Daron Acemoglu on the Struggle Between State and Society (Ep. 81)

But actually, I think geographic factors are not a great explanatory framework for understanding prosperity and poverty.

但实际上，我认为地理因素并不是理解繁荣和贫困的一个很好的解释框架。

So, for a variety of reasons — and geography might’ve played a role, though I’m not completely sure — European powers pulled ahead of the rest, and then they went ahead and colonized much of the rest of the world.

因此，出于多种原因——地理可能发挥了一定作用，尽管我不完全确定——欧洲列强领先于其他国家，然后他们继续前进并殖民了世界其他大部分地区。

Today, for about 120 countries, their current institutions are heavily shaped by their colonial experience, and the colonial episode has been very unequal for different countries.

如今，对于大约 120 个国家来说，其现行机构在很大程度上受到殖民经历的影响，而且不同国家的殖民经历非常不平等。

If you take places such as the United States or Australia — they ended up with pretty good institutions, actually better institutions in many ways than their mother country back at home, because the settlers who got to live in these places pushed for better institutions, fought for better institutions.

如果你看美国或澳大利亚这样的地方——他们最终拥有相当好的制度，实际上在很多方面都比他们的祖国更好，因为生活在这些地方的定居者推动更好的制度，为更好的制度而奋斗。

Australia was one of the more democratic places in the 19th century.

澳大利亚是 19 世纪较为民主的国家之一。

The US, of course, introduced the smallholder society, much better than Britain.

当然，美国引入了小农社会，这比英国要好得多。

But in most of the tropical areas, the conditions that Europeans encountered led them to adopt a very different colonization strategy, essentially for two separate but related reasons.

但在大多数热带地区，欧洲人遇到的情况导致他们采取了截然不同的殖民战略，主要是出于两个独立但相关的原因。

First, many of the more civilized and densely populated areas were in the tropics or near the topics: the Inca Empire, Aztec Empire, the Indian subcontinent with the Mughal Empire colonized by the British, the North African civilizations.

首先，许多文明程度较高、人口稠密的地区都位于热带地区或主题附近：印加帝国、阿兹特克帝国、被英国殖民的印度次大陆和莫卧儿帝国、北非文明。

And all of those created a much better opportunity for Europeans to set up what James and I called extractive institutions, to essentially control labor and use labor.

所有这些都为欧洲人创造了更好的机会来建立詹姆斯和我所说的榨取制度，从根本上控制劳动力和使用劳动力。

Moreover, the settlement pattern that was at the root of the better institutional development of places such as the US, Canada, Australia really was made impossible in most of these places because, associated with both climatic conditions and the dense population, they had vectors of diseases that were very, very different than the ones the Europeans were used to, so the mortality rates that Europeans faced were very different.

此外，作为美国、加拿大、澳大利亚等地更好的制度发展的根源的定居模式在大多数地方实际上是不可能的，因为与气候条件和人口稠密有关，它们的疾病载体与欧洲人习惯的疾病载体非常非常不同，因此欧洲人面临的死亡率也非常不同。

The combination of these two factors meant that the colonization experience was very different and the colonial institutions were very different in these places.

这两个因素的结合意味着这些地方的殖民经历有很大不同，殖民制度也有很大不同。

And to a first approximation, all of that big gap between places such as US, Argentina, Chile, and places like Peru, Bolivia, India, Pakistan, can be explained by these different colonization strategies and their institutional implications.

初步估计，美国、阿根廷、智利等地与秘鲁、玻利维亚、印度、巴基斯坦等地之间的巨大差距可以通过这些不同的殖民战略及其制度含义来解释。

On institutions and human capital

论制度与人力资本

But relatively speaking, it was places that were empty, without any urbanization, without much established road networks or agricultural surplus, such as Chile, Argentina, US, Canada — relative to the places that I mentioned a moment ago: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Mexico, India, Pakistan — that actually became richer.

但相对而言，那些空旷、没有任何城市化、没有太多成熟的道路网络或农业剩余的地方，例如智利、阿根廷、美国、加拿大——相对于我刚才提到的玻利维亚、秘鲁、厄瓜多尔、墨西哥、印度、巴基斯坦——实际上变得更加富裕。

So, that reversal of fortune is a prima facie evidence against a purely geographic explanation.

因此，命运的逆转是反对纯粹地理解释的表面证据。

Now, what else could explain it?

现在，还有什么可以解释呢？

Well, essentially there are two broad categories.

嗯，本质上有两大类。

The details, of course, within those categories matter, but there are two broad categories.

当然，这些类别中的细节很重要，但有两大类。

One is that it’s the institutions, as I’ve tried to explain.

一是正如我试图解释的那样，这是机构的问题。

And second, it’s culture.

其次，是文化。

Perhaps Europeans brought their culture into some places or messed up the culture in some other places.

也许欧洲人把他们的文化带到了一些地方，或者搞乱了另一些地方的文化。

And the human capital is somewhere in between because human capital is an institutional feature, meaning that it really depends on the educational investments, but it also, of course, has a cultural element.

人力资本介于两者之间，因为人力资本是一种制度特征，这意味着它实际上取决于教育投资，但它当然也具有文化因素。

So a lot of the qualitative and the quantitative research that we have done puts much more emphasis and finds more support for the institutional interpretation.

因此，我们所做的许多定性和定量研究更加重视并为制度解释找到了更多支持。

For example, if you take human capital, it wasn’t that Europeans brought human capital to the places such as the US or Argentina or Chile.

例如，如果你拿人力资本来说，并不是欧洲人把人力资本带到了美国、阿根廷或智利等地。

Actually, the Europeans who were more educated were the ones who went to places such as the Inca Empire or the Aztec Empire.

事实上，受过更多教育的欧洲人是去了印加帝国或阿兹特克帝国等地方的人。

Europeans settled in some numbers in Barbados.

一些欧洲人在巴巴多斯定居。

In 1680, about 10,000 people in Barbados had European ancestry and probably about 2,000, 3,000 were British.

1680 年，巴巴多斯约有 10,000 人有欧洲血统，其中可能有 2,000 至 3,000 人是英国人。

But these people, who benefited mightily from the plantation complex and from about 40,000 people being chattel slaves, did not have any idea of introducing a Declaration of Independence.

但这些从种植园和约 40,000 人成为动产奴隶中获益匪浅的人根本没有任何提出《独立宣言》的想法。

They actually established a very draconian regime.

他们实际上建立了一个非常严厉的政权。

Executions were commonplace.

处决是司空见惯的事情。

All the power was concentrated in the hands of about 150 families that were to be plantation owners.

所有权力都集中在大约 150 个即将成为种植园主的家庭手中。

And the way that the independence declaration evolved and other things evolved in the US was actually in reaction to British power.

美国独立宣言和其他事情的演变实际上是对英国势力的反应。

The important story, which, of course, everybody knows, is that Declaration of Independence was in order for the Americans to reject the European imposition to some degree.

当然，每个人都知道的重要故事是，《独立宣言》是为了让美国人在某种程度上拒绝欧洲的强加。

But actually, the story goes much further back if you take the first semi-successful colony in Jamestown.

但实际上，如果你以詹姆斯敦第一个半成功的殖民地为例，这个故事可以追溯到更早的时候。

What makes Jamestown unique is not that .

詹姆斯敦的独特之处并非如此。

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or actually, very common in some sense, but a first in history.

或者实际上，在某种意义上很常见，但却是历史上的第一次。

It actually broke completely new ground institutionally to introduce the headright system, smallholder property, to introduce the general assembly.

它实际上在制度上开辟了全新的天地，引入了头权制度，小农财产，引入了大会。

And none of this was because the Virginia Company, who colonized and owned the place, wanted to.

而这一切都不是因为殖民并拥有该地的弗吉尼亚公司想要这样做。

They wanted to set up a system very similar to the one in Barbados or Jamaica.

他们想要建立一个与巴巴多斯或牙买加非常相似的系统。

It was against the wishes of their British masters because the settlers said, “No, we’re not going to go along with that.” And they had enough political power to do it.

这违背了英国主人的意愿，因为定居者说：“不，我们不会同意。”他们有足够的政治权力来做到这一点。

Therefore, the story is more complicated.

因此，故事更加复杂。

It’s not that the European ideas directly came.

欧洲的想法并不是直接传来的。

It’s the European ideas interacting with the local conditions, and often the success came from local conditions making European strategies of dominance unsuccessful.

这是欧洲的想法与当地条件相互作用的结果，而成功往往来自于当地条件，这使得欧洲的主导战略无法成功。

It’s not that the European ideas directly came.

欧洲的想法并不是直接传来的。

It’s the European ideas interacting with the local conditions, and often the success came from local conditions making European strategies of dominance unsuccessful.

这是欧洲的想法与当地条件相互作用的结果，而成功往往来自于当地条件，这使得欧洲的主导战略无法成功。

And there’s a lot of selection among the Russians who come here.

来到这里的俄罗斯人有很多选择。

There are a lot of criminal Russian elements who come to Europe, and they do very well, but for different reasons than the mathematical or the physical-sciences human capital that they’re bringing.

有很多俄罗斯犯罪分子来到欧洲，他们做得很好，但出于不同的原因，而不是他们带来的数学或物理科学人力资本。

But I would say, what the Russian scientists are bringing .

但我想说的是，俄罗斯科学家带来了什么。

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and that’s very well documented.

这是有详细记录的。

For example, in the case of after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian mathematicians came here, and they took jobs from American mathematicians because they were actually better.

例如，苏联解体后，俄罗斯数学家来到这里，他们抢走了美国数学家的工作，因为他们实际上更优秀。

Well, that’s both human capital and institutions, meaning that the reason why that’s actually persisting is not simply that the current generation of Russians have parents who are very high human capital.

嗯，这既是人力资本，也是制度，这意味着这种情况实际上持续存在的原因不仅仅是当代俄罗斯人的父母拥有非常高的人力资本。

That matters, of course.

当然，这很重要。

That matters for the values.

这对于价值观很重要。

But really, Russian educational institutions have persisted.

但实际上，俄罗斯教育机构一直在坚持。

Take away those, they collapse, and nothing remains.

拿走那些，它们就会倒塌，什么也没有留下。

And you’ve seen that happen in some of the Russian republics, for example.

例如，您已经在俄罗斯的一些共和国看到了这种情况的发生。

They had pretty good educational institutions at the time, but then in the context of the civil wars that ensued, for example, some of those educational institutions have collapsed, and rebuilding them has been much harder.

他们当时有相当好的教育机构，但后来在内战的背景下，例如，其中一些教育机构已经倒塌，重建起来就困难得多。

So the Mincer regression says if you get one more year of schooling, you’re going to increase your earnings by about 6 percent in the US, perhaps as high as 8 or 9 percent in some developing countries.

因此，明瑟回归表明，如果你再接受一年的教育，在美国你的收入将会增加约 6%，在一些发展中国家可能会高达 8% 或 9%。

Let’s say 10 percent.

假设是 10%。

Let’s be generous.

让我们慷慨一点吧。

That means that if you are going to increase your rate of schooling by 3 or 4 percent, and if there are no major human capital externalities — and we can come back to that — then that’s going to increase your GDP per capita by 25, 30 percent.

这意味着，如果你打算将受教育率提高 3% 或 4%，并且不存在重大的人力资本外部性（我们可以回到这一点），那么你的人均 GDP 将会增加 25%、30%。

That’s a very small number relative to the gaps that we actually observe.

相对于我们实际观察到的差距来说，这个数字非常小。

So if you look at what —

所以如果你看看什么——

And later literature that followed — some of it very good, some of it not so good because there are other methodological issues, but they all uniformly find much more limited returns to human capital.

随后出现的文献——有些非常好，有些则不太好，因为存在其他方法论问题，但它们都一致发现人力资本的回报要有限得多。

And that’s not my work.

那不是我的工作。

Here, I’m actually building on other people’s work, such as Pete Klenow, Andres Rodriguez-Clare, or others who have really made this point very effectively.

在这里，我实际上是在其他人的工作的基础上进行的，例如 Pete Klenow、Andres Rodriguez-Clare 或其他确实非常有效地阐述了这一点的人。

So the only nuance here is exactly what you’ve pointed out: some sort of human capital externalities.

因此，这里唯一的细微差别正是您所指出的：某种人力资本外部性。

Could it be that the return for a society from education is much, much larger than what we mentioned with Mincer regression, when we look at an individual’s own earnings increasing?

当我们观察个人收入的增长时，教育对社会的回报是否会比我们在明瑟回归中提到的要大得多？

And that would be the realm of human capital externalities, and those could come in one or two forms.

这就是人力资本外部性的领域，这些外部性可能以一种或两种形式出现。

They could come either through some sort of local externalities, meaning that I get more education and I make people around me richer.

它们可以通过某种当地的外部性来实现，这意味着我得到了更多的教育，并且让我周围的人变得更富有。

Or they could come through some sort of R&D externalities, that I become more educated, and as a result of that, I invent something and make everybody in the world more productive.

或者他们可以通过某种研发外部性来实现，让我受更多的教育，因此，我发明了一些东西，让世界上每个人都更有生产力。

Now, the first one, the local human capital externalities — that’s something I actually investigated, for example, with my work with Joshua Angrist, and we don’t find much evidence for it.

现在，第一个是当地人力资本的外部性——这是我实际调查过的，例如，我与约书亚·安格里斯特的合作，但我们没有找到太多证据。

And it’s not so surprising at some level.

从某种程度上来说，这并不奇怪。

There could be some small externalities, but are you going to become suddenly much more productive because a bunch of McDonald’s workers suddenly increase their education level by two years?

可能会有一些小的外部性，但是你会因为一群麦当劳员工突然将他们的教育水平提高两年而突然变得更有生产力吗？

Sure, perhaps when you go to McDonald’s, you’ll get better service.

当然，也许当你去麦当劳时，你会得到更好的服务。

There might be some other small externalities, but it’s not going to be a transformative event to increase your rate of return by three- or fourfold.

可能还有其他一些小的外部因素，但这不会是一个将你的回报率提高三到四倍的变革性事件。

Now, the R&D externalities are different.

现在，研发外部性不同了。

So I think it’s really hard to cook up stories for human capital externalities that’s going to get you anywhere close to Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s type of numbers or implications.

因此，我认为编造人力资本外部性的故事确实很难让你接近曼昆、罗默和韦尔的数字或含义。

Google got an amazing value.

谷歌获得了惊人的价值。

It’s one of the most valuable companies that human history has ever seen.

它是人类历史上最有价值的公司之一。

But some of it came because it actually took the market of other search engines, such as Yahoo or AltaVista.

但其中一些是因为它实际上占领了其他搜索引擎的市场，例如雅虎或 AltaVista。

It also created value for its customers, and it’s also been pretty good at capturing that value.

它还为客户创造了价值，并且也非常善于捕捉这种价值。

But the important thing, again, is those are very exceptional one or two innovations.

但重要的是，这些都是非常特殊的一两项创新。

When you say the average level of schooling increases from 10 to 11, we’re not really capturing that.

当你说平均受教育程度从 10 提高到 11 时，我们并没有真正理解这一点。

Some of the people who innovate and capture such values are not the most educated ones, and they’re not educated in the US.

一些创新并捕捉这些价值观的人并不是受过最高教育的人，而且他们在美国也没有受过教育。

One of the great things about US is, actually, we attract those talents, again because of the business environment, because of the institutional environment, as well as the teams that they can form when they come to the US.

事实上，美国的一大优点是，我们吸引了这些人才，同样是因为商业环境，因为制度环境，以及他们来到美国后可以组建的团队。

On democratization and progress

关于民主化和进步

But you have to be careful.

但你必须小心。

Of course, if you judge whether democracy is successful or not by comparing China to Switzerland, you’re going to get not very meaningful answers.

当然，如果你通过比较中国和瑞士来判断民主是否成功，你会得到没有多大意义的答案。

That’s like a chief case of comparing apples and oranges.

这就像比较苹果和橙子的一个主要例子。

I have written a couple of papers on this, and the econometrics here really matters for a variety of reasons.

我已经就此写了几篇论文，出于多种原因，这里的计量经济学确实很重要。

You don’t want to compare apples and oranges.

你不想比较苹果和橘子。

You also want to be careful because it turns out that there’s one surefire predictor of when a country democratizes — it’s economic crisis.

你还需要小心，因为事实证明，一个国家何时民主化有一个可靠的预测因素——那就是经济危机。

Dictatorships don’t go often because they decide, well, citizens should rule themselves.

独裁政权并不经常出现，因为他们决定，公民应该自己统治。

They collapse, and they collapse more likely in the midst of severe economic recessions.

它们崩溃了，而且在严重的经济衰退期间更有可能崩溃。

So you really have to take care of these things.

所以你真的必须照顾这些事情。

And when you do that, you find two things that are both amazingly robust.

当你这样做时，你会发现有两件事都非常强大。

One is that democracies grow faster.

一是民主国家发展得更快。

So when a country democratizes, for another three or four years, it takes time for it to get out of the crisis.

所以当一个国家实现民主化之后，再过三四年，它就需要时间来走出危机。

Then it starts a much faster growth process.

然后它开始一个更快的增长过程。

It’s not going to make Nigeria turn into Switzerland, but a country that democratizes adds about 20 to 25 percent more to its GDP per capita.

这不会让尼日利亚变成瑞士，但一个民主化的国家的人均 GDP 会增加约 20% 至 25%。

When a country democratizes, for another three or four years, it takes time for it to get out of the crisis.

当一个国家实现民主化后，再过三四年，它就需要时间才能走出危机。

Then it starts a much faster growth process.

然后它开始一个更快的增长过程。

It’s not going to make Nigeria turn into Switzerland, but a country that democratizes adds about 20 to 25 percent more to its GDP per capita.

这不会让尼日利亚变成瑞士，但一个民主化的国家的人均 GDP 会增加约 20% 至 25%。

And then the second thing, again, completely the opposite of what you said from Mulligan’s research — one of the most important mechanisms for that seems to be that when you democratize, you tax more, so the taxation, the budgets go up.

然后第二件事，再次与你在马里根的研究中所说的完全相反——最重要的机制之一似乎是，当你民主化时，你会征收更多的税，因此税收和预算都会增加。

And you spend more, especially on education and health, so the health of the population improves.

而且你会花更多的钱，特别是在教育和健康方面，因此人们的健康状况会得到改善。

Child mortality is one of the things that improves very fast.

儿童死亡率是改善得非常快的因素之一。

Primary and secondary enrollment improves a little bit more slowly, but it improves very steadily.

小学和中学的入学率提高得稍慢一些，但提高得非常稳定。

But at the end of the day, that translating into better public services like education, healthcare — that’s really what this book is about.

但归根结底，这会转化为更好的公共服务，如教育、医疗保健——这才是本书的真正目的。

That’s what The Narrow Corridor is about.

这就是《狭窄的走廊》的意义所在。

It’s how do you make states and societies work together?

这就是如何让国家和社会合作？

If you look at most of human history, it doesn’t work.

如果你看看大部分人类历史，就会发现这是行不通的。

Either you have stateless societies, no centralized law, no third-party enforcement — so, lawlessness and lots of other costs — or you have despotic states that don’t listen to society and impose their will, often very repressively and otherwise, on societies.

要么是无国家的社会，没有中央集权的法律，没有第三方执法——因此，无法无天和许多其他成本——要么是专制的国家，它们不倾听社会的意见，将自己的意志强加于社会，通常是非常镇压和其他方式。

But the original part of the book is to say, actually, squeezed in between these two things, there is this Red Queen dynamics, the corridor where states and societies sort of support each other, and that supporting process is a contentious process.

但这本书的最初部分是说，实际上，在这两件事之间，存在着红皇后动态，即国家和社会相互支持的走廊，而支持过程是一个有争议的过程。

It’s not that they are happily cooperating.

这并不是说他们合作愉快。

They are trying to race with each other.

他们正试图与彼此比赛。

Each is trying to have the upper hand.

每个人都试图占据上风。

But as long as that competition doesn’t become destructive, it can actually add to the capacity of both of them.

但只要这种竞争不具有破坏性，它实际上可以增加双方的能力。

So in that sense, it is an institutional theory.

所以从这个意义上说，它是一种制度理论。

It is also about norms and cultures because you really need to write norms and cultures for society to participate in politics, and the right sort of understanding of what that participation is about.

它还与规范和文化有关，因为你确实需要为社会参与政治制定规范和文化，以及对参与的内容有正确的理解。

But at some level, I also don’t see it that easily being reduced to other stories because it is exactly about this cooperation-and-competition dimension of state and society empowering both, which, at least to our understanding, was not an idea that has received much attention, but when you start thinking about it, it really opens up new horizons about your interpretation of the world.

但在某种程度上，我也不认为它很容易被简化为其他故事，因为它正是关于国家和社会赋予双方权力的这种合作与竞争的维度，至少在我们看来，这并不是一个受到太多关注的想法，但当你开始思考它时，它确实为你解释世界打开了新的视野。

On European exceptionalism

论欧洲例外论

Then you also need some sort of institutional elements that survive or that are present, about how state institutions are run, how bureaucracy is organized, how administration is organized.

然后，你还需要某种现存的或现存的制度要素，关于国家机构如何运作、官僚机构如何组织、行政管理如何组织。

Let me take a specific example, and then we can talk about human capital in that context.

我举一个具体的例子，然后我们就可以谈谈人力资本。

You cannot talk about liberty without at least addressing, to some degree, why Europe is exceptional.

如果不至少在某种程度上解决欧洲为何如此特殊，就不能谈论自由。

Why is it that certain representative institutions develop most strongly in Europe and certain aspects of liberty — they did not only develop in Europe; the demand certainly was there throughout the world — but they took strongest root in Europe.

为什么某些代议制机构和自由的某些方面在欧洲发展得最为强劲——它们不仅在欧洲发展；而且在欧洲也发展得很好。世界各地肯定都有这种需求，但它们在欧洲扎根最深。

So what was special about it?

那么它有什么特别之处呢？

Culture, Greco-Roman heritage, geography?

文化、希腊罗马遗产、地理？

We say none of this.

我们不说这些。

It’s actually the meeting of bottom-up political participation and the institutions of the Roman Empire, even after the Western Roman Empire had collapsed.

这实际上是自下而上的政治参与和罗马帝国制度的相遇，即使是在西罗马帝国崩溃之后。

So where does the bottom-up element come from?

那么自下而上的元素从哪里来呢？

Well, it comes from the Germanic tribes who were raiding and sometimes fighting with, sometimes fighting against the Romans.

嗯，它来自日耳曼部落，他们经常袭击罗马人，有时与罗马人作战，有时与罗马人作战。

But after the Western Roman Empire collapsed, especially the Franks, sorry, amalgamation of several other Germanic tribes really took root throughout that area.

但在西罗马帝国崩溃后，尤其是法兰克人，抱歉，其他几个日耳曼部落的合并确实在该地区扎根。

The Franks did not have much human capital.

法兰克人没有多少人力资本。

They did not have any educational institutions.

他们没有任何教育机构。

They didn’t know how to read and write.

他们不知道如何读写。

They learned that from the church after they sort of adopted Christianity.

他们在接受基督教后从教会得知了这一点。

But what they had were these traditions of organizing their politics.

但他们拥有的是组织政治的传统。

This is recognized by Julius Caesar and Tacitus during the times of the Roman empires and the early chroniclers of the Merovingians and the Carolingians.

罗马帝国时期的尤利乌斯·凯撒和塔西佗以及墨洛温王朝和加洛林王朝的早期编年史家都承认这一点。

They had this view that the chiefs had to serve the people.

他们认为酋长必须为人民服务。

So the chiefs were often temporarily appointed during wartime, and out of war, they held back.

因此，酋长们往往是在战时临时任命的，而在战争结束后，他们就退缩了。

They had all these assemblies.

他们举行了所有这些集会。

Some historians call them the assembly politics of the German tribe.

一些历史学家称其为日耳曼部落的集会政治。

Everything had to be done through assemblies, and those traditions were the ones that they tried to fuse, and quite successfully in the hands of Clovis and Charlemagne, for example, together with the much more top-down Roman Empire’s institutions.

一切都必须通过集会来完成，而这些传统正是他们试图融合的传统，并且在克洛维和查理曼手中非常成功，例如，与更加自上而下的罗马帝国机构一起融合。

So it’s the human capital came out of that process, especially with the church’s doctrines and teachings as one of the key repositories of human capital around the Middle Ages, sort of playing out.

因此，人力资本就是从这个过程中产生的，特别是教会的教义和教义作为中世纪人力资本的关键宝库之一，在某种程度上发挥了作用。

But when you look at the Merovingians — they did not have high human capital.

但当你看看墨洛温王朝时，你会发现他们并没有很高的人力资本。

They certainly had much less human capital than the Romans before the Roman Empire had collapsed.

他们的人力资本肯定比罗马帝国崩溃之前的罗马人少得多。

But the ideas that they are bringing aren’t associated with any sort of religious ideology or anything like that.

但他们带来的想法与任何宗教意识形态或类似的东西无关。

They’re just much more practical, and the role of the church is actually quite much more complex than what might first meet the eye.

它们只是更加实用，而且教会的角色实际上比乍一看要复杂得多。

First of all, the Merovingians weren’t, or the Franks weren’t, initially Christian.

首先，墨洛温王朝或者法兰克人最初并不是基督教徒。

They became Christian as a state-building effort.

他们成为基督徒是为了国家建设的努力。

Clovis decided to convert to Christianity, but it wasn’t a personal conversion.

克洛维斯决定皈依基督教，但这不是个人的皈依。

He converted together with all of his warriors, and he wanted to have the additional political hierarchy created thanks to the church.

他和他的所有战士一起皈依了基督教，他希望通过教会建立额外的政治等级制度。

And we know that when the church institutions and the Roman institutions meet with other sort of conditions, they did not lead to anything like the corridor that we see starting during the Merovingian and the Carolingian times.

我们知道，当教会机构和罗马机构遇到其他类型的条件时，它们并没有导致像我们看到的墨洛温王朝和加洛林王朝时期开始的走廊那样的事情。

The place where the church was extremely strong and Roman institutions were extremely strong was Byzantium.

教会极其强大、罗马机构极其强大的地方就是拜占庭。

The Eastern Roman Empire survived, and it was actually much better organized in many ways than the Western Roman Empire.

东罗马帝国幸存下来，而且它在很多方面的组织实际上比西罗马帝国要好得多。

Christianity played a very, very important role.

基督教发挥了非常非常重要的作用。

Their bureaucratic traditions persisted, but no liberty emerged in the Byzantium Empire because you had the one blade, which was the state institutions, but the other blade, the bottom-up politics, was completely missing.

他们的官僚传统依然存在，但拜占庭帝国没有出现自由，因为你拥有一把刀片，即国家机构，但另一把刀片，即自下而上的政治，完全缺失。

But about Christianity, I would say the Byzantium example says there’s nothing exceptional about Christianity in the hands of the Byzantium emperors.

但关于基督教，我想说拜占庭的例子表明，拜占庭皇帝手中的基督教并没有什么特殊之处。

Christianity was as repressive and as a top-down state religion as any.

基督教是一种压制性的、自上而下的国教。

Examples of that abound from Portugal to Spain, both in their own countries when the monarchs became strong enough, or the way that they impose this in their colonies.

从葡萄牙到西班牙，这样的例子比比皆是，无论是在他们自己的国家，当君主变得足够强大时，还是他们在殖民地强加这种做法的方式。

Christianity turned out to be extremely consistent with top-down politics imposition, stamping out all sorts of rights and bottom-up elements.

事实证明，基督教与自上而下的政治强加极为一致，消除了各种权利和自下而上的因素。

You see that, for example, again, in the case of the Anglo-Saxon England.

例如，在盎格鲁-撒克逊英格兰的例子中，你会再次看到这一点。

In the case of Anglo-Saxon England, Christianity plays a much secondary role relative to the assembly politics in the way that the Saxons brought to the British Isles.

就盎格鲁-撒克逊英格兰而言，相对于撒克逊人带到不列颠群岛的集会政治，基督教扮演着次要的角色。

You see those assemblies playing a role at every stage, constraining kings and completely changing the political traditions, even after the Norman Conquest.

你会看到这些议会在每个阶段都发挥着作用，限制国王并彻底改变政治传统，即使在诺曼征服之后也是如此。

Christianity comes in and out of the picture, but it’s completely secondary.

基督教在这个画面中出现和消失，但它完全是次要的。

Now once, of course, those political traditions become well rooted and the country is Christian, those two start merging, and some of the exporting of these ideas beyond the boundaries of the Germanic tribes themselves or Britain sometimes have a religious element.

当然，现在一旦这些政治传统根深蒂固并且国家是基督教国家，这两者就开始融合，而这些思想的一些输出超出了日耳曼部落本身或英国的边界，有时带有宗教元素。

But I don’t think I would interpret that as saying that there is something inherently different about Christianity.

但我不认为我会将此解释为基督教有本质上的不同。

What’s really very exceptional about East Asia are the traditions of state capacity that go back to the Qin dynasty in China.

东亚真正的独特之处在于其国家能力的传统可以追溯到中国的秦朝。

And Confucius’s teaching, as has been adopted by the successive Chinese dynasties, is an important part of it.

而孔子的学说，为中国历代王朝所沿用，就是其中的重要组成部分。

It spreads from China to Korea to Vietnam.

它从中国传播到韩国再到越南。

You have this more meritocratic organization of the bureaucracy, for example.

例如，官僚机构的组织更加精英化。

And you have strong states, but at least with some capacity, not just tinpot dictators.

你们有强大的国家，但至少有一定的能力，而不仅仅是无用的独裁者。

But what you want to think about there, again, is not a simply cultural thing.

但你想要思考的不仅仅是文化问题。

It does certainly survive in the forms of culture.

它确实以文化的形式存在。

It does certainly survive in the form of norms.

它确实以规范的形式存在。

But its institutional underpinnings are very important as well: the exact way in which the state is organized, the exact way in which the bureaucracy is organized, and the relationship between state and society.

但其制度基础也非常重要：国家组织的具体方式、官僚机构的具体组织方式以及国家与社会的关系。

The fact that society hasn’t had much of a voice really helps some of those traditions evolve.

事实上，社会没有太多的发言权，这确实有助于其中一些传统的发展。

If you go back in time long enough — for example, the Ottoman Spring period — China looks very different.

如果你回溯到足够长的时间——例如奥斯曼之春时期——中国看起来就大不一样了。

So it was a political change that happened, especially during the big wars of the Warring period, that really changed those traditions, those institutions.

因此，发生的政治变革，特别是在战国时期的大战期间，真正改变了这些传统和制度。

So again, my interpretation would be that it’s very much along the lines of what I’m talking about, which is the interplay of norms and institutions together shaping these things.

再说一遍，我的解释是，这与我所说的非常一致，即规范和制度的相互作用共同塑造了这些事物。

And there isn’t a special Chinese genetic or some such human capital or idea that’s surviving.

中国并没有特殊的基因或类似的人力资本或理念得以幸存。

It’s those norms and institutions that are recreating themselves in different guises.

正是这些规范和制度以不同的形式重新塑造了自己。

On Chinese exceptionalism

论中国例外论

All of those are very similar to what happened with the Prussian growth, for example, in 19th century, with the Russian growth, but it all even has some elements of commonality with the Soviet growth during the 1930s, ’40s, and ’50s.

所有这些都与普鲁士的增长非常相似，例如19世纪俄罗斯的增长，但它甚至与1930年代、40年代和50年代苏联的增长有一些共同点。

But what we are seeing right now is — against the predictions of many pundits, but very much consistent with the framework that we’re presenting in The Narrow Corridor — the imbalance between state and society meant that growth went hand in hand with the state’s control over society not weakening and, in many ways during Xi Jinping, getting stronger.

但我们现在看到的是——与许多专家的预测相反，但与我们在《狭窄的走廊》中​​提出的框架非常一致——国家与社会之间的不平衡意味着经济增长与国家对社会的控制齐头并进，在习近平执政期间，国家对社会的控制没有减弱，而且在很多方面变得更强。

But what makes China exceptional is that — like no other despotic, extractive society in history — it has a complete obsession with innovation and technology.

但中国的特殊之处在于——与历史上任何其他专制、榨取性的社会不同——它对创新和技术有着完全的痴迷。

When you look at other despotic states, they understand they have to use technology.

当你看看其他专制国家时，他们明白他们必须使用技术。

They understand they have to build some edge in some things such as war making, but they are not pouring resources.

他们明白他们必须在战争等某些事情上建立一些优势，但他们并没有投入资源。

They’re not trying to reorganize society in a new way in order to bring forth innovation while still keeping that despotic control.

他们并不是试图以新的方式重组社会，以带来创新，同时仍然保持专制控制。

China is the first society that’s really systematically trying to do that.

中国是第一个真正系统地尝试这样做的社会。

China wants to keep the despotic control of the Chinese Communist Party while at the same time be a leader in digital technology, leader in Telecom, leader in AI, and it’s pouring a lot of resources.

中国希望保持中共的专制控制，同时成为数字技术的领导者、电信的领导者、人工智能的领导者，并且正在投入大量资源。

It’s providing incentives, and the question is whether this is going to succeed.

它提供了激励，问题是这是否会成功。

My view is, it is not a complete failure, but it’s not going to be a huge success.

我的观点是，这不是彻底的失败，但也不会取得巨大的成功。

You see the problems in it already, and we can go into some of the details.

您已经看到了其中的问题，我们可以讨论一些细节。

I don’t want to keep going on and on.

我不想继续这样下去。

But there are tensions.

但也存在紧张局势。

You really need — you called it individualism.

你确实需要——你称之为个人主义。

I’m happy to call it that.

我很高兴这样称呼它。

I would have called it something differently.

我会用不同的方式称呼它。

But you need that individualism spark.

但你需要个人主义的火花。

You need that experimentation for the most radical type of innovations to take place, and China is missing that.

你需要进行最激进的创新实验，而中国却缺少这一点。

It’s going to try to pour more and more resources to make up for it, but I’m not sure whether it’s going to work.

它会尝试投入越来越多的资源来弥补，但我不确定它是否会起作用。

I don’t think China is going to seamlessly democratize and enter the corridor and start having very strong civil-society institutions.

我认为中国不会无缝地实现民主化并进入走廊并开始拥有非常强大的公民社会机构。

You’re not going to be able to build very strong state capacity institutions in places that have a tradition of completely distrusting the state.

在具有完全不信任国家传统的地方，你将无法建立非常强大的国家能力机构。

You also are going to have a very different growth experience in places where you have a tradition of state capacity.

在拥有国家能力传统的地方，你也会有非常不同的成长经历。

So Vietnam is going to be very different than Burma, for example, because at least in parts of Vietnam, you have this tradition and institutions of states organizing production, organizing irrigation.

因此，越南将与缅甸有很大不同，因为至少在越南的部分地区，有这种传统和国家组织生产、组织灌溉的机构。

And in Africa, Rwanda and Burundi, with a tradition of much stronger state institutions, are going to be very different.

在非洲，卢旺达和布隆迪有着更强大的国家机构传统，情况将会非常不同。

Ethiopia has some of that also, and those countries can pursue a very different growth strategy than, say, Nigeria.

埃塞俄比亚也有一些这样的特点，这些国家可以采取与尼日利亚等国家截然不同的增长战略。

Nigeria is an amalgamation of many, many, many different ethnicities, tribes, and nationalities.

尼日利亚是许多不同种族、部落和民族的融合体。

It had none of it.

它什么也没有。

Well, Yoruba perhaps a little bit has some of these traditions of older empires.

嗯，约鲁巴人也许有一些古老帝国的传统。

But the country is not going to have a top-down growth strategy like the one that Rwanda and Ethiopia have.

但该国不会像卢旺达和埃塞俄比亚那样采取自上而下的增长战略。

But these are just very general tendencies.

但这些只是非常普遍的趋势。

Nigeria can collapse into civil war again, and it’s very difficult to predict those things.

尼日利亚可能会再次陷入内战，而这些事情很难预测。

You can predict the fault lines.

您可以预测断层线。

You can predict some of the comparative advantages.

您可以预测一些比较优势。

You can predict what is going to be very difficult.

你可以预测什么会是非常困难的。

But making very specific predictions is going to be very hard.

但做出非常具体的预测将非常困难。

They both have very deep conflicts.

他们两人有很深的矛盾。

Chile is a very highly unequal country.

智利是一个非常不平等的国家。

Economic inequality, I think, actually understates social inequality.

我认为，经济不平等实际上低估了社会不平等。

And you are seeing that with protests.

你在抗议中看到了这一点。

We’re seeing that with distributional conflicts.

我们在分配冲突中看到了这一点。

But despite that, I think this combination makes Chile unique in many ways.

但尽管如此，我认为这种结合使智利在很多方面都独一无二。

And Uruguay, I think, has attempted to do the same thing.

我认为乌拉圭也试图做同样的事情。

I think Ethiopia is a great example to watch.

我认为埃塞俄比亚是一个值得关注的很好的例子。

It’s been crushed under brutal dictatorships for so long, but it has some of the elements of state institutions that are much stronger than the rest of Africa.

它长期以来一直被残酷的独裁统治所压垮，但它的国家机构的一些要素比非洲其他国家要强大得多。

And again, what you’re seeing with Abiy Ahmed now is this attempt to bring out the bottom-up element.

再说一次，你现在在阿比·艾哈迈德身上看到的是这种尝试带出自下而上的元素。

I think that’s very important.

我认为这非常重要。

You can go a little bit more micro.

你可以更微观一些。

In the book, we talk about Lagos.

在书中，我们谈论拉各斯。

Lagos is a super interesting case because it was the favorite example for everybody who wanted to talk of chaos and anarchy.

拉各斯是一个非常有趣的案例，因为它是每个想要谈论混乱和无政府状态的人最喜欢的例子。

It was a lawless city falling into pieces.

这是一座支离破碎的无法无天的城市。

Gangs were roaming the streets.

帮派在街上游荡。

But then what you actually witnessed in Lagos is exactly the type of thing that our framework suggests is a way out.

但你在拉各斯实际目睹的情况正是我们的框架所建议的出路。

Some politicians who understood that the only way out of the morass was, you’re going to promise to offer better state services, better tax collection, better refuse collection, better schooling, while at the same time encourage society to monitor them better.

一些政客明白，摆脱困境的唯一出路是，你将承诺提供更好的国家服务、更好的税收、更好的垃圾收集、更好的教育，同时鼓励社会更好地监督他们。

So the dual action of increase the state’s capacity while society’s controls get tightened as well.

因此，在增加国家能力的同时，社会的控制也得到加强。

On things under- and overrated

关于被低估和高估的事情

Publishing in the top five journals is a good discipline because it makes sure that we don’t slack off, we don’t do shoddy research and get the credit for it.

在排名前五的期刊上发表文章是一项很好的纪律，因为它可以确保我们不会懈怠，不会做粗制滥造的研究并因此获得荣誉。

But if it becomes an obsession, it is at the cost of communicating with the rest of the world.

但如果它成为一种痴迷，那就是以与世界其他地方沟通为代价的。

And that’s not healthy either.

这也不健康。

Since at the moment, all of the incentives in academia and economics depend on publishing in the top five journals, I would say somewhat overrated because we should also value people who are able to reach a broader audience, think outside the box.

由于目前学术界和经济学界的所有激励措施都取决于在排名前五的期刊上发表文章，我想说有点高估了，因为我们还应该重视那些能够接触到更广泛受众、跳出框框思考的人。

Sometimes fads really determine who can get published and what can get published in the top five journals.

有时，时尚确实决定了谁可以在前五名期刊上发表文章以及什么内容可以发表。

So if you have some big ideas and you’re looking at the data of the world in a different way, but your identification isn’t solid, you’re never going to get into a top-five journal.

因此，如果你有一些伟大的想法，并且你正在以不同的方式看待世界数据，但你的识别并不可靠，那么你永远不会进入前五名期刊。

But we shouldn’t be discouraging that type of research.

但我们不应该阻止此类研究。

On political liberty in Turkey

论土耳其的政治自由

Now, the future of political liberty in Turkey.

现在，土耳其政治自由的未来。

Are you optimistic?

你乐观吗？

And what’s the path back?

回去的路是什么？

The new presidency with executive powers and no checks and balances is terrible.

拥有行政权力、没有制衡的新总统是可怕的。

Turkey has become much, much more polarized over the last 15 years.

过去 15 年里，土耳其变得更加两极分化。

All of the independent agencies, judiciary institutions have completely collapsed.

所有的独立机构、司法机构都彻底崩溃了。

There is not even a modicum of judicial independence in Turkey.

土耳其甚至没有一点司法独立。

If you can look at the military period and you can say the courts were not independent of the military at the time, that’s true, but the extent to which that could happen is not comparable to today.

如果你看看军事时期，你可以说当时的法院并不独立于军队，这是事实，但这种情况发生的程度与今天无法相比。

But on the other hand, when the West, especially the Europeans, look at Turkey, they misinterpret it.

但另一方面，当西方，尤其是欧洲人看待土耳其时，他们却误解了它。

They misinterpreted it in the 2000s, thinking, well, Erdogan was a force for democracy.

他们在 2000 年代误解了这一点，认为埃尔多安是民主的力量。

By the time he became the darling of some European media outlets, he was already undermining all Turkish institutions.

当他成为一些欧洲媒体的宠儿时，他已经在破坏土耳其的所有机构。

But they are also misjudging the situation in Turkey, thinking that he’s an absolute dictator.

但他们也误判了土耳其的局势，认为他是一个绝对的独裁者。

What really distinguishes Erdogan is his weakness as well as his strength.

埃尔多安的真正与众不同之处在于他的弱点和优点。

And he really depends on some sort of public opinion and enough support from the public to be able to do it.

他确实依赖某种公众舆论和公众足够的支持才能做到这一点。

Many of the worst economic policies in Turkey are attempts to get that, and some of the very bad foreign policies are attempts to get that support.

土耳其许多最糟糕的经济政策都是为了获得这种支持，而一些非常糟糕的外交政策也是为了获得这种支持。

So what we have seen in the latest municipal elections this summer was exactly that.

所以我们在今年夏天最近的市政选举中看到的情况正是如此。

Erdogan did not have the power to stop a huge electoral backlash that happened against him.

埃尔多安没有能力阻止针对他的巨大选举抵制。

So that says that the way out is possible for Turkey, but it’s going to be a very slow way out.

所以这表明土耳其的出路是可能的，但这将是一个非常缓慢的出路。

And the fact that the opposition itself is problematic, divided, doesn’t have a clear ideology of building Turkish democracy — I think all of these make the endgame really, really hard and treacherous in Turkey.

事实上，反对派本身就有问题、分裂，没有建立土耳其民主的明确意识形态——我认为所有这些都使得土耳其的结局变得非常非常艰难和危险。

I think the biggest threats that we are facing right now are Islamic State terrorists getting free or getting a toehold in that area, or the Syrian and the Russian army now completely controlling that strip, or at least much of that strip.

我认为我们现在面临的最大威胁是伊斯兰国恐怖分子逃脱或在该地区获得立足点，或者叙利亚和俄罗斯军队现在完全控制该地带，或者至少是该地带的大部分。

I think none of those are good for the future of the Middle East, and they’re not really good for the security of the West, especially there, again, if the Islamic State comes back.

我认为这些对中东的未来都没有好处，对西方的安全也没有真正的好处，尤其是在伊斯兰国卷土重来的情况下。

So I think the current situation before the Turkish offensive had a lot of problems, but where we are heading right now is even worse.

所以我认为土耳其进攻之前的现状有很多问题，但我们现在的情况更糟。

This is one of the things that we try to grapple with in the book.

这是我们在书中试图解决的问题之一。

Freedom, liberty is a process.

自由，自由是一个过程。

It’s all of these various social hierarchies and restrictions on what people can do in their economic and social lives being broken down one by one, and women’s freedom is a very important element of it.

所有这些不同的社会等级制度以及对人们在经济和社会生活中可以做什么的限制都被一一打破，而妇女的自由是其中非常重要的因素。

And along the lines of what we are emphasizing, it’s not something that was given as a gift by men.

正如我们所强调的那样，这不是男人作为礼物赠送的东西。

It’s not something that naturally came just in and of itself.

这并不是自然而然发生的事情。

It was a process of political change.

这是一个政治变革的过程。

This is one of the things that we try to grapple with in the book.

这是我们在书中试图解决的问题之一。

Freedom, liberty is a process.

自由，自由是一个过程。

It’s all of these various social hierarchies and restrictions on what people can do in their economic and social lives being broken down one by one, and women’s freedom is a very important element of it.

所有这些不同的社会等级制度以及对人们在经济和社会生活中可以做什么的限制都被一一打破，而妇女的自由是其中非常重要的因素。

And along the lines of what we are emphasizing, it’s not something that was given as a gift by men.

正如我们所强调的那样，这不是男人作为礼物赠送的东西。

It’s not something that naturally came just in and of itself.

这并不是自然而然发生的事情。

It was a process of political change.

这是一个政治变革的过程。

People protested.

人们提出抗议。

They wanted more rights, they wanted more voice, and it was, even more importantly, a process of cultural norm change.

他们想要更多的权利，想要更多的发言权，更重要的是，这是一个文化规范改变的过程。

Even after women got the vote in the US and Britain, for example, you wouldn’t say that women were free.

例如，即使女性在美国和英国获得了投票权，你也不会说女性是自由的。

There were so many norms that discriminated against them in the workplace, in the family, and what they could do in social life.

在工作场所、家庭以及社交生活中，有太多歧视他们的规范。

And all of these had to change slowly, but it’s this process of political and social change together, and economic change follows from that.

所有这些都必须缓慢改变，但这是政治和社会变革共同发生的过程，经济变革随之而来。

One is that Pakistan, of course, ended up with the most feudal parts of the Indian subcontinent, in some sense.

一是，从某种意义上说，巴基斯坦当然最终成为了印度次大陆最封建的地区。

And the way that its political system evolved wasn’t adaptation to those feudal political, social relations.

而其政治制度的演变方式并不适应那些封建的政治、社会关系。

The strengthening of the army, the alliance between dictatorial power of army generals and politicians, together with the feudal landowners, I think, was not something that was invented out of raw cloth.

我认为，加强军队、军队将领和政客的独裁权力与封建地主的联盟，并不是凭空捏造出来的。

But even more importantly, the Muslims in the Indian history should not be thought of as a separate category.

但更重要的是，印度历史上的穆斯林不应该被视为一个单独的类别。

They are part of the caste system.

他们是种姓制度的一部分。

The caste system, by creating social hierarchies, in the same way that it affects the untouchables, the Dalits, it also affects the Muslims.

种姓制度通过创造社会等级制度，以同样的方式影响贱民、达利特人，它也影响穆斯林。

So they’re part of that social hierarchy, and the evolution of their norms, their economic opportunities were very much shaped by that whole heritance.

因此，他们是社会等级制度的一部分，他们的规范的演变、他们的经济机会在很大程度上受到整个传承的影响。

Why isn’t the difference between Guatemala and Costa Rica mostly a matter of ethnicity and not so much a matter of the differential history of coffee plantations?

为什么危地马拉和哥斯达黎加之间的差异主要不是种族问题，而不是咖啡种植园历史差异的问题？

Isn’t that the more economical theory that also explains distribution of income within each country?

这难道不是更经济的理论，也能解释每个国家内部的收入分配吗？

Costa Rica is a marginal land.

哥斯达黎加是一块边缘土地。

So it is that political background that really shapes how they react to the new opportunities being made available by the transport revolution and coffee economy.

因此，正是这种政治背景真正决定了他们如何应对交通革命和咖啡经济带来的新机遇。

So they go in the smallholder direction, whereas Guatemala doubled down on repression.

因此，他们朝着小农方向发展，而危地马拉加大了镇压力度。

Who are the people who are being repressed?

那些被镇压的人是谁？

Well, the people who are being repressed are the ethnically indigenous inhabitants of Guatemala.

好吧，受到镇压的人是危地马拉的土著居民。

It’s a very, very naked, savage form of repression.

这是一种非常非常赤裸裸、野蛮的镇压形式。

No education, no economic opportunities, and it actually goes on well into the late 20th century.

没有教育，就没有经济机会，这种情况实际上一直持续到 20 世纪末。

The military dictatorship in Guatemala and the civil war — they were all along the lines of indigenous versus nonindigenous people, and the elites that were created by unequal land distribution versus not.

危地马拉的军事独裁和内战——都是围绕着土著人民与非土著人民、以及由不平等的土地分配与非不平等土地分配所创造的精英的界限。

So it is that history that you have to take into account when you say that people with indigenous inheritance and origin are actually poorer.

因此，当你说拥有土著遗产和血统的人实际上更贫穷时，你必须考虑到这段历史。

And the reason why I’m saying the ethnicity-based explanation is not an obvious one — when you look at other areas where economic history has been different, then the role of indigenous heritage is very different.

我之所以说基于种族的解释并不明显——当你看看经济历史不同的其他地区时，土著遗产的作用就非常不同。

So again, back to Chile.

再说一遍，回到智利。

Of course, the people with indigenous background in Chile have had a worse time than the elites who live in Santiago, but the income gaps are much, much smaller because the economy went in a different direction.

当然，智利有土著背景的人比圣地亚哥的精英阶层过得更糟，但收入差距要小得多，因为经济发展方向不同。

The extent of repression — especially after democratization and people got the vote, and with the secret ballot — significantly decreased, and states started providing services in terms of education and healthcare to these people, and those gaps really significantly narrowed.

镇压的程度——特别是在民主化和人们获得投票权以及无记名投票之后——显着减少，各州开始向这些人提供教育和医疗保健方面的服务，这些差距确实显着缩小。

So I don’t think you can just —

所以我认为你不能只是——

On the Daron Acemoglu production function

关于 Daron Acemoglu 生产函数

So there’s a lot of email conversation and sometimes long phone conversations, but we’re able to understand each other when we write.

因此，我们有很多电子邮件交谈，有时还有很长的电话交谈，但我们在写作时能够互相理解。

For example, it’s very difficult for people to tell which part of a paper or which part of our book we have written because we’ve been working so closely together.

例如，人们很难判断我们写了论文的哪一部分或书的哪一部分，因为我们一直在密切合作。

But if they’re getting — as many students often do — somewhat down because the whole research process is so hard, you have to find the right way of motivating them because you’re dealing with amazing people who are doing amazing work and putting their thoughts and soul into it.

但是，如果他们像许多学生经常做的那样，因为整个研究过程非常困难而感到有些沮丧，那么你必须找到激励他们的正确方法，因为你面对的是出色的人，他们正在做着出色的工作，并将他们的思想和灵魂投入其中。

So I think the support from their advisers is the least that they deserve.

所以我认为他们顾问的支持是他们最起码应得的。