么这个案例是什么样的？
The case looks like it is a very strong conviction for a specific theology and a specific definition of true belief in the Islamic tradition.
这个案例看起来是对特定神学的非常强烈的信念，也是对伊斯兰传统真正信仰的特定定义。
That’s the best case I can make.
这是我能做的最好的情况。
Could the Saudi nation have been built without it?
如果没有它，沙特国家还能建立起来吗？
I would argue no, and I would also qualify that by saying that our sources for the early history of Saudi political expansion are so few and partisan, we can’t reach a firm historical conclusion about that.
我认为不是，而且我还想指出，我们关于沙特政治扩张早期历史的资料非常少，而且有党派之争，我们无法对此得出明确的历史结论。
But it seems to me that this religious purification movement, which is what Wahhabism purported to be, was essential for state-building in that part of Arabia and the 1700s.
但在我看来，瓦哈比主义所谓的宗教净化运动对于阿拉伯那个地区和 1700 年代的国家建设至关重要。
If you were to define Wahhabism, pull it out of the Saudi context, but just theologically, what is distinct about it compared to other forms of Sunni Islam?
如果你要定义瓦哈比主义，请将其从沙特的背景中拉出来，但仅从神学角度来看，它与其他形式的逊尼派伊斯兰教相比有何独特之处？
It is a theological position on how you define belief.
这是关于如何定义信仰的神学立场。
The teachings of the founder of this school of thought, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab — so it’s named after him — argued that it is not enough to affirm that you believe in one God.
该学派创始人穆罕默德·本·阿卜杜勒·瓦哈卜（Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab）——“所以以他的名字命名”——的教义认为，仅仅确认你相信一位上帝是不够的。
You must also actively negate any deviation from correct belief in God.
凡是偏离正确信神的行为，你们也要积极否定。
Therefore, it has an activist impulse toward what it regards as heresy or unbelief.
因此，它对它所认为的异端或不信有积极的冲动。
Whereas in the Sunni tradition, theology had evolved different schools of thought that were, I would say, mutually tolerant.
而在逊尼派传统中，神学已经发展出不同的思想流派，我想说，这些流派是相互宽容的。
They didn’t persecute each other for what they regarded as incorrect religious practice based on incorrect theology.
他们并没有因为他们认为基于不正确神学的不正确宗教实践而互相迫害。
It really is a theological conviction that was new in the history of Muslim societies and would probably have not made much of an impact had it not gained the support of the Saud family in the 1740s.
这确实是穆斯林社会历史上的一个新神学信念，如果它没有在 1740 年代获得沙特家族的支持，可能不会产生太大影响。
Now, Mecca is open to all Muslims, right?
现在，麦加向所有穆斯林开放，对吗？
Right.
正确的。
How is that then compatible with Wahhabism?
那么它如何与瓦哈比主义兼容呢？
Or is it just a contradiction that everyone lives with?
或者这只是每个人都生活的矛盾？
Well, it is a contradiction.
嗯，这是一个矛盾。
One of the political achievements of the early 20th-century Saudi leader, Abdulaziz, was to annex Mecca to his kingdom, which was based in Riyadh, and do so in a way that imposed what you might call a qualified Wahhabi regime, because in its original homeland in central Arabia, the Wahhabi clerics purged the entire region as thoroughly as they could, of any religious dissent, that is, of other Sunni Muslims.
20世纪初沙特领导人阿卜杜勒阿齐兹的政治成就之一，是将麦加并入他的王国（其总部设在利雅得），并以一种可以称之为合格瓦哈比政权的方式这样做，因为在其最初的祖国阿拉伯中部，瓦哈比神职人员尽可能彻底地清除了整个地区的任何宗教异议，即其他逊尼派穆斯林。
That was in the 1700s, 1800s.
那是在1700年代、1800年代。
When Abdulaziz annexed Mecca, at the end of 1924, he realized that it was a globally significant annexation and that if he tried to impose a strict Wahhabi regime that purged other Muslim traditions from the holy city, he would alienate Muslims in the rest of the world.
当阿卜杜勒阿齐兹于 1924 年底吞并麦加时，他意识到这是一次具有全球意义的兼并，如果他试图强行实行严格的瓦哈比政权，从圣城清除其他穆斯林传统，他就会疏远世界其他地区的穆斯林。
So, he did put Wahhabi clerics in charge of religious institutions in Mecca, but he chose clerics who were willing to work with Muslims in other Sunni traditions.
因此，他确实让瓦哈比派神职人员负责麦加的宗教机构，但他选择了愿意与其他逊尼派传统的穆斯林合作的神职人员。
He actually had to compromise, you would say, on strict Wahhabi doctrine.
你可能会说，他实际上不得不在严格的瓦哈比教义上做出妥协。
The Shiite Muslims in the Eastern Provinces — they’re just tolerated?
东部省份的什叶派穆斯林 ——他们只是被容忍？
Or there’s discrimination?
还是存在歧视？
What’s their legal status?
他们的法律地位如何？
Their legal status today in Saudi Arabia is as Saudi citizens, none of whom have very many legal rights, be they Sunni or Shiite.
他们今天在沙特阿拉伯的法律地位是沙特公民，无论是逊尼派还是什叶派，他们都没有太多合法权利。
Over time, they have endured periods of persecution.
随着时间的推移，他们经历了一段时期的迫害。
A number of Shiites moved out of their home provinces in the 1790s, the very first time Saudi forces annexed it.
1790 年代，许多什叶派人士离开了自己的家乡省份，这是沙特军队第一次吞并该省。
The Saudis lost control of that region.
沙特失去了对该地区的控制。
They regained control again.
他们再次夺回了控制权。
Most recently, in 1913, there was another exodus of 100 or so Shiites to other parts of the Gulf region.
最近一次是在 1913 年，大约有 100 名什叶派教徒再次逃亡到海湾地区的其他地区。
So, there is a history of persecution and discrimination.
所以，有迫害和歧视的历史。
Just today, 2025.
就在今天，2025 年。
Today, Tyler, that is, for me, very difficult to know, because what we hear from the Saudi government is that there is no more discrimination against Shiite Muslims.
今天，泰勒，对我来说，很难知道，因为我们从沙特政府那里听到的是，不再存在对什叶派穆斯林的歧视。
Personally, I don’t know if that is true or not.
就我个人而言，我不知道这是真的还是假的。
It might be true, but I do not know that it is true because we really don’t hear what I regard as reliable information about conditions in Saudi Arabia regarding recent occurrence of dissent.
这可能是真的，但我不知道这是真的，因为我们确实没有听到我认为关于沙特阿拉伯最近发生的异议情况的可靠信息。
They’ve all been silenced.
他们都沉默了。
You could have an LLM read anonymous posts on social media, right?
你可以让法学硕士阅读社交媒体上的匿名帖子，对吧？
You could.
你可以。
I haven’t seen that.
我没见过。
It’s possible that there is a completely new climate.
可能会出现一种全新的气候。
They claim there is a completely new climate, and I’ve been told by colleagues there is a completely new climate for Shiite Muslims.
他们声称存在一种全新的气候，同事告诉我什叶派穆斯林存在一种全新的气候。
I just don’t know that.
我只是不知道。
I don’t know that as a fact.
我不知道这是事实。
Let’s say you’re a Sunni cleric from Egypt or Iraq, traditional Sunni establishment.
假设您是来自埃及或伊拉克传统逊尼派机构的逊尼派神职人员。
What would be your critique of Wahhabism?
您对瓦哈比主义有何批评？
That it is an eccentric, erroneous interpretation of Muslim religious sources, and that it was the product of a poorly educated, ambitious preacher from the 1700s.
它是对穆斯林宗教来源的一种古怪、错误的解释，并且是 1700 年代一位受过良好教育、雄心勃勃的传教士的产物。
That’s what they would say.
这就是他们会说的。
So, it’s making up claims that are not in the Quran.
因此，它是在编造《古兰经》中没有的说法。
It’s not that it’s ignoring what is in the Quran.
这并不是说它忽视了《古兰经》中的内容。
Is that correct?
这是正确的吗？
They would say it’s misreading the Quran, to get into the details.
他们会说，深入细节是误读《古兰经》。
Just as you have very strong disagreements in Christianity between different denominations, there have always been strong disagreements between Muslims over theology.
正如不同教派之间在基督教方面存在非常强烈的分歧一样，穆斯林之间在神学上也一直存在着强烈的分歧。
The Wahhabi movement made them matter more than they did before because of this activist impulse and its position on theology, that belief requires action, not just verbal affirmation and individual conduct.
瓦哈比运动使它们比以前更加重要，因为这种激进的冲动及其在神学上的立场，即信仰需要行动，而不仅仅是口头肯定和个人行为。
Why do the Saudis seem to dislike the Palestinians so much?
为什么沙特人似乎如此不喜欢巴勒斯坦人？
Is that theological or some other set of reasons?
这是神学原因还是其他原因？
Because the Palestinians are not a direct threat to the Saudi establishment.
因为巴勒斯坦人并不是沙特当权派的直接威胁。
Well, I don’t know the Saudi establishment does dislike Palestinians.
好吧，我不知道沙特建制派是否不喜欢巴勒斯坦人。
Well, when people talk to me — this is completely anecdotal —
好吧，当人们跟我说话时 ——“这完全是轶事”——
Okay.
好的。
— they seem highly skeptical about the Palestinians, would be my sense, relative to, say, many other Arab groups.
——我的感觉是，相对于许多其他阿拉伯团体，他们似乎对巴勒斯坦人持高度怀疑态度。
Well, this might be true of the current government, maybe.
嗯，也许现任政府就是这样。
I really don’t know.
我真的不知道。
I’m not part of this conversation.
我不参与这次谈话。
I guess my hunch is that any critical attitude toward Palestinians on the part of the Saudi government would be that they’re inconvenient, because I think what the Saudi government wants is a very neat, seamless integration with Western economic, political, technological, and military spheres.
我想我的预感是，沙特政府对巴勒斯坦人的任何批评态度都会是他们不方便，因为我认为沙特政府想要的是与西方经济、政治、技术和军事领域的非常整齐、无缝的融合。
The Palestinians get in the way of that.
巴勒斯坦人阻碍了这一点。
They might say that.
他们可能会这么说。
I’m not sure that’s true, but that might be how they see it.
我不确定这是真的，但这可能就是他们的看法。
On the development of the Saudi state
论沙特国家的发展
Now, as you know, the senior religious establishment is largely Nejd, right?
现在，如你所知，高级宗教机构主要是内吉德，对吗？
Why does that matter?
为什么这很重要？
What’s the historical significance of that?
这有什么历史意义呢？
Right.
正确的。
Nejd is the region of central Arabia.
内志是阿拉伯中部地区。
Riyadh is currently the capital.
目前首都为利雅得。
The first Saudi empire had a capital nearby, called Diriyah.
第一个沙特帝国在附近有一个首都，称为德拉伊耶。
Nejd is really the territory that gave birth to the Wahhabi movement, it’s the homeland of the Saud dynasty, and it is the region of Arabia that was most thoroughly purged of the older Sunni tradition that had persisted in Nejd for centuries.
内志实际上是瓦哈比运动的诞生地，它是沙特王朝的故乡，也是阿拉伯地区对内志持续了几个世纪的古老逊尼派传统进行最彻底清除的地区。
Consequently, by the time that the Saudi government developed bureaucratic agencies in the 1950s and ’60s, the religious institution was going to recruit from that region of Arabia primarily.
因此，当沙特政府在 20 世纪 50 年代和 60 年代建立官僚机构时，宗教机构将主要从阿拉伯地区招募人员。
Now, it certainly attracted loyalists from other parts of Arabia, but the Wahhabi mission, as I call it — their calling to what they considered true belief — began in Nejd and was very strongly identified with the towns of Nejd ever since the late 1700s.
现在，它确实吸引了来自阿拉伯其他地区的忠诚者，但瓦哈比传教士，我称之为“他们对他们所认为的真正信仰的呼唤”，始于内志，并且自 1700 年代末以来就与内志城镇有着强烈的认同感。
Would I be correct in inferring that some of the least cosmopolitan parts of Saudi Arabia built the Saudi state?
我关于沙特阿拉伯一些最不国际化的地区建立了沙特阿拉伯国家的推断是否正确？
Yes, that is correct.
是的，这是正确的。
That is correct.
这是正确的。
If you think of the 1700s and 1800s, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf coast of Arabia were the most cosmopolitan parts of Arabia.
如果你想想 1700 年代和 1800 年代，阿拉伯的红海和波斯湾沿岸是阿拉伯最国际化的地区。
They’re richer, too, right?
他们也更富有，对吗？
Jeddah is a much more advanced city than Riyadh at the time.
吉达是当时比利雅得先进得多的城市。
Somewhat more advanced.
更先进一些。
Yes, it is more advanced, it is more cosmopolitan than Nejd.
是的，它比内志更先进，更国际化。
There is the regional identity in Hejaz, that is the Red Sea coast where the holy cities and Jeddah are located.
汉志有一个地域特征，那就是圣城和吉达所在的红海沿岸。
The townspeople there tended to look upon Nejd as a less advanced part of Arabia.
那里的市民倾向于将内志视为阿拉伯半岛不太先进的地区。
But again, that’s a very recent historical development.
但同样，这是最近的历史发展。
How is it that the coastal regions just dropped the ball?
沿海地区怎么就掉了球呢？
You could imagine some alternate history where they become the center of Saudi power and religious thought, but they’re not.
你可以想象一些替代历史，他们成为沙特权力和宗教思想的中心，但他们不是。
Right.
正确的。
If you take Jeddah, Mecca, and Medina — that region of Arabia, known as Hejaz, had always been under the rule of other Muslim empires.
如果你以吉达、麦加和麦地那为例，阿拉伯地区被称为汉志，一直处于其他穆斯林帝国的统治之下。
They were under the rule of other Muslim powers because of the religious value of possessing, if you will, the holy cities, Mecca and Medina.
他们之所以受到其他穆斯林势力的统治，是因为拥有（如果你愿意的话）圣城麦加和麦地那的宗教价值。
From the time of the first Muslim dynasty that was based in Damascus in the seventh and early eighth centuries, all the way until the Ottoman Empire, Muslim dynasties outside Arabia coveted control of that region.
从七世纪和八世纪初期在大马士革建立的第一个穆斯林王朝开始，一直到奥斯曼帝国，阿拉伯以外的穆斯林王朝都渴望控制该地区。
They were just more powerful than local resources could generate.
它们的力量比当地资源所能产生的还要强大。
Hejaz was always, if you were, to dependency on outside Muslim powers.
如果你愿意的话，汉志总是依赖外部穆斯林势力。
If you look at the east coast of Arabia — what’s now the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf — it was richer than central Arabia.
如果你看看阿拉伯的东海岸——现在的沙特阿拉伯东部省和波斯湾——它比阿拉伯中部更富裕。
It’s the largest oasis in Arabia.
它是阿拉伯最大的绿洲。
It is in proximity to pearling banks, which were an important source for income for residents there.
它靠近珍珠银行，珍珠银行是当地居民的重要收入来源。
It was part of the Indian Ocean trade between Iraq and India.
这是伊拉克和印度之间印度洋贸易的一部分。
The population there was always — well, always — for the last thousand years has been dominated by Bedouin tribesmen.
在过去的一千年里，那里的人口一直是“——好吧，一直是——”，一直由贝都因部落成员占主导地位。
There was a brief Ismaili Shia republic, you might say, in that part of Arabia in medieval times.
你可能会说，中世纪时期阿拉伯半岛的那个地区曾有过一个短暂的伊斯玛仪什叶派共和国。
It just didn’t have, it seems, the cohesion to conquer other parts of Arabia.
它似乎没有足够的凝聚力来征服阿拉伯的其他地区。
That’s what makes the Saudi story really remarkable, is that they were able to muster and sustain the cohesion to carry out a conquest like that over the course of 50 years.
这就是沙特故事真正引人注目的原因，因为他们能够在 50 年的时间里聚集并维持凝聚力来进行这样的征服。
Physically, how did they manage that?
从身体上来说，他们是如何做到这一点的？
Water is a problem, a lot of transport is by camel, there’s no real rail system, right?
水是一个问题，很多运输都是通过骆驼进行的，没有真正的铁路系统，对吗？
Right.
正确的。
How is it they do it?
他们是如何做到的？
What gets sent where to do what?
什么被发送到哪里做什么？
I would say it was accomplished almost inch by inch.
我想说，这几乎是一寸一寸地完成的。
It took 30 years for the first Saudi principality, I would call it, in their original home, Diriyah, which is now an outskirt of Riyadh.
第一个沙特公国花了 30 年的时间，我称之为它，在他们原来的家乡迪里耶（Diriyah），现在是利雅得的郊区。
It took them 30 years to conquer Riyadh.
他们花了30年才征服利雅得。
Thirty years.
三十年了。
It was, I would say, more a matter of persistence and willpower than resources or strategy.
我想说，这更多的是坚持和意志力的问题，而不是资源或策略的问题。
Now, there is one thesis out there, which really doesn’t have tremendous amount of evidence to support it, that the spread of firearms has something to do with the success of Saudi expansion.
现在，有一个论点，实际上没有大量证据支持它，即枪支的传播与沙特扩张的成功有关。
I think that’s an interesting hypothesis, but the evidence for that is pretty thin.
我认为这是一个有趣的假设，但其证据非常薄弱。
I really think it was a matter of persistence, and then the ability of the Wahhabi mission to gain a following to form, if you would, a Wahhabi party in different towns in Nejd, and to support the Saudis when they were able to get the upper hand over a local ruling family.
我真的认为这是一个坚持的问题，然后是瓦哈比使命获得追随者的能力，如果你愿意的话，在内志的不同城镇组建瓦哈比政党，并在沙特人能够战胜当地统治家族时支持他们。
I attribute the success of Saudi power to persistence and leadership and having that religious commonality.
我将沙特实力的成功归功于坚持、领导力以及宗教共性。
Some people just did buy into this teaching.
有些人确实接受了这种教导。
How much is there ever a de facto Ottoman rule over parts of Saudi?
奥斯曼帝国对沙特部分地区事实上的统治有多少？
Almost never.
几乎从来没有。
There was an Ottoman invasion that destroyed the very first Saudi empire, 1811 to 1818.
1811 年至 1818 年，奥斯曼帝国的入侵摧毁了第一个沙特帝国。
They were able to destroy the first Saudi empire.
他们能够摧毁第一个沙特帝国。
They captured and deported the Saudi ruler to Istanbul, and he was executed in public in Istanbul.
他们俘虏了沙特统治者并将其驱逐到伊斯坦布尔，他在伊斯坦布尔被公开处决。
Communications from western Arabia to central Arabia is so difficult and harsh that it was too difficult to maintain an occupation there, so after a few years, the Ottomans pulled out.
从阿拉伯西部到阿拉伯中部的交通非常困难和恶劣，以至于很难维持在那里的占领，所以几年后，奥斯曼人撤出了。
There’s not even tribute after those years?
那些年之后连致敬都没有了吗？
No. You do get tribute, it seems, starting in the 1840s.
不。从 1840 年代开始，你似乎确实得到了贡品。
After a second Ottoman invasion, there are reports of tribute.
奥斯曼帝国第二次入侵后，有报道称有人进贡。
I have not really seen a year-by-year account of when the Saudis rendered tribute and when they withheld tribute, but there are some moments when they paid tribute.
我并没有真正看到沙特人何时缴纳贡品以及何时扣留贡品的逐年记录，但有一些时刻他们缴纳了贡品。
Then, in 1913, right before World War I, when the Saudis conquered the Eastern Province, the heavily Shiite region, they promised some tribute, but World War I broke out, and the Ottomans were too preoccupied to enforce that.
然后，在 1913 年，就在第一次世界大战之前，当沙特征服了什叶派占主导地位的东部省份时，他们承诺提供一些贡品，但第一次世界大战爆发了，奥斯曼帝国太专注于执行这一任务。
So, there had been a few moments, but it was never really part of the Ottoman’s sphere.
所以，确实有过一些时刻，但它从来都不是奥斯曼帝国势力范围的一部分。
No real Ottoman cultural traces?
没有真正的奥斯曼文化痕迹？
No, not in central Arabia.
不，不在阿拉伯中部。
You have that in eastern Arabia, and you have that in Hejaz, for sure — very strong Ottoman traces, but not in central Arabia.
在阿拉伯东部有这种情况，在汉志也有这种情况，当然——非常明显的奥斯曼帝国痕迹，但在阿拉伯中部却没有。
To fast forward to more recent times — 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca is seized.
快进到最近的时代——1979 年，麦加的大清真寺被占领。
Who does it and why?
谁做的以及为什么？
Right.
正确的。
This is carried out by a band that broke off from a puritanical band that had broken off from mainstream Saudi society.
这是由一支与沙特主流社会脱离的清教徒乐队分离出来的乐队进行的。
They’re called the Salafi group, or they call themselves the Salafi group.
他们被称为萨拉菲派，或者他们称自己为萨拉菲派。
They formed in the mid-1960s.
他们成立于 20 世纪 60 年代中期。
They were alarmed at the arrival of certain customs they considered immoral, like television, like retail stores that would have mannequins with ladies’ dress.
他们对某些他们认为不道德的习俗的到来感到震惊，比如电视，比如零售店里摆着女装模特的服装。
They didn’t like paper currency because it had the face of the king on it.
他们不喜欢纸币，因为上面有国王的头像。
Supposedly, they would only carry bags of coins weighing 20 pounds instead of carrying paper currency with them.
据说，他们只会携带一袋重20磅的硬币，而不是携带纸币。
So, you had this puritanical group form in Medina in the mid-1960s.
所以，20 世纪 60 年代中期，麦地那出现了这种清教徒团体形式。
They were able to establish themselves in other parts of Arabia among people who disapproved of any sign of Western cultural influence.
他们能够在阿拉伯其他地区那些不赞成任何西方文化影响迹象的人们中站稳脚跟。
They’re not Wahhabis or they are Wahhabis?
他们不是瓦哈比派还是瓦哈比派？
Theologically, they are definitely Wahhabis.
从神学上来说，他们绝对是瓦哈比派。
They considered the Saudi family to have betrayed fidelity to true Wahhabi principles.
他们认为沙特家族背叛了对真正的瓦哈比原则的忠诚。
Now, they were under the supervision of the official Saudi religious establishment, which is Wahhabi, and some of them broke away from that supervision.
现在，他们受到沙特官方宗教机构瓦哈比的监督，其中一些人脱离了这种监督。
The leader of that breakaway faction was a man named Juhayman al-Otaybi.
这个分裂派系的领导人是朱海曼·奥泰比 (Juhayman al-Otaybi)。
Juhayman was apparently a very strong, charismatic personality.
朱海曼显然是一个非常坚强、有魅力的人。
He alienated some people in the group.
他疏远了团体中的一些人。
Other people thought that he was speaking the truth to power, if you will.
如果你愿意的话，其他人认为他是在向权力说实话。
In late 1978, there was an attempt to arrest him.
1978 年底，有人试图逮捕他。
He was tipped off, it seems, by a relative in the police, and he escaped.
他似乎是受到警察亲戚的举报，然后他逃跑了。
He fled into the desert, as they say, and he was a fugitive for a year.
正如人们所说，他逃进了沙漠，逃亡了一年。
During that year, members of his group started having dreams of the Muslim messiah.
那一年，他的小组成员开始梦想穆斯林弥赛亚。
They came to believe that one member of their breakaway faction was indeed the Mahdi, or the Muslim messiah.
他们开始相信，他们分裂派系的一名成员确实是马赫迪，即穆斯林弥赛亚。
They believed that November 20, 1979, was the day that the Muslim messiah would appear.
他们相信1979年11月20日是穆斯林弥赛亚出现的日子。
That was really the thinking behind the takeover of the mosque in Mecca.
这确实是接管麦加清真寺背后的想法。
It was a millenarian movement, in a way.
在某种程度上，这是一场千禧年运动。
It was a phenomenon that Wahhabism had never generated before, this kind of millenarianism.
这种千禧年主义是瓦哈比主义以前从未产生过的现象。
It was very much more like a David Koresh movement than a mainstream evangelical movement.
它更像是大卫·科雷什运动，而不是主流福音派运动。
Is that still a traumatic event for Saudi rulers, or it’s mostly forgotten?
对于沙特统治者来说，这仍然是一个创伤性事件，还是已经被遗忘了？
Well, I think Saudi rulers like to say that their country had what they call a moderate form of Islam until 1979.
嗯，我认为沙特统治者喜欢说他们的国家在 1979 年之前一直拥有所谓的温和形式的伊斯兰教。
Then, in response to that traumatic moment in Mecca, the Saudi government adopted the agenda of extremists, what they call extremist Muslims.
然后，为了应对麦加的那个创伤时刻，沙特政府采取了极端分子的议程，他们称之为极端主义穆斯林。
They claim that they want to go back to how things were before 1979.
他们声称他们想回到 1979 年之前的状态。
I think that is a convenient, concocted narrative, but that’s what they say.
我认为这是一种方便的、捏造的叙述，但他们就是这么说的。
They like to point to 1979 as a turning point.
他们喜欢将 1979 年视为一个转折点。
That in response to that event, the government adopted a policy that fostered extremism.
为了应对这一事件，政府采取了助长极端主义的政策。
Again, I don’t think that’s true at all, but that’s what they say.
再说一次，我认为这根本不是真的，但他们就是这么说的。
Now, I know it’s hard to tell in autocratic societies, but how complete has Saudi nation-building been?
现在，我知道这在专制社会中很难说，但沙特的国家建设有多完整？
You still have the Shiites, you have some radical groups, you had al-Qaeda.
仍然有什叶派，有一些激进团体，还有基地组织。
We’re not sure what’s going on now, but is it a truly solid here forever nation-state in terms of the borders and who rules?
我们不确定现在发生了什么，但就边界和谁统治而言，它是一个真正永久的民族国家吗？
Well, I would say yes.
嗯，我会说是的。
I think that there are definitely groups that would like to dismantle the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but my impression is that generations of Saudi kings and princes and technocrats have succeeded at integrating the population into a nation that looks to certain institutions, looks at outsiders and sees them as different from themselves, which is an essential part of being a nation, and thinks of themselves as sharing common values.
我认为肯定有一些团体想要瓦解沙特阿拉伯王国，但我的印象是，几代沙特国王、王子和技术官僚已经成功地将人民融入到一个依赖某些机构、看待外来者并认为他们与自己不同的国家，这是作为一个国家的重要组成部分，并认为自己拥有共同的价值观。
Yes, I do think that they are a nation.
是的，我确实认为他们是一个民族。
I think that if by some totally unexpected event, which of course, unexpected events happen, the kingdom were to fall, I don’t think the country would disintegrate.
我认为，如果由于某种完全意想不到的事件，当然，意外事件发生，王国陷落，我不认为这个国家会解体。
I think that the different parts have too much at stake in each other to stick together to disintegrate.
我认为不同的部分彼此之间有太多的利害关系，不能粘在一起而瓦解。
I don’t see it at all similar to Syria or Iraq, I’ll put it that way, or Lebanon, which do have much stronger tendencies pulling those countries apart.
我不认为它与叙利亚或伊拉克（我会这样说）或黎巴嫩完全不同，它们确实有更强烈的倾向使这些国家分裂。
The greater stability of many of the Gulf states, not just Saudi, to me, is quite striking as an outsider.
对我来说，作为一个局外人，许多海湾国家（不仅仅是沙特）的稳定性是相当惊人的。
If you had to boil that down to as abstract an explanation as possible, to what do you attribute that?
如果您必须将其归结为尽可能抽象的解释，您将其归因于什么？
Again, this is not only Saudi, but a number of other places.
再说一遍，这不仅是沙特，还有其他许多地方。
I would say it’s fear of annexation by larger neighbors.
我想说这是对被更大邻国吞并的恐惧。
Iran has a claim to Bahrain.
伊朗对巴林拥有主权。
Iraq has a claim to Kuwait.
伊拉克对科威特拥有主权。
Saudi Arabia, at times, has tried to take over Qatar and the Emirates in their history.
沙特阿拉伯在历史上有时曾试图接管卡塔尔和阿联酋。
What allowed the smaller Gulf states to remain independent was Western strategic intervention.
使海湾较小国家保持独立的是西方的战略干预。
The British established a truce, if you will, in the Persian Gulf in the early 1800s.
如果你愿意的话，英国于 1800 年代初期在波斯湾签订了休战协议。
That evolved into a series of treaties whereby London guaranteed the independence of the different Emirates that eventually formed the United Arab Emirates, and of Qatar, and of Bahrain, and of Kuwait, and of Oman, for that matter.
这演变成了一系列条约，伦敦保证了最终形成阿拉伯联合酋长国的不同酋长国的独立，以及卡塔尔、巴林、科威特和阿曼的独立。
Of course, the British left in 1971.
当然，英国人在1971年就离开了。
There was a great deal of concern who would fill that position.
人们非常担心谁将填补这个职位。
London wanted the United States to do it, but the United States was quite involved in Vietnam.
伦敦希望美国这么做，但美国在越南问题上有相当大的介入。
The Nixon administration didn’t think the American public would go for a new strategic commitment at that time.
尼克松政府当时并不认为美国公众会寻求新的战略承诺。
Of course, the United States did become strategically committed to the Gulf after the Iranian Revolution and after the Iran-Iraq War.
当然，在伊朗革命和两伊战争之后，美国确实在战略上致力于海湾地区。
I would say what accounts for the stability of these small principalities is fear of annexation by larger neighbors.
我想说，这些小公国之所以稳定，是因为担心被较大邻国吞并。
Why is Riyadh so ugly as a city?
为什么利雅得这座城市如此丑陋？
I’m from Los Angeles, Tyler.
我来自洛杉矶，泰勒。
I take exception to that.
我对此不以为然。
I love Los Angeles.
我爱洛杉矶。
I think it’s beautiful.
我觉得很漂亮。
Right.
正确的。
Actually, Riyadh has really fantastic modern architecture.
事实上，利雅得拥有非常棒的现代建筑。
Now, it’s hard to appreciate because, like Los Angeles, it’s an automobile city.
现在，它很难被欣赏，因为就像洛杉矶一样，它是一个汽车城市。
You can’t really walk there.
你不能真正走到那里。
In that regard, I really didn’t like living there very much.
从这一点来说，我真的不太喜欢住在那里。
Whereas I lived in Damascus in early 1980s, and I really loved Damascus because it was really a walkable city.
而 20 世纪 80 年代初我住在大马士革，我真的很喜欢大马士革，因为它确实是一个适合步行的城市。
Riyadh does have a great modern architecture.
利雅得确实拥有伟大的现代建筑。
So, I wouldn’t say it’s ugly.
所以，我不会说它丑陋。
It’s not my view.
这不是我的观点。
On Saudi influence in the world
论沙特在世界上的影响力
Why are the Saudis so interested in either funding or owning sports teams, sports leagues, top sports athletes under contract?
为什么沙特人对资助或拥有运动队、体育联盟、签约的顶级体育运动员如此感兴趣？
Is that a political thing, or it’s just how they enjoy spending their money, because they love the sport?
这是政治问题，还是他们喜欢花钱的方式，因为他们热爱这项运动？
Some mix of both?
两者的某种混合？
How do you model that?
你如何建模？
I do see it as a mix of both.
我确实将其视为两者的混合体。
I think that the term of critics is “sports washing.” You’ve probably heard that term?
我认为批评者的用语是“运动洗涤”。您可能听说过这个词？
Yes.
是的。
Qatar is hosting the World Cup, and Saudi Arabia’s takeover of the PGA.
卡塔尔正在主办世界杯，而沙特阿拉伯则接管了美国职业高尔夫球协会 (PGA)。
People look at that as an attempt to whitewash their image by hosting prestigious global sporting events.
人们认为这是通过举办著名的全球体育赛事来粉饰自己形象的尝试。
Many people look at this as part of a political agenda.
许多人将此视为政治议程的一部分。
To my mind, there’s no doubt that it’s extremely popular with Saudis.
在我看来，毫无疑问它在沙特人中非常受欢迎。
Saudis love sports, Tyler.
沙特人热爱运动，泰勒。
When I was there, I was there in the fall of 2001.
当我在那里的时候，是2001年秋天。
I arrived actually two days before 9/11.
我实际上是在 9/11 前两天到达的。
I was living downtown in an apartment building, and right after the Americans started bombing Afghanistan to chase out the Taliban and try to apprehend bin Laden, one evening I heard a crowd coming down the main boulevard.
我住在市中心的一栋公寓楼里，就在美国人开始轰炸阿富汗以赶走塔利班并试图逮捕本拉登后，一天晚上我听到一群人沿着主干道走来。
I was a little nervous about it.
我对此有点紧张。
That it was some anti-American demonstration.
这是一些反美示威活动。
It turned out they were celebrating Saudi Arabia’s victory in the Gulf soccer cup.
原来他们正在庆祝沙特阿拉伯在海湾足球杯中获胜。
That’s what was on their minds that evening.
这就是那天晚上他们的想法。
Not politics.
不是政治。
It’s extremely popular, especially with young Saudis, and they are the main constituency of the monarchy today.
它非常受欢迎，尤其是受到年轻的沙特人的欢迎，他们是当今君主制的主要支持者。
Now, if you drive around North Macedonia, you’ll see some number of Saudi-funded mosques.
现在，如果您在北马其顿开车，您会看到一些沙特资助的清真寺。
They’re quite large and elaborate.
它们很大而且很精致。
It’s not obvious that the demand for them is so strong.
对它们的需求如此强劲并不明显。
How do you model why the Saudis do that?
你如何解释沙特人为什么这样做？
Is it some kind of kickback scheme, or they just want to proselytize, or they want to raise their status in the Islamic world?
这是某种回扣计划，还是他们只是想传教，或者他们想提高自己在伊斯兰世界的地位？
Well, I see that in at least three different frames.
嗯，我至少在三个不同的框架中看到了这一点。
One frame is that Islam or Christianity is a proselytizing religion.
一个框架是伊斯兰教或基督教是一种传教的宗教。
Muslims are proselytized from the very beginning of the founder of Islam, prophet Muhammad.
从伊斯兰教创始人先知穆罕默德一开始就开始向穆斯林传教。
The Wahhabi mission has been a proselytizing movement ever since its founding in 1740.
瓦哈比派传教团自 1740 年成立以来一直是一场传教运动。
It was a total failure at proselytizing.
传教完全失败了。
The teachings of Wahhabism were rejected completely by almost every Muslim society that encountered it from the 1740s until probably the late 1800s, but they never stopped trying.
从 1740 年代一直到 1800 年代末，几乎每一个遇到瓦哈比教义的穆斯林社会都完全拒绝瓦哈比教义，但他们从未停止过尝试。
I think that there’s that.
我认为就是这样。
The third is that for the Saudi monarchy, it is a form of soft power.
第三，对于沙特君主国来说，这是一种软实力。
Democracy promotion for the United States, exporting communism for Fidel, marketing Wahhabism for Riyadh.
为美国推动民主，为菲德尔输出共产主义，为利雅得推销瓦哈比主义。
Do they get soft power from it?
他们从中获得软实力吗？
I think they do.
我认为他们确实如此。
I think they do.
我认为他们确实如此。
My sense is that the scholarship on Wahhabi soft power is beginning to sharpen the focus on particular case studies in Nigeria, in Indonesia, in Central Asia.
我的感觉是，关于瓦哈比软实力的学术研究开始加强对尼日利亚、印度尼西亚和中亚特定案例研究的关注。
The finding so far is that the Wahhabis are in competition with other Muslim religious tendencies from Iran, from Turkey, even from Kuwait.
迄今为止的发现是，瓦哈比派正在与来自伊朗、土耳其、甚至科威特的其他穆斯林宗教倾向竞争。
Just as Catholic and Protestant missionaries competed around the world for converts, what they regarded as true Christianity, the Wahhabis are competing.
正如天主教和新教传教士在世界各地争夺他们所认为的真正基督教的皈依者一样，瓦哈比派也在竞争。
Of course, they’ve had a ton of money, behind their proselytizing, from I would say from the early 1980s until about 2015.
当然，从 20 世纪 80 年代初到 2015 年左右，他们在传教活动背后投入了大量资金。
It seems that King Salman has really put the lid on that.
看来萨勒曼国王真的已经把这件事掩盖了。
I’ll be curious to see the follow-up studies that were really based on research in the period, roughly 2005 to 2015.
我很想知道真正基于 2005 年至 2015 年这一时期研究的后续研究。
I haven’t seen a lot about recent developments, but I think that by curtailing financial support for at least Saudi religious institutions to proselytize, that Saudi influence will diminish.
我没有看到太多有关最近事态发展的信息，但我认为，通过减少至少对沙特宗教机构传教的财政支持，沙特的影响力将会减弱。
It’ll leave a residue for sure, but it will diminish.
它肯定会留下残留物，但它会减少。
In general, who do you think has been winning that ideological competition of the different branches of Islam?
总的来说，您认为谁赢得了伊斯兰教不同分支的意识形态竞争？
Which would have greater soft power today than say 20, 25 years ago?
今天哪个国家的软实力比 20 年前、25 年前更强？
I do think the Saudis rebranded themselves as Salafis.
我确实认为沙特人将自己重新命名为萨拉菲派。
Wahhabism has an association with Saudi Arabia.
瓦哈比教与沙特阿拉伯有联系。
If they call themselves Salafis, it says that they are following the ways of the founding fathers.
如果他们称自己为萨拉菲派，就表明他们正在追随开国元勋的道路。
Americans like to say, “We follow the way of the founding fathers.” Sunni Muslims like to say they follow the ways of the founding fathers, which is the Salaf.
美国人喜欢说：“我们追随开国元勋的道路”。逊尼派穆斯林喜欢说他们遵循开国元勋的道路，即萨拉夫。
Salafism became extremely popular around the Muslim world, in Muslim diasporas, and is still extremely influential.
萨拉菲主义在穆斯林世界和穆斯林侨民中变得非常流行，并且仍然具有极大的影响力。
Is it dominant among Muslim populations?
它在穆斯林人口中占主导地位吗？
It is very high profile, but I don’t know that it’s dominant.
它的知名度很高，但我不知道它占主导地位。
I don’t really know how to measure that.
我真的不知道如何衡量。
I haven’t seen public opinion polls, for instance, that ask Muslims in different countries, “Do you favor Salafism over other versions of Islam?” I can cite an anecdote for one of the downsides of this puritanical form of Islam, is that in Iraq, when David Petraeus engineered the surge in 2006/2007, one of his assets was that Iraqi Sunni Muslims were fed up with the busy-body intrusion into their personal lives of the Salafis.
例如，我还没有看到民意调查询问不同国家的穆斯林，“相比其他版本的伊斯兰教，你更喜欢萨拉菲主义吗？”我可以引用一则轶事来说明这种清教徒形式的伊斯兰教的缺点之一，那就是在伊拉克，当大卫·彼得雷乌斯 (David Petraeus) 在 2006/2007 年策划激增时，他的优势之一是伊拉克逊尼派穆斯林厌倦了萨拉菲派对他们个人生活的爱管闲事的侵犯。
They told men they couldn’t just wear a mustache, they had to grow a beard.
他们告诉男人不能只留胡子，必须留胡子。
They punished people for smoking cigarettes.
他们惩罚吸烟的人。
I don’t think that most Muslims around the world, not that I’ve met Muslims, but I’ve lived in several Muslim countries, and most Muslims I’ve met regard Salafis as busy bodies and intrusive.
我不认为世界上大多数穆斯林，不是我见过穆斯林，而是我住在几个穆斯林国家，我见过的大多数穆斯林都认为萨拉菲派是忙碌的机构和侵入者。
I don’t think they’re going to win the battle for hearts and minds in the long run.
从长远来看，我认为他们不会赢得民心之战。
They had a very strong run in the ’90s and early 2000s.
他们在 90 年代和 2000 年代初期表现强劲。
I think al-Qaeda did a lot to discredit that.
我认为基地组织做了很多事来抹黑这一点。
To what extent should I think of Saudi as a nation of immigrants?
我应该在多大程度上将沙特视为一个移民国家？
As you know, bin Laden family has roots in Yemen.
众所周知，本·拉登家族根源于也门。
Prince Al Waleed bin Talal, who I think is still number two owner at Twitter, has Armenian and Lebanese descent.
瓦利德·本·塔拉勒王子拥有亚美尼亚和黎巴嫩血统，我认为他仍然是 Twitter 的第二号所有者。
Overall, how many of the Saudis are actually Saudi in origin?
总体而言，有多少沙特人实际上是沙特人？
I have no idea.
我不知道。
I’ll just say that.
我就这么说吧。
I’ll say that.
我会这么说。
Yes, if you take away the one quarter of the population that are foreign workers, of the 75% that remain, I would say probably a very small number are descended from people outside Arabia, because certainly, the royals and wealthy Arabian families in general had a long history of marrying or having children with slaves.
是的，如果去掉四分之一的外国工人，剩下的 75% 中，我想说可能只有极少数是阿拉伯以外的人的后裔，因为当然，王室成员和富裕的阿拉伯家庭一般都有与奴隶结婚或生孩子的悠久历史。
That was legal until the early 1960s.
直到 20 世纪 60 年代初，这都是合法的。
It doesn’t seem that the majority, or even close to majority of Arabs, owned slaves in Arabia over the centuries.
几个世纪以来，大多数、甚至接近大多数阿拉伯人似乎都没有在阿拉伯拥有奴隶。
It was a small number of better-off Arabs.
这是少数富裕的阿拉伯人。
In terms of immigrants, people moving to Arabia, very few people moved to Arabia from other parts of the Middle East because it was very poor.
就移民而言，人们搬到阿拉伯，很少有人从中东其他地区搬到阿拉伯，因为那里非常贫穷。
The largest site of immigrant settlement was Mecca and Medina, and that would have been from pilgrims who journeyed months overland from West Africa, or weeks through the Indian Ocean from Southeast Asia, and once you got there, a lot of them stayed.
最大的移民定居点是麦加和麦地那，这些人可能来自西非经陆路旅行数月，或从东南亚穿越印度洋数周的朝圣者，一旦到达那里，很多人就留下来了。
So that you did have permanent colonies from Java, from Bukhara in Central Asia, but central Arabia, the Saudi homeland, very little.
因此，爪哇、中亚的布哈拉确实拥有永久殖民地，但沙特阿拉伯的祖国阿拉伯中部却很少。
One reads of these families who maybe came over from Yemen, they’re then in Saudi, they’ve whitewashed the origins a bit, pretend they’re long-standing Saudis.
有人读到这些家庭可能来自也门，他们当时在沙特，他们稍微粉饰了自己的出身，假装他们是长期存在的沙特人。
Is that common?
这很常见吗？
Well, certainly, it’s pretty common if you’re from a poorer country and you want to have the benefits of Saudi citizenship.
嗯，当然，如果您来自较贫穷的国家并且希望获得沙特公民身份的好处，那么这种情况很常见。
But out of 30 million people, how many people are like that?
但三千万人中，有多少人是这样的呢？
I couldn’t put a number on.
我无法说出具体数字。
I’m sorry.
对不起。
I just couldn’t.
我就是做不到。
What’s the best food in Saudi Arabia?
沙特阿拉伯最好吃的食物是什么？
Well, I had Najdi food, and I didn’t care for it.
好吧，我吃了纳吉迪食物，但我不喜欢它。
It was camel and wheat grain.
那是骆驼和小麦的谷物。
Ranch food, I guess I would say.
牧场食物，我想我会说。
When I was in Riyadh in the early 2000s, you had every kind of foreign cuisine you could imagine: Chinese, Persian, Mexican, Cheesecake Factory.
2000 年代初我在利雅得时，这里有你能想象到的各种外国美食：中国菜、波斯菜、墨西哥菜、芝士蛋糕工厂。
Saudis love American food.
沙特人喜欢美国菜。
I don’t know the culinary traditions of Hejaz, or of other parts of Arabia.
我不了解汉志或阿拉伯其他地区的烹饪传统。
I just know the Najdi culinary tradition, and it was pretty basic.
我只知道纳吉迪的烹饪传统，而且非常基本。
In Jeddah, is the food more, I don’t know, Red Sea, more Ethiopian, more Yemeni.
在吉达，是不是食物比较多，我不知道，红海的，埃塞俄比亚的比较多，也门的比较多。
I was only in Jeddah for a weekend.
我只在吉达呆了一个周末。
I’m not familiar with Jeddah to say.
我对吉达不熟悉。
On Saudi education
关于沙特的教育
Now, take KAUST, King Abdullah University of Science and Technology.
现在，以阿卜杜拉国王科技大学 KAUST 为例。
It has, I read, a $10 billion endowment.
据我所知，它拥有 100 亿美元的捐赠。
Will that be a successful research university?
那会是一所成功的研究型大学吗？
How’s that going?
怎么样？
My understanding is that it’s not going all that well.
我的理解是事情进展得不太顺利。
That the intention was to provide a global-level postgraduate education in STEM and most of the students are foreign students.
其目的是提供全球水平的 STEM 研究生教育，大多数学生是外国学生。
The main problem is just the demand side?
主要问题只是需求方？
Saudis don’t want to go there?
沙特人不想去那里？
Or they’re not qualified for that.
或者他们没有资格这样做。
I think if we were to start talking about plans to transform the Saudi economy, I think that the huge hurdle is improving K through 12 of education there.
我认为，如果我们开始谈论沙特经济转型计划，我认为最大的障碍是提高那里的 K 至 12 教育水平。
They just have not been able to succeed at changing their public education, the mass public education, to prepare students for challenging college, let alone postgraduate-level STEM subjects.
他们只是未能成功地改变他们的公共教育、大众公共教育，让学生为挑战大学做好准备，更不用说研究生水平的 STEM 科目了。
I think it’s still the case that families who want their students to excel in STEM typically send their children to private schools and then to the Engineering Petroleum University.
我认为，希望学生在 STEM 方面取得优异成绩的家庭通常会将孩子送到私立学校，然后送到工程石油大学。
It’s like their Texas A&M.
这就像他们的德克萨斯农工大学。
It is an excellent university.
这是一所优秀的大学。
From there they tend to go to American graduate schools and then come back and work in the petroleum engineering fields.
从那里，他们倾向于去美国研究生院，然后回来在石油工程领域工作。
It just seems that the K through 12 level has not been solved much.
只是K到12级好像还没有解决多少。
Here we are in the United States talking about that, right?
我们在美国正在谈论这个，对吗？
Yes.
是的。
What’s the main barrier to improving the Saudi system?
改善沙特制度的主要障碍是什么？
Because they do have money, right?
因为他们确实有钱，对吗？
They have money.
他们有钱。
I think that you would have to probably replace most of the teachers.
我认为你可能必须更换大部分老师。
They would have to find a way to train up teachers to improve the quality of STEM education in the public schools.
他们必须找到一种方法来培训教师，以提高公立学校 STEM 教育的质量。
They’ve reduced the religious content quite a bit already.
他们已经大大减少了宗教内容。
My understanding is, they’ve taken out a lot of the, I would say, xenophobic religious teachings that were part of their education system for about half a century, but they just don’t have a cadre of teachers that they can put into the schools and replace people who are there already.
我的理解是，他们已经取消了很多仇外的宗教教义，这些教义是他们教育体系的一部分，大约半个世纪了，但他们只是没有一支教师骨干队伍可以放入学校并取代现有的教师。
What is the chance Qatar survives as an independent nation, say 50 years from now?
比如说 50 年后，卡塔尔作为一个独立国家生存的机会有多大？
I would bet against that, but do you have an opinion?
我打赌反对，但你有意见吗？
I don’t have an opinion.
我没有意见。
Why would you bet against it?
你为什么要反对它？
Because without US protection, which I do not think will endure forever due to our own energy independence, someone will swallow them, probably Iran, but it could be Saudi as well, or they become a pawn of either side.
因为如果没有美国的保护，我认为由于我们自身的能源独立，这种保护不会永远持续下去，有人会吞掉它们，可能是伊朗，但也可能是沙特，或者它们会成为任何一方的棋子。
Right now, they can play different sides off against each other, but maybe that just won’t last.
现在，他们可以让不同的球队互相对抗，但也许这种情况不会持续太久。
That’s a reasonable scenario.
这是一个合理的场景。
One of the big questions I won’t be around for, is what will happen to the entire Gulf political alignment when the global appetite for their one really valuable resource diminishes?
我不会讨论的一个大问题是，当全球对其一种真正有价值的资源的需求减弱时，整个海湾政治联盟将会发生什么？
That’s a big question, but I have no idea.
这是一个很大的问题，但我不知道。
Between extreme heat and autocracy, how are they going to manage without billions in oil revenue every year?
在极端炎热和独裁统治之间，如果每年没有数十亿美元的石油收入，他们将如何应对？
I think that’s what they’re trying to do.
我认为这就是他们正在尝试做的事情。
They’re trying to diversify their economies, but I don’t think they have the technical skills to do that.
他们正在努力实现经济多元化，但我认为他们不具备做到这一点的技术能力。
They’ve rented it now, for many decades, by paying high salaries to qualified people from other countries.
现在，他们通过向其他国家的合格人员支付高薪来租用它，已经几十年了。
Maybe they’ll get there.
也许他们会到达那里。
Maybe they don’t need that many people if AI can replace a lot of technically qualified people in this country.
如果人工智能可以取代这个国家很多有技术资格的人，也许他们不需要那么多人。
I hear coders are losing their jobs.
我听说程序员正在失业。
Maybe countries won’t need a large pool of technically qualified manpower.
也许国家不需要大量的技术合格的人力资源。
Is the UAE stable?
阿联酋稳定吗？
There’s both external threats, as you know, they’ve fought over territory with Saudi.
正如你所知，既有外部威胁，他们也与沙特争夺领土。
But just internally, if the smaller places start to resent the rule of Abu Dhabi, they might want to split off or disagree about how much autonomy they’ll have.
但就内部而言，如果较小的地方开始不满阿布扎比的统治，他们可能会想要分裂或在拥有多少自治权方面存在分歧。
Right.
正确的。
Well, I don’t think it would be like the Velvet Divorce between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, they can both survive.
嗯，我不认为这会像捷克共和国和斯洛伐克之间的天鹅绒离婚一样，他们都能生存下来。
I think if Ras Al-Khaimah broke away, it would be swallowed up probably by Oman or Saudi Arabia.
我认为如果哈伊马角脱离，它可能会被阿曼或沙特阿拉伯吞并。
I think they stick together because of fear of annexation, and then subjugation to a neighbor, one or another neighbor.
我认为他们之所以团结在一起，是因为害怕被吞并，然后屈服于邻居，一个或另一个邻居。
I think the UAE is stable.
我认为阿联酋很稳定。
Yes, I don’t see any threat to the UAE on the horizon, but I could be blind to that.
是的，我认为阿联酋不会受到任何威胁，但我可能对此视而不见。
On Yemen
关于也门
Do you think of Bahrain and Yemen as historically the most advanced or cosmopolitan parts of that region of the world?
您认为巴林和也门历史上是世界该地区最先进或最国际化的地区吗？
Yemen has a history of kingdoms going back a few thousand years, although, in terms of the modern global economy, it’s the poorest part of Arabia.
也门的王国历史可以追溯到几千年前，尽管就现代全球经济而言，它是阿拉伯最贫穷的地区。
Yemen’s future as a cohesive country is a big question mark.
也门作为一个有凝聚力的国家的未来是一个很大的问号。
It seems to me the strong secessionist movement in the south.
在我看来，南方的分离主义运动很强烈。
Bahrain will probably be, as long as there is American forces there, an independent country.
只要那里有美军，巴林就可能是一个独立国家。
It’s the biggest American naval base in the Persian Gulf.
它是美国在波斯湾最大的海军基地。
If there were to be a withdrawal of Western strategic interest in the Persian Gulf, that goes back to about 1820, it would change everything.
如果西方在波斯湾的战略利益撤回，这可以追溯到 1820 年左右，这将改变一切。
It would change everything.
这会改变一切。
It did change everything in 1820 when the British exercised gunboat diplomacy to suppress low-level warfare.
1820年，英国通过炮舰外交压制低水平战争，这一切确实改变了。
They called it piracy.
他们称之为盗版。
Here we are, 200 years on, still sort of an outpost of Western security interest.
200 年后的今天，我们仍然是西方安全利益的前哨基地。
Why is Yemen so unstable when the rest of the region looks really quite stable?
为什么也门如此不稳定，而该地区其他地区看起来确实相当稳定？
I think a Yemen expert could give a better answer than I could, but my understanding is that the Yemen Arab Republic that formed in 1990 from the union of North and South Yemen was stable because of a very delicate political compromise between powers in different parts of the country.
我认为也门专家可以比我给出更好的答案，但我的理解是，1990 年由北也门和南也门联盟组成的阿拉伯也门共和国之所以稳定，是因为该国不同地区的权力之间存在非常微妙的政治妥协。
That political compromise, of course, has been exploded by a number of different factors, among which is this phenomenon of Zaydi revivalism represented by the Houthis, which represents a very strong regional religious tendency that is different from the rest of the country.
当然，这种政治妥协被许多不同的因素所破坏，其中包括以胡塞武装为代表的扎伊迪复兴主义现象，它代表了与该国其他地区不同的非常强烈的地区宗教倾向。
Then, of course, outside intervention has made it difficult for Yemenis to see that, look, we have to live with each other.
当然，外部干预让也门人很难认识到我们必须和睦相处。
We can’t reach out to one power or another to clobber our local rival.
我们无法向任何一个国家伸出援手来打击我们当地的竞争对手。
It’s a lot like Lebanon was for 15 years, from 1975 to 1990.
这很像黎巴嫩从 1975 年到 1990 年这 15 年的情况。
They never had this period of nation-building analogous to what the Saudis had from the Najdis?
他们从来没有经历过像沙特从纳吉迪人那里经历过的国家建设时期？
No, they didn’t really.
不，他们真的没有。
They didn’t really.
他们真的没有。
Yemen has some oil and gas, but not very much.
也门有一些石油和天然气，但数量不多。
Not enough to set up the kind of national social welfare system that gets people to a certain standard of living and education, so they haven’t had that.
不足以建立那种让人们达到一定生活水平和教育水平的国家社会福利体系，所以他们还没有享受到。
Because of the weakness of the state, outsiders like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, Iran, Saudi Arabia, they’ve been able to intervene and make a mess of things.
由于国家的软弱，基地组织、伊斯兰国、伊朗、沙特阿拉伯等外部势力能够干预并把事情搞得一团糟。
Much like happened in Lebanon for 15 years.
就像黎巴嫩 15 年来发生的事情一样。
Is there still any residual sense of cultural inferiority in Saudi vis-à-vis Yemen, which has a much grander civilizational tradition, right?
相对于拥有更伟大文明传统的也门来说，沙特是否还残留着文化上的自卑感，对吧？
Right.
正确的。
It’s evident when you go there.
当你去那里时就很明显了。
Sure.
当然。
Wow, this is amazing.
哇，这太棒了。
You’re in Saudi and it’s like, “Here’s some new buildings.”
你在沙特，就像是，“这里有一些新建筑。”
They’re very proud of the new buildings.
他们对新建筑感到非常自豪。
It’s a little bit like the United States and Europe.
这有点像美国和欧洲。
People come to the United States, from Europe, and they think it’s a fabulous country, but we don’t really have medieval cities.
人们从欧洲来到美国，他们认为这是一个神话般的国家，但我们并没有真正的中世纪城市。
You would say that Europe has a much deeper and richer cultural history.
你可能会说欧洲有着更深厚、更丰富的文化历史。
The United States is a great commercial and military power, producer of popular culture, but I think Europeans might feel that the United States is still a parvenu on the world stage.
美国是一个伟大的商业和军事强国，流行文化的生产者，但我认为欧洲人可能会觉得美国仍然是世界舞台上的新贵。
Maybe that’s how they look at it.
也许他们就是这么看的。
How serious are the Saudis about building a wall, or really, finishing a wall on the border with Yemen?
沙特人对于修建隔离墙或者真正完成与也门边境的隔离墙有多认真？
Well, it’s going to take them a long time to achieve that.
好吧，他们需要很长时间才能实现这一目标。
Do they want to?
他们愿意吗？
If they want to?
如果他们愿意的话？
Well, some of them certainly do.
嗯，其中一些确实如此。
It would enhance their security against smuggling.
这将加强他们打击走私的安全。
In the early 2000s, there was a lot of weapon smuggling, a lot of drug smuggling happening through Yemen, and also through the northern border.
2000年代初，也门和北部边境发生了大量武器走私和毒品走私。
There was a serious drug problem in Saudi Arabia.
沙特阿拉伯存在严重的毒品问题。
I don’t know if there still is or not, but a lot of families were worried about it.
我不知道现在是否还有，但很多家庭都担心。
I hear there is.
我听说有。
Right.
正确的。
It was a topic of conversation in 2001, 2002, when I was there.
2001年、2002年我在那里的时候，这是一个话题。
Conversations about teenage or somewhat older children having to go to rehab.
关于青少年或年龄较大的儿童必须去康复中心的对话。
They had a whole cadre of therapists trained at American universities in drug rehabilitation.
他们有一批治疗师在美国大学接受过戒毒康复培训。
Now, would building a wall on the Saudi-Yemeni border — I imagine at some point there will be the technology to conduct surveillance on that border.
现在，会在沙特和也门边境修建一堵墙吗？——我想在某个时候将会有技术在该边境进行监视。
The world does seem to be moving in a direction of greater surveillance capabilities by states, so I don’t think it’s as far-fetched as it was 10 years ago.
世界似乎确实正在朝着各国加强监控能力的方向发展，所以我认为这不像十年前那么牵强。
To the extent that the monarchies seek certainty for suppressing any challenge, yes, they might build a wall.
如果君主国寻求压制任何挑战的确定性，是的，他们可能会建造一堵墙。
They might.
他们可能会。
If the Saudis look back on their earlier policies toward Yemen, do you think they have regrets?
如果沙特人回顾其早期对也门的政策，你认为他们会后悔吗？
Do they regret having rooted for so long for a weak Yemen and now it’s come back to bite them in the bum, so to speak?
他们是否后悔这么长时间以来一直支持弱小的也门，现在却又回来咬他们的屁股，可以这么说吗？
Did they just screw it all up?
他们只是把一切搞砸了吗？
Did they screw it up?
他们搞砸了吗？
Well, I don’t know if they screwed up.
好吧，我不知道他们是否搞砸了。
I have no idea how they look at it.
我不知道他们怎么看。
I know that the current leadership thinks that they needed to adopt a more activist foreign policy, and in the very early years of King Salman’s reign, a lot of that backfired.
我知道现任领导层认为他们需要采取更加积极的外交政策，而在萨勒曼国王统治的最初几年，很多政策都适得其反。
They seem to have adopted, I would say, a more cautious approach in dealing with Yemen, and Iraq, and Lebanon, and Syria, and that is more in line with traditional Saudi diplomacy.
我想说，他们在处理也门、伊拉克、黎巴嫩和叙利亚问题上似乎采取了更加谨慎的态度，这更符合传统的沙特外交。
It’s the difference between deciding to invade and bomb Yemen, and deciding to try to negotiate with Houthis and renew relations with Iran.
这是决定入侵和轰炸也门与决定尝试与胡塞武装谈判并与伊朗恢复关系之间的区别。
Of course, brokered by China a couple of years ago, and see if there’s a way to manage what they regard a strategic threat, then pursue the elimination of a strategic threat, which seems to have backfired for them.
当然，几年前在中国的斡旋下，看看是否有办法管理他们认为的战略威胁，然后寻求消除战略威胁，但这似乎对他们来说适得其反。
Now, as you know, in 1962, Egypt is bombing parts of Yemen.
现在，如您所知，1962 年，埃及正在轰炸也门部分地区。
They have some involvement in that war.
他们参与了那场战争。
Some of the bombs, it seems, even fall on the Saudi side of the border.
有些炸弹似乎甚至落在了边境的沙特一侧。
Is there a historical memory of that?
历史上有这样的记忆吗？
Does it matter, or is it just forgotten, that was some mistake in the past and who cares?
这很重要，还是只是被遗忘了，那是过去的一些错误，谁在乎呢？
I don’t think Yemen has forgotten about it, and I don’t think everybody in Saudi Arabia has forgotten about it.
我不认为也门已经忘记了这件事，我也不认为沙特阿拉伯的每个人都忘记了这件事。
I think the men around Mohammed bin Salman, the crown prince, are quite aware of the history of relations between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
我认为王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼身边的人非常了解沙特阿拉伯和也门之间的关系历史。
I think that they may have been responsible for tempering some of the adventurous foreign policies.
我认为他们可能对缓和一些冒险的外交政策负有责任。
If anything, what the Saudis did by intervening in Yemen in 2015, was similar to what Nasser did, when he intervened.
如果说有什么不同的话，那就是沙特 2015 年干预也门的做法与纳赛尔干预时的做法相似。
He sent 40,000 Egyptian troops to Yemen, eventually, in the 1960s.
最终，他在 20 世纪 60 年代向也门派遣了 40,000 名埃及军队。
That was a terrible mistake for Nasser.
这对纳赛尔来说是一个可怕的错误。
It fatally weakened his regime.
这致命地削弱了他的政权。
I think some Saudis may not have read what they did, in terms of what Nasser did, but looking at it from the outside, it was a comparable mistake.
我认为一些沙特人可能没有读过他们所做的事情，没有读过纳赛尔所做的事情，但从外部来看，这是一个类似的错误。
It just reminds me that foreign policy is always a matter of experimentation and seeing what works.
它只是提醒我，外交政策始终是一个试验和看看什么有效的问题。
I hear a lot of talk about grand strategy.
我听到很多关于大战略的讨论。
It’s hard to think of a case where grand strategy really worked out.
很难想象大战略真正奏效的案例。
There’s a lot of luck involved in achieving foreign policy success, no matter what country we’re talking about.
无论我们谈论的是哪个国家，外交政策的成功都需要很多运气。
Is there still a meaningful historical memory of the 1934 Saudi-Yemen border war, or is that just forgotten?
1934 年沙特和也门边境战争是否仍然存在有意义的历史记忆，或者只是被遗忘了？
I think that’s forgotten.
我想那已经被遗忘了。
I think that’s forgotten.
我想那已经被遗忘了。
Again, some people in Yemen might remember it, especially in the border region, because they’re right up against the Saudi border.
同样，也门的一些人可能还记得这一点，尤其是在边境地区，因为他们正对着沙特边境。
There’s a long tradition of trade across that border.
跨境贸易有着悠久的传统。
When you try to control that trade, it becomes smuggling.
当你试图控制这种贸易时，它就变成了走私。
That line was imposed on territory where people on both sides were accustomed to dealing with each other.
这条界线是在双方人民习惯于彼此打交道的地区强加的。
It’d be like building a wall between Pennsylvania and Maryland.
这就像在宾夕法尼亚州和马里兰州之间建造一堵墙。
People between Baltimore and York, between Frederick and Gettysburg, would find that appalling.
巴尔的摩和约克之间、腓特烈和葛底斯堡之间的人们会发现这令人震惊。
How would you model what you think the Houthis want?
您认为胡塞武装想要什么，您会如何建模？
What’s their strategy, their game, so to speak?
可以这么说，他们的策略、他们的游戏是什么？
That’s a great question.
这是一个很好的问题。
The people that I think are informed about this, see the Houthis as evolving in their aims, and becoming more ambitious and perhaps overreaching, as rising movements have a habit of doing.
我认为了解这一情况的人认为，胡塞武装的目标正在不断演变，变得更加雄心勃勃，甚至可能有些过分，正如新兴运动的习惯一样。
Right now it seems that they do not want to have any power-sharing in the part of the country that they control.
现在看来，他们不想在他们控制的国家地区分享任何权力。
I don’t see how they imagine a unified Yemen with any other political force.
我不明白他们如何想象一个与任何其他政治力量联合的也门。
I have no idea how they see that.
我不知道他们怎么看。
They can’t conquer the rest of Yemen; the rest of Yemen doesn’t seem capable of conquering them, but they don’t seem to be interested in sharing power.
他们无法征服也门其他地区；也门其他地区似乎没有能力征服他们，但他们似乎对分享权力不感兴趣。
It could be the case that they’re concerned with control day-to-day, and they’ll see what other Yemenis come up with in the way of an offer to run the country.
可能他们关心的是日常控制，他们会看到其他也门人提出管理国家的提议。
To my mind, they don’t really have a clear strategic goal other than staying in power where they are.
在我看来，除了继续掌权之外，他们并没有真正明确的战略目标。
On Saudi Arabia’s future
关于沙特阿拉伯的未来
How optimistic are you about Saudi Arabia?
您对沙特阿拉伯有多乐观？
Optimistic?
乐观的？
Well, I have to say that I think that for many Saudis, the opening of social freedoms is wonderful.
嗯，我不得不说，我认为对于许多沙特人来说，社会自由的开放是美妙的。
I know that many Saudis are extremely happy to have the religious police off their backs.
我知道许多沙特人非常高兴能够摆脱宗教警察的追捕。
That they don’t have to close doors and be harassed if they don’t go to the mosque.
如果他们不去清真寺，就不必关门并受到骚扰。
Of course, women have much greater freedom than they’ve ever had, under the modern Saudi regime.
当然，在现代沙特政权下，女性享有比以往更大的自由。
They’re free to take creative initiatives in music, in theater, in film, in literature, in a way that they never have been.
他们可以以前所未有的方式自由地在音乐、戏剧、电影、文学领域采取创造性举措。
In that regard, I do think that the changes since 2015 for many Saudis, have made their lives a lot better.
在这方面，我确实认为自 2015 年以来的变化对许多沙特人来说已经让他们的生活变得更好了。
How deeply rooted or sustainable do you think that is?
您认为这种现象根深蒂固或可持续吗？
I think that’s very deep.
我认为这是非常深奥的。
Yes.
是的。
You said yourself, it’s never been the case before.
你自己也说过，以前从来没有这样过。
Right.
正确的。
I think it’s very deep.
我认为这是非常深的。
I really do believe that the country has turned away from that puritanical religious legacy.
我确实相信这个国家已经放弃了清教徒的宗教遗产。
I do believe.
我确实相信。
One of the things I try to do in my book is I try to show that the, what I call the modernist or cosmopolitan current in Saudi Arabia, is not recent.
我在书中试图做的一件事是，我试图表明，我所说的沙特阿拉伯的现代主义或国际化潮流并不是最近才出现的。
It goes back 100 years, to the annexation of the holy cities and Jeddah.
事情可以追溯到 100 年前，当时圣城和吉达被吞并。
That the very logic of state-building nurtured that tendency.
国家建设的逻辑本身就孕育了这种趋势。
I’m sure that you have a lot of Saudis, particularly in the older generation, who are furious with the new social reality, but I don’t see them regaining power ever again.
我确信有很多沙特人，尤其是老一代人，对新的社会现实感到愤怒，但我不认为他们会再次重新掌权。
Now, when it comes to their economic future, and will they be able to transition to a post-petroleum economy, that’s an open question.
现在，当谈到他们的经济未来以及他们是否能够过渡到后石油经济时，这是一个悬而未决的问题。
I have no idea, because, to my mind, the future of the global economy is so up in the air because of technological changes and political changes.
我不知道，因为在我看来，由于技术变革和政治变革，全球经济的未来悬而未决。
How oil-producing states will manage that, will they become big data centers, because they have all this energy?
石油生产国将如何管理这一点，它们会成为大数据中心，因为它们拥有所有这些能源？
I have no idea.
我不知道。
Yes, is my answer.
是的，这是我的答案。
I think they will.
我想他们会的。
Okay.
好的。
Right.
正确的。
Yes.
是的。
That might be their new resource.
那可能是他们的新资源。
I don’t know, Tyler.
我不知道，泰勒。
You probably have a much better sense of that than I do.
你可能比我更清楚这一点。
What’s your fondest memory from Saudi Arabia?
您在沙特阿拉伯最美好的回忆是什么？
I have to say that I was there during a time of high tension between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
我不得不说，我在那里正值美国和沙特阿拉伯关系高度紧张的时期。
As I said, I arrived there September 9, 2001, and I was there until the end of February the next year.
正如我所说，我是2001年9月9日到达那里的，一直呆到第二年2月底。
Even so, I was really amazed at the hospitality that I found.
即便如此，我还是对我所受到的热情款待感到非常惊讶。
I was invited to many people’s homes and hometowns.
我被邀请到许多人的家里和家乡。
It was just the hospitality that people showed to me.
这只是人们对我表现出的热情好客。
It got to the point that I had to start turning down invitations, because they stay up very late when they have company.
到了我不得不开始拒绝邀请的地步，因为他们有伴时会熬夜。
One, two o’clock in the morning, and I was trying to keep a daily work and research schedule.
凌晨一两点，我努力保持每天的工作和研究时间表。
That’s my fondest memory.
那是我最美好的回忆。
It really is.
确实如此。
Tremendous warmth and hospitality from the people I met there.
我在那里遇到的人们非常热情好客。
If one of our educated listeners wants to visit a place in Saudi, where would you send them?
如果我们的一位受过教育的听众想要参观沙特的某个地方，您会派他们去哪里？
Say they’re going to land in Riyadh anyway, in the city.
假设他们无论如何都会降落在利雅得这座城市。
Right.
正确的。
They’re going to land in Riyadh.
他们将降落在利雅得。
Where should they go?
他们应该去哪里？
Where should they go?
他们应该去哪里？
Where should they go?
他们应该去哪里？
If you’re not a Muslim, you can’t go to Medina or Mecca.
如果你不是穆斯林，你就不能去麦地那或麦加。
Right.
正确的。
They’re not a Muslim.
他们不是穆斯林。
I would urge them to go to Jeddah and see what’s happening in Jeddah with the new cultural scene there.
我会敦促他们去吉达，看看吉达正在发生什么以及那里的新文化景观。
Yes.
是的。
Before my last question, let me just plug your recent book again.
在我提出最后一个问题之前，让我再次插入您最近的一本书。
Saudi Arabia: A Modern History, by David Commins.
沙特阿拉伯：现代史，大卫·康明斯著。
I enjoyed it very much.
我非常喜欢它。
Learned a great deal from it.
从中学到了很多东西。
Final query.
最终查询。
What will you do next?
接下来你会做什么？
I’m leaving for Prague in a week and a half.
一个半星期后我要去布拉格。
I’m teaching there next semester, for Dickinson College.
下学期我将在那里为迪金森学院教书。
My next writing project is actually going to be something completely different.
我的下一个写作项目实际上将是完全不同的。
It’s going to be about Arab travelers to the United States between 1876 and 1940.
故事讲述 1876 年至 1940 年间前往美国的阿拉伯旅行者的故事。
I chose 1940 as the terminal date because after World War II, the United States has the rise to globalism and its image and reputation in the Arab world becomes something very different.
我选择1940年作为结束日期，是因为二战后，美国开始走向全球化，其在阿拉伯世界的形象和声誉发生了很大变化。
I’m going to be going to Buffalo, New York; Long Beach, California; El Paso, Texas, with Arab tourists in those 70 years and seeing what they saw.
我要去纽约州布法罗；加利福尼亚州长滩；德克萨斯州埃尔帕索，这 70 年来与阿拉伯游客一起见证了他们所看到的一切。
That’s it.
就是这样。
Sounds great.
听起来很棒。
Should be refreshing.
应该很清爽。
David, thank you very much.
大卫，非常感谢你。
Thanks, Tyler.
谢谢，泰勒。
It was a pleasure.
这是一种乐趣。
This episode was made possible through the support of the John Templeton Foundation.
这一集是在约翰·邓普顿基金会的支持下得以实现的。