Daron Acemoglu on Liberalism, Automation, and the Educated Elite (Ep. 286)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today I’m honored to be sitting here with Daron Acemoglu.
今天我很荣幸能和达龙·阿塞莫格鲁一起坐在这里。
He is, of course, Nobel laureate in economics, arguably the best-published and, by some measures, the best-cited economist in the world.
当然，他是诺贝尔经济学奖得主，可以说是世界上出版最多、从某些方面来看被引用最多的经济学家。
Most importantly, he has a new book out, What Happened to Liberal Democracy?
最重要的是，他出版了一本新书《自由民主发生了什么？
This is a major work.
这是一项重大工作。
I think of it as an attempt to redefine and revitalize liberalism for our current times.
我认为这是为当今时代重新定义和振兴自由主义的一次尝试。
Daron, welcome.
达伦，欢迎。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
It’s my pleasure, and thanks for that wonderful introduction, which gets to the heart of the matter.
我很高兴，也感谢您的精彩介绍，它触及了问题的核心。
That’s exactly what my ambition is with the book.
这正是我对这本书的抱负。
Whether it will succeed, that’s much more questionable.
是否会成功，那就更值得怀疑了。
I’d like to start with an oblique question.
我想从一个间接的问题开始。
What is your main objection to social contract theories and contractarianism?
您对社会契约论和契约论的主要反对意见是什么？
That’s jumping into the book, but that’s part of how I try to think of an alternative to the current conceptualization of liberalism, which I believe relies too much on social contract theories.
这就是本书的内容，但这是我试图思考当前自由主义概念化的替代方案的一部分，我认为自由主义过于依赖社会契约理论。
In my mind, social contract theories try to circumvent a key question, which is that we need to build consensus around shared moral values and shared priorities.
在我看来，社会契约理论试图回避一个关键问题，即我们需要围绕共同的道德价值观和共同的优先事项建立共识。
In their place, contractarian ideas put in some absolute truths that we are supposed to agree on philosophical grounds.
契约论思想取而代之的是一些我们应该在哲学基础上达成一致的绝对真理。
That’s a too extreme a view or too extreme way of putting it, but I think it fits the Rousseau end of it.
这是一种过于极端的观点或过于极端的表达方式，但我认为它符合卢梭的观点。
Then the other ones are adjacent to it, not exactly as strict as the Rousseau end.
那么其他的就与其相邻，不完全像卢梭端那么严格。
The Rousseau’s general will, for example, overrides any kind of consensus that a community, for example, could have because the general will is defined to have precedence over any kinds of agreements or shared moral values or shared priorities.
例如，卢梭的公意凌驾于社区可能拥有的任何共识，因为公意被定义为优先于任何类型的协议或共同的道德价值观或共同的优先事项。
I think by doing that liberalism avoids asking some of the hard questions.
我认为自由主义这样做可以避免提出一些棘手的问题。
For example, how to deal with intolerance or how to deal with different views than its own, especially those that challenge it.
例如，如何处理不宽容或如何处理与自己不同的观点，尤其是那些挑战它的观点。
Richard Rorty had a consensus-based defense of liberal democracy.
理查德·罗蒂对自由民主进行了基于共识的辩护。
Is your view the same as his, or are there some metrics along which it’s different?
您的观点与他相同，还是有一些不同的指标？
Are you more objectivist in some way?
在某些方面你更客观吗？
I wouldn’t say it’s more objectivist.
我不会说这更客观。
I think my commitment in my mind has always been that it’s impossible for us at any point in time not just to know what’s really the absolute truth, but also to have a clear map of what is the right stance.
我认为我心中的承诺一直是，我们在任何时候都不可能不仅知道什么是真正的绝对真理，而且也不可能清楚地了解什么是正确的立场。
In the same way that I think many people would agree science makes gradual and sometimes uncertain progress toward some better understanding, I think morally, philosophically, we also have to have gradual uncertain evolution toward what we agree on.
就像我认为许多人会同意科学在更好的理解方面取得逐渐的、有时是不确定的进展一样，我认为从道德上、哲学上来说，我们也必须朝着我们所同意的方向逐步不确定地进化。
Objectivism, in some sense, is too strict.
从某种意义上说，客观主义过于严格。
Say we’re not evolving toward greater agreement.
假设我们没有朝着达成更大共识的方向发展。
No, sometimes we go back.
不，有时我们会回去。
Today, it seems we’re not evolving toward greater agreement, right?
今天，我们似乎并没有朝着达成更大共识的方向发展，对吗？
We’re not.
我们不是。
Absolutely not.
绝对不是。
I think you can blame that on reactions to globalization, reactions to technology, better authoritarian challenges.
我认为你可以将此归咎于对全球化的反应、对技术的反应、更好的独裁挑战。
This is the most uncomfortable part because I see myself firmly within the left liberal tradition.
这是最不舒服的部分，因为我认为自己坚定地属于左翼自由主义传统。
I think it’s partly because of the failure of left liberalism.
我认为部分原因是左翼自由主义的失败。
In some sense, if you think of why did Rome fail or collapse, we can tell a story about the barbarians were really too strong.
从某种意义上说，如果你想到罗马为何失败或崩溃，我们可以讲述一个关于野蛮人实在太强大的故事。
No, really, Rome collapsed because internally it had problems that opened up weaknesses against outside invaders as well as some inside problems.
不，实际上，罗马崩溃是因为它内部存在一些问题，这些问题暴露了抵御外部入侵者的弱点以及一些内部问题。
It’s the same with left liberalism.
左翼自由主义也是如此。
I think it became quite influential throughout much of the Western world and some of the emerging economies as well over the last 70, 80 years.
我认为它在过去 70、80 年里对西方世界的大部分地区和一些新兴经济体产生了相当大的影响。
It did not use that establishment power just in the right way, creating its own weaknesses that made it much more vulnerable to outside attacks.
它没有以正确的方式使用这种权力，从而造成了自己的弱点，使其更容易受到外部攻击。
That’s why I think we are now going back because we are at an interregnum period in which ideas are battling again.
这就是为什么我认为我们现在要回去，因为我们正处于一个思想再次发生斗争的空位期。
In some sense, it’s just like the early 19th century where you had all these very different ideas and they were trying to get a toehold in the imagination of people.
从某种意义上说，就像 19 世纪初，人们有各种截然不同的想法，他们试图在人们的想象力中站稳脚跟。
I think we are going through a period like that, except that there are really many more confusing ideas out there.
我认为我们正在经历这样一个时期，只是确实存在更多令人困惑的想法。
Say when we’re not evolving toward greater consensus, what’s the external standard you introduce to judge which are the correct ideas and which not?
比如说，当我们没有朝着更大的共识发展时，你引入的外部标准是什么来判断哪些是正确的想法，哪些是错误的？
Like Rorty, you need one, though.
不过，像罗蒂一样，你也需要一个。
I don’t have one.
我没有。
Then why believe in what you believe?
那为什么要相信你所相信的呢？
Okay.
好的。
I think what I believe is, first of all, not as an external standard—I don’t know whether external standard or internal standard is the right word—but that we have to defend some degree of individual freedom because everything starts from that, both in terms of our meaningful lives, but also any kind of improvement in the human condition requires individual initiative, and that individual initiative is impossible without some amount of freedom, a meaningful freedom, not just saying, “Okay, you have the freedom to pray, but you cannot express that idea with others or you cannot turn it into action.” Some meaningful freedom.
我认为我所相信的首先不是一个外部标准——我不知道外部标准或内部标准这个词是否正确——而是我们必须捍卫某种程度的个人自由，因为一切都始于此，无论是我们有意义的生活，还是人类状况的任何形式的改善都需要个人主动性，而如果没有一定程度的自由，一种有意义的自由，个人主动性是不可能的，而不仅仅是说，“好吧，你有祈祷的自由，但你不能向别人表达这个想法，或者你无法改变它付诸行动。”一些有意义的自由。
That is the only starting point that we need to have.
这是我们需要的唯一起点。
Around that, we need to build things with some sort of consensus within society.
围绕这一点，我们需要在社会内部达成某种共识来构建事物。
That’s what I think liberalism has to recognize, that you have to enshrine those rights, but then give enough elbow room to people to form their own community-level agreements.
这就是我认为自由主义必须认识到的，你必须承认这些权利，但然后给人们足够的空间来形成他们自己的社区层面的协议。
You present some different values in the book.
您在书中提出了一些不同的价值观。
One is nondomination.
一是非统治。
Another is noninterference.
另一个是不干涉。
There’s others.
还有其他的。
When they clash, what’s the metric you introduce to decide how to resolve that clash?
当它们发生冲突时，您引入什么指标来决定如何解决冲突？
I wish I had a perfect answer for that.
我希望我对此有一个完美的答案。
I don’t.
我不知道。
You have an imperfect answer.
你有一个不完美的答案。
I have an imperfect answer.
我有一个不完美的答案。
I think noninterference by itself isn’t enough because, at least as read or as interpreted by some philosophers and economists, it is just about being left alone from higher authority or typically state-level authority, although it could be some other authorities as well.
我认为不干涉本身是不够的，因为至少按照一些哲学家和经济学家的解读或解释，它只是不受更高权威或通常是国家级权威的影响，尽管也可能是其他一些权威。
We do also need opportunities and some way of actualizing our intentions and our freedom.
我们确实还需要机会和某种方式来实现我们的意图和自由。
That’s what the idea of nondomination, which goes back to Roman Republican times, recognizes.
这就是可追溯到罗马共和时代的非统治思想所认识到的。
It is not, in my mind, an extremely interventionist philosophy.
在我看来，这并不是一种极端干预主义的哲学。
It doesn’t say the state knows it best or that the state should always have an opportunity to override individual or group-level decisions.
这并不是说国家最了解这一点，也不是说国家应该始终有机会推翻个人或团体层面的决定。
It does emphasize that providing people some amount of protection against those who have much greater physical or other power relative to them is something that cannot be done at the individual level.
它确实强调，为人们提供一定程度的保护，以防止那些拥有比他们强大得多的体力或其他力量的人，是无法在个人层面上完成的事情。
It has to have a community-level component.
它必须有社区层面的组成部分。
That’s a good answer, but is it an answer to the question?
这是一个很好的答案，但是这是问题的答案吗？
If we’re Sidgwick, we might say, when values clash, we look to utility, or maybe it’d be cost-benefit analysis to decide which gets priority.
如果我们是西奇威克，我们可能会说，当价值观发生冲突时，我们会考虑效用，或者可能会通过成本效益分析来决定哪个优先。
You’re not willing to say that, so why not?
你不愿意这么说，为什么不呢？
What’s wrong with that answer?
这个答案有什么问题吗？
Let me start with what’s wrong with a general-will type answer—I’m simplifying it—but I would say in a general-will type of approach is that we have a book in our hand which says when values clash and when there’s something, here is a higher value and we’re going to follow that.
让我从公意型答案的问题开始——我正在简化它——但我想说的是，在公意型方法中，我们手里有一本书，上面写着，当价值观发生冲突时，当出现问题时，这里有一个更高的价值，我们将遵循它。
Ultimately, even though he’s a true liberal, John Rawls also goes into that direction.
最终，尽管约翰·罗尔斯是一个真正的自由主义者，但他也朝着这个方向发展。
Now, you might think utilitarianism avoids that because it says, “No, we don’t have a book.
现在，你可能认为功利主义避免了这一点，因为它说：“不，我们没有书。
All we do is we turn everything to utils and then we compare those utils.”
我们所做的就是将所有内容都转为实用程序，然后比较这些实用程序。”
Who decides how to compare, how to turn things into utils?
谁决定如何比较，如何将东西变成utils？
When there are externalities that are important?
什么时候存在重要的外部因素？
There again needs to be a book.
再次需要有一本书。
I don’t like that book because who decides what that book is and how can we be certain that book exists?
我不喜欢那本书，因为谁决定那本书是什么，我们如何确定那本书存在？
That’s why once we have the building blocks of individual liberty, then I think we have to go back to society and seek consensus on what our temporary book should be.
这就是为什么一旦我们拥有了个人自由的基石，那么我认为我们必须回到社会并就我们的临时书应该是什么寻求共识。
On the working class vs. the elite
关于工人阶级与精英阶层
There’s a lot of talk in your book about what you call working-class liberalism, but say today in America, what exactly is working class?
你的书中有很多关于你所谓的工人阶级自由主义的讨论，但是说在今天的美国，工人阶级到底是什么？
Household income, it’s almost six figures.
家庭收入，接近六位数。
Percentage working in manufacturing, it’s what, 8 percent to 9 percent.
在制造业工作的比例是 8% 到 9%。
Private sector unions are very small.
私营部门工会规模很小。
Is this even a meaningful notion today, the working class?
对于今天的工人阶级来说，这还有意义吗？
It may or may not be.
可能是也可能不是。
That’s why I say that social democracy, as it evolved in Scandinavia and then spread to Europe and to some extent in a modified version to the United States, isn’t the right actualization of liberal ideas today because it very strongly relies on unions and a particular kind of industrial working class.
这就是为什么我说，社会民主主义在斯堪的纳维亚半岛发展起来，然后传播到欧洲，并在某种程度上以改良版本传播到美国，它并不是当今自由主义思想的正确实现，因为它非常依赖工会和特定类型的产业工人阶级。
Today we don’t have an industrial working class.
今天我们没有工业工人阶级。
If by working class I meant industrial working class, obviously that would be almost a vacuous notion.
如果我所说的工人阶级是指产业工人阶级，那么显然这几乎是一个空洞的概念。
But we have the vast majority of people who live by earning their living in the labor market.
但我们绝大多数人靠在劳动力市场谋生。
That’s the working class.
这就是工人阶级。
If you’re getting your income from the labor market mostly, not from capital, not from your parents, then in my definition you’re part of the working class.
如果你的收入主要来自劳动力市场，而不是来自资本，不是来自你的父母，那么根据我的定义，你就是工人阶级的一部分。
The working class is distinguished by having a very diverse set of skills.
工人阶级的特点是拥有非常多样化的技能。
Not just one skill.
不只是一项技能。
It’s going to have the manual part.
它将有手册部分。
It’s going to have the trades.
它将进行交易。
It’s going to have office jobs.
它将有办公室工作。
It’s going to have entrepreneurship of some sort, but that’s what the unifying theme is.
它将有某种形式的创业精神，但这就是统一的主题。
That’s of course not a very simple unifying theme.
这当然不是一个非常简单的统一主题。
There’s going to be a lot of heterogeneity within the working class.
工人阶级内部将会存在很多异质性。
That’s why I emphasize in the working-class liberalism different communities that are going to have their own practices and values.
这就是为什么我在工人阶级自由主义中强调不同的社区将有自己的实践和价值观。
Say when MIT decides who in the economics department should get tenure, that’s a working-class decision?
假设麻省理工学院决定经济系的谁应该获得终身教职，这是工人阶级的决定吗？
Yes.
是的。
It’s like the edge of the working class because the tenured professors are a bit weird.
这就像工人阶级的边缘，因为终身教授有点奇怪。
Tell me what’s wrong with the following view.
请告诉我以下观点有什么问题。
There’s an educated elite in most countries.
大多数国家都有受过教育的精英。
They decide who gets a Nobel Prize, who at MIT gets tenure, how to referee economics papers at top five journals.
他们决定谁获得诺贝尔奖、谁在麻省理工学院获得终身教职、如何评审排名前五的期刊上的经济学论文。
I think for the most part they know best.
我认为大多数情况下他们最了解。
Other parts of the working class need to feel included enough not to bring the system down.
工人阶级的其他部分需要有足够的参与感，以免导致体系崩溃。
But actual outcomes and policies, we do as much as possible want to be decided by the educated elite.
但实际的结果和政策，我们确实尽可能希望由受过教育的精英来决定。
Is that a correct view?
这是正确的观点吗？
Because that’s close to my view.
因为这很接近我的观点。
Is it your view?
这是你的看法吗？
No, it’s not my view.
不，这不是我的观点。
Tell me your view.
告诉我你的看法。
Okay.
好的。
How many hours do we have?
我们有多少个小时？
You very succinctly summarized what—I try to convey this in the book, but perhaps not clearly enough—but what I think brought liberalism’s crisis.
你非常简洁地总结了我认为带来自由主义危机的是什么——我试图在书中传达这一点，但也许不够清楚。
In two words, liberalism crisis is related to the rise of a post-industrial economy in which what you just called the educated elite has become both much more powerful and more numerous, and a philosophical shift that gave more and more priority and power to the educated elite.
简而言之，自由主义危机与后工业经济的崛起有关，在后工业经济中，你所谓的受过教育的精英变得更加强大和数量更多，以及一种哲学转变，赋予受过教育的精英越来越多的优先权和权力。
Whether you approach that from the left liberal point of view or from more of a right liberal point of view, that’s problematic in my mind.
无论你是从左翼自由主义观点还是从右翼自由主义观点来看待这个问题，在我看来这都是有问题的。
We cannot have true freedom and true flourishing of a population when there is a clear hierarchy, whether it is by education, it is by race, it is by income.
当存在明确的等级制度时，无论是通过教育、种族还是收入，我们都不可能拥有真正的自由和人口的真正繁荣。
Just empowering the elite in that way is not going to cut it.
仅仅以这种方式赋予精英权力并不能解决问题。
But we want to cover up the role of the elite to some extent, right?
但我们想在某种程度上掩盖精英的作用，对吗？
The Straussian view.
施特劳斯的观点。
Okay, well, if you cover it up really well.
好吧，如果你把它掩盖得很好的话。
No. I think the nuance here is that I am also very committed to expertise, obviously, given where I am.
不。我认为这里的细微差别是，考虑到我所处的位置，我显然也非常致力于专业知识。
One challenge, which I mentioned in passing, and perhaps I should have done more in the book on this, is how do you utilize and respect expertise without creating the wrong kind of technocracy that is insular and too self-confident and, frankly, looking down upon the rest?
我顺便提到了一个挑战，也许我应该在书中对此做更多的努力，那就是如何利用和尊重专业知识，而不产生一种错误的技术官僚，这种技术官僚是狭隘的、过于自信的，坦率地说，是看不起其他人的？
Unfortunately, that’s what we’ve created in the United States and Europe, and that’s what working-class liberalism has to avoid.
不幸的是，这就是我们在美国和欧洲所创造的，也是工人阶级自由主义必须避免的。
On automation
关于自动化
Now, here’s a sentence in your book that I very much disagreed with.
现在，你书中有一句话我非常不同意。
I almost thought you left out a word.
我差点以为你漏掉了一个字。
Let me read it to you, and I’ll tell you why I disagree.
让我读给你听，然后我会告诉你我不同意的原因。
You wrote, “Automation is central to my account because it severs the link between mass production and shared prosperity.” Now, I view automation as creating the link between mass production and shared prosperity.
您写道：“自动化是我的叙述的核心，因为它切断了大规模生产和共同繁荣之间的联系。”现在，我认为自动化在大规模生产和共同繁荣之间建立了联系。
There’s a lot of evidence that automation doesn’t lower the labor share.
有大量证据表明自动化不会降低劳动力份额。
I know well your papers with Restrepo.
我很了解你与雷斯特雷波的文件。
That’s about the composition of labor income, right?
这就是劳动收入的构成吧？
Not about the total labor share.
与总劳动力份额无关。
There’s a new paper out by Barany, Patel, and Siegel looking at France up through 2019.
Barany、Patel 和 Siegel 发表了一篇新论文，展望了 2019 年的法国。
Automation doesn’t harm the labor share at all, so why be so negative on automation?
自动化根本不会损害劳动力份额，那么为什么对自动化如此消极呢？
I just think it’s great.
我只是觉得这很棒。
There are two parts to this.
这有两个部分。
The first is how to put automation in our pantheon of different types of technological changes.
第一个是如何将自动化纳入我们不同类型技术变革的万神殿中。
By the way, by just having this conversation, we have gone way beyond what most economists do, which is to give up the pretense that there is just one kind of technology, that technology has a uniform effect.
顺便说一句，通过这次对话，我们已经远远超出了大多数经济学家所做的，即放弃认为技术只有一种、技术具有统一效果的假象。
We’re explicitly talking about automation because there are other kinds of technological changes as well.
我们明确谈论自动化是因为还有其他类型的技术变革。
I think that’s very important.
我认为这非常重要。
I think blackboxing of technology is one of the least productive things that we’ve done as economists.
我认为技术黑箱是我们作为经济学家所做过的效率最低的事情之一。
By the way, I’m guilty of this for the first 15 years of my career too.
顺便说一句，在我职业生涯的前 15 年里，我也为此感到内疚。
Second is what is the conceptual and then empirical effects of automation?
其次，自动化的概念效应和实证效应是什么？
Let me start with the second.
让我从第二个开始。
I don’t know this new paper that you mentioned.
我不知道你提到的这篇新论文。
There’s plenty of papers showing automation brings prosperity, right?
有很多论文表明自动化带来繁荣，对吧？
You could say the whole history since the Industrial Revolution.
你可以说自工业革命以来的整个历史。
No, those are macro things, and let’s come back to that.
不，这些都是宏观的事情，让我们回到这一点。
The evidence in terms of what automation does, at least at the firm or the sectoral level, is very clear.
关于自动化的作用的证据，至少在公司或部门层面，是非常清楚的。
It does reduce the labor share.
它确实降低了劳动力份额。
I have several papers on this.
我有几篇关于此的论文。
There are another 20, 30 papers.
还有20、30篇论文。
This is one area where evidence and theory are very well aligned.
这是证据和理论非常一致的领域。
When you look at how it does it, it just really coheres with the theory.
当你看看它是如何做到的时，你会发现它确实与理论相一致。
What automation is, is that it takes tasks or activities that were previously performed by labor and it transforms them to capital, algorithm, machinery, or whatever, robots.
自动化是什么，它把以前由劳动力执行的任务或活动转化为资本、算法、机器或其他机器人。
That has a first-order impact on the labor share because fewer things are done by labor.
这对劳动力份额产生了一级影响，因为由劳动力完成的事情越来越少。
Now, that doesn’t mean labor is going to get unemployed.
现在，这并不意味着劳动力将会失业。
There could be enough demand from nonautomated tasks for labor, but that would never come back to increase the wage enough to restore the labor share to where it is.
非自动化任务可能对劳动力有足够的需求，但这种需求永远不会回升到足以使工资增加到足以将劳动力份额恢复到原来水平的程度。
That’s exactly what the theory is.
这正是理论的内容。
Then when you look at the data, and in some papers we’ve been able to do that at the sectoral level, but in some papers really look at it very micro about what tasks are disappearing, what kinds of workers’ wages are changing, what kind of employment is changing, it coheres very well with the theory.
然后当你看数据时，在一些论文中，我们已经能够在部门层面做到这一点，但在一些论文中，我们确实非常微观地看待哪些任务正在消失，什么样的工人工资正在发生变化，什么样的就业正在发生变化，它与理论非常吻合。
Now, at the macro level, it’s more complicated because there are composition effects between like Walmart effects and things like that, so we can talk about those, but I think the evidence, at least the ones that I know, is very clear that automation will reduce the labor share.
现在，在宏观层面上，情况变得更加复杂，因为沃尔玛效应和类似的东西之间存在组合效应，所以我们可以讨论这些，但我认为证据，至少是我所知道的证据，非常清楚，自动化将减少劳动力份额。
That doesn’t mean reduce the wage.
这并不意味着减少工资。
Sure.
当然。
Wages are very high in the United States.
美国的工资非常高。
Wages are high.
工资很高。
What are we worried about?
我们担心什么？
Even the labor share, if you adjust for equity compensation, it’s gone from 62 to 60.
即使是劳动份额，如果调整股权薪酬，也会从 62 降至 60。
That might be modestly unfortunate, but it’s hardly a tragedy from 62 to 60.
这可能有点不幸，但从 62 岁到 60 岁这并不是一场悲剧。
Hold onto that thought because it’s a great question, Tyler, but I want to come back to the first part of your earlier question because that’s very important.
坚持这个想法，因为这是一个很好的问题，泰勒，但我想回到你之前问题的第一部分，因为这非常重要。
What’s my view of automation?
我对自动化的看法是什么？
How should we view it?
我们应该如何看待呢？
Let me first tell you my view and then we can talk about whether it’s justified or not.
我先说一下我的看法，然后我们再讨论是否合理。
I am not, 100 percent not, against automation.
我不，百分百不反对自动化。
Automation has been ongoing since at least the beginning of the Industrial Revolution.
至少从工业革命开始，自动化就一直在持续进行。
It enables us not to do some of the harder, more manual, more routine, more back-breaking tasks.
它使我们不必做一些更困难、更手动、更常规、更费力的任务。
That’s fantastic.
太棒了。
If the only type of technological change out of that many diverse types of technologies, if the only thing that we do is automation, then that’s not going to be a firm basis for shared prosperity.
如果众多不同类型的技术中唯一的技术变革，如果我们唯一做的就是自动化，那么这将不会成为共同繁荣的坚实基础。
When you talk about the US economy has high wages—for example, wage growth was very high in the ’40s, ’50s, ’60s, ’70s—that’s not, in my mind, just because of automation.
当你谈论美国经济的高工资时——例如，20世纪40年代、50年代、60年代、70年代的工资增长非常高——在我看来，这不仅仅是因为自动化。
Automation was a contributing factor, but more because of other kinds of technologies that created new opportunities, new tasks where workers that were displaced from the more mundane things could go, so that combination.
自动化是一个促成因素，但更多的是因为其他类型的技术创造了新的机会、新的任务，让那些从更平凡的事情中流离失所的工人可以去完成这样的结合。
What I am really worried about in the age of AI, and robots’ entry into the manufacturing sector illustrates this very well, if you prioritize automation and don’t do enough of the new task creation, new opportunity creation for labor, that’s when the labor share decline is going to become more severe, and the wage growth is going to be not there, or in fact, it could be negative.
我真正担心的人工智能时代，机器人进入制造业就很好地说明了这一点，如果你优先考虑自动化，而在创造新的任务、创造新的劳动力机会方面做得不够，那么劳动力份额的下降将变得更加严重，工资增长将不会出现，甚至可能是负增长。
The thing about automation is that you’re right, automation could increase the real wage, but it could even reduce it.
关于自动化的事情是，你是对的，自动化可以增加实际工资，但它甚至可能会减少实际工资。
Well, it could.
嗯，可以。
How many cases are there, say since post-World War II—Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, United States—where automation has on the whole decreased real wages?
比如说自二战后以来——西欧、日本、韩国、美国——自动化总体上降低了实际工资的案例有多少？
On the whole, but again, define on the whole.
总的来说，但还是要从整体上定义。
If on the whole is at the macro level when you look at the time series, that’s not just automation because automation is coupled with lots of other things.
如果从整体上看时间序列的宏观层面，这不仅仅是自动化，因为自动化与许多其他事物相结合。
For example, my work on this with Pascual wasn’t that great because we did not have fantastic measures of new task creation.
例如，我与 Pascual 在这方面的工作并不是那么出色，因为我们没有很好的措施来创建新任务。
David Autor with his co-authors has written a more recent book that’s with much better data.
David Autor 和他的合著者最近写了一本包含更好数据的书。
What he shows and what we also found is a lot of the wage growth in the post-war period in the United States is related to these new tasks.
他所展示的以及我们也发现的是，美国战后时期的工资增长很大程度上与这些新任务有关。
About 40 percent to 50 percent of what the US labor market supports right now in terms of human work is related to these new tasks.
美国劳动力市场目前支持的人力工作中约有 40% 至 50% 与这些新任务相关。
Really it’s not correct to say, “We’ve had a lot of automation since World War II and look at wages,” but if we zero in in periods of rapid automation, and that’s what we do in the paper on robots with Pascual Restrepo, you do see wage decline.
事实上，这样说是不正确的：“自二战以来，我们已经实现了很多自动化，并关注工资”，但如果我们在快速自动化时期将其归零，就像我们在 Pascual Restrepo 的机器人论文中所做的那样，你确实会看到工资下降。
The wages of people who used to be in especially blue-color heavy manual tasks that were the ones that robots of the 1990s and 2000s went after, like welding and painting and things like that, the wages of those workers both—
那些曾经从事特别蓝色的繁重体力劳动的人的工资，这些工作是 20 世纪 90 年代和 2000 年代的机器人所从事的，比如焊接和喷漆之类的，这些工人的工资都是——
Sure.
当然。
Some tasks.
一些任务。
—in the aggregate and also in local labor markets went down quite a bit.
——总体而言，当地劳动力市场也出现了相当大的下降。
That’s a funny definition of automation because the new tasks being created, so often they’re coming from machines, right—
这是自动化的一个有趣的定义，因为创建的新任务通常来自机器，对吧——
They are, absolutely.
他们绝对是。
—and from computers.
——以及来自计算机。
Oh, 100 percent, but that’s why I’m, again, if perhaps we’ll go to this later, when I talk of AI, I don’t say, “AI is going to be automation.” No, AI is going to be hopefully both automation and new tasks and then creating the right balance.
哦，100%，但这就是为什么我再次强调，如果我们稍后再讨论这个问题，当我谈论人工智能时，我不会说“人工智能将成为自动化”。不，人工智能有望成为自动化和新任务，然后创造适当的平衡。
Again, once we open that black box of technology, which I uploaded enthusiastically five minutes ago, then we are also saying, well, there are different rates at which these different components of technologies are advancing.
再说一次，一旦我们打开我五分钟前热情上传的技术黑匣子，那么我们也会说，这些不同的技术组成部分的进步速度是不同的。
During some periods, and when we went so much into robots, that was one, automation was really going very rapidly and new task creation wasn’t going as rapidly.
在某些时期，当我们如此深入地研究机器人时，自动化确实发展得非常快，而新任务的创建却没有那么快。
By the way, that’s not just in the nature of technology.
顺便说一句，这不仅仅是技术的本质。
When Japanese and South Korean, and to some extent German car manufacturers, for example, were introducing robots, they also redesigned jobs to create many new tasks that American companies didn’t do.
例如，当日本和韩国，以及某种程度上的德国汽车制造商引进机器人时，他们也重新设计了工作岗位，创造了许多美国公司没有做过的新任务。
There’s a lot of choice in that endeavor.
在这一努力中有很多选择。
That’s why I think AI is so exciting and so dangerous.
这就是为什么我认为人工智能如此令人兴奋但又如此危险。
You have a new paper with David Autor, Beirn, and Scott where when the number of young people is relatively low, there’s induced innovation, and that raises per capita income, right?
您与 David Autor、Beirn 和 Scott 合作发表了一篇新论文，其中当年轻人数量相对较少时，就会产生诱导创新，从而提高人均收入，对吧？
Does that not make you much more optimistic?
这难道不会让你更加乐观吗？
Is it at variance with your papers with Restrepo?
与您与 Restrepo 的论文不一致吗？
It’s a much more positive vision, right?
这是一个更加积极的愿景，对吗？
Yes, it is a more positive vision, absolutely, 100 percent.
是的，这绝对是一个更积极的愿景，100%。
By the way, the precursor to that paper is also another paper I wrote with Pascual Restrepo.
顺便说一句，那篇论文的前身也是我与 Pascual Restrepo 合作撰写的另一篇论文。
Both papers use the task-based framework, but that just shows exactly like I was trying to say in the task-based framework and in my thinking automation isn’t bad.
这两篇论文都使用了基于任务的框架，但这恰恰表明了我在基于任务的框架中试图说的，并且在我看来自动化还不错。
Sometimes automation is a response to scarcities of certain types of factors, in which case it’s really very important for enabling economic growth.
有时自动化是对某些类型因素稀缺的反应，在这种情况下，它对于促进经济增长确实非常重要。
By the way, I think the possibility that there will be shortages of labor in certain, especially manual tasks, is indeed, as you say, a possibility for optimism, but depends on how you deal with it also.
顺便说一句，我认为某些方面，特别是体力劳动中出现劳动力短缺的可能性，确实如你所说，是乐观的可能性，但也取决于你如何处理它。
In both papers, you also see the element of choice.
在这两篇文章中，您还可以看到选择的元素。
You have to do the technology, and not every society does that technology in the same way.
你必须开发技术，但并不是每个社会都以同样的方式开发技术。
We could get that wrong.
我们可能会弄错。
We can get too excited with certain currents in AI and miss some of those boats, or we can use AI just the right way to deal with our shortages while also creating opportunities for remaining workers.
我们可能会对人工智能的某些潮流过于兴奋而错过其中的一些船，或者我们可以以正确的方式使用人工智能来解决我们的短缺问题，同时也为剩余的工人创造机会。
I don’t think there is any law of nature or economics that all of these things are going to work perfectly, or there is just one path for them to work in one way and not in other ways.
我认为没有任何自然法则或经济学法则可以保证所有这些事情都会完美地发挥作用，或者只有一条路径可以让它们以一种方式而不是以其他方式发挥作用。
On free speech
关于言论自由
At the beginning of your book, there’s an excellent quotation from Frederick Douglass.
在你的书的开头，引用了弗雷德里克·道格拉斯（Frederick Douglass）的精彩引言。
I read, “Slavery cannot tolerate free speech.
我读到：“奴隶制不能容忍言论自由。
Five years of its exercise would banish the auction block and break every chain in the South.”
五年的行使将消除拍卖区块并打破南方的每条链条。”
I love that quote.
我喜欢这句话。
For you, what are the limits of free speech, and how do you decide where they go?
对您来说，言论自由的限制是什么？您如何决定它们的去向？
I wish I could say that, for me, there should be no limits to free speech.
我希望我可以说，对我来说，言论自由不应该受到限制。
Ultimately, that’s what I believe if you allow me to define free speech.
最终，如果你允许我定义言论自由，这就是我所相信的。
If I just said that sentence, you would give me an immediate counter example, having read my book.
如果我只是说这句话，你读过我的书后就会立即给我一个反例。
You would say, “But you’re in favor of regulating social media.
你会说，“但你赞成监管社交媒体。
Isn’t that restrictions on free speech?” I actually don’t believe so.
这不是限制言论自由吗？”我其实不这么认为。
I think I would like to be a free speech absolutist while also regulating social media.
我想我想成为一名言论自由绝对主义者，同时规范社交媒体。
I can say more on this, but it looked like you had a question.
我可以对此说更多，但看起来你有一个问题。
Children are a complicated case for any liberal theory, I would say, right?
我想说，对于任何自由主义理论来说，儿童都是一个复杂的案例，对吧？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
Putting aside children, are you an absolutist on free speech?
抛开孩子不谈，你是言论自由的绝对主义者吗？
No. Again, I am an absolutist on free speech as I define it, but no, I’m not going to say that social media should not be regulated.
不。再说一遍，我是言论自由的绝对主义者，但不，我不会说社交媒体不应该受到监管。
For adults, what’s the limiting case where you think we should limit free speech?
对于成年人来说，您认为我们应该限制言论自由的极限情况是什么？
In my opinion, again, we shouldn’t limit free speech, but we should still regulate social media.
在我看来，我们不应该限制言论自由，但我们仍然应该规范社交媒体。
The way that I think about this is the following.
我对此的思考方式如下。
We should let individuals say whatever they want.
我们应该让个人畅所欲言。
Once social media can build very complex algorithms that human nature could not have anticipated, and we are evolutionarily not very well prepared, and they can almost weaponize certain types of statements, I think that’s no longer free speech.
一旦社交媒体能够构建出人性无法预料的非常复杂的算法，而我们在进化上还没有做好充分的准备，它们几乎可以将某些类型的言论武器化，我认为这不再是言论自由。
The free speech is when Tyler says something.
言论自由是指泰勒说话的时候。
I never want to take your right away, but I want to regulate what other people take your statement and how they use it.
我从来不想立即拿走你的陈述，但我想规范其他人如何看待你的陈述以及他们如何使用它。
That’s why I think I am an absolutist when it comes to free speech because I never want to restrict Tyler’s right to say anything.
这就是为什么我认为在言论自由方面我是一个绝对主义者，因为我从来不想限制泰勒说话的权利。
You can come back to me and say, “No, you’re not an absolutist because you want to put some framework about how others, companies, by the way, the most powerful companies humanity has ever seen, how those companies can take Tyler’s speech and use it in their algorithms or in the way that they feed into your vulnerabilities.”
你可以回来对我说，“不，你不是一个绝对主义者，因为你想建立一些框架，说明其他公司，顺便说一句，人类有史以来最强大的公司，这些公司如何利用泰勒的演讲并将其用于他们的算法或以他们的方式填补你的漏洞。”
Say book markets and the printing press, they weaponized Marx and Lenin for many decades.
比如说图书市场和印刷机，几十年来它们一直将马克思和列宁当作武器。
That’s an algorithm in the very broad sense that led to terrible consequences, much worse than whatever you might think current social media have done, and yet we believe in free speech for the printing press.
这是一种非常广泛意义上的算法，它导致了可怕的后果，比你想象的当前社交媒体所做的更糟糕，但我们相信印刷媒体的言论自由。
I do.
我愿意。
I do believe in it.
我确实相信它。
Why don’t you look at the printing press and say, “Oh my goodness, this was horrible.
你为什么不看着印刷机说：“天哪，这太可怕了。
We need to restrict what books are put out by publishers”?
我们需要限制出版商出版哪些书籍”？
First of all, the history is that when the printing press first came, it was used in the religion wars.
首先，历史是印刷机刚出现时，它被用于宗教战争。
It did have some periods during which we adjusted to it.
确实有一些时期我们需要适应它。
If I was alive during that period, I don’t know what my reaction to that would have been.
如果我当时还活着，我不知道我对此会有什么反应。
Think of American society or European society or even India or Latin America in the 1980s.
想想 20 世纪 80 年代的美国社会或欧洲社会，甚至印度或拉丁美洲。
I think even though some people could be swayed by some extremist books of one sort or another from the right or from the left, humanity, human community was very well adjusted to the broadcast of certain free speech–driven ideas via books.
我认为，尽管有些人可能会受到某种右翼或左翼极端主义书籍的影响，但人类、人类社会已经很好地适应了通过书籍传播某些言论自由驱动的思想。
Algorithms are a completely different matter.
算法则完全不同。
If social media, and this is one of the proposals I make related to social media, always stayed in the nonalgorithmic feed that on Facebook, Twitter—TikTok couldn’t exist in that case—you only see posts by your chosen outlets and your friends and neighbors in chronological order, I think we would adjust to that very quickly.
如果社交媒体（这是我提出的与社交媒体相关的建议之一）始终停留在 Facebook、Twitter 上的非算法提要中（在这种情况下，TikTok 就不可能存在），你只能看到你选择的媒体以及你的朋友和邻居按时间顺序发布的帖子，我认为我们会很快适应这一点。
That’s like the Myspace kind of model.
这就像 Myspace 类型的模型。
Once algorithms can see, “Tyler has a weakness for this specific thing, I can fan the flames,” I think that’s a completely new world.
一旦算法可以看到，“泰勒在这个特定的事情上有弱点，我可以煽风点火，”我认为这是一个全新的世界。
Now, perhaps in 10 years’ time, our education system, not by the way so optimistic about our education system, that’s a different conversation, but it’s possible that our education systems, our social norms will evolve such that we are well adapted to those algorithms.
现在，也许十年后，我们的教育系统，顺便说一下，我们的教育系统不再那么乐观，这是一个不同的话题，但我们的教育系统、我们的社会规范可能会发展，使我们能够很好地适应这些算法。
Perhaps at that point, I could have a different view.
或许到了那个时候，我就能有不同的看法了。
Right now, I find the ability of these very powerful companies to exploit the free speech of other people potentially very damaging to mental health, to people’s daily social activities, and to political discourse.
现在，我发现这些非常强大的公司利用其他人的言论自由的能力可能对心理健康、人们的日常社交活动和政治话语造成极大损害。
On immigration
关于移民
Since you’re a left liberal, I want to pull you in the direction of being more pro-immigration.
既然你是左翼自由主义者，我想把你拉向更支持移民的方向。
The H-1B visa program, which no one thinks is well designed, but it’s, what, 85,000 workers a year, it’s not really creating brain drain for India or China.
没人认为 H-1B 签证计划设计得很好，但每年有 85,000 名工人，它并没有真正造成印度或中国的人才外流。
It gives people an incentive to develop skills.
它激励人们发展技能。
I came by the H-1B.
我是持H-1B来的。
Good.
好的。
It’s wonderful.
太棒了。
In one of your pieces, one of your recent columns in the public press, you seemed pretty down on high-skilled immigration.
在你最近在公共媒体上发表的一篇文章中，你似乎对高技能移民相当不满。
Oh, Americans won’t become educated enough.
哦，美国人的教育程度不够。
You were back and forth, but why not just say high-skilled immigration is great.
你来来回回，但为什么不直接说高技术移民很棒呢？
There’s more innovation.
还有更多创新。
It helps the whole world.
它帮助了整个世界。
It’s good for our budget.
这对我们的预算有好处。
There’s marginal problems, but it’s hard to think of a policy that more economists on a bipartisan basis would endorse.
虽然存在一些边际问题，但很难想象有一项政策会得到更多两党经济学家的认可。
Why be so waffling on it?
为什么要这么胡言乱语呢？
Great question.
很好的问题。
I was trying to have my cake and eat it too in that piece.
我试图把我的蛋糕也吃掉。
It’s always dangerous to do that.
这样做总是很危险的。
It’s also not an academic piece.
这也不是一篇学术文章。
That was an op-ed.
那是一篇专栏文章。
Sure.
当然。
It’s still what we think, right?
这仍然是我们的想法，对吗？
Yes.
是的。
Here is my view, and perhaps the op-ed should have been written this way.
这是我的观点，也许专栏应该这样写。
I love H-1B.
我喜欢H-1B。
I think skilled immigration is great, as it is right now, despite its problems, as you point out.
我认为技术移民很棒，就像现在一样，尽管正如你指出的那样存在问题。
Here is the problem that I’m very troubled by.
这是我非常困扰的问题。
That educated elite that we’re talking about—let me not use a different word, although I feel uncomfortable with that word, but let’s use that educated elite—has given up on the education of Americans because they think that they can fill any skill gap with importing those skills, whether they are nurses, whether they’re doctors, whether they’re programmers.
我们正在谈论的那些受过教育的精英——让我不要用不同的词，虽然我对这个词感到不舒服，但让我们使用那个受过教育的精英——已经放弃了美国人的教育，因为他们认为他们可以通过引进这些技能来填补任何技能差距，无论他们是护士、医生还是程序员。
That’s the problem.
这就是问题所在。
I would love to have skilled immigration, but I would love also to renew the, I call this the social compact, to distinguish it from the social contract, the social compact of America such that the influential people, be they politicians, journalists, or tech barons, really have a commitment to the education of Americans.
我希望有技术移民，但我也希望更新，我称之为社会契约，以区别于社会契约，美国的社会契约，这样有影响力的人，无论是政治家、记者还是科技大亨，都真正致力于美国人的教育。
COVID era aside, test scores are pretty flat for decades.
撇开新冠疫情时代不谈，几十年来考试成绩都相当平稳。
Higher education right now, because of President Trump, has a crisis, but in general, longer-term, it’s been getting better and better.
由于特朗普总统的原因，高等教育现在面临着危机，但总的来说，从长远来看，它正在变得越来越好。
Quality of economics research been getting better and better.
经济学研究质量越来越好。
Why think we’ve given up on education in this country?
为什么认为我们已经放弃了这个国家的教育？
I don’t see that.
我不这么认为。
Well, about half of people in the United States in middle school read and write a couple of grades below.
嗯，大约一半的美国人在中学时的阅读和写作水平低于几个年级。
That’s longstanding.
这是长期存在的。
Immigration is much more recent, right?
移民是最近的事，对吗？
It’s not because of immigration that that’s coming down.
这并不是因为移民而下降。
No, but we’re not doing anything about that despite the fact that everybody recognizes that we are moving into the skills age where we are going to need more and more human capital.
不，但我们并没有对此采取任何行动，尽管每个人都认识到我们正在进入技能时代，我们将需要越来越多的人力资本。
We’re not doing anything.
我们什么也没做。
We’re just giving up on these people.
我们只是放弃这些人。
I think that is what really bothers me, that somehow we have, as the most powerful, arguably the richest, country in the world, have resigned ourselves to give up on the education of about a third to a half of the youth.
我认为这才是真正困扰我的地方，不知何故，我们作为世界上最强大、可以说是最富有的国家，已经放弃了大约三分之一到一半年轻人的教育。
When you say given up, you look at New York City, which is a complex place with some real problems, but per capita spending per student is through the roof.
当你说放弃时，你会看到纽约市，这是一个复杂的地方，存在一些实际问题，但每个学生的人均支出却很高。
Oh, yes, I know.
哦，是的，我知道。
It’s arguably way too high.
可以说是太高了。
We’re spending money.
我们正在花钱。
We’re throwing money at it, but we’re not really dealing with the root causes.
我们投入了大量资金，但并没有真正解决根本原因。
Some of that money goes to a dysfunctional education system that’s become ideological.
其中一些资金流向了功能失调、意识形态化的教育体系。
We should break the teachers’ unions.
我们应该解散教师工会。
Well, I am, in general, as you know from the book, in favor of unions because labor needs to be represented, but yes, teacher unions, right now, I think they need to be reconstituted because they no longer serve children’s interest.
嗯，总的来说，正如你从书中知道的那样，我支持工会，因为劳工需要有代表，但是，是的，教师工会，现在，我认为它们需要重组，因为它们不再服务于孩子们的利益。
On artificial intelligence
关于人工智能
Less than a year ago, you wrote a much-debated piece on artificial intelligence and argued that over the next—
不到一年前，您写了一篇关于人工智能的备受争议的文章，并认为在接下来的时间里——
Which one?
哪一个？
I’ve written many.
我写了很多。
The big long one.
又大又长的那种。
They’ve all had many detractors.
他们都有很多批评者。
You’ve argued it will have only a very small productivity boost over the next 10 years, right?
您认为未来 10 年生产力的提升幅度非常小，对吗？
Right.
正确的。
It’s now less than a year later—
现在已经过去不到一年了——
Oh, no. That paper was written in 2024, it was published, so yes, three years after that, yes.
哦，不。那篇论文写于 2024 年，发表了，所以是的，三年后，是的。
Okay.
好的。
Anthropic is a trillion-dollar company.
Anthropic 是一家价值数万亿美元的公司。
The rate of increase of its revenue is through the ceiling.
其收入增幅已突破上限。
Models seem to be getting better at an accelerating pace.
模型似乎正在以越来越快的速度变得更好。
Do you wish to revise your estimates?
您想修改您的估计吗？
Yes.
是的。
If I were writing that today, I would revise my estimates, but the general point remains.
如果我今天写这篇文章，我会修改我的估计，但总体要点仍然存在。
There are three general points there.
那里有三点。
One is a meta point, which is that there is a particular way we should think about the contribution of artificial intelligence to productivity.
一个是元点，即我们应该以一种特定的方式来思考人工智能对生产力的贡献。
It’s going to come through doing new things, and it’s going to come through cost savings in the things that we already do.
这将通过做新的事情来实现，并且将通过我们已经做的事情节省成本来实现。
That’s the meta point.
这就是元点。
The second was trying to put some flesh on those bones and say, given the numbers that others have come up with for what tasks, what occupations are going to be impacted by AI?
第二个是试图在这些骨头上添加一些肉，并说，考虑到其他人针对哪些任务、哪些职业将受到人工智能影响的数字？
Can we try to do that?
我们可以尝试这样做吗？
Then the third was just a rhetorical point, which is the industry just comes up with some crazy estimates, so can we try to ground them a little bit?
那么第三个只是一个修辞观点，即业界只是提出了一些疯狂的估计，所以我们可以尝试将它们接地一点吗？
Those are the three things.
这是三件事。
The first and the third, I would write them exactly the same way today.
第一个和第三个，我今天也会用同样的方式写。
The second, which is the numbers, of course, would be different.
第二个，也就是数字，当然会有所不同。
Relative to what I thought in 2023, 2024, when that paper was written and completed, yes, the models have advanced faster.
相对于我在 2023 年、2024 年撰写并完成该论文时的想法，是的，模型进展得更快。
On the other hand, relative to what I was expecting there, the applications on the basis of the models, which are crucial for the spread of the models, widespread adoption of the models, have been developing pretty sluggishly.
另一方面，相对于我的预期，基于模型的应用对于模型的传播、模型的广泛采用至关重要，但发展却相当缓慢。
The future is very unknown, very uncertain, much more than usual, and I try to emphasize that in the paper, and agentic AI is creating much more uncertainty in that.
未来是非常未知的，非常不确定，比平常更加不确定，我试图在论文中强调这一点，而代理人工智能正在创造更多的不确定性。
It is possible that agentic AI will also facilitate those applications, and in the course of two years or three years, we’re going to have many applications that small and medium-sized enterprises can take off the shelf and use.
代理人工智能也可能会促进这些应用程序的发展，在两年或三年的时间里，我们将有很多应用程序可供中小企业下架使用。
That would be a game-changer.
这将改变游戏规则。
My expectation is that it’s still going to be somewhat slow.
我的预期是它仍然会有点慢。
Yes, I think I would revise that up a little bit, but not radically.
是的，我想我会稍微修改一下，但不是彻底修改。
If we look at, say, 1995 to 1998, we have an IT boom.
如果我们回顾一下 1995 年到 1998 年，我们经历了 IT 繁荣时期。
It looks quite unsexy by current standards, but productivity growth goes up by at least half a percentage point.
以目前的标准来看，这看起来相当不吸引人，但生产率增长至少提高了半个百分点。
I would be shocked if what we have now didn’t do at least as much for us.
如果我们现在所拥有的并没有为我们带来同样多的帮助，我会感到震惊。
I completely reject the crazy utopian or dystopian estimates, but would you be willing to say that half a percentage point of productivity growth is certainly something easily imaginable and maybe to be expected?
我完全拒绝疯狂的乌托邦或反乌托邦的估计，但你愿意说半个百分点的生产率增长肯定是容易想象的，也许是可以预期的吗？
Or is that still too high for you?
或者这对你来说仍然太高了？
I think that would be an amazing thing.
我认为这将是一件了不起的事情。
Our society would be so much better.
我们的社会将会变得更加美好。
I wish it were.
我希望如此。
Your prediction.
你的预测。
Well, to put my prediction into perspective, you’ve mentioned 1995, 1998, but we had been making those investments that led to that for the previous 20 years.
好吧，为了正确地看待我的预测，你提到了 1995 年、1998 年，但我们在过去 20 年里一直在进行这些投资，从而实现了这一目标。
It depends on what period you take.
这取决于您服用的时间段。
If you take 1980, or some people actually started in the mid-’70s, to, say, 2008, before the financial crisis, during that period, our productivity isn’t super rapid.
如果你把 1980 年，或者有些人实际上从 70 年代中期开始，到 2008 年，金融危机之前，在那段时期，我们的生产力并不是很快。
There are periods in which it’s rapid.
有些时期它的速度很快。
That’s exactly what I expect.
这正是我所期望的。
In the next, when I wrote in 2024, so that would be next 10 years, so 2024 to 2034, I would expect exactly the same thing, that there will be one or two years of very rapid growth.
接下来，当我写到 2024 年时，也就是接下来的 10 年，也就是 2024 年到 2034 年，我预计会发生完全相同的事情，即将会有一两年的非常快速的增长。
Okay, my estimates were definitely AI is increasing GDP and TFP, which is great.
好吧，我的估计是人工智能肯定会增加 GDP 和 TFP，这很棒。
We don’t have many levers to increase GDP and TFP.
我们没有太多手段来增加 GDP 和 TFP。
That’s fantastic, but it’s not going to be the kind of game-changer that McKinsey or OpenAI or Anthropic are thinking about.
这太棒了，但它不会成为麦肯锡、OpenAI 或 Anthropic 正在考虑的那种游戏规则改变者。
If someone is 20 years old today, they’re well educated, and they don’t buy a motorcycle, what do you think is their life expectancy?
如果有人今天 20 岁，受过良好教育，但不买摩托车，你认为他们的预期寿命是多少？
I think it’s 100.
我认为是 100。
What’s your view?
你的看法是什么？
In part because of AI and computational biology, which in a sense is a broader vision of AI.
部分原因是人工智能和计算生物学，从某种意义上说，这是人工智能更广阔的视野。
I think people will die of old age or motorcycle accidents.
我认为人们会死于年老或摩托车事故。
Great question, great question.
好问题，好问题。
Look, I have not given that much thought in the way that you posed it.
听着，我没有按照你提出的方式考虑那么多。
You may reach 100, right?
你可能会达到100，对吗？
You already told me you’re younger than I am.
你已经告诉我你比我年轻。
I have an outside chance.
我有一个外部机会。
Save accordingly.
相应保存。
Okay, I’m agreeing with you.
好吧，我同意你的观点。
I’m going to reach 100.
我要达到100。
Look, I think what we have seen in Russia and in the United States, both before COVID and during COVID, is that public health is a major contributor to mortality and morbidity.
听着，我认为我们在俄罗斯和美国看到的情况，无论是在新冠疫情之前还是在新冠疫情期间，公共卫生都是造成死亡率和发病率的主要原因。
Computational biology is very exciting.
计算生物学非常令人兴奋。
I find it super exciting.
我觉得超级令人兴奋。
New drugs, AI or not, they’re pretty amazing.
新药，无论是否人工智能，它们都非常神奇。
By the way, many of the new drugs we’re making right now all predate AI.
顺便说一句，我们现在正在生产的许多新药都早于人工智能出现。
There are some companies that are doing very interesting AI-based drug discovery, but none of them are using large language models.
有一些公司正在做非常有趣的基于人工智能的药物发现，但他们都没有使用大型语言模型。
That’s a different question.
这是一个不同的问题。
It’s computational nonetheless, right?
尽管如此，它仍然是计算性的，对吧？
It’s computational.
这是计算性的。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
I’m very optimistic about AI if AI goes in the right way.
如果人工智能朝正确的方向发展，我对人工智能非常乐观。
That’s why I’m always emphasizing AGI through large language models is the target for me, because that’s just sucking all of our energy and all of our resources.
这就是为什么我总是强调通过大型语言模型实现 AGI 是我的目标，因为这只会耗尽我们所有的精力和资源。
That’s a different discussion.
这是一个不同的讨论。
I think so long as public health issues aren’t tackled, the way that that impacts the average American or bottom 30 percent Americans is still going to be an issue.
我认为，只要公共卫生问题不得到解决，对普通美国人或底层 30% 美国人的影响仍然是一个问题。
Oh, I agree, yes.
哦，我同意，是的。
The educated person can live to 100.
受过教育的人可以活到100岁。
Oh, you said the educated person.
哦，你说的是有教养的人。
Yes.
是的。
He takes care of himself or herself.
他照顾自己。
There’s GLP-1 drugs, which are not AI, but significant.
有 GLP-1 药物，虽然不是人工智能，但很重要。
GLP-1 is very interesting.
GLP-1 非常有趣。
More to come.
未来还会有更多。
More to come.
未来还会有更多。
I think it’s a real game-changer.
我认为这是一个真正的游戏规则改变者。
mRNA and GLP-1 are the two examples that are pre-AI amazing technologies.
mRNA 和 GLP-1 是前人工智能技术的两个例子。
Even with GLP-1, my understanding is that unless you do the public health side of it, it’s not going to have the same impact.
即使有了 GLP-1，我的理解是，除非你关注公共卫生方面，否则它不会产生同样的影响。
People lose muscle.
人们失去肌肉。
People might suffer other adverse effects in terms of strength if they just do GLP-1.
如果人们只做 GLP-1，他们可能会在力量方面遭受其他不利影响。
What do they have to do?
他们必须做什么？
They have to do exercise.
他们必须锻炼身体。
They have to change their habits.
他们必须改变习惯。
They have to change their diets.
他们必须改变饮食习惯。
Well, that’s all public health.
嗯，这就是公共卫生。
There are so many large American corporations that are using open-source AI, very often from China.
有很多美国大公司正在使用开源人工智能，其中很多来自中国。
Some will claim it’s only nine months behind the best proprietary models.
有些人会声称它只比最好的专有模型落后九个月。
That’s debatable, but it’s not that far behind.
这是有争议的，但也并不落后。
With open-source out there, why worry so much about AI centralizing power?
有了开源技术，为什么还要如此担心人工智能的权力集中化呢？
It seems to me an extraordinarily competitive market, and it almost cannot stop being so.
在我看来，这是一个竞争异常激烈的市场，而且几乎无法停止。
Fantastic question.
很棒的问题。
Look, I go back and forth on this.
看，我在这个问题上来来回回。
On the one hand, if I do scenario planning for the future, one very important scenario is that indeed the AI stack is not going to empower the foundation models, but is either going to create much bigger profit and monetization opportunities for those that go before the foundation models, like the chips like Nvidia, or the applications.
一方面，如果我对未来进行场景规划，一个非常重要的场景是，人工智能堆栈确实不会增强基础模型的能力，但要么会为那些先于基础模型的人（例如 Nvidia 等芯片）或应用程序创造更大的利润和货币化机会。
The reason for that is exactly what you say.
原因正如你所说。
It’s actually becoming easier and easier to distill these models.
事实上，提炼这些模型变得越来越容易。
There’s going to more competition, et cetera.
将会有更多的竞争，等等。
That, I think, is definitely a nonzero and probably 30 percent or so probability in my mind, just making it up.
我认为，这绝对是一个非零的概率，在我看来可能是 30% 左右，只是虚构的。
It’s impossible to have objective probabilities here.
这里不可能有客观的概率。
The large language model approach is centralizing.
大语言模型方法是集中化的。
Both the philosophy and the practice of it is that you take all of the data that you can, and one model rules it all.
它的理念和实践都是，你可以获取所有可以获取的数据，并由一个模型来统治这一切。
Now, that model can be copied, so perhaps you cannot monetize it that well, but there is a centralizing element to it.
现在，该模型可以复制，因此也许您无法很好地将其货币化，但它有一个中心化的元素。
Maybe to the knowledge, but not the power, right?
也许是知识，但不是力量，对吗？
The gains will go to the users, just as they have for electricity, antibiotics, fire.
收益将归用户所有，就像他们获得电力、抗生素、火力一样。
The gains could go to some users.
部分用户可能会受益。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
That’s part of that 30 percent.
这是那 30% 的一部分。
Again, that’s 30 percent.
再说一次，这个比例是 30%。
Why isn’t that 95 percent, say?
比如说，为什么不是 95%？
Open source is there.
开源就在那里。
It’s quite cheap, especially with the yanking of Fable 5.
它相当便宜，尤其是在《神鬼寓言5》被撤下的情况下。
Everyone’s so obsessed now with diversifying their reliance.
现在每个人都如此痴迷于多样化他们的依赖。
The knowledge is centralized in the sense everyone wants to draw on all the knowledge, but that’s hardly a bad thing.
从每个人都想利用所有知识的意义上来说，知识是集中的，但这并不是一件坏事。
It’s like having more data in your model.
这就像模型中有更多数据一样。
It’s mostly a good thing.
这主要是一件好事。
Again, I think that’s definitely a possible path, but all of the winner-take-all dynamics, both between companies and between China and US, is going in the opposite direction.
再说一次，我认为这绝对是一条可能的道路，但所有赢家通吃的动态，无论是公司之间还是中美之间，都在朝着相反的方向发展。
If you’re right, then China and US should collaborate on everything because there is no winner-take-all dynamics.
如果你是对的，那么中国和美国应该在所有事情上进行合作，因为不存在赢家通吃的动态。
You should take up that to the Trump administration.
你应该向特朗普政府提出这个问题。
There shouldn’t be much of a competition between OpenAI and Anthropic because neither of them are going to dominate the market.
OpenAI 和 Anthropic 之间不应该有太多竞争，因为他们都不会主导市场。
If you look at the valuations or the investments of these companies, I think there is a significant winner-take-all.
如果你看一下这些公司的估值或投资，我认为存在明显的赢家通吃的现象。
That’s why I’m undecided.
这就是我犹豫不决的原因。
But it’s a very good question that you’re posing here.
但你在这里提出的问题非常好。
If I take a step back, and this relates to both Hayek and to some of the themes that I try to develop in What Happened to Liberal Democracy?, I believe that liberalism and the kinds of society that we want to build that supports freedom does need decentralization.
如果我退后一步，这与哈耶克和我在《自由民主发生了什么？》中试图阐述的一些主题有关，我相信自由主义和我们想要建立的支持自由的社会确实需要权力下放。
Excessive centralization of many sorts is inimical to that agenda.
许多形式的过度集中都不利于这一议程。
I worry that the current AI approach has a centralizing element.
我担心当前的人工智能方法具有中心化元素。
Perhaps that’s excessive worry that market dynamics and other aspects of AI is going to take care of it, but I still worry about that.
也许过度担心市场动态和人工智能的其他方面会解决这个问题，但我仍然担心这一点。
I think true decentralization would be much better served with more domain-specific models of AI and other approaches that really use high-quality data for specific things, which I think is the more promising thing.
我认为真正的去中心化可以通过更多特定领域的人工智能模型和其他真正使用高质量数据来处理特定事物的方法来更好地服务，我认为这是更有前途的事情。
By the way, there’s more of that in China than in the US.
顺便说一下，中国的这种情况比美国还多。
That’s an interesting observation.
这是一个有趣的观察。
You’ve called repeatedly for what you call pro-worker AI.
您曾多次呼吁建立所谓的“支持工人的人工智能”。
Just specifically, what does that mean in terms of regulation?
具体来说，这对监管意味着什么？
Because current AI, by definition, the knowledge or the abilities are fairly general, but they’re implemented in a decentralized fashion.
因为当前的人工智能，从定义上来说，知识或能力相当普遍，但它们是以去中心化的方式实现的。
Mercatus has accounts.
Mercatus 有账户。
We use AI.
我们使用人工智能。
Companies use AI on their own.
公司自己使用人工智能。
Is the regulator supposed to look at what Stripe, Mercatus, all these different institutions are doing with their AIs, and ask if it helps the workers and approve it or not?
监管机构是否应该看看 Stripe、Mercatus 以及所有这些不同的机构正在用他们的人工智能做什么，并询问它是否对工人有帮助并批准它？
What does that regulation look like for you?
该规定对您来说是什么样的？
Fantastic question.
很棒的问题。
Thanks for asking that, Tyler.
谢谢你这么问，泰勒。
I’m again going to give a two-part answer to that.
我将再次对此给出两部分的答案。
The most important part of what I’ve been, like a broken record, talking about pro-worker AI for 10 years—although the term I’ve been using only for about five, that’s what I want to clarify.
我所做的最重要的部分，就像打破记录一样，谈论支持工人的人工智能 10 年——尽管这个术语我只使用了大约五年，但这就是我想要澄清的。
I do not think that we know today or we desire today a regulator deciding what is pro-worker AI and what’s not, and then saying only pro-worker AI should be enabled.
我认为我们今天不知道，也不希望监管机构决定什么是有利于工人的人工智能，什么不是，然后说只应该启用有利于工人的人工智能。
I’ve never argued that, and I do not believe that.
我从来没有争论过这一点，我也不相信这一点。
What I believe is that pro-worker AI would be much better for society, and if we find a way of cultivating it, we would be better off.
我相信，有利于工人的人工智能会对社会变得更好，如果我们找到一种培养它的方法，我们的生活会更好。
Cultivating it has to start by changing the narrative, changing the aspirations of tech entrepreneurs and tech companies, and public policy has a role but has a supporting role in that.
培育它必须从改变叙事开始，改变科技企业家和科技公司的愿望，而公共政策在这方面可以发挥作用，但也可以发挥支持作用。
No, I do not believe that we need to have a regulator that says, oh, only pro-worker AI is allowed.
不，我不认为我们需要有一个监管机构说，哦，只允许支持工人的人工智能。
Absolutely not.
绝对不是。
What is pro-worker AI?
什么是有利于工人的人工智能？
Let me just clarify that for a minute.
让我澄清一下。
By pro-worker AI, I mean AI that enables workers to do new or more sophisticated things by giving them information, by expanding their problem-solving and their expertise.
我所说的支持工人的人工智能，是指人工智能通过向工人提供信息、扩展他们的问题解决能力和专业知识，使他们能够做新的或更复杂的事情。
That’s intimately related to the earlier discussion that we had about automation and other things.
这与我们之前关于自动化和其他事物的讨论密切相关。
Automation, again, narrowly construed, isn’t pro-worker AI.
再次，从狭义的角度来看，自动化并不是有利于工人的人工智能。
If we use new machinery and new information systems to train people better to do things that they couldn’t do, nurses now can do much more, journalists can do much more, electricians can do much more, that is where pro-worker AI comes in.
如果我们使用新的机器和新的信息系统来训练人们更好地做他们无法做的事情，那么护士现在可以做更多的事情，记者可以做更多的事情，电工可以做更多的事情，这就是支持工人的人工智能的用武之地。
Now, a somewhat different question.
现在，一个有点不同的问题。
Your recent paper with Autor, Beirne, and Scott, does that mean you’re less worried about the fertility crisis than many of my friends?
您最近与 Autor、Beirne 和 Scott 合作发表的论文，这是否意味着您不像我的许多朋友那样担心生育危机？
Yes, I am less worried about it.
是的，我不太担心。
Does that mean you’re not really such a Keynesian?
这是否意味着你并不是真正的凯恩斯主义者？
Because the fertility crisis, aggregate demand, aggregate supply, they’re shrinking forever.
因为生育危机、总需求、总供给，它们都在永远萎缩。
A Keynesian or a supply-sider could get quite worried.
凯恩斯主义者或供给学派可能会非常担心。
Paul Romer, the market size is shrinking, he should get quite worried.
Paul Romer，市场规模正在缩小，他应该感到非常担心。
In a funny way, you end up at a real business cycle point of view where as long as the induced innovation is positive, the macro will go fine.
有趣的是，你最终会从一个真正的商业周期的角度来看，只要诱导的创新是积极的，宏观经济就会进展顺利。
You’re like Long and Plosser, King and Plosser in your macro.
你就像宏中的 Long 和 Plosser、King 和 Plosser。
Is that wrong?
这是错误的吗？
I never thought of King and Plosser about induced innovation.
我从来没有想到过 King 和 Plosser 所说的诱导创新。
It’s about the residual, and if the residual is—
这是关于残差的，如果残差是——
Habakkuk was the first one who was about this.
哈巴谷是第一个提出这个问题的人。
He argued that this is the reason why the American economy outpaced the British one in the 19th century.
他认为这就是19世纪美国经济超过英国的原因。
I always thought that was intriguing.
我一直认为这很有趣。
The models that I’ve been working on for the last 25 years on this topic always said that’s a possibility.
过去 25 年我一直在研究这个主题的模型总是说这是有可能的。
By the way, it’s not a certainty, but it’s only after seeing the evidence that I’m more in that camp.
顺便说一句，这并不是确定的，但只有在看到证据后我才更倾向于那个阵营。
No, I never saw myself as a traditional Keynesian.
不，我从来不认为自己是一个传统的凯恩斯主义者。
I think there are some great ideas in Keynes.
我认为凯恩斯有一些很棒的想法。
Obviously, aggregate supply, however you define it, doesn’t always determine things, but I never saw myself as a traditional Keynesian, and I never understood the new Keynesian models very well.
显然，无论你如何定义，总供给并不总是决定一切，但我从未将自己视为传统的凯恩斯主义者，也从未很好地理解新凯恩斯主义模型。
I’m sure, because we see this, there are episodes in which aggregate demand shortages create problems, but the fertility declines or birth rate declines are slow acting.
我确信，因为我们看到了这一点，总需求短缺会造成一些问题，但生育率下降或出生率下降是缓慢的。
It’s not like it happens overnight.
这并不是一夜之间发生的。
Perhaps that’s part of the reason why that aggregate demand shortage is not working out that much.
也许这就是总需求短缺问题没有得到太大解决的部分原因。
By the way, I’m also finding these results surprising.
顺便说一句，我也发现这些结果令人惊讶。
We’ve checked them so many times, and that’s why we’ve done them so many different ways, but it seems to be there in the data.
我们已经检查了很多次，这就是为什么我们用了很多不同的方式来完成它们，但它似乎存在于数据中。
What if someone says, well, there’s a lot of young labor missing after World War II, but right before us is this period of great population plenty, and to some extent, it’s expected.
如果有人说，二战后大量年轻劳动力缺失，但摆在我们面前的是这个人口充足的时期，而且在某种程度上，这是意料之中的，该怎么办？
No one thinks there’ll be a 1.3 total fertility rate, whereas today, you have all these countries, some of them quite poor—Brazil, I think, is at 1.36 or so—and that just seems to be ongoing, and it may fall even further.
没有人认为总生育率会达到 1.3，而今天，所有这些国家，其中一些非常贫穷——我认为巴西的生育率约为 1.36——而且这种情况似乎正在持续，而且可能会进一步下降。
Isn’t there a Lucas critique objection to your lack of fear of the fertility crisis?
卢卡斯不是批评你对生育危机缺乏恐惧吗？
Absolutely, 100 percent.
绝对，100%。
Yes, that’s a very good point.
是的，这是一个很好的观点。
The last paragraph of that paper says that.
该论文的最后一段就是这么说的。
We’ve never seen anything as large as what’s going on in China.
我们从未见过像中国发生的这样大规模的事情。
By the way, South Korea went through exactly the same thing, but South Korea is much smaller than China, is a fraction of the world population.
顺便说一句，韩国也经历了完全相同的事情，但韩国比中国小得多，只占世界人口的一小部分。
South Korea was already developed by the time it was doing that.
韩国在这样做时已经发达了。
China is a little bit less developed than South Korea when they started.
中国起步时比韩国落后一点。
India, 10 years ago, Narendra Modi was out there saying India cannot deal with this population, and now he’s talking about a fertility crisis.
印度，十年前，纳伦德拉·莫迪(Narendra Modi)曾表示印度无法应对这样的人口，现在他谈论的是生育危机。
Actually, the reasons, the causes of that fertility crisis are fascinating.
事实上，生育危机的原因令人着迷。
That’s so poorly understood.
这太不理解了。
That’s a different matter.
那是另一回事了。
Yes, indeed, Brazil is going through it.
是的，巴西确实正在经历这个过程。
Turkey is going through it.
土耳其正在经历这个过程。
Mexico is going through it.
墨西哥正在经历这个过程。
India is going through it.
印度正在经历这个过程。
When the whole world goes through it, except sub-Saharan Africa, perhaps the general equilibrium, general world equilibrium effects are going to be different.
当全世界都经历这种情况时，除了撒哈拉以南非洲以外，也许一般均衡、一般世界均衡的效果会有所不同。
That’s a possibility, absolutely.
这绝对是有可能的。
On the other hand, again, also, as we point out in the last paragraph, we’re also making people who live longer, as you said earlier on, and live healthier.
另一方面，正如我们在上一段中指出的那样，正如您之前所说，我们也让人们活得更长，活得更健康。
That’s also going to change things.
这也将改变事情。
That’s going to enable people to accumulate more and more relevant human capital throughout their lives.
这将使人们在一生中积累越来越多的相关人力资本。
That’s another completely new thing.
这是另一件全新的事情。
Now, you’re well known for writing a lot of papers, but just also a lot of very well-cited papers.
现在，您以撰写大量论文而闻名，但也有很多被广泛引用的论文。
Is AI going to increase your rate of output?
人工智能会提高你的产出率吗？
So far, I think a lot of people are using AI.
到目前为止，我认为很多人都在使用人工智能。
In economics, at least, it’s being used in a more labor-saving way.
至少在经济学中，它正在以一种更节省劳动力的方式被使用。
I don’t see anybody, and definitely not me, using AI in a way that, oh, my God, I’m now generating ideas I couldn’t generate.
我没有看到任何人（当然不是我）使用人工智能，天哪，我现在正在产生我无法产生的想法。
I think, both for me and other people, it’s only the very best papers that contribute significantly to collective knowledge.
我认为，对于我和其他人来说，只有最好的论文才能对集体知识做出重大贡献。
The question is, is AI going to change those papers?
问题是，人工智能会改变这些论文吗？
If I were, again, I’m talking for myself, to write three more of my below-average papers, nobody would care, and nobody should care about that.
如果我再为自己说话，再写三篇低于平均水平的论文，没有人会关心，也不应该关心。
You don’t always know which are the hits, right?
你并不总是知道哪些是热门产品，对吧？
Paul McCartney, Hey Jude would be his best song.
保罗·麦卡特尼的《Hey Jude》将是他最好的歌曲。
Maybe yes, maybe no. You do more.
也许是，也许不是。你做得更多。
There’s some hit rate.
有一定的命中率。
Beethoven wrote a lot that was not as wonderful as the Fifth Symphony, and so on.
贝多芬写了很多不如第五交响曲等精彩的作品。
The quantity and quality often go together, especially with top achievers.
数量和质量往往是相辅相成的，尤其是对于顶尖成就者来说。
They do.
他们确实这么做了。
Ken Arrow wrote an incredible amount.
肯·阿罗写下了令人难以置信的数量。
Milton Friedman did.
米尔顿·弗里德曼做到了。
Maybe you’ll just do more and have more top work, and when you need a meta-analysis on a topic, the AI will give it to you in an hour.
也许你会做得更多，有更多的顶级工作，当你需要对某个主题进行元分析时，人工智能会在一小时内给你。
For a meta-analysis and things like that, AI is going to be very useful.
对于元分析之类的事情，人工智能将非常有用。
Cleaning up data.
清理数据。
It’ll happen much more quickly.
它会发生得更快。
Cleaning up data.
清理数据。
Again, that’s labor-saving.
再说一遍，这很省力。
That’s what I meant by labor-saving.
这就是我所说的省力的意思。
The one thing that I’m using AI and other people are using it better than me, that’s very exciting, but so far, it hasn’t led to the big breakthroughs, it’s turning historical, verbal, qualitative data into measures that we can use for quantitative research.
我正在使用人工智能并且其他人比我更好地使用它，这是非常令人兴奋的，但到目前为止，它还没有带来重大突破，它正在将历史、口头、定性数据转变为我们可以用于定量研究的措施。
I think that’s very, very important.
我认为这非常非常重要。
That’s very, very exciting.
这非常非常令人兴奋。
What you say is also true, that there is a lot of uncertainty.
你说的也对，有很多不确定性。
For my own track record, I know when a paper is okay, not that great.
根据我自己的记录，我知道一篇论文什么时候还可以，什么时候不太好。
I don’t know the other one.
我不知道另一位。
I often think, oh, this paper is going to be great, and it doesn’t turn out to be.
我经常想，哦，这篇论文会很棒，但事实并非如此。
The bottom ones you sort of know.
你所知道的最底层的。
Now, some number of MIT economics graduate students have received job offers from Anthropic, OpenAI, have taken them, are considering taking them.
现在，一些麻省理工学院经济学研究生已经收到了 Anthropic、OpenAI 的工作机会，已经接受、正在考虑接受。
How do you feel about that?
你对此有何感想？
Is that the future of MIT economics, is to feed the beast, the AIs?
难道麻省理工学院经济学的未来就是喂养人工智能这头野兽吗？
At high salaries, of course, right?
当然是高薪，对吧？
At high salaries, of course.
当然是高薪。
Look, let me answer a different question first.
听着，让我先回答一个不同的问题。
Because I’ve seen somebody else write about this recently.
因为我最近看到有人写过这个。
I think The Economist magazine.
我认为是《经济学人》杂志。
AI companies are also hiring a lot of philosophers.
人工智能公司也在聘请很多哲学家。
What do you think about that?
你对此有何看法？
I think they’re hiring the wrong philosophers, frankly.
坦率地说，我认为他们雇佣了错误的哲学家。
I’m happy that they’re doing it.
我很高兴他们正在这样做。
I think AI companies have a lot of money and are waking up to the fact that their decisions are so consequential that they need to think about the broader effects.
我认为人工智能公司拥有很多钱，并且正在意识到他们的决定是如此重要，以至于他们需要考虑更广泛的影响。
I actually applaud them for hiring philosophers.
我实际上对他们聘请哲学家表示赞赏。
I agree.
我同意。
Now, for economists, it’s a bit more complicated.
现在，对于经济学家来说，情况有点复杂。
That’s why I wanted to answer the philosophers first.
这就是为什么我想首先回答哲学家的问题。
Because for economists, they’re doing it for two reasons.
因为对于经济学家来说，他们这样做有两个原因。
One is they’re thinking about it broadly, but second is to whitewash.
一是他们考虑的比较广泛，二是粉饰。
They want to have better reports that say our impact is going to be positive, we’re going to contribute to productivity, we’re going to contribute to well-being.
他们希望得到更好的报告，表明我们的影响将是积极的，我们将为生产力做出贡献，我们将为福祉做出贡献。
That’s not the best use of our economics talent.
这并不是我们经济学人才的最佳利用方式。
The question is, if you’re going to go to Anthropic, if you’re going to go to OpenAI, make sure you have backbone, you have nerves of steel, and you have standards, a moral compass.
问题是，如果你要去 Anthropic，如果你要去 OpenAI，请确保你有骨气，你有钢铁般的意志，你有标准，有道德指南针。
On Armenia
关于亚美尼亚
Are you optimistic about the future of Armenia, given how close it is to Russia?
鉴于亚美尼亚与俄罗斯的距离如此之近，您对亚美尼亚的未来持乐观态度吗？
Or is that just never going to work that well?
或者这永远不会那么有效？
As you know, two-thirds of its history, it’s ruled by the Persians.
如您所知，其三分之二的历史是由波斯人统治的。
More recently, Russia has been the major influence.
最近，俄罗斯成为主要影响力。
It’s part of the Soviet Union.
它是苏联的一部分。
Now it’s autonomous, but with an uncertain future.
现在它是自治的，但未来不确定。
What do you think?
你怎么认为？
You know, but your audience may not, I’m Armenian.
你知道，但你的观众可能不知道，我是亚美尼亚人。
I follow Armenia.
我关注亚美尼亚。
At the time of independence, by many standards, Armenia looked like the best placed because it was the place where the Soviet Union chose as education and technical expertise, engineering hub.
在独立时，从许多标准来看，亚美尼亚看起来是最好的，因为它是苏联选择作为教育和技术专长、工程中心的地方。
The people are so smart.
人们是如此聪明。
The people are well educated.
人们受过良好的教育。
Armen Alchian, right?
阿门·阿尔奇安，对吗？
Yes, exactly.
是的，完全正确。
Kasparov.
卡斯帕罗夫。
It has disappointed.
它令人失望。
Armenia has really disappointed.
亚美尼亚确实令人失望。
It has underperformed economically.
它在经济上表现不佳。
It had a good start in terms of building democracy, and then it’s squandered that.
它在建设民主方面有一个良好的开端，但后来却被浪费了。
It still has that human capital focus, but the situation is very difficult.
它仍然注重人力资本，但情况非常困难。
It’s squeezed between Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.
它被挤压在俄罗斯、土耳其和阿塞拜疆之间。
Turkey is now finally perhaps going to start allowing trade and other things with Armenia, but it’s not always.
土耳其现在也许终于开始允许与亚美尼亚进行贸易和其他活动，但情况并非总是如此。
It’s a landlocked country.
这是一个内陆国家。
It cannot export anything because, again, transport is not a possibility.
它不能出口任何东西，因为运输也是不可能的。
It has to find a way of using its talent.
它必须找到一种利用其人才的方法。
I think the AI age actually creates opportunities for Armenia.
我认为人工智能时代实际上为亚美尼亚创造了机会。
There is a lot of interesting activity going on there, but the geopolitics is really, very risky.
那里正在进行很多有趣的活动，但地缘政治确实非常危险。
So far, it has somehow managed never to anger Russia, which I don’t know how they manage that.
到目前为止，它以某种方式从未激怒俄罗斯，我不知道他们是如何做到这一点的。
On the other hand, that comes at the expense of sometimes being too pro-Russian.
另一方面，这是以有时过于亲俄为代价的。
It’s a complicated situation.
这是一个复杂的情况。
I’ll be visiting Armenia for the first time in September.
我将在九月第一次访问亚美尼亚。
Now, of course, I’ll read guidebooks, ask my AIs, but what else should I know to make my visit a better one that I won’t pick up from traditional sources?
现在，当然，我会阅读旅游指南，询问我的人工智能，但我还应该知道什么才能让我的旅行变得更好，而我不会从传统来源获取信息呢？
Oh, boy.
哦，男孩。
That’s a hard question.
这是一个很难回答的问题。
I mean, just have fun.
我的意思是，玩得开心就好。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
How’s Armenian food different from Turkish food?
亚美尼亚食物与土耳其食物有何不同？
Armenian food in Turkey is very, very similar to Turkish food because the two have merged.
土耳其的亚美尼亚食物与土耳其食物非常非常相似，因为两者已经融合。
In fact, the Armenian language that I learned when I was born in Turkey—but my first language was Armenian—is actually somewhat different than the Armenian that people speak in Armenia because it’s merged with Turkish.
事实上，我在土耳其出生时学到的亚美尼亚语（但我的母语是亚美尼亚语）实际上与亚美尼亚人所说的亚美尼亚语有些不同，因为它与土耳其语合并了。
Armenian food in Armenia is different than Turkish food.
亚美尼亚的亚美尼亚食物与土耳其食物不同。
Armenian food in Turkey is very similar to Turkish food.
土耳其的亚美尼亚食物与土耳其食物非常相似。
You’ll get a diversity.
你会得到多样性。
If I want Armenian food in America, should I go to Fountain and Vermont in Los Angeles or somewhere else?
如果我想在美国吃亚美尼亚菜，我应该去洛杉矶的喷泉和佛蒙特州还是其他地方？
Los Angeles is the second-largest Armenian city in the world.
洛杉矶是世界第二大亚美尼亚城市。
I’ve not spent that much time in Los Angeles, so I’m not able to guide you there.
我在洛杉矶待的时间不长，所以无法引导您前往那里。
On what comes next
关于接下来会发生什么
Final question—but before, just your book again, What Happened to Liberal Democracy?
最后一个问题——但在此之前，又是你的书《自由民主发生了什么？》
by Daron Acemoglu, new out this year—what is it you want to learn about next?
作者：Daron Acemoglu，今年新出——接下来你想了解什么？
I have several big questions that I’m exploring right now.
我现在正在探索几个大问题。
One is what we just talked about, how can we make AI, not as a regulation, but just ground up, how can you make AI more pro-worker?
一个是我们刚才讲的，我们如何让人工智能，不是作为一个规定，而是从根本上讲，如何让人工智能更加有利于工人？
I think that’s just my big passion.
我认为这就是我的一大热情。
Second, all of these questions, and actually your first question, intersect with the following issue: Where do you need talent in society?
其次，所有这些问题，实际上也是你的第一个问题，都与以下问题相交叉：社会上哪里需要人才？
Where do you need talent, education, expertise?
您在哪里需要人才、教育、专业知识？
Is it enough to have it at the very top with the elite, the best scientists, and then it will trickle down, or do you need it everywhere in society?
把它放在精英、最好的科学家的最高层就足够了，然后它就会向下渗透，还是社会各处都需要它？
What makes the most radical innovations work?
是什么让最激进的创新发挥作用？
I think we actually don’t know the answer to that question.
我认为我们实际上不知道这个问题的答案。
I suspect that it’s not as top-down as sometimes the standard histories tell, so that’s the second thing.
我怀疑它并不像有时标准历史所讲述的那样自上而下，所以这是第二件事。
Then the third, it’s both bridging this gap between political economy, which is half of my work and more than half of my passion, and all of these things.
第三，它既是弥合政治经济学（这是我一半的工作，也是我一半以上的热情）与所有这些事情之间的差距。
What’s the role of ideas?
想法的作用是什么？
The materialist conception, which is both dominant in Marxism and all of the leftist social science and economics, leaves very little room for ideas.
在马克思主义和所有左翼社会科学和经济学中占主导地位的唯物主义观念，给思想留下的空间很小。
When you look at the real world, sometimes ideas from individuals, but also from groups, create very different dynamics.
当你观察现实世界时，有时来自个人的想法，但也来自团体的想法，会创造出非常不同的动力。
That’s the third thing that I’m passionate about.
这是我热衷的第三件事。
Daron Acemoglu, thank you very much.
达龙·阿塞莫格鲁，非常感谢你。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
This was a pleasure, always.
这总是令人愉快的。
Image credit: Bryce Vickmark
图片来源：布莱斯维克马克