Daniel Carpenter on Smart Regulation (Ep. 121)

I do believe that the Pendleton Act created the basis for the decline of patronage, and it took a while.

我确实相信《彭德尔顿法案》为赞助的下降奠定了基础，而且这需要一段时间。

The Pendleton Act depended heavily upon presidential enforcement.

彭德尔顿法案在很大程度上取决于总统的执行。

It was actually Theodore Roosevelt, more than two decades after the act, who really implemented the pivotal administrative decisions there.

事实上，在该法案实施二十多年后，真正执行该法案关键行政决策的是西奥多·罗斯福。

I would say if we were trying to do this today, I would actually reduce the number of political appointees at the top levels of the civil service.

我想说，如果我们今天尝试这样做，我实际上会减少公务员高层政治任命的人数。

It’s actually relevant to some recent politics regarding the FDA.

这实际上与 FDA 最近的一些政治有关。

Surely, the leaders of an administrative agency, executive branch, or so-called independent commission, are appointed by the president.

当然，行政机构、行政部门或所谓的独立委员会的领导人都是由总统任命的。

That’s an Article II power.

That’s an Article II power.

They should continue to be appointed by the president.

他们应该继续由总统任命。

It’s all of the other folks — communications, undersecretaries, and so forth — that I’m not sure about the added value of those appointments.

我不确定这些任命的附加价值是因为所有其他人——“通讯、副部长等等”。

I think we would do better by restricting their number.

我认为通过限制他们的数量我们会做得更好。

One of the things that merit reform did is, it got rid of one form of politics by reducing the link between partisanship, party organization, and appointment at the middle and lowest levels, but it introduced another.

值得改革的一件事是，它通过减少党派、党组织和中层和基层任命之间的联系，摆脱了一种政治形式，但引入了另一种政治形式。

It accentuated and facilitated the growth of public employee labor unions, and I have a mixed judgment on those.

它强调并促进了公共雇员工会的发展，我对此有不同的判断。

I don’t think you can have a conversation about policing like we’re having in this country right now without calling into question the value of some of those unions and the degree to which they protect their members from egregious actions.

我认为，你不可能像我们现在在这个国家那样谈论警务，而不会对其中一些工会的价值以及他们保护其成员免受恶劣行为的程度提出质疑。

Obviously, there’s a huge literature there as well on teachers’ unions and other public employees’ unions.

显然，那里还有大量关于教师工会和其他公共雇员工会的文献。

At the federal level, I actually think the federal employee unions are pretty weak.

在联邦层面，我实际上认为联邦雇员工会相当薄弱。

Part of that is just basic political science.

Part of that is just basic political science.

Just about nowhere other than a few western states — I guess you’d probably say parts of Virginia now — are federal employee unions politically strong enough to make a difference in the electoral calculations of a congressional majority.

除了少数几个西部州（我猜你现在可能会说弗吉尼亚州的部分地区）之外，几乎没有其他地方的联邦雇员工会在政治上足够强大，足以对国会多数派的选举计算产生影响。

I don’t know that we’ve reached an optimum there.

我不知道我们是否已经达到了最佳状态。

I do think termination at some level should be easier for basic nonperformance.

我确实认为，对于基本的不履行职责，在某种程度上终止应该更容易。

I do think using career incentives among a whole bunch of positions in the civil service should be easier to do.

我确实认为在公务员队伍的一大堆职位中使用职业激励措施应该更容易做到。

But I would say, at the federal level, you’ve got a situation where, again, I’m not going to say optimum.

但我想说，在联邦层面，你面临着一种情况，我再次不会说最佳。

If anything, I believe the last presidential administration showed us the value of having an independent civil service, one that cannot be used by a party or a leader who verges on authoritarian energies, while at the same time avoiding some of the problems that one sees in the worst case of public employee union abuses, such as we see in some police departments.

如果说有什么不同的话，我相信上一届总统政府向我们展示了拥有独立公务员制度的价值，一个独立的公务员制度不能被一个接近​​独裁能量的政党或领导人所使用，同时避免了人们在公共雇员工会滥用职权的最严重情况下看到的一些问题，例如我们在一些警察部门看到的情况。

On the history of the US Postal Service

On the history of the US Postal Service

The letters subsidized the newspapers, which was crucial because the newspaper created a much more informed society.

这些信件为报纸提供了补贴，这至关重要，因为报纸创造了一个更加消息灵通的社会。

It was a platform for advertising, things like that.

这是一个广告平台，诸如此类。

I don’t want to make a simplistic mapping from that to, say, net neutrality because there are a whole bunch of other issues involved there.

我不想将其简单化地映射到网络中立性，因为其中还涉及很多其他问题。

But I do think the degree to which providers can close off access or make access to this large externality much more costly is a grave concern.

但我确实认为，提供商可以在多大程度上关闭访问或使访问这种巨大的外部性的成本更高，这是一个严重的问题。

For what it’s worth, at some level, yes, we’re there with the internet now.

就其价值而言，在某种程度上，是的，我们现在有了互联网。

At some level, it’s replaced the post office, but as I recently argued in the Boston Review, not entirely.

在某种程度上，它取代了邮局，但正如我最近在《波士顿评论》中指出的那样，它并不完全取代。

There are still a large number of magazines, newspaper subscriptions for that matter now, pharmacy activities, and others that rely heavily upon the postal system and probably will for the foreseeable future.

现在仍然有大量的杂志、报纸订阅、药房活动以及其他严重依赖邮政系统的活动，并且在可预见的未来可能会如此。

Any number of other services were, of course, decentralized to the state level, sometimes to the local, so Progressives saw at one moment in the Postal Service, well, here’s actually something that the national government can do, and it can provide this platform for democratic republic, open deliberation, markets, and a much more universalized cultural dialogue.

当然，许多其他服务都被分散到州一级，有时分散到地方，所以进步派一度在邮政服务中看到，这实际上是国家政府可以做的事情，它可以为民主共和国、开放审议、市场和更普遍的文化对话提供这个平台。

I don’t want to say singular cultural dialogue — pluralism was there — but a much more globalized dialogue.

我不想说单一的文化对话——“存在多元化”——而是一种更加全球化的对话。

That said, the other thing they saw in the Postal Service — and this is something that Theodore Roosevelt saw in the Postal Service — was something that was being eaten from within by the patronage system.

也就是说，他们在邮政服务中看到的另一件事——这就是西奥多·罗斯福在邮政服务中看到的东西——是被赞助系统从内部蚕食的东西。

It was, in part, the folks in the Pendleton Act, but I would argue even more the presidents who really pushed civil service reform forward with their administrative decisions, who said, “If it’s going to happen anywhere, it has to happen in the Postal Service, in part because there’s a big part of our economy, as well as our society, that depends upon it.”

部分原因是《彭德尔顿法案》中的人们，但我更认为那些真正通过行政决策推动公务员制度改革的总统，他们说：“如果要在任何地方发生这种情况，它就必须发生在邮政服务中，部分原因是我们的经济和社会的很大一部分都依赖于邮政服务。”

Roosevelt, before and after he made these very controversial moves to cover in, as it’s said, thousands of postmaster positions under the merit system, actually received a lot of support from shipping industries and medium-size, smaller-size retailers.

罗斯福在采取这些非常有争议的举措之前和之后，据说在绩效制度下填补了数千个邮政局长职位，实际上得到了航运业和中小型零售商的大量支持。

I guess it depends on what you mean by “itself.” I would start with the idea that basic privacy restrictions, which governed the postal system as much through norm as by law in the 19th century and early 20th century, should govern the system.

我想这取决于你所说的“本身”是什么意思。我首先认为，基本的隐私限制在 19 世纪和 20 世纪初通过规范和法律对邮政系统进行了同样的管理，现在也应该对整个系统进行管理。

It’s a crime if I were to walk past your mailbox and open your letter.

如果我走过你的邮箱并打开你的信，那就是犯罪。

I’m committing a federal crime, but there were also norms that seals were not to be broken, things like that.

我犯了联邦罪行，但也有禁止破坏封印之类的规范。

I do think whichever way the Postal Service goes — and it’s quite possible that you could imagine an electronic platform for the US postal system — I think basic privacy restrictions have to be guaranteed.

我确实认为，无论邮政服务采取哪种方式 ——你很可能可以想象美国邮政系统的电子平台 —— 我认为必须保证基本的隐私限制。

Actually, in some respects, I think we need to know a fair amount about what postal workers do without, say, calling for Amazon tracking.

实际上，在某些方面，我认为我们需要大量了解邮政工作人员在不要求亚马逊跟踪的情况下所做的事情。

But if we think that postal workers are misplacing ballots or not providing birth control pills or something like that, then we should probably have some way of picking up on that kind of nefarious behavior.

但如果我们认为邮政工作人员放错了选票或不提供避孕药或类似的东西，那么我们可能应该有某种方式来发现这种邪恶行为。

On government regulation

关于政府监管

I actually think that’s a problem.

I actually think that’s a problem.

I’m happy to say that I think the case against price regulation, especially micro-level regulation of prices, is generally a strong one, the case against price regulation.

我很高兴地说，我认为反对价格监管，特别是微观层面的价格监管的理由总体上是强有力的，反对价格监管的理由。

We’ve seen a fair degree of deregulation in environmental spaces.

我们已经看到环境空间的管制有相当程度的放松。

I would argue, depending on which part of the FDA you want to look at, even in medicines approval and things like that, we’ve seen some deregulation.

我认为，取决于你想了解 FDA 的哪个部分，即使在药品审批和类似的事情上，我们也看到了一些放松管制的情况。

The point that you’re talking to right now — there’s a development in local-level valuation of housing in American culture that is leading many governments, I agree, to crack down on building.

你现在所说的这一点是——我同意，美国文化中地方层面住房估值的发展正在导致许多政府打击建筑业。

It happens in my own town to make building new construction harder.

这种情况发生在我自己的城镇，这使得建造新建筑变得更加困难。

I could see that as ratcheting one-way, except, of course, now let’s talk about some of those very rural areas that we just mentioned a few minutes ago that are depopulating.

我可以认为这是单向的，当然，现在我们来谈谈我们几分钟前刚刚提到的一些人口正在减少的农村地区。

It would be interesting — I don’t know the answer to this question — to see whether there’s more freedom to build in areas like that.

看看在这样的区域是否有更多的建设自由，这会很有趣——“我不知道这个问题的答案”。

My guess is, where you’re going to see less freedom to build — if you want to use that metaphor — is in precisely the kinds of places on the coasts and maybe in certain aspects of the Southeast, places that are driven, in part, by racial and ethnic discrimination, but also by wealth discrimination, that are going to crack down much more heavily upon new building, especially new residential building.

我的猜测是，你会看到更少的建设自由——如果你想用这个比喻的话——正是在沿海地区，也许在东南部的某些地区，这些地方部分受到种族和民族歧视的驱动，但也受到财富歧视的驱动，这些地方将对新建筑，特别是新住宅建筑进行更严厉的打击。

There’s a complicated story there.

There’s a complicated story there.

The story in France — where they also have nuclear regulation — is that so many of the folks who work at that agency come through the country’s formidable technical schools, and they’re trained in a certain way that leads them to be much more likely to see nuclear power as a good thing.

法国的故事——“那里也有核监管”——是，在该机构工作的许多人都来自该国强大的技术学校，他们接受过某种方式的培训，这使他们更有可能将核电视为一件好事。

For what it’s worth, I happen to be a believer in nuclear power as part of a bundle of non-carbon-based energy sources.

无论如何，我碰巧相信核能是一系列非碳能源的一部分。

That said, I think it’s very plausible that, due to professional training, things like that, nuclear regulation may be a plausible case of capture, both here and, again, in other countries.

也就是说，我认为，由于专业培训，诸如此类的事情，核监管可能是一个看似合理的捕获案例，无论是在这里还是在其他国家。

Let me just flip it by one .

Let me just flip it by one .

.

。

.

。

for the moment, probably the least captured agency .

目前，这可能是最少被捕获的机构。

.

。

.

。

I wouldn’t say the least.

I wouldn’t say the least.

An agency that is newer and less captured would probably be the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

消费者金融保护局可能是一个较新且较少关注的机构。

That’s not to say that I believe in every decision it makes.

这并不是说我相信它所做的每一个决定。

I do think there’s something to the way an agency gets set up when it’s new — assuming it’s set up in a certain way, it’s got certain kind of staffers, it’s got merit service protection, things like that — that it is less likely to be captured.

我确实认为，一个机构在新成立时的设立方式是有一定道理的——假设它是以某种方式设立的，有某种类型的员工，有功绩保护，诸如此类的东西，那么它就不太可能被抓获。

This is, at some level, a difference between the early political science theories of capture and the Stiglerian theory.

在某种程度上，这是早期政治学的俘获理论与斯蒂格勒理论之间的区别。

I’m about to participate in a 50th anniversary — it’s another podcast with Luigi Zingales on the 50th anniversary of Stigler’s theory of economic regulation.

我即将参加 50 周年纪念活动——这是 Luigi Zingales 的另一个播客，纪念斯蒂格勒经济监管理论诞生 50 周年。

His theory was really much more about legislative design and in much of the ways that you and I have been talking about.

他的理论实际上更多地涉及立法设计以及你和我一直在谈论的许多方式。

But before him, there were two political scientists who were thinking in similar but not identical terms.

但在他之前，有两位政治科学家的思考方式相似但不相同。

One was my late colleague, Sam Huntington, who actually wrote in the ICC, and the other was Marver Bernstein.

一位是我已故的同事萨姆·亨廷顿，他实际上在国际刑事法院撰稿，另一位是马弗·伯恩斯坦。

Marver Bernstein, who was at one point dean of the Woodrow Wilson School — he talked about the life cycle of agencies.

马弗·伯恩斯坦（Marver Bernstein）曾担任伍德罗·威尔逊学院院长，他谈到了机构的生命周期。

Capture wasn’t something that was designed de novo into an agency.

Capture 并不是机构从头开始设计的东西。

It was something that evolved in an agency that wasn’t originally captured but became so.

它是在一个机构中演变而来的，最初并没有被捕获，但后来却被捕获了。

I’m not saying that’s a better model necessarily, but clearly, sometimes that happens when capture by design does not.

我并不是说这一定是一个更好的模型，但显然，有时当设计捕获不是更好的模型时就会发生这种情况。

The second, we really got hit, I’d arguably say, more from the left than from the right on this as we actually argued it’s hard to prove capture.

第二，我们确实受到了打击，我可以说，更多的是来自左边的打击，而不是来自右边的打击，因为我们实际上认为很难证明捕获。

You have to have a counterfactual of what an agency that wouldn’t be captured would — in the same situation ceteris paribus — be doing.

你必须对一个不会被抓获的机构在其他条件不变的情况下会做什么有一个反事实的认识。

A lot of the existing empirical studies — and this goes back generations, and I’m indicting a set of things in political science as well as economics — suffer from the usual omitted variable bias problems.

许多现有的实证研究 ——这可以追溯到几代人之前，我指的是政治学和经济学中的一系列事情—— 遭受着常见的遗漏变量偏差问题。

Some of them, I think, were making the wrong inferences from the evidence that exists, such as noticing, for instance, that in certain kinds of patterns of regulatory decision-making, larger and older firms did better, enjoyed, say, quicker or more favorable decisions than did smaller and newer firms.

我认为，他们中的一些人从现有的证据中做出了错误的推论，例如注意到，在某些监管决策模式中，规模较大、历史悠久的公司比规模较小、较新的公司做得更好，享受更快或更有利的决策。

As I wrote in a — it was a mathematical essay published almost 20 years ago, that can be true even when the underlying regulator or the regulator in question has zero implicit or explicit preference over the kind of firm it’s regulating.

正如我在《a》中所写——这是一篇大约 20 年前发表的数学论文，即使底层监管者或相关监管者对其监管的公司类型的隐性或显性偏好为零，情况也可能如此。

It has everything to do with, not even risk avoidance, but uncertainty avoidance.

它与一切有关，甚至不是规避风险，而是规避不确定性。

Long before the comments rolled in, there were a set of hundreds of meetings with the agency that happened even before the notice of proposed rulemaking.

早在这些评论出现之前，甚至在拟议的规则制定通知发布之前，就与该机构举行了数百次会议。

Essentially, the architecture that we have in the Administrative Procedure Act doesn’t regulate those meetings at all.

从本质上讲，我们在《行政程序法》中的架构根本不规范这些会议。

A legal scholar named Kimberly Krawiec — I believe she’s at Duke, or she was when she wrote the article — noticed that the vast majority of these meetings — just go to the article, but I’m going to say 90 percent — were with either large bank holding companies — not the smaller regional banks, Fifth Third, things like that; we’re talking JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Citi, law firms representing those companies like Sullivan Cromwell, and associations representing those companies — get into a whole question about why the hybrid representation in another.

一位名叫金伯利·克拉维茨（Kimberly Krawiec）的法律学者 ——“我相信她在杜克大学，或者当她写这篇文章时她就在杜克大学”——“注意到这些会议中的绝大多数 ——”只是去看文章，但我要说的是 90%  ——“要么是大型银行控股公司”——“而不是较小的地区性银行，第五第三银行，诸如此类的；我们谈论的是摩根大通、高盛、花旗、代表这些公司的律师事务所（如沙利文·克伦威尔）以及代表这些公司的协会 ——深入思考为什么在另一个公司中采用混合代表形式。

But that was one thing.

但那是一回事。

Pre-proposed rulemaking, earliest agenda-setting meetings are dominated by industrial interests.

预先提议的规则制定、最早的议程设定会议都是由工业利益主导的。

The second–and this was an asset-pricing study by Professor Libgober, who’s now at UCSD — showed that the banks that met with the Fed — he only looked at the Fed, and then he used a very small window for when the proposed rules were announced, and they witnessed and enjoyed a statistically significant and financially significant continual abnormal positive return on their stocks the moment the proposed rule was announced.

第二个——这是现在在加州大学圣地亚哥分校的 Libgober 教授进行的一项资产定价研究——表明，与美联储会面的银行——他只关注美联储，然后他在宣布拟议规则时使用了一个非常小的窗口，并且在宣布拟议规则的那一刻，他们见证并享受了其股票在统计上和财务上显着的持续异常正回报。

Not so much the final rule because that comes much later, but the first.

与其说是最终规则，因为它出现得晚得多，不如说是第一个规则。

He totaled up, I think, $40–70 billion of positive abnormal returns just from those meetings with the Fed just in the first hour — which is what an intraday study has to do — after the proposed rule was announced.

我认为，仅在拟议规则宣布后的第一个小时（这是盘中研究必须做的事情）中，他就从与美联储的会议中总计获得了 40-700 亿美元的正异常回报。

I’m not saying I agree with all of these folks, but I do think that, right now, all of our attention on notice-and-comment rulemaking — and for that matter, cost-benefit analysis as concomitant to it — misses the fact that there are people who are close observers of this space — and now a very empirically sophisticated observer in this space, Brian Libgober — who believe that most of the action is actually occurring before notice and comment starts.

我并不是说我同意所有这些人的观点，但我确实认为，现在我们对通知和评论规则制定的所有关注 ——就这一点而言，与之相伴的成本效益分析 ——忽视了这样一个事实：有人是这个领域的密切观察者 ——现在这个领域的一个非常经验丰富的观察者布莱恩·利布戈伯 —— 他相信大多数操作实际上是在通知和评论开始之前发生的。

There’s a great chapter in our book, Preventing Regulatory Capture, by Daniel Schwartz, who’s shown that, at least in insurance regulation in Minnesota, that Minnesota has been able to do this.

我们的书《防止监管捕获》中有一个很棒的章节，作者是丹尼尔·施瓦茨 (Daniel Schwartz)，他表明，至少在明尼苏达州的保险监管方面，明尼苏达州已经能够做到这一点。

Whether it’s made folks better off or worse off — that’s much harder to tell, but I would argue, in fact, that if you proactively embed voices — interests that wouldn’t otherwise be represented — that you’ll actually open up the conversation.

它是否使人们的境况变得更好还是更糟 ——这很难说，但事实上，我认为，如果你主动地嵌入声音 —— 本来不会被代表的利益 ——你实际上会打开对话。

My guess, if I had to think, would be the folks in Fairfax County, the NIMBY folks, the anti-nuclear-power folks, they’re already pretty well represented in this process.

我猜，如果我不得不思考的话，会是费尔法克斯县的人们、邻避者、反核人士，他们在这个过程中已经得到了很好的代表。

On things under- and overrated

关于被低估和高估的事情

There are stories you can tell — reporters and mid-level agency folks who would talk on a semi-regular basis for years.

有些故事你可以讲——记者和中层机构人员多年来都会半定期地谈论。

Now they don’t need to have that relationship to get the information they want, and so they just file a FOIA request, and they get it.

现在，他们不需要拥有这种关系来获取他们想要的信息，因此他们只需提交 FOIA 请求，然后就可以得到它。

That said, and again, going from the experience of the last few years, going from what I regard as a critical worry for our globe, for our country — creeping authoritarianism — I think FOIA is — and strongly enforced because it was just weakened by the Supreme Court — is one of the most important laws that we have.

话虽如此，从过去几年的经验来看，从我认为对我们的地球、对我们的国家而言的一个严重担忧——“蔓延的威权主义”——“我认为《信息自由法》”是我们拥有的最重要的法律之一，而且因为它刚刚被最高法院削弱而得到了强有力的执行。

In terms of small favors, let me say that I think that’s underrated.

就小恩小惠而言，我认为这被低估了。

The psychological literature has demonstrated that small gifts are sometimes the most powerful ones.

心理学文献表明，小礼物有时是最有力量的。

On the FDA

关于 FDA

There are different ways of generating information.

产生信息的方式有多种。

We want the good stuff.

我们想要好东西。

We want the RCTs.

我们想要随机对照试验。

We want credible information.

我们想要可靠的信息。

I’m happy to talk about Bayesian clinical trials, so-called, real-world evidence — that’s a term that’s thrown around a little too much without definition.

我很高兴谈论贝叶斯临床试验，即所谓的现实世界证据——这个术语在没有定义的情况下被滥用了一点。

But if we’re thinking about ways that, say, a pharmaceutical company can inform its potential consumers — and I mean consumers at all levels: payers, physicians, nurse practitioners, pharmacies, folks who decide on formularies, and then relevant to vaccination, the people who get the shots in their arms or whether or not they adhere to the drug — well, they’ve got other ways to do that, and that’s advertising.

但是，如果我们正在考虑如何告知其潜在消费者——我指的是各个层面的消费者：付款人、医生、执业护士、药房、决定处方集的人，然后与疫苗接种相关的人、手臂上注射疫苗的人或他们是否坚持服用药物——那么，他们还有其他方法可以做到这一点，那就是广告。

You could have a world in which it’s like a lemons equilibrium in which, essentially, you would have lots of bad products outcompeting good ones.

你可能会拥有一个像柠檬均衡一样的世界，本质上，你会拥有很多劣质产品来竞争优质产品。

For what it’s worth, in the 19th century .

无论如何，在 19 世纪。

.

。

.

。

I don’t usually buy the model of cars or other kinds of experience goods as mapped onto drugs because the information structure of those markets is quite different.

我通常不会购买汽车模型或其他映射到药品上的体验商品，因为这些市场的信息结构有很大不同。

I think that the role of beliefs is far, far more important.

我认为信仰的作用要重要得多。

Collective beliefs, if you will, Bayesian priors, about whether or not such things work is absolutely central and deeply endogenous to the value of the product itself.

如果你愿意的话，关于这些东西是否有效的集体信念，如果你愿意的话，贝叶斯先验，对于产品本身的价值来说绝对是核心和深刻的内生性。

Well, pick your poison, I’m not sure the tort system is .

好吧，选择你的毒药，我不确定侵权制度是否如此。

.

。

.

。

You could say that’s a system that works well.

你可以说这是一个运行良好的系统。

Really?

真的吗？

Do we know that surgical innovation has provided that much more — in terms of health benefits — than pharmaceutical innovation?

我们是否知道外科创新所提供的“在健康益处方面”比药物创新多得多？

I haven’t seen the aggregate accounting, but if it has, the form of regulation there is deeply decentralized, subject to all forms of bias, and that’s juries at the state and local level, not the federal level.

我还没有看到总体会计，但如果有的话，那里的监管形式是深度分散的，受到各种形式的偏见的影响，这是州和地方层面的陪审团，而不是联邦层面的。

It’s a community of researchers that is essentially highly closed.

这是一个本质上高度封闭的研究人员社区。

There are some doctors here and there who do things, but it’s governed immensely by ASCO.

到处都有一些医生在做事，但很大程度上是由 ASCO 管辖的。

There’s a kind of a community of practice there.

那里有一个实践社区。

What the FDA does in a lot of these cases is allows for a molecule to be approved, say, cisplatin would be an example of the first platinum-based chemotherapy, and then basically knows — I think the FDA knows that when a lot of these molecules are out there, there’s going to be off-label prescribing.

FDA 在很多此类情况下所做的就是允许一种分子获得批准，比如说，顺铂将是第一个铂类化疗的一个例子，然后基本上知道 —— 我认为 FDA 知道当有很多这样的分子出现时，就会出现标签外处方。

That’s not to say, however, that off-label prescribing is not regulated.

然而，这并不是说标签外处方不受监管。

Whether something is on the label or not is still a significant decision.

标签上是否有某些东西仍然是一个重要的决定。

I’ve written about the case of bevacizumab for breast cancer, and that was a pretty significant decision by the FDA, one that a number of industrial interests fought against pretty hard, in part because they knew that money was on the line.

我写过关于贝伐珠单抗治疗乳腺癌的案例，这是 FDA 做出的一项非常重大的决定，许多工业利益集团对此进行了激烈的反对，部分原因是他们知道金钱是危险的。

The FDA only now, this week in the end of March, is allowing such testing.

FDA 直到现在，即三月底的本周，才允许进行此类测试。

Doesn’t that verify the old-style Sam Peltzman argument that the FDA is too risk averse, too slow?

这难道不验证了萨姆·佩尔兹曼（Sam Peltzman）的老式观点，即 FDA 过于规避风险、过于缓慢吗？

And when the FDA finally did let some of that testing through, you had to do it with a prescription, which seems to make no sense under any worldview.

当 FDA 最终允许部分测试通过时，你必须凭处方才能进行，这在任何世界观下似乎都毫无意义。

Was Sam Peltzman right about the FDA?

Sam Peltzman 对 FDA 的看法正确吗？

In this case, I think there’s a very plausible case — in the case of testing, yes, there’s a very plausible case that the FDA was too slow.

在这种情况下，我认为有一个非常合理的情况 ——在测试方面，是的，有一个非常合理的情况，即 FDA 太慢了。

Did that cause more deaths than, say, a culture that didn’t take COVID seriously, people not believing COVID was a problem, vaccine hesitancy in the United States, which I think is pretty significant?

这是否比不认真对待新冠病毒的文化、人们不相信新冠病毒是一个问题、美国对疫苗犹豫不决（我认为这相当重要）造成的死亡人数更多？

That’s much harder for me — or for anybody — to judge what the marginal contribution.

对我来说——或者对任何人来说——判断边际贡献要困难得多。

But I have no problem in saying that, yes, I think that that was an issue.

但我可以毫不犹豫地说，是的，我认为这是一个问题。

But look, we can always find a single example of where an agency was too slow or too conservative or — and I think this is the other way — stuck to its scientific procedures too much without adaptability — which is one of the cases, one of the problems with the FDA and testing — and not think about all the other cases in which, no, the FDA was right to abide by a certain procedural conservatism.

但是看，我们总能找到一个例子，说明某个机构太慢或太保守，或者“我认为这是另一种方式”——“过于坚持其科学程序而缺乏适应性”——这是其中一个案例，FDA和测试的问题之一——而不去考虑所有其他案例，在这些案例中，不，FDA遵守某种程序保守主义是正确的。

Let me give you another example.

让我再举一个例子。

The AstraZeneca vaccine was approved by over 15 nations, including Canada and the United Kingdom.

阿斯利康疫苗已获得超过 15 个国家的批准，其中包括加拿大和英国。

FDA still has done nothing.

FDA 仍然没有采取任何行动。

You might think now, much later, “Well, only approve it for men who are over 50 due to some data on thrombosis.” But basically, it seems many responsible countries approved AstraZeneca, FDA did nothing.

很久以后，你现在可能会想，“好吧，由于一些关于血栓形成的数据，只批准 50 岁以上的男性使用它。”但基本上，似乎很多负责任的国家都批准了阿斯利康，FDA却什么也没做。

Had we had that vaccine earlier, it would have saved thousands of lives.

如果我们早点接种这种疫苗，它就能挽救数千人的生命。

FDA didn’t seem to care.

FDA 似乎并不关心。

Why isn’t that an example, again, of the FDA being too slow and too conservative?

为什么这不是 FDA 过于缓慢和过于保守的一个例子呢？

Then there were study design and data reporting issues that were called by the company’s own DSMB, the Data Safety Monitoring Board.

然后是公司自己的 DSMB（数据安全监控委员会）提出的研究设计和数据报告问题。

There are a whole bunch of folks.

有一大群人。

You could say, “Oh, well, there’s a bunch of folks who’ve approved it.” Of course, as we know, in many cases in Europe, there are people who don’t want to take it, in part because of its bad reputation.

你可以说，“哦，好吧，有很多人都批准了它。”当然，正如我们所知，在欧洲的许多情况下，有些人不想接受它，部分原因是它的坏名声。

To me —

对我来说 —

About the thousands of lives counterfactual, I’m going to disagree because it’s not clear to me — and you might see this problem with Johnson & Johnson — I clearly see it in a lot of conversations.

关于成千上万的生命反事实，我不同意，因为我不清楚 —— 你可能会在强生公司看到这个问题 —— 我在很多对话中清楚地看到它。

It’d be interesting to see survey data about whether people trust certain brands more than others.

看到有关人们是否比其他品牌更信任某些品牌的调查数据会很有趣。

Part of it is vaccine nationalism.

部分原因是疫苗民族主义。

The French don’t trust the British.

法国人不信任英国人。

The British trust what’s endorsed by their National Health Service, but also their own company far more, things like that.

英国人不仅信任他们的国家医疗服务体系认可的东西，而且更信任他们自己的公司，诸如此类。

I gave a talk recently to a group in Israel and Europe on regulation, where I said the big bullet we dodged in the past year was one in which there was all this pressure, in summer 2020, on the FDA to quicken a whole set of therapies for coronavirus and COVID-19.

我最近在以色列和欧洲的一个团体上做了一次关于监管的演讲，我在演讲中说，我们在过去一年中躲过了的那颗大子弹是在 2020 年夏天，FDA 面临的所有压力，要求其加快针对冠状病毒和 COVID-19 的一整套疗法。

This obviously started with hydroxychloroquine, which I think the jury is in on that now — not effective; convalescent plasma — probably very effective, but its rollout certainly didn’t help.

这显然是从羟氯喹开始的，我认为陪审团现在正在考虑这一点——“无效；”恢复期血浆——可能非常有效，但它的推出肯定没有帮助。

What you see in at least two different surveys over the summer of 2020 is a pronounced drop in expressed willingness to be vaccinated, anywhere from 10 to 15 percentage points, and deeply concentrated among the young.

从 2020 年夏季至少两项不同的调查中可以看出，接种疫苗的意愿明显下降，下降了 10 到 15 个百分点，而且主要集中在年轻人中。

The mathematical models would suggest that’s exactly the population you want to have vaccinated sooner or later.

数学模型表明，这正是您希望迟早接种疫苗的人群。

Why?

为什么？

They’re more mobile.

他们更具流动性。

They’re much more likely to be vectors.

它们更有可能是向量。

I’ve done some back-of-the-envelope calculations.

我做了一些粗略的计算。

I shared them with Ezra.

我和以斯拉分享了它们。

I also presented them to this group.

我也将它们介绍给了这个小组。

If we start to think about what’s the social value of good vaccination just for the United States, and we think anywhere in the area of 10 to 20 trillion.

如果我们开始思考良好的疫苗接种对美国的社会价值，我们认为在 10 到 20 万亿美元之间。

I know some economists who think it’s much higher.

我认识一些经济学家，他们认为这个数字要高得多。

But now we think, okay, what if the vaccine .

但现在我们想，好吧，如果疫苗呢？

.

。

.

。

because you could have said this with just about any vaccine.

因为你可以用任何疫苗来这么说。

Pfizer’s readout from its data wasn’t until November, but you could have said, “Well, why didn’t we approve that vaccine in May or June?” And you would have had, I think, a social catastrophe — tens of millions of people not taking the vaccine.

辉瑞公司直到 11 月才读出数据，但你可能会说，“好吧，为什么我们没有在 5 月或 6 月批准该疫苗？”我认为，你将会遭遇一场社会灾难——数以千万计的人不接种疫苗。

It’s very consistent with those polls that, right after the convalescent plasma debacle, showed a 10 to 15 percentage point decline — and possibly greater — in vaccine confidence, and you would have lost thousands and thousands of lives that way.

这与那些民意调查非常一致，即在恢复期血浆崩溃之后，疫苗信心下降了 10 到 15 个百分点——甚至可能更大——这样你就会失去成千上万的生命。

At the end of the day, vaccines are only as good — especially a treatment with positive externalities — vaccines are only as good as the set of population that takes them.

归根结底，疫苗的好坏取决于服用疫苗的人群，尤其是具有正外部性的治疗方法。

Again, I emphasize, it’s the young that you need for herd immunity.

我再次强调，群体免疫需要的是年轻人。

The marginal benefit of vaccinating the young is higher for herd immunity.

为年轻人接种疫苗对于群体免疫的边际效益更高。

The results already are shown to be good.

结果已经证明是好的。

More people want the vaccine.

更多的人想要疫苗。

They see that their uncle is not keeling over dead.

他们看到他们的叔叔并没有倒地死去。

Why isn’t that a better theory of public opinion — that if you get people good vaccines quickly that make them healthier, more people are going to want vaccine?

为什么这不是一个更好的舆论理论——“如果你迅速为人们提供良好的疫苗，使他们更健康，更多的人就会想要疫苗？”

Look, the correlation between vaccine hesitancy factors as expressed in public opinion and first-dose vaccination of eligible population in the United States is 0.6.

看一下，美国公众舆论中表达的疫苗犹豫因素与符合条件人群首剂疫苗接种的相关性为0.6。

That’s an extremely high correlation.

这是一个极高的相关性。

Rather than just use a story, let’s actually look at data, and the data suggest, in fact, that public opinion on vaccine confidence is a very, very strong predictor of actual vaccinations in the United States.

与其只是用一个故事，不如让我们实际看看数据，数据表明，事实上，公众对疫苗信心的看法是美国实际疫苗接种情况的非常非常有力的预测因素。

The other example I would say is part of my theory of the FDA.

我要说的另一个例子是我的 FDA 理论的一部分。

Let’s divorce it, to some degree, from vaccination more generally.

让我们在某种程度上将其与更普遍的疫苗接种分开。

Let’s look more broadly at what happens.

让我们更广泛地看看发生了什么。

It’s not just that people said last summer, “Oh gosh, we don’t trust Trump.” It’s that we don’t trust certain kinds of procedural irregularities that are going on at the FDA, which, of course, are very deeply Trump-related, but I’ll give you another example.

这不仅仅是人们去年夏天说的，“天哪，我们不信任特朗普。”而是我们不相信 FDA 正在发生的某些程序违规行为，这当然与特朗普密切相关，但我再举一个例子。

It’s a completely different example in a different world, but I think it’s important.

这是另一个世界中完全不同的例子，但我认为这很重要。

It’s a tragic story.

这是一个悲惨的故事。

There’s this deadly disease, Duchenne multiple dystrophy, for which was developed a really important drug called eteplirsen or Exondys.

有一种致命的疾病，杜氏多发性营养不良症，为此开发了一种非常重要的药物，称为 eteplirsen 或 Exondys。

I say it’s an important drug.

我说这是一种重要的药物。

It’s an important drug therapy.

这是一种重要的药物治疗。

It’s actually still not known whether it works in many respects.

实际上仍然不知道它在很多方面是否有效。

The FDA approval procedure was, shall we say, different and marked by much more controversy than usual.

容我们说，FDA 的批准程序是不同的，并且比平常有更多的争议。

The advisory committee voted against it.

咨询委员会对此投了反对票。

The division director voted against it.

部门主管投了反对票。

Janet Woodcock, senior director, voted for it.

高级总监珍妮特·伍德科克 (Janet Woodcock) 投了赞成票。

I believe it was then Commissioner Robert Califf who approved it over and above the other objections, and that’s fine.

我相信当时的专员罗伯特·卡利夫（Robert Califf）在其他反对意见之上批准了该法案，这很好。

He had his right to do that, but it was clear from everybody watching that this was not the usual approval process.

他有权这样做，但每个旁观者都清楚这不是通常的审批流程。

You say, “What’s the problem?

你说：“有什么问题吗？

Now we’ve got this drug for a deadly disease that’s on the market.” The problem is lots of insurers now won’t cover it, still won’t.

现在我们已经有了这种治疗市场上致命疾病的药物。”问题是很多保险公司现在不会承保，现在仍然不会。

The New York Times ran a story about this, and they got one exec to say — and I’m paraphrasing.

《纽约时报》刊登了一篇有关此事的报道，他们让一位高管说“——”我正在解释。

You can look up the story.

你可以查一下这个故事。

I know that I just looked up a whole bunch of Blue Cross Blue Shield groups — still won’t cover Exondys.

我知道我刚刚查了一大堆 Blue Cross Blue Shield 团体 ——仍然不包括 Exondys。

They basically said, “We don’t know whether this works.”

他们基本上说，“我们不知道这是否有效。”

This is not vaccine hesitancy, where you’ve got all the standard psychological .

这不是对疫苗的犹豫，你已经有了所有标准的心理。

.

。

.

。

These are informed purchasers.

这些都是知情的购买者。

So, part of what happens when you have procedural irregularity or corners cut or bad evidence underlying approval decisions is, you get, in some cases, what might be rational hesitancy on the part of treatments.

因此，当你出现程序违规、偷工减料或批准决策背后的不良证据时，在某些情况下，你会对治疗产生合理的犹豫。

I think we can say right now, with the benefit of hindsight, “Hey, look, we’ve got these great mRNA vaccines.

我想我们现在可以说，事后看来，“嘿，看，我们已经有了这些很棒的 mRNA 疫苗。

We’ve got some other vaccines out there.” Sure.

我们还有其他一些疫苗。”当然。

If we had done things differently, that’s right, but of course, that’s not what I would regard as a proper, rational and Bayesian way to think about it.

如果我们以不同的方式做事，那是对的，但当然，这不是我认为的正确、理性和贝叶斯的思考方式。

The question is, what decisions should we have made at the time, given the information we had?

问题是，根据我们掌握的信息，我们当时应该做出什么决定？

You might be saying, “Well, I want a value function that places heavy, heavy emphasis on the option value that things could just go right here.” I’m very much open to that, but what I want, also, is a world where the unknown, deeply unknown product studied or being potentially approved gets studied massively, thoroughly, and where the studies continue well after approval.

你可能会说，“好吧，我想要一个价值函数，它非常非常强调期权价值，事情就可以在这里进行。”我对此非常开放，但我也想要一个这样的世界：正在研究或可能批准的未知的、深度未知的产品得到大规模、彻底的研究，并且研究在批准后继续进​​行。

That’s, by the way, something else that you miss with the Good Housekeeping model.

顺便说一句，这是“好管家”模型中你所错过的其他东西。

You don’t have any incentive for continual study of things that are something like Prozac or a statin, taken for 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 years of a person’s life.

你没有任何动力去持续研究像百忧解或他汀类药物这样的药物，在人的一生中服用 5 年、10 年、15 年、20 年、30 年。

I’m not saying they should have been, but I’m saying if you were to rush things out in September and October, which was precisely when vaccine confidence was at its nadir — was actually much higher during the summer beforehand, but it had sunk again 10 to 15 percentage points — you would have had a vaccine that tens of millions of people were not taking.

我并不是说它们应该如此，但我是说，如果你在 9 月和 10 月匆忙进行疫苗接种，那正是疫苗信心处于最低点的时候——实际上之前夏天的时候信心要高得多，但又下降了 10 到 15 个百分点——那么你就会接种一种数千万人没有接种的疫苗。

So, we need to think very carefully.

所以，我们需要非常仔细地思考。

To just call it a cost-benefit analysis, I think, is both right and wrong.

我认为，将其称为成本效益分析既对又错。

There needs to be a perspective consideration of what the health costs of putting something on a black box label.

需要从长远角度考虑将某物贴上黑盒标签所带来的健康成本。

That would do it.

这样就可以了。

The other thing I would say is, the usual argument is that doctors only, what, 50 percent to 60 percent of the time read the label.

我要说的另一件事是，通常的论点是，只有医生，50% 到 60% 的时间才会阅读标签。

There are some people who say, “Well, then the label beyond the black box really isn’t effective.” I actually agree.

有人说：“那么，黑匣子之外的标签确实没有作用。”我其实同意。

It’s not that I’m generally a glass-half-full guy.

我并不是一个酒足饭饱的人。

I just happen to think that 50 percent to 60 percent of people reading the actual label is actually something that we should be pleasantly surprised about.

我只是碰巧认为 50% 到 60% 的人阅读实际标签实际上是我们应该感到惊喜的事情。

I think it’s entirely fine for some of these wealthier countries to say, “Well, we don’t trust those trials and we’re not going to rely upon those trials alone” in, say, a pivotal phase III or a really important phase II trial.

我认为，对于一些较富裕的国家来说，在关键的第三阶段或非常重要的第二阶段试验中说：“好吧，我们不相信这些试验，我们不会单独依赖这些试验”，这是完全可以的。

You get into problems with what’s the quality of a country’s institutions, and this is something we usually think about from the standpoint of, say, somebody like Robert Putnam or Douglass North or Margaret Levi, but I think institutions and the credibility of scientific institutions is also important.

你会遇到一个国家机构质量的问题，这是我们通常从罗伯特·普特南、道格拉斯·诺斯或玛格丽特·莱维等人的角度思考的问题，但我认为机构和科学机构的可信度也很重要。

Back when I wrote the book on the FDA, I spent a little bit of time in India and thinking about its issues in regulating drugs.

当我写关于 FDA 的书时，我在印度花了一点时间思考其在药品监管方面的问题。

Of course, there’s a lot of drug manufacturing in India, a lot of generics manufacturing and so forth.

当然，印度有大量的药品生产、大量的仿制药生产等等。

I don’t know the stats offhand, but the FDA has any number of times had to crack down on generic drug manufacturers in India.

我不知道统计数据，但 FDA 曾多次不得不打击印度的仿制药制造商。

There have been a whole host of quality problems there.

那里存在大量质量问题。

If we think that a country has weak scientific and credibility-based institutions, then I’m fine with allowing the trials there, but I’m also fine with regulators in so-called advanced industrial countries saying, “Yeah, we’re not going to allow those trials.

如果我们认为一个国家的科学和信誉机构薄弱，那么我同意在那里进行试验，但我也同意所谓的先进工业国家的监管机构说：“是的，我们不会允许这些试验。

We’re not going to accept those trials as pivotal for approval.”

我们不会接受这些试验作为批准的关键。”

On how petitions transformed politics

关于请愿如何改变政治

But as they saw this — what I call the accountability of voice, the idea that their voices could matter, not only in the arguments they put forth, but also in the weight of the numbers — I think that became a much more powerful motivator for women’s rights movements to make bolder and bolder claims for the vote.

但当她们看到这一点时——我称之为“声音的责任”，即她们的声音不仅在她们提出的论点上很重要，而且在数字的分量上也很重要——我认为这成为女权运动更强大的动力，促使她们为投票提出更大胆的主张。

Yes, actually, we tend to think, “Oh what are the big petitioning societies?” The United States, Britain, Anglo-American societies, and in part, French Canada, is that because it’s still, technically, a colony.

是的，实际上，我们倾向于想，“哦，什么是大型上访团体？”美国、英国、英美社会，以及部分法属加拿大，是因为从技术上讲，它仍然是一个殖民地。

But I would say two things happened.

但我想说发生了两件事。

At some level, it was a Jacksonian revolution before Jackson, 1822 and even 1827 and 1828, before Jackson was president.

在某种程度上，这是杰克逊之前的一场杰克逊式革命，1822年，甚至1827年和1828年，杰克逊就任总统之前。

You get what would be called a producer’s revolution in favor of parliamentary responsibility and parliamentary sovereignty.

你会得到所谓的生产者革命，支持议会责任和议会主权。

At some level, you could say, weren’t they just doing what had already happened in the United States with the American Revolution?

在某种程度上，你可以说，他们不就是在做美国革命中已经发生过的事情吗？

And I would say no.

我会说不。

Let me be clear.

让我说清楚。

What I’m talking about here is arguably the largest — on a per capita basis — petition of the Atlantic world of its time, a single petition with over 90,000 names attached — excuse me, 87,000 names, roughly 90,000 names attached — that was signed in what is today Quebec, and with which the French Canadians did several things.

我在这里所说的可以说是当时大西洋世界最大的“——”以人均计算”——“请愿书，一份附有超过90,000个名字的请愿书”——“对不起，87,000个名字，大约90,000个名字”——在今天的魁北克签署，法裔加拿大人用它做了几件事。

First off, they fought off colonial fusion.

首先，他们抵制殖民融合。

If you ask yourself why is French Canada still French Canada, and why is Canada bilingual, you have to point to these petitioning campaigns as one of the reasons that colonial fusion was fought off.

如果你问自己为什么法属加拿大仍然是法属加拿大，为什么加拿大是双语的，你必须指出这些请愿运动是阻止殖民融合的原因之一。

The other thing that they did, which was not easy to do at the time, was to depose a colonial governor.

他们做的另一件事，在当时并不容易做到，就是废黜了一位殖民地总督。

Even in British North America — the 13 colonies that eventually became the United States — getting a colonial governor deposed was much easier through elite mechanisms, going through the colonial office, going to the crown, than by massive protests.

即使在英属北美——“最终成为美国的 13 个殖民地”——通过精英机制、通过殖民地办公室、到达王室，罢黜一位殖民地总督也比通过大规模抗议要容易得多。

And that’s exactly what they did with deposing Governor Dalhousie in the United States.

这正是他们在罢免美国州长达尔豪西时所做的。

Finally, as I mentioned — and there are other historians who have really cemented this story better than I have; Malcolm Chase was arguably the historian of the chartists — working-class reform in Britain depended heavily upon lessons that the chartists and other working-class agitators in Britain learned from the French Canadians.

最后，正如我所提到的，还有其他历史学家比我更好地巩固了这个故事；马尔科姆·蔡斯可以说是研究图表主义者的历史学家——英国的工人阶级改革在很大程度上依赖于英国图表主义者和其他工人阶级煽动者从法裔加拿大人那里学到的教训。

They called them “our brothers in oppression” in the 1830s, and a whole host of things that happen as the suffrage is open, and a whole bunch of changes happen in 19th-century Britain, taken with at least partial inspiration from French Canadians, the patriote movement, as I described them, and these petitions.

他们在 1830 年代称他们为“我们受压迫的兄弟”，随着选举权开放，19 世纪的英国发生了一系列的事情，发生了一系列的变化，这些变化至少部分受到了法裔加拿大人、我所描述的爱国运动以及这些请愿书的启发。

There’s a bunch of different hypotheses you might have about petitions — that they strengthen the relative power of what is truly popular, or you might think it strengthens the relative power of groups who organize well, or maybe groups who are good on the media, groups that are good at fundraising.

关于请愿，你可能有很多不同的假设——它们增强了真正受欢迎的事物的相对力量，或者你可能认为它增强了组织良好的团体的相对力量，或者可能是擅长媒体、擅长筹款的团体的相对力量。

On net overall, on average for each of those two periods, what do you analytically see as the major effect of petitions, apart from any particular case?

总体而言，从分析角度来看，除了任何特定情况外，您认为请愿书的主要影响是什么？

What I see is — particularly during this crucial period, say, the 1820s to the 1850s in the United States, Canada, parts of Mexico — people who didn’t already have organizations, didn’t already have parties — which of course, in the United States, especially, were really an important technological innovation — didn’t already have lobbies, didn’t already have interest groups, were able to successfully harness the petition to make their voices better heard, to set the agenda — I think agenda setting is really important when we think about democratization — and also to organize.

我看到的是 —— 特别是在这个关键时期，比如说1820年代到1850年代的美国、加拿大、墨西哥部分地区 —— 那些还没有组织的人，还没有政党 —— 当然，这在美国尤其是一个重要的技术创新 —— 还没有游说团体，还没有兴趣群体，能够成功地利用请愿书让他们的声音被更好地听到，设定议程 ——我认为当我们考虑民主化时，议程设定非常重要——以及组织起来。

What I argue in the book is that everything, from anti-slavery societies to new parties, such as Canadian reform parties, the American Whigs, and others, drew much of their energy and structure from early petitioning campaigns.

我在书中主张的是，从反奴隶制社会到加拿大改革党、美国辉格党等新政党，一切事物都从早期的请愿活动中汲取了大部分能量和结构。

Look, we’re in a different world now, especially in the United States, where I don’t think petitions have quite the societal and historical imprint that they used to.

看，我们现在处于一个不同的世界，尤其是在美国，我认为请愿书不像以前那样具有社会和历史印记。

There’s a whole bunch of reasons for that, but I want to answer your question.

原因有很多，但我想回答你的问题。

I would say now, in part, what we don’t have .

我现在想说的是我们所没有的部分内容。

.

。

.

。

Let me just first bracket this by saying, we don’t have anything like the legislative petition process that we used to have in the 19th century.

首先我要说的是，我们没有像 19 世纪那样的立法请愿程序。

By the way, Canada still does, and Canada still gets, I think, 1500 paper petitions per year.

顺便说一句，加拿大仍然这样做，我认为加拿大每年仍然收到 1500 份纸质请愿书。

Now, we could get into a whole argument about whether that changes anything.

现在，我们可以就这是否会改变什么展开一场完整的争论。

What you’re going to see with petitioning nowadays — especially of the electronic variety, occasionally of the plebiscitary variety, like the initiative and referendum — is that select groups and interests that know how to make something go viral.

如今，你会看到请愿——尤其是电子请愿，偶尔是公民投票的请愿，比如倡议和全民公投——是那些知道如何让某些事情像病毒一样传播的特定群体和利益集团。

Virality, if I can use that term, was there in the 19th century now, but you have to make it get hot right away.

病毒式传播，如果我可以用这个词的话，在 19 世纪就已存在，但你必须让它立即变得热门。

I’m reminded that there was an electronic petition signed about 10 years ago, contesting new card fees at Bank of America.

我记得大约十年前签署了一份电子请愿书，对美国银行的新卡费用提出异议。

I think it was by somebody in Chevy Chase, and immediately, within days, hundreds of thousands of signatures.

我认为这是切维蔡斯的某个人写的，几天之内立刻就有了数十万个签名。

Bank of America backed down.

美国银行做出了让步。

I don’t know, by the way, whether that’s good or bad economic policy — probably an effective petition from the standpoint of having changed things.

顺便说一句，我不知道这是好是坏的经济政策——从改变现状的角度来看，这可能是一个有效的请愿书。

Can you imagine any other institution — the courts, parties — through which that would have happened?

你能想象任何其他机构——“法院、当事人”——可以通过它来实现这一点吗？

Nowadays we could say social media — somebody could jump on social media and say, “Hey, look at this awful card statement I just got.” And then you get a bunch of likes.

如今，我们可以说社交媒体 ——有人可以跳上社交媒体并说：“嘿，看看我刚刚收到的这张糟糕的信用卡账单。”然后你就会得到一堆喜欢。

It’s some kind of aggregation mechanism like that, that can do that, but I don’t think we have the kinds of institutions that we used to, in part because we don’t have a petition institution that structures robust public debate as much as we used to, and I think that’s a problem.

这是某种类似的聚合机制，可以做到这一点，但我认为我们没有过去那样的机构，部分原因是我们没有像过去那样构建强有力的公共辩论的请愿机构，我认为这是一个问题。

Let me just say that’s about initiative and referendum.

我只想说，这是关于倡议和公投的。

I’m not going to wax much more generally about, say, school financing or bond issuances — things like that.

我不会更笼统地谈论诸如学校融资或债券发行之类的事情。

But at the level of California, yes, I do have problems with those institutions, in part because it weakens the separation of powers.

但在加州层面，是的，我确实对这些机构存在问题，部分原因是它削弱了权力分立。

It weakens deliberation.

它削弱了深思熟虑。

One advantage of representative government is that there are certain kinds of deliberation and investigation that go on.

代议制政府的优势之一是可以进行某些类型的审议和调查。

It weakens compromise.

它削弱了妥协。

It’s either we’re going to have this ballot proposition, or we’re going to have the status quo, and nobody gets to go into the ballot and say, “Oh, let’s think about a third option between the two that might be better than both.” The ballot and the plebiscite don’t give you that option.

要么我们提出这个投票提案，要么我们维持现状，没有人可以进入投票并说：“哦，让我们考虑一下两者之间的第三种选择，它可能比两者都更好。”选票和公民投票不会给你这个选择。

I distinguish, for that reason, between plebiscitary petitions and what I call directed petitions.

因此，我区分了公民投票请愿和我所说的定向请愿。

I also worry about plebiscitary petitions, and I don’t think they have the same value, institutional robustness, and benefits that directed petitions — which are the kind of petitions that I write about in Democracy by Petition — do.

我也担心公民投票请愿，我认为它们不具有与定向请愿相同的价值、制度稳健性和好处——这些请愿就是我在《请愿的民主》中写到的那种请愿。

In part, the answer to the question is yes, I agree that I’m not that high on the initiative and referendum process.

在某种程度上，这个问题的答案是肯定的，我同意我对倡议和公投过程并不那么重视。

Ohio, by the way — if I can bracket — has a policy that might be a little better, which is to say, all right, we’re going to let the legislature pass a law, so we’re going to respect the republican (small-r) process — separated powers, things like that.

顺便说一下，俄亥俄州 —— 如果我可以括起来 —— 有一项可能会好一点的政策，也就是说，好吧，我们将让立法机关通过一项法律，所以我们将尊重共和党（小r）程序 —— 权力分离，诸如此类。

We’re going to allow the people to veto it, but the agenda is then set by the republican process: mixed regime and so forth, not untrammeled, purely discretionary lawmaking power, or constitutional-amendment power, again, given to that 50-plus-epsilon percentage points of people on a given day.

我们将允许人民否决它，但议程随后由共和进程确定：混合政体等等，而不是不受限制的、纯粹自由裁量的立法权，或宪法修改权，同样，在某一天赋予超过 50 个百分点的人民。

Then what I will just say again is, I think in part, petitioning — I don’t know if it’s net harmful.

然后我要再说一遍，我认为部分是请愿 —— 我不知道这是否是净有害的。

It’s definitely become less beneficial, in part because of the way that plebiscites have transformed the petition.

它肯定变得不那么有益了，部分原因是公民投票改变了请愿书的方式。

What it would mean is part of the problem — we’ve got institutions that are efficient at some level.

这意味着问题的一部分——我们拥有在某种程度上有效的机构。

If we want to take a massive hundreds of millions of people and condense their preferences down into a single platform in a single label, parties do that well.

如果我们想吸引数亿人并将他们的偏好浓缩到单一品牌的单一平台中，那么各方就可以做得很好。

The problem is that so much gets left out of the process, to say nothing of the kinds of polarization that can end up really breaking a society into two, which I do think we’re at risk of in the United States and, of course, which has happened before.

问题是，这个过程中遗漏了太多东西，更不用说最终可能真正将社会一分为二的两极分化了，我确实认为我们在美国面临着这种风险，当然，这种情况以前也发生过。

It would basically be a way to make, not just the United States more democratic, but actually to make the democratic republic more deliberative, which would be to .

从根本上来说，这不仅是让美国变得更加民主，而且实际上是让民主共和国变得更加协商，也就是说。

.

。

.

。

and it would be inefficient — I’ll be honest.

而且效率很低 —— 老实说。

At some level, you could say, “Well, yes, wouldn’t legislators be better off reading scholarship from economists and doctors and things like that and getting presentations from people in the know?” You could argue, yes, maybe they would, but I actually think it would potentially increase social trust.

在某种程度上，你可以说，“嗯，是的，立法者阅读经济学家和医生的学术成果以及类似的东西并听取知情人士的演讲不是更好吗？”你可能会说，是的，也许他们会，但我实际上认为这可能会增加社会信任。

By the way, New Zealand and Canada do this now.

顺便说一句，新西兰和加拿大现在也这样做。

Of course, you can always say, “Yes, New Zealand and Canada do everything better.” Maybe they do, maybe they don’t.

当然，你总是可以说：“是的，新西兰和加拿大一切都做得更好。”也许他们这样做，也许他们不这样做。

But It’s not unknown for this to occur in the modern day — again, giving the people the sense of being heard.

但这种情况在现代发生并不陌生——再次给人们一种被倾听的感觉。

And then, I would say arguably, potentially opening up the legislative agenda because I think there’s a degree to which the closure of agendas — which makes parties efficient — often prevents some of the best ideas from reaching the table of policy.

然后，我可以说，可能会开放立法议程，因为我认为在一定程度上，议程的封闭——“这使得政党效率更高”——常常会阻止一些最好的想法进入政策桌面。

As I began to look into the petitions, I just saw more and more petitions from Native Americans, and that’s part of the reason that I emphasize them as much as I do in the book, is that on a per capita basis — maybe the French Canadians aside — few people are petitioning as much as they are.

当我开始研究请愿书时，我看到越来越多的美洲原住民请愿书，这就是我在书中强调它们的部分原因，就人均而言，“也许法裔加拿大人除外”，很少有人像他们一样进行请愿。

And then that got me into thinking, also, why don’t political scientists study Native Americans?

然后这也让我开始思考，为什么政治科学家不研究美洲原住民？

There are millions of them, especially when you start to take a look at Alaska First Nations, things like that.

他们有数以百万计，尤其是当你开始看看阿拉斯加原住民之类的事情时。

You’ve got all this variation in tribal governments, so part of it was an intellectual interest.

部落政府存在如此多的差异，所以其中一部分是出于知识兴趣。

Then, without getting into a long personal history — I’m not indigenous myself, but I’ve got a number of family members who are on both sides.

然后，不谈很长的个人历史 —— 我自己不是土著，但我有一些家庭成员是双方的。

In part, it was hearing just different stories around dinner tables, family reunions, things like that, that made me start to think that these are things that we should probably be studying.

在某种程度上，正是在餐桌上、家庭团聚等事情上听到不同的故事，让我开始认为这些是我们应该研究的事情。

The work I do now is, in part, work on native history, allowing these people to understand — not allowing them to understand; they understand it pretty well — working with them to better understand their histories of petitioning, advocacy, things like that, lobbying.

我现在所做的部分工作是研究本土历史，让这些人理解——而不是让他们理解；他们非常了解这一点——与他们合作，更好地了解他们上访、倡导、游说之类的历史。

One of the courses I’m teaching right now — part of what we do is work with particular tribal communities, nations that are dealing with some pretty significant issues, like suicide and suicide prevention at the Fort Peck Reservation, or traditional food-gathering practices and the way they’re regulated by state governments, and the kind of maze that different Native Americans have to navigate as they practice their traditional cultures.

我现在教授的课程之一——我们所做的一部分是与特定的部落社区、正在处理一些非常重要的问题的国家合作，比如佩克堡保留地的自杀和自杀预防，或者传统的食物采集做法以及州政府对它们的监管方式，以及不同的美洲原住民在实践其传统文化时必须穿越的迷宫。

Brook Trout, Image Credit: https://www.ncwildlife.org/Learning/Species/Fish/Brook-Trout

布鲁克特劳特，图片来源：https://www.ncwildlife.org/Learning/Species/Fish/Brook-Trout

There are moments that are — I don’t even know what Zen is because I don’t practice it — but there are moments that are definitely contemplative and lovely, but it’s absorbing.

有些时刻是 —— 我什至不知道禅宗是什么，因为我没有修行 —— 但有些时刻绝对是令人沉思和可爱的，但它很吸引人。

It’s absorbing in some very beautiful places.

它在一些非常美丽的地方很吸引人。

I’ve got a brook trout right behind me in a picture.

照片中我身后有一条溪鳟鱼。

It’s one that my students see in all my lectures.

这是我的学生在我所有的讲座中看到的。

I happen to think that brook trout are some of the most beautiful creatures on the planet.

我碰巧认为溪鳟鱼是地球上最美丽的生物之一。

It’s proof of the existence of a divine, and I like spending time around brook trout.

这是神的存在的证明，我喜欢在溪鳟鱼周围度过时光。