Dani Rodrik on Premature Deindustrialization and Why the World is Second Best, at Best (Ep. 4 - Live at Mason)

He’s our guest today.

他是我们今天的客人。

He’s arguably the world’s leading and most important economist on trade, globalization, industrial policy, and lately the prerequisites for liberal democracy.

他可以说是贸易、全球化、产业政策以及最近自由民主先决条件方面世界领先和最重要的经济学家。

His new book, which I’ll mention again, Economics Rules — that’s spelled R-U-L-E-S.

我会再次提到他的新书《经济学规则》——拼写为 R-U-L-E-S。

Why should I not read my own blurb?

为什么我不应该阅读自己的简介？

Quote, “The best economists make the best methodologists, and Dani Rodrik is both.

引用：“最好的经济学家造就最好的方法论者，丹尼·罗德里克两者兼而有之。

His Economics Rules is the single best source for explaining the strengths and weaknesses of economics to an outside audience.”

他的《经济学规则》是向外部读者解释经济学优缺点的最佳来源。”

On premature deindustrialization

论过早的去工业化

We’re going to start this conversation with some questions about some of your recent papers on this topic of premature deindustrialization.

我们将以一些关于您最近关于过早去工业化主题的论文的问题来开始这次对话。

I find this one of the most interesting themes in your work.

我发现这是您作品中最有趣的主题之一。

The notion that a mix of automation and competitive trade with wealthier nations might mean that poorer nations today will not be able to industrialize and follow the path of South Korea or Taiwan or Singapore.

自动化和与富裕国家竞争性贸易的结合可能意味着当今较贫穷的国家将无法实现工业化并追随韩国、台湾或新加坡的道路。

Now, if this is the case, if a lot of economies out there are deindustrializing prematurely, before they’ve built up a significant middle class, what do you see happening, for instance, for the future of Africa?

现在，如果是这种情况，如果许多经济体在建立起重要的中产阶级之前过早地去工业化，那么您认为非洲的未来会发生什么？

The parts of Africa which do relatively well, but let’s say they do not industrialize.

非洲部分地区表现相对较好，但假设它们没有实现工业化。

What does that future look like in your vision?

在您的愿景中，未来是什么样的？

Credit: Nick Donner Photography

图片来源：尼克·唐纳摄影

If you look throughout economic history, the countries that have made that very rapid leap into middle income and beyond that advanced country status, starting from the non-Western countries first, Japan from the late 19th century onward, and then after the Second World War, South Korea, Taiwan, and then eventually, of course, China, along with a number of countries that did more or less the same in the periphery of Western Europe, closer to Western Europe.

如果你纵观整个经济史，那些迅速跃入中等收入并超越发达国家地位的国家，首先是非西方国家，从19世纪末开始的日本，然后是第二次世界大战后的韩国、台湾，最后当然是中国，以及一些在西欧外围、更接近西欧的国家，他们或多或少也做了同样的事情。

The one thing that’s common in all of them is very rapid industrialization.

所有这些国家的共同点是非常快速的工业化。

With very rapid industrialization, you can get growth rates on a per capita basis of 4 or 5 percent per year on an ongoing basis for decade after decade.

随着工业化的快速发展，人均增长率可以达到每年 4% 或 5%，并持续数十年。

That’s sort of what’s made South Korea what it is today, in that kind of rapid growth.

这就是韩国今天的快速增长的原因。

But that’s, if you will, a very exceptional kind of experience.

但如果你愿意的话，那是一种非常特殊的体验。

I think if the possibilities of rapid industrialization are no longer there — as you suggest, I think they are no longer there — what we’re going to get is slower growth.

我认为，如果快速工业化的可能性不再存在 ——“正如你所说，我认为它们不再存在了”—— 我们将得到的是更缓慢的增长。

What I call growth is based much more on the steady and hard work of accumulating basic capabilities, human capital, skills, institutional improvement.

我所说的增长更多地是建立在积累基本能力、人力资本、技能和制度完善的稳定和艰苦努力的基础上的。

All of those things that are required for the long run, but don’t produce the kind of 4 percent, 5 percent growth on a per annum basis, as we’ve seen in those rapid growth countries.

所有这些都是长期需要的，但不会产生每年 4%、5% 的增长，正如我们在那些快速增长的国家所看到的那样。

You end up with a middle class being built rapidly.

最终，中产阶级正在迅速建立。

That middle class is the foundation for a democracy.

中产阶级是民主的基础。

The special interest groups behind the infrastructure, it’s clear who they are.

基础设施背后的特殊利益集团是谁，一目了然。

They win almost every political battle, even without a democracy.

他们几乎赢得了每一场政治斗争，即使没有民主。

You see some version of the same in China.

你在中国看到了同样的版本。

You end up with a middle class being built rapidly.

最终，中产阶级正在迅速建立。

That middle class is the foundation for a democracy.

中产阶级是民主的基础。

The special interest groups behind the infrastructure, it’s clear who they are.

基础设施背后的特殊利益集团是谁，一目了然。

They win almost every political battle, even without a democracy.

他们几乎赢得了每一场政治斗争，即使没有民主。

You see some version of the same in China.

你在中国看到了同样的版本。

The countries that don’t industrialize, could you imagine them having an ongoing kind of ramshackle existence where consumer goods flood in at cheap prices?

那些没有实现工业化的国家，你能想象他们的生活持续摇摇欲坠，消费品以低廉的价格涌入吗？

They grow at 4 percent instead of 10 percent.

它们的增长率是 4%，而不是 10%。

But Lagos, in a way, always looks a bit like current Lagos and never looks like Seoul, South Korea.

但拉各斯在某种程度上总是看起来有点像现在的拉各斯，而从来不像韩国首尔。

What’s even a developed country, maybe, in some fundamental psychological sense, changes?

从某种基本的心理意义上讲，即使是发达国家，也许会发生什么变化？

So, it wasn’t the growth itself that enabled the development of the middle class and the emergence and the spread of liberal values and the creating of the liberal democracy, but the transformation of the economy and its social structure in a particular kind of way: if you will, the spread of bourgeois liberal values, the restraints placed on the state in terms of how much it could do and under what kind of circumstances.

因此，并不是经济增长本身促成了中产阶级的发展、自由主义价值观的出现和传播以及自由民主的创建，而是经济及其社会结构以一种特殊的方式发生了转变：如果你愿意的话，也可以说是资产阶级自由主义价值观的传播，以及对国家能做多少事以及在何种情况下对国家施加的限制。

t wasn’t the growth itself that enabled the development of the middle class and the emergence and the spread of liberal values and the creating of the liberal democracy, but the transformation of the economy and its social structure in a particular kind of way: if you will, the spread of bourgeois liberal values, the restraints placed on the state in terms of how much it could do and under what kind of circumstances.

并不是增长本身促成了中产阶级的发展、自由价值观的出现和传播以及自由民主的建立，而是经济及其社会结构以一种特殊的方式发生了转变：如果你愿意的话，也可以说是资产阶级自由价值观的传播，以及对国家能做多少事以及在什么情况下对国家施加的限制。

You’re right that in countries like Nigeria and many others, which have had very rapid population growth, where the urban areas have swollen with people from the countryside.

你说得对，在尼日利亚和其他许多国家，人口增长非常迅速，城市地区挤满了来自农村的人口。

I think managing these kinds of tensions, especially when you’re in a sort of open economy and the markets are being flooded by cheap consumer goods from elsewhere, managing these transitions are very difficult, especially since these countries, and Africa, of course, particularly so, are torn apart by a number of additional cleavages of ethnic, language, regional, tribal, and so forth.

我认为管理这些紧张局势，特别是当你处于一种开放经济中，市场被来自其他地方的廉价消费品淹没时，管理这些转型是非常困难的，特别是因为这些国家，当然还有非洲，尤其是被种族、语言、地区、部落等方面的一些额外分歧所撕裂。

Those are all things that are making it very, very difficult for these countries.

这些都让这些国家的处境变得非常非常困难。

I’m not so sure that rapid growth would necessarily have eliminated these kinds of problems.

我不太确定快速增长一定会消除这些问题。

In some ways, it might even aggravate them.

在某些方面，这甚至可能会激怒他们。

Think, for example, that in the Arab Spring, the kind of troubles and the riots that started the Arab Spring, arose not in those parts of the Arab world which had had the least amount of development but, in fact, in those countries like Tunisia and Egypt which had had the most rapid development.

例如，想一想，在阿拉伯之春中，引发阿拉伯之春的麻烦和骚乱并不是发生在阿拉伯世界发展最少的地区，而是实际上发生在突尼斯和埃及等发展最快的国家。

It wasn’t just GDP growth, per se.

这不仅仅是 GDP 增长本身。

Tunisia was always an exemplar of improvements in human and social development.

突尼斯始终是人类和社会发展进步的典范。

I think it’s less the rate of growth and then what is happening underneath that in terms of the overall structure.

我认为，问题不在于增长率，而在于整体结构背后发生的事情。

There you have many, many different paths that are possible.

那里有很多很多不同的可能路径。

One of my favorite economists is Albert Hirschman.

我最喜欢的经济学家之一是阿尔伯特·赫希曼。

For a while, two years, I occupied the chair that was named after him at the Institute for Advanced Study.

有一段时间，两年来，我担任了高等研究院以他的名字命名的主席。

He coined the term of possibilism, which was the notion that as much as in social science you think you want to generate theories that are deterministic theories of .

他创造了“可能性论”这个术语，这个概念是指，就像在社会科学中一样，你认为你想要产生确定性理论。

.

。

.

。

you have industrialization and then the urbanization and then the bourgeoisie.

先是工业化，然后是城市化，然后是资产阶级。

That’s going to generate capitalist democracy and so forth.

这将产生资本主义民主等等。

A lot of what happens is just maneuvering around the constraints that geography and history have bequeathed and doing things that otherwise might not have seemed possible.

发生的很多事情只是绕过地理和历史留下的限制，做一些原本看似不可能的事情。

If 50 percent is driven by exogenous conditions, 50 percent is still basically in your hands is one way of looking at it.

如果 50% 是由外部条件驱动的，那么 50% 基本上仍然掌握在你的手中，这是看待它的一种方式。

I always look for things in how you can manipulate and maneuver the context in which you find yourself in.

我总是在寻找如何操纵和操纵你所处环境的东西。

I think those possibilities always exist.

我认为这些可能性总是存在的。

As I understand you, if you do industrial policy and you get the right kind of manufacturing that puts you on a better path.

据我了解，如果你制定产业政策，并且获得正确的制造业，就会走上更好的道路。

Your papers on productivity convergence — once you’re started in manufacturing, according to your data, you get bigger ongoing gains than you do an agriculture.

你关于生产力融合的论文 ——根据你的数据，一旦你开始从事制造业，你将获得比从事农业更大的持续收益。

Catch-up in agriculture is especially slow.

农业的追赶尤其缓慢。

I find this intuitively plausible but if we try to ask at the most foundational level, what is it exactly that’s the difference between agriculture and manufacturing which accounts for this?

我觉得这在直觉上是合理的，但如果我们试图在最基本的层面上问，农业和制造业之间到底有什么区别造成了这种情况？

What are the microfoundations of where that comes from?

它从何而来的微观基础是什么？

We’ve seen that, for example, in the case of the Green Revolution.

例如，我们在绿色革命的例子中已经看到了这一点。

It required a lot of on-the-ground adaptation because the weather and soil conditions can be very different.

由于天气和土壤条件可能非常不同，因此需要大量的实地适应。

If you will, the non-traded component of that technology transfer is much greater in agriculture.

如果你愿意的话，农业技术转让的非贸易部分要大得多。

For that matter, it’s also in services.

就此而言，它也在服务领域。

You can figure out how to run a hospital system or education system in an advanced country.

您可以弄清楚如何在发达国家运营医院系统或教育系统。

You’re never going to be able to just take that and transplant in a developing country because, technically speaking, the non-traded component of that technology, or the latent part of the technology that requires that adaptation to local contexts.

你永远无法将其移植到发展中国家，因为从技术上讲，该技术的非贸易部分，或者需要适应当地情况的技术的潜在部分。

Culture is back in economics.

文化又回到了经济中。

I still have to be convinced that it’s actually adding a significant amount to what we learn.

我仍然必须确信它实际上大大增加了我们学到的东西。

Culture is back in economics.

文化又回到了经济中。

I still have to be convinced that it’s actually adding a significant amount to what we learn.

我仍然必须确信它实际上大大增加了我们学到的东西。

Let me get back to the question about manufacturing.

让我回到关于制造的问题。

One thing I said is that it’s much easier to move technology.

我说过的一件事是，移动技术要容易得多。

If you’ve seen the way that Toyota manufactures cars in Japan or in the United States or in South Africa, it’s more or less the same.

如果您看过丰田在日本、美国或南非制造汽车的方式，就会发现它们或多或少是一样的。

That is possible.

这是可能的。

The second thing, which I think is the microeconomics of why it is that manufacturing is so special is that manufacturing, standard, traditional manufacturing like making cars or garments or toys or wigs, has the feature that you can absorb a lot of very unskilled workers into that.

第二件事，我认为是微观经济学为什么制造业如此特别，是制造业，标准的，传统的制造业，如制造汽车、服装、玩具或假发，具有可以吸收大量非常不熟练的工人的特点。

Being a production worker, even in an auto factory, certainly in a footwear factory, doesn’t take a whole lot of skill.

作为一名生产工人，即使是在汽车厂，当然是鞋厂，也不需要太多的技能。

That means that you can absorb a lot of people off the countryside in a much more rapid way than you could in a lot of other activities where technology and skill are actually highly complementary.

这意味着你可以比许多其他技术和技能实际上高度互补的活动更快地吸收大量农村人口。

I heard once a Chinese entrepreneur telling me that she was running a footwear factory and she was hiring people from the countryside when the industry was starting.

我曾经听到一位中国企业家告诉我，她经营着一家鞋厂，行业刚起步时，她就从农村招聘员工。

Basically, the only skill that was required to get that thing going was not whether they could read, not whether they were numerate, but basically whether they could do this with their hands.

基本上，让这件事进行下去所需的唯一技能不是他们是否能够阅读，也不是他们是否能够计算，而是基本上他们是否可以用手做到这一点。

Basic eye-hand coordination is all the skill that was required.

所需要的全部技能就是基本的眼手协调能力。

You could put thousands of people into these factories.

你可以把数千人投入这些工厂。

The fact that you can absorb a lot of people, you can increase their productivity threefold, fourfold off the farm by putting them in these factories is an opportunity that very few other economic sectors provide.

事实上，你可以吸收很多人，你可以通过将他们安置在这些工厂中，将他们的生产力提高三倍、四倍，这是其他经济部门很少提供的机会。

A third, and I’ll just mention it.

第三个，我就提一下。

A third thing, which is very important in manufacturing, is tradable.

第三件事是可贸易的，这在制造业中非常重要。

You don’t have to develop a whole industrial complex.

您不必开发整个工业园区。

You can import inputs and then export the outputs.

您可以导入输入，然后导出输出。

You don’t require domestic demand to take off.

不需要国内需求就能起飞。

You don’t require an economy-wide productivity revolution in order to have consumers to whom you can sell your output.

你并不需要一场全经济范围的生产力革命才能拥有可以向其出售你的产品的消费者。

You can simply sell it on world markets.

您可以简单地在世界市场上出售它。

What that means is that it’s enough to develop mastery in one segment of manufacturing at a time.

这意味着一次掌握制造业的一个领域就足够了。

That provides the kind of engine that you need.

这提供了您需要的引擎。

Compare that with the kind of transformation you need in services where most of the output has to be sold domestically.

与服务业所需的转型相比，服务业的大部分产品必须在国内销售。

You need basically everybody’s incomes to grow, every sector to experience a productivity increase so you have a large enough market that you can sell.

基本上，你需要每个人的收入增长，每个部门都经历生产力的提高，这样你就有足够大的市场可以销售。

Otherwise, any service sector that is doing really well eventually is going to experience very rapid terms of trade deterioration domestically.

否则，任何表现良好的服务业最终都将经历国内贸易条件的快速恶化。

Those things, the transferability of the technology, the fact that it can absorb a lot of unskilled workers — traditionally, this is what’s changing — off the countryside, or out of informality and tradability I think is what makes manufacturing, historically has made it special.

这些东西，技术的可转移性，它可以吸收大量非技术工人的事实——“传统上，这就是正在发生的变化”——“我认为，出于非正规性和可贸易性，我认为制造业之所以如此特别，是因为它在历史上变得特别。

Richard Baldwin writes of the splitting up of supply chains.

理查德·鲍德温 (Richard Baldwin) 谈到了供应链的分裂。

So South Korea and Japan had relatively integrated supply chains.

所以韩国和日本有相对完整的供应链。

Now, the supply chains are all around the globe.

现在，供应链遍布全球。

In a time like this, where manufacturing is changing rapidly and policy itself is subject to a status quo bias, as we know from your own writings, what do you think is the new role for industrial policy, if any?

在这样一个时代，制造业正在迅速变化，政策本身也受到现状偏见的影响，正如我们从您自己的著作中了解到的那样，您认为产业政策的新作用是什么（如果有的话）？

Should we today, perhaps, not be more skeptical about it than we were, say, when Singapore started it?

也许我们今天不应该比新加坡开始这样做时更加怀疑它吗？

That has a couple of implications.

这有几个含义。

One is that, increasingly, I think we really need a different term.

一是，我越来越认为我们确实需要一个不同的术语。

We shouldn’t say industrial policy.

我们不应该说产业政策。

Maybe we should talk about a structural transformation policy.

也许我们应该谈谈结构转型政策。

Your perspective in terms of how do you get to rapid transformation.

您对如何实现快速转型的看法。

You should move away a little bit at the margin from manufacturing into other parts of the economy.

你应该稍微从制造业转移到经济的其他领域。

I think you should be thinking more about services, as well.

我认为你也应该更多地考虑服务。

A lot of services are tradable.

许多服务是可以交易的。

To some extent, some of the advantages might exist in tradable services, as well.

在某种程度上，可贸易服务也可能存在一些优势。

The other thing which I think a lot of .

另一件我想了很多的事情。

.

。

.

。

a common mistake in industrial policy that low- and middle-income countries do, which is to look at industrial policy or criteria for success of industrial policy in terms of output, exports, innovation, R&D, patents, and things like that.

低收入和中等收入国家在产业政策中常犯的一个错误是从产出、出口、创新、研发、专利等方面来看待产业政策或产业政策成功的标准。

Whereas I would put a lot more emphasis on actually employment.

而我会更加重视实际就业。

Credit: Nick Donner Photography

图片来源：尼克·唐纳摄影

The question is, are you generating adequate employment in these more productive industries that are oriented into world markets?

问题是，这些面向世界市场的生产力更高的行业是否创造了充足的就业机会？

Because the kind of industrial policy that ends up generating profits and investment and R&D in a low-to-middle-income country, but at the same time your employment is shrinking, is not going to be the kind of high-return activity for the economy as a whole.

因为那种最终会在中低收入国家产生利润、投资和研发，但同时就业却在萎缩的产业政策，对于整个经济来说不会是一种高回报的活动。

I think you’re basically right.

我认为你基本上是对的。

I go around these days a lot less advocating for very forceful industrial policy, in large part because I do think that the returns to it have fallen.

这些天我很少提倡非常强有力的产业政策，很大程度上是因为我确实认为它的回报已经下降。

I think also we need to think through a lot more what it should look like in a world where in fact we are concerned at least as much about services as manufacturing, even in the middle-income or low-income countries.

我认为我们还需要更多地思考在一个事实上我们至少与制造业一样关注服务业的世界应该是什么样子，即使是在中等收入或低收入国家。

On “trilemmas” around the world

论世界各地的“三难困境”

Given that, which I would agree with, if we take the eurozone today, something clearly isn’t working.

鉴于这一点，我同意这一点，如果我们今天以欧元区为例，显然有些事情不起作用。

I don’t mean just Greece.

我指的不仅仅是希腊。

But every now and then we have of a nascent recovery, and the recovery’s over before it really has even gotten underway.

但时不时地，我们会出现初步的复苏，但复苏在真正开始之前就已经结束了。

The eurozone is now sliding back to deflation.

欧元区目前正在滑向通货紧缩。

France, Italy seem to be slow-growth countries permanently.

法国、意大利似乎永远是增长缓慢的国家。

Let’s say it’s up to you.

假设这取决于你。

Given Rodrik’s trilemma, what should the eurozone do?

鉴于罗德里克的三难困境，欧元区应该做什么？

That’s the choice that .

这就是选择。

.

。

.

。

assuming that we don’t want to give up on democracy.

假设我们不想放弃民主。

If we want to subject to the constraint that we want Europe to remain, or regain its thriving democracy, then this is the inescapable choice that the trilemma points to.

如果我们想要受到希望欧洲留下来的约束，或者恢复其蓬勃发展的民主，那么这就是三难困境所指向的不可避免的选择。

Which is to say, you have to decide whether you’re going to politically integrate, and if you’re not going to politically integrate, you have to figure out a way of economically beginning at least some of this integration.

也就是说，你必须决定是否要在政治上一体化，如果你不打算在政治上一体化，你必须找到一种在经济上至少开始部分一体化的方法。

That means losing the monetary integration in particular.

这尤其意味着失去货币一体化。

Now, you ask me which would be my preference.

现在，你问我哪一个是我的偏好。

My preference certainly would have been before this crisis or well into the crisis, a year or two into the crisis, would have been this is the opportunity where you just basically go to your electorates and say, “This is why we need to federalize Europe.

我的偏好当然是在这场危机之前或危机爆发后一两年，这将是一个机会，你基本上可以到你的选民那里说：“这就是为什么我们需要将欧洲联邦化。

This is why we need to politically integrate.

这就是为什么我们需要政治一体化。

This is why we need not just banking integration, but we also need a significant amount of fiscal integration, and the creation of pan-European political space .

这就是为什么我们不仅需要银行业一体化，还需要大量的财政一体化，以及创建泛欧洲政治空间。

.

。

.”

”。

European integration was always an elite project.

欧洲一体化一直是一个精英项目。

European integration was never something that the people demanded, and then the leaders said, “OK, we will do whatever you ask.” But it was always an elite project the governmental leaders sold to their population, to their electorate.

欧洲一体化从来都不是人民要求的，然后领导人说：“好吧，我们会做你要求的任何事情。”但这始终是政府领导人向其民众和选民推销的精英项目。

European integration was always an elite project.

欧洲一体化一直是一个精英项目。

European integration was never something that the people demanded, and then the leaders said, “OK, we will do whatever you ask.” It was always an elite project the governmental leaders sold to their population, to their electorate.

欧洲一体化从来都不是人民要求的，然后领导人说：“好吧，我们会做你要求的任何事情。”这始终是政府领导人向其民众和选民推销的精英项目。

I think what happened with the euro crisis is that somebody like America, instead of going out and saying, “Look, this is not a crisis of .

我认为欧元危机发生的情况是，像美国这样的国家没有出去说：“看，这不是一场……的危机。”

.

。

.

。

it’s not a moral issue, that here you have a profligate country that we need to discipline.

这不是道德问题，我们需要对这个挥霍无度的国家进行纪律处分。

But this is really a crisis of interdependence.

但这确实是一场相互依存的危机。

That it was as much a German problem or German banks that are the source of the problem as the Greeks who borrowed, or the Spaniards who borrowed.”

德国问题或德国银行是问题的根源，就像希腊人或西班牙人借钱一样。”

That line was never put forth to the German population.

这条路线从未向德国民众提出过。

It was always become the moralistic narrative of the North versus South.

它始终成为北方与南方的道德叙事。

I think that’s where the political elite failed in Europe.

我认为这就是欧洲政治精英失败的地方。

I think with that, it’s very difficult to see now how you’re going to undo that in Europe, unfortunately.

我认为，不幸的是，现在很难看到如何在欧洲扭转这一局面。

Credit: Nick Donner Photography

图片来源：尼克·唐纳摄影

But there’s more phony invoicing all the time, exports running through Hong Kong.

但通过香港出口的假发票一直在增加。

A lot of chicanery, people trading money out through bitcoin.

很多骗术，人们通过比特币交易资金。

A lot of leakage.

大量泄漏。

In the last few months, they’ve spent three or four hundred billion of reserves, that’s real money, trying to keep the value of their currency up.

在过去的几个月里，他们花费了三四千亿的储备金，这是真金白银，试图保持其货币的价值。

It still doesn’t seem to be working.

它似乎仍然不起作用。

In the past, you’ve argued eloquently capital controls often make a good deal of sense.

过去，您曾雄辩地指出，资本管制往往很有道理。

Their capital controls now, should they double down and defend the value of the yuan at all costs?

他们现在实行资本管制，是否应该加倍努力，不惜一切代价捍卫人民币币值？

Or should they let it go, open up the capital account, and see what the new value of the currency will be?

或者他们应该放手，开放资本账户，看看货币的新价值是多少？

But they did more or less the right things in this whole process.

但在整个过程中他们或多或少做了正确的事情。

They’ve allowed the currency in the last few years to move more freely.

过去几年他们允许货币更加自由地流动。

They’re true to their policy roots, which have paid off very handsomely over the last three decades.

他们忠于自己的政策根源，在过去三十年中取得了非常丰厚的回报。

I think the last thing that we outsiders should do is second-guess the wisdom of Chinese economic policymaking.

我认为我们局外人最不应该做的就是事后质疑中国经济决策的智慧。

We’re talking about the country that has engineered history’s most miraculous poverty reduction program ever.

我们谈论的是这个制定了历史上最神奇的减贫计划的国家。

If you ask me, “Tell me why I should be worried about China?” I can give you real reasons why you should be worrying about China relating to the fact that they in fact have both a huge political transformation ahead of them, as well as a huge economic transformation.

如果你问我，“告诉我为什么我应该担心中国？”我可以告诉你为什么你应该担心中国的真正原因，因为他们实际上面临着巨大的政治转型和巨大的经济转型。

The political transformation being the one of having to open up eventually, become more democratic, and we have no idea how they will manage that.

政治转型最终必须开放，变得更加民主，我们不知道他们将如何做到这一点。

The economic transformation, which they have not really gotten underway seriously — they’ve started, but it’s really, they are at the very beginning — it’s hard to turn into more of a domestically consumer-oriented, less investing, more consuming kind of economy, and less dependent on the world market.

他们还没有真正认真地进行经济转型——“他们已经开始了，但实际上，他们才刚刚开始”——很难转变为更多以国内消费者为导向、投资更少、消费更多、对世界市场依赖更少的经济。

Those are hugely challenging problems.

这些都是极具挑战性的问题。

Managing the currency right now, and the financials.

现在管理货币和金融。

There’s the stock market, which is a tiny, tiny part of the Chinese economy.

还有股票市场，它只是中国经济中很小很小的一部分。

It pales, I think, in comparison to those bigger issues.

我认为，与那些更大的问题相比，它显得苍白无力。

If politically it turned out that you had to choose at the margin, cutting back immigration or cutting back the welfare state, you as a citizen, the economist cannot say.

如果在政治上你必须在边际上做出选择，削减移民还是削减福利国家，你作为一个公民，经济学家不能说。

But what are your thoughts on that?

但你对此有何看法？

My answer is that, at the margin, this is a relatively easy question to answer.

我的回答是，从某种程度上来说，这是一个相对容易回答的问题。

Because I say, “OK, how much weight would I have to place on somebody on the other side of the border, relative to somebody on my side of the border, for me not to let that person in?” If you do the calculation, which I have done recently, which is to say .

因为我说，“好吧，相对于我这边的人，我需要对边境另一边的人施加多大的压力，才能不让那个人进来？”如果你做一下我最近做的计算，也就是说。

.

。

.

。

Let me be clear about what I’m saying.

让我澄清一下我在说什么。

I’m asking the question, under what kind of weighting of outsiders would it be a bad idea for me not to let some more people to come in?

我问的问题是，在什么样的外人权重下，我不让更多的人进来会是一个坏主意吗？

The answer is that I would have to put a weight of less than one-fifth of somebody on the other side of the border compared to somebody here.

答案是，与这里的人相比，我必须将边界另一边的人的重量减少到不到五分之一。

Then I say, look, I might understand that it’s reasonable to say, “OK, maybe I care twice as much as somebody who’s my neighbor as somebody who’s not,” but five times as much?

然后我说，看，我可能会明白这样说是合理的：“好吧，也许我对邻居的关心程度是对非邻居的关心程度的两倍，”但五倍呢？

I’m not so sure.

我不太确定。

That seems excessive.

这似乎太过分了。

Given how restrictive and how high these barriers are at the moment, at the margin, to me it’s a relatively easy answer.

考虑到目前这些障碍的限制性和高度，对我来说，这是一个相对简单的答案。

Which is to say, yes, at this point, it makes sense for rich countries to take in more people from the poor countries.

也就是说，是的，在这一点上，富裕国家从贫穷国家接收更多的人口是有道理的。

Given how restrictive and how high these barriers are at the moment, at the margin, to me it’s a relatively easy answer.

考虑到目前这些障碍的限制性和高度，对我来说，这是一个相对简单的答案。

Which is to say, yes, at this point, it makes sense for rich countries to take in more people from the poor countries.

也就是说，是的，在这一点上，富裕国家从贫穷国家接收更多的人口是有道理的。

To put it in a somewhat, to draw an analogy between the trade regime, what has happened in terms of trade liberalization and the migration regime, the migration regime today is more or less where the trade regime was back in the 1950s.

某种程度上来说，在贸易制度、贸易自由化方面发生的事情和移民制度之间进行类比，今天的移民制度或多或少与20世纪50年代的贸易制度是一样的。

Back in the 1950s, the global gains from further liberalizing of trade relative to the income distributional costs within countries and so forth was relatively huge.*

早在 20 世纪 50 年代，贸易进一步自由化所带来的全球收益相对于各国内部收入分配成本等而言是相对巨大的。*

I think the migration regime is somehow back there.

我认为移民制度在某种程度上又回到了那里。

We need to rationalize it and liberalize it a little bit more.

我们需要使其合理化并更加自由化。

I’m evading the tougher question, of course, which is where would you stop?

当然，我回避了更棘手的问题，即你会在哪里停止？

It’s easy for me to answer at this point — the regulations are too restrictive.

在这一点上我很容易回答——“法规太严格了。”

But where would you actually stop?

但你实际上会在哪里停下来呢？

I would certainly stop at a point where the integrity of public institutions and the welfare systems of the advanced countries would be seriously threatened.

当发达国家的公共机构和福利体系的完整性受到严重威胁时，我肯定会停下来。

But I don’t know where that is.

但我不知道那是哪里。

I think that’s the most direct comparison and analogue is what happened with the Turkish inflow of the ‘60s and ‘70s.

我认为最直接的比较和类比就是 60 年代和 70 年代土耳其人的流入。

That was huge.

那是巨大的。

I don’t remember offhand what the numbers are, but certainly it was huge, and it’s worked quite well.

我不记得具体数字是多少，但肯定是巨大的，而且效果很好。

On Turkey

关于土耳其

Just a little simple question.

只是一个简单的小问题。

I would put it this way.

我会这样说。

Do you trust the median voter in Konya?

您相信科尼亚的中间选民吗？

If you think about Turkey’s troubles, if Turkey were truly ruled by the median voter in Konya, to what extent would things be fine, or to what extent is the problem it’s not really democratic enough?

如果你想想土耳其的麻烦，如果土耳其真的是由科尼亚的中间选民统治的话，到什么程度就可以了，或者问题到什么程度是不够民主？

Do you see what I’m asking?

你明白我在问什么吗？

Because in some obvious ways, the current regime is not very democratic, even though there are elections of a sort.

因为在某些明显的方面，尽管有某种选举，但目前的政权并不是很民主。

But do you trust the median voter in Konya?

但你相信科尼亚的中间选民吗？

The things about democracy that we really care about are just two-fold.

我们真正关心的民主有两个方面。

One is that we want the median voter’s views to be reflected.

一是我们希望中间选民的观点得到反映。

The second is we don’t want to allow the median voter to do whatever he or she wants to the rest of the population.

第二是我们不想让中间选民对其他人为所欲为。

The things about democracy that we really care about are just two-fold.

我们真正关心的民主有两个方面。

One is that we want the median voter’s views to be reflected.

一是我们希望中间选民的观点得到反映。

The second is we don’t want to allow the median voter to do whatever he or she wants to the rest of the population.

第二是我们不想让中间选民对其他人为所欲为。

That’s why I think the constraints that liberalism or liberal institutions, the rule of law, the constraints of non-discrimination of minorities of ideological or ethnic or religious sort.

这就是为什么我认为自由主义或自由制度、法治、不歧视意识形态、种族或宗教少数群体的限制。

Those are equally important parts of well-functioning democracies.

这些对于运作良好的民主国家同样重要。

One thing that has happened in countries like Turkey, which is actually a very widespread phenomenon around the world, is as the franchise and elections have spread around the world, by the count of the Polity, which is this group that keeps track of this, we have now more democracies than autocracies in the world.

在像土耳其这样的国家发生的一件事（这实际上是世界各地非常普遍的现象）是，随着选举权和选举在世界各地蔓延，根据政体（这个组织跟踪这一情况）的统计，我们现在世界上的民主国家比独裁国家更多。

But they’re all electoral democracies.

但它们都是选举民主国家。

They’re democracies precisely in the sense that you meant, which is that you have elections regularly they’re generally free and fair.

它们正是你所说的民主国家，即定期举行选举，通常是自由和公平的。

But what they do, however, is that they allow the winners of those elections to more or less freely trample on the rights of those who are not part of that winning majority.

但他们所做的是，他们允许这些选举的获胜者或多或少自由地践踏那些不属于获胜多数的人的权利。

So the liberal element of that democracy is really what’s missing.

因此，民主制度中确实缺少自由主义元素。

I’m all for empowering the median voter in Turkey or elsewhere, but all in the context of rules and practices that ensure equal treatment of minorities of all kind.

我完全赞成赋予土耳其或其他地方的中间选民权力，但所有这些都是在确保平等对待各种少数群体的规则和做法的背景下进行的。

That’s really the part that I think, for example, the whole political economy literature on democracy has missed out on, because essentially it’s just thinking about it in terms of elections and the median voter, not thinking about it in terms of these restraints on what the median voter can do.

这确实是我认为的一部分，例如，整个关于民主的政治经济学文献都错过了，因为本质上它只是从选举和中位选民的角度来思考它，而不是从对中位选民可以做什么的这些限制来思考它。

In the early part of the 20th century, that changes very fundamentally.

20 世纪初，情况发生了根本性的变化。

You have some very violent events, and it’s never gone back.

你经历了一些非常暴力的事件，而且它永远不会消失。

Do you think it’s possible for the Eastern Mediterranean to be an area where these civil minorities have protection, or do you think the more monoglot version, Turks plus Kurds, now plus refugees, is simply what we’re going to have?

您认为东地中海有可能成为这些少数民族受到保护的地区吗？或者您认为单一语言的版本，土耳其人加库尔德人，现在加上难民，就是我们将要拥有的？

How do you think about that whole change?

您如何看待整个变化？

A great, terrible, unfortunate development, or somehow, it’s a bit like the European 17th century.

这是一个伟大的、可怕的、不幸的发展，或者不知何故，它有点像欧洲的 17 世纪。

Great human tragedy, but a clearing out that enabled nation-states to in some way move forward?

这是一场巨大的人类悲剧，但一场清理工作却使民族国家能够以某种方式向前迈进？

Of course, the forces of nationalism and the creation of the nation-state moved us into this new world where I think what happened in the Eastern Mediterranean as in so many other parts of the world was that you had mobilization of the masses under a nationalist rubric relatively early in terms of historical development compared to Western European countries.

当然，民族主义的力量和民族国家的创建将我们带入了这个新世界，我认为东地中海和世界许多其他地区所发生的情况是，与西欧国家相比，就历史发展而言，在民族主义标题下动员群众相对较早。

Credit: Nick Donner Photography

图片来源：尼克·唐纳摄影

For example, in Western Europe you had liberal ideas developed before the franchise became a mass franchise.

例如，在西欧，在特许经营成为大众特许经营之前，自由主义思想就已经发展起来。

In fact in Britain and Western Europe, the liberals didn’t want — liberalism existed before democracy came into being.

事实上，在英国和西欧，自由主义者并不希望自由主义在民主出现之前就已经存在。

Whereas, of course, in the Eastern Mediterranean and places like Turkey we’re trying to create liberalism, after you had a nationalist mobilization and the creation of democratic-like regimes based on the mass franchise.

当然，在东地中海和土耳其等地，我们正试图创造自由主义，在民族主义动员和基于群众选举权的基础上建立类似民主的政权之后。

It’s harder to bring those ideas of tolerance, the separation of powers, the rule of law and so forth relatively later in the game.

在游戏中相对较晚的时间里引入宽容、权力分立、法治等理念会更加困难。

That’s what’s happening.

这就是正在发生的事情。

But it is not impossible.

但这并非不可能。

One of the places that I like to talk about, in fact I talk about this in my latest paper on liberal democracy, is the case of Lebanon in the Eastern Mediterranean.

我喜欢谈论的地方之一，事实上我在我最新的关于自由民主的论文中谈论了这一点，就是东地中海的黎巴嫩的例子。

Lebanon until 1975 was a fascinating example of — it wasn’t exactly a liberal democracy because it was based on these different groups.

1975 年之前的黎巴嫩是一个令人着迷的例子——它并不完全是一个自由民主国家，因为它是建立在这些不同群体的基础上的。

They each had their shares in power and constitutionally they were each allocated .

他们每个人都有自己的权力份额，并且根据宪法，他们每个人都被分配了。

.

。

.

。

There were so many of these cross-cutting cleavages that they essentially had reached a modus operandi that no individual group had this notion that if simply they could prevail, then they could rule forever.

这些相互交叉的分歧如此之多，以至于他们基本上已经达到了一种作案手法，以至于没有哪个群体有这样的观念：如果他们能够获胜，那么他们就可以永远统治。

When you don’t have that expectation, then you work out bargains with alternatives.

当你没有这种期望时，你就会与其他选择进行讨价还价。

Because you are afraid of what the other side is going to do to you when they come to power, if they have a chance of doing that.

因为你害怕对方上台后会对你做什么（如果他们有机会这样做的话）。

Of course, how that system came to an end is also interesting, because once you had the massive influx of Palestinian refugees from Jordan, that balance was upset.

当然，这个体系如何结束也很有趣，因为一旦巴勒斯坦难民从约旦大量涌入，这种平衡就被打破了。

You now have one group that can, has potentially, can see itself as having a majority for an indefinite period time, so no longer has to essentially keep on with that basic compromise.

现在，有一个团体可以、有可能将自己视为无限期的多数派，因此不再需要继续坚持这种基本妥协。

That’s how the Lebanese consociational system came to an end after 1975 with the civil war.

1975 年内战后，黎巴嫩的联合制度就这样结束了。

But at least that gives you an idea of the possibilities that this, I don’t think is cultural.

但至少这让你了解了我认为这不是文化的可能性。

I don’t think this has anything to do necessarily with Islam.

我认为这与伊斯兰教没有必然的关系。

It’s not in the water.

它不在水中。

These things can happen.

这些事情都有可能发生。

But you need this experience of learning to compromise and to think that you need to be moderate in your policies because it might be that some other group will rule after you.

但你需要学习妥协的经验，并认为你的政策需要温和，因为其他群体可能会在你之后进行统治。

So that you have this, if you will, these repeated game incentives to basically not discriminate against those not in power very much.

这样，如果你愿意的话，这些重复的游戏激励措施基本上不会歧视那些没有权力的人。

I can certainly come up with scenarios for Turkey where this might have developed over time.

我当然可以想象出土耳其的情况随着时间的推移可能会发展。

I would have to blame successive mistakes made by political leaderships at different times as to why this process has so often been short-circuited.

我不得不归咎于政治领导人在不同时期所犯的连续错误，从而解释了为什么这一进程经常出现短路。

First, of course, the military by intervening repeatedly and, therefore, short-circuiting this process of building up these habits of regular change in power and therefore moderation and compromise developing.

首先，当然，军队反复干预，从而缩短了这种定期权力更迭习惯的形成过程，从而阻碍了温和和妥协的发展。

Of course, these days with the government of Erdoğan, who basically has just chosen the tactic that he’ll do anything to remain in power, including aggravate all the cleavages on the basis of sect, on the basis of nationality, and so forth.

当然，这些天埃尔多安政府基本上刚刚选择了这样的策略：他将不惜一切代价继续掌权，包括加剧基于教派、国籍等的所有分歧。

Do you see that is headed toward something like Lebanon in its more vital, feistier time?

您是否认为黎巴嫩正在走向更加生机勃勃、更加活跃的时期？

Or do you see it going very badly wrong?

或者你认为事情进展得很严重吗？

The Kurds, Turkey, and to some extent Kurds and Iraq.

库尔德人、土耳其，以及某种程度上的库尔德人和伊拉克。

Will there be a Kurdish state, and is there any equilibrium at all?

是否会出现库尔德国家，是否存在平衡？

But I don’t think that there is something deeply structural that prevents the kind of compromise.

但我不认为有什么深层的结构性因素会阻止这种妥协。

I think the Kurdish nationalists are, in Turkey at least, are very clear-sighted in understanding that full independence is neither in their interests nor something that they are likely to get.

我认为库尔德民族主义者，至少在土耳其，非常清楚地认识到，完全独立既不符合他们的利益，也不可能获得。

The kinds of things that they do want realistically are not things that the Turkish national government could not give up.

他们真正想要的东西并不是土耳其国民政府无法放弃的。

There’s no fundamental problem as to why that cannot be resolved.

不存在根本问题无法解决。

If it not being exploited for political reasons.

如果不是出于政治原因被利用的话。

Right now, for example, what’s happening is that Erdoğan is exploiting the Kurdish problem as a way of building up his own nationalist base.

例如，目前正在发生的事情是，埃尔多安正在利用库尔德问题作为建立自己民族主义基础的一种方式。

That’s being used, that particular cleavage is being used for a political purpose.

这正在被利用，这种特殊的分裂被用于政治目的。

But one can imagine other political strategies, other winning strategies that would involve compromise.

但人们可以想象其他政治策略，其他需要妥协的获胜策略。

But his novels, I have to say, are, I find convoluted and going around and around and around in circles.

但我不得不说，他的小说令人费解，绕来绕去。

I’m not a big Orhan Pamuk fan.

我不是奥尔罕·帕慕克的忠实粉丝。

I love his older brother, by the way, who’s an economic historian, who’s a very distinguished economic historian, Şevket Pamuk, and I finished a lot of his books.

顺便说一句，我爱他的哥哥塞夫凯特·帕慕克（Şevket Pamuk），他是一位经济历史学家，一位非常杰出的经济历史学家，我读完了他的很多书。

I’ve never had this starry-eyed view of how government agencies operate.

我从来没有对政府机构的运作抱有如此过分乐观的看法。

It’s not one that is jarring with respect to my own worldview.

这与我自己的世界观并不冲突。

I’ve never had this starry-eyed view of how government agencies operate.

我从来没有对政府机构的运作抱有如此过分乐观的看法。

It’s not one that is jarring with respect to my own worldview.

这与我自己的世界观并不冲突。

But even a lot of your papers that don’t mention Turkey at all, I guess personally, I read them as asking the question, “why hasn’t Turkey become a fully free and modern society?” Even if I think of your work on premature deindustrialization, if I think of Turkey in the 19th century, a big theme from my understanding is that Turkey is then prematurely industrializing, and that’s why the Ottoman Empire becomes the sick man of Europe.

但即使你的很多论文根本没有提到土耳其，我个人认为，我读它们也是在问这样一个问题：“为什么土耳其没有成为一个完全自由的现代社会？”即使我想到你关于过早去工业化的著作，如果我想到19世纪的土耳其，我理解的一个大主题是土耳其当时正在过早地工业化，这就是为什么奥斯曼帝国成为欧洲病夫的原因。

I read a lot of your papers as looking at this elephant from different sides, even if not about Turkey at all.

我读了很多你的论文，从不同的角度看待这头大象，即使根本不是关于土耳其的。

Would you respond to that?

你会对此做出回应吗？

Do you think that’s a fair characterization?

你认为这是一个公平的描述吗？

Like all Turkish kids of my generation with some academic pretensions or at least relatively good in school, my goal was to do engineering.

就像我这一代所有有一些学术自负或至少在学校相对较好的土耳其孩子一样，我的目标是从事工程学。

So I came to Harvard as an undergraduate to study engineering, only to find out that there’s actually no engineering major at Harvard.

于是我以本科生的身份来到哈佛学习工程学，却发现哈佛其实没有工程学专业。

But the one thing that motivated me always was this question of why was Turkey relatively poor and not developed, and the rest of the world, and the United States or Western Europe developed.

但一直激励我的一件事是这个问题：为什么土耳其相对贫穷且不发达，而世界其他地区、美国或西欧却发达。

Then you get defeated in a world war.

然后你就会在世界大战中被击败。

You start in very inauspicious circumstances.

你在非常不吉利的环境中开始。

Then agency.

然后代理。

What happened, for example, under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who was the leader who made Turkey, who took Turkey from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, erected the Turkish republic on top of that.

例如，在穆斯塔法·凯末尔·阿塔图尔克（Mustafa Kemal Atatürk）领导下所发生的事情，他是土耳其的领导人，他将土耳其从奥斯曼帝国的废墟中夺取，并在此基础上建立了土耳其共和国。

He did a lot of very good things and a lot of very silly things, and we’re still living with the consequences of many of those things, including the good things.

他做了很多非常好的事情，也做了很多非常愚蠢的事情，而我们仍然生活在其中许多事情的后果中，包括好的事情。

The fact that Turkey is a relatively secular country with a large middle class to a large extent is the result of his top-down, extremely brutal, extremely narrow-minded view of what it meant to be a modern nation-state — basically take the Swiss civil code and the French criminal code and German commercial code and just apply it.

土耳其是一个相对世俗的、拥有大量中产阶级的国家，很大程度上是他自上而下的、极其残酷、极其狭隘的现代民族国家观的结果——基本上把瑞士民法典、法国刑法典和德国商法典拿来套用。

The fact that Turkey is a relatively secular country with a large middle class to a large extent is the result of top-down, extremely brutal, extremely narrow-minded view of what it meant to be a modern nation-state — basically take the Swiss civil code and the French criminal code and German commercial code and just apply it.

土耳其是一个相对世俗的、拥有大量中产阶级的国家，很大程度上是自上而下的、极其残酷、极其狭隘的现代民族国家观的结果——基本上是把瑞士民法典、法国刑法典和德国商法典拿来套用。

But also a lot of the problems that we are having are also the residue of the fact that in that rigid view of how to modernize, he pushed out a lot of the people who need to be included back into the Turkish polity, including the conservatives, the religious conservatives, and a lot of others, and the Kurds.

但我们所面临的许多问题也是这样一个事实的残余：他对如何现代化的僵化观点，将许多需要重新纳入土耳其政体的人排除在外，包括保守派、宗教保守派和许多其他人，以及库尔德人。

If you’re comparing Eastern and Western Europe, again, this isn’t only about Turkey.

如果你再次比较东欧和西欧，这不仅仅与土耳其有关。

It’s not about Atatürk.

这与阿塔图尔克无关。

You could say the same about most of Eastern Europe, except possibly Poland.

对于大多数东欧国家，你也可以这么说，但波兰可能除外。

What’s that fundamental difference between West and East that is giving rise structurally to whatever percent of the explanation you want to assign to structural forces?

西方和东方之间的根本差异是什么，在结构上导致了你想要将解释分配给结构性力量的百分比？

I think a lot of what he said had to do with the nature of, how did market forces and social structures interact?

我认为他所说的很多内容都与市场力量和社会结构如何相互作用的本质有关？

In particular, what was the mode of commercialization of agriculture?

特别是农业商品化的模式是什么？

If you started out with sort of peasant agriculture, small scale farms and landlords that weren’t interested in labor-repressive agriculture, who diversified into commercial businesses in urban areas, as in Britain, you got a very different kind of path of industrialization and political development.

如果你从某种小农农业、小规模农场和对劳动力压制性农业不感兴趣的地主开始，他们在城市地区多元化发展商业业务，就像在英国一样，你就会得到一条非常不同的工业化和政治发展道路。

Where you got large commercial estates, large landlords, absentee or not, interested in labor-repressive methods of farming, who did not diversify to a large extent into industry, into commercial enterprises, allied themselves with the state, so as to be able to continue their repression of the agrarian sector.

那里有大型商业地产、大地主，无论是否缺席，他们对劳动压制的农业方法感兴趣，他们没有在很大程度上多元化进入工业、进入商业企业，他们与国家结盟，以便能够继续对农业部门的镇压。

I think having the Netherlands in the North and Britain to the West, I think both the competition, the benchmarking, and the ideas, I think in that way geography made a difference.

我认为荷兰在北部，英国在西部，我认为竞争、基准测试和想法，我认为地理在这方面发挥了作用。

But geography, it sort of enables the transfer of ideas and who are you looking at as what kind of a country you want to be.

但是地理，它在某种程度上可以促进思想的转移，以及你想成为什么样的国家以及你在看谁。

In many ways, France had the initial conditions that would have made it look more like a Central or Eastern European country than a Western European one.

从很多方面来说，法国的初始条件使它看起来更像是一个中欧或东欧国家，而不是西欧国家。

But the fact that it’s part of Western Europe I think has to do that it was it was so much closer to Britain.

但我认为，事实上它是西欧的一部分，因此它离英国非常近。

I think you see the same about why is it that Vietnam has developed in the way that it has after it opened up its economy.

我想你对越南开放经济后为什么会发展成这样的问题也有同样的看法。

I think if Vietnam was located in Latin America or Central America, I don’t think it would have been half the miracle that it was.

我认为，如果越南位于拉丁美洲或中美洲，我认为它不会有一半的奇迹。

On things under- and overrated

关于被低估和高估的事情

As an economic method, going back to your book, this book Economic Rules, randomized control trials as an economic method.

作为一种经济方法，回到你的书，这本书《经济规则》，随机对照试验作为一种经济方法。

Overrated or underrated?

被高估还是被低估？

The way that I think about it is internal validity is not the only thing.

我认为内部有效性并不是唯一的事情。

The good thing about all these RCTs is they’re very good about being able to identify causal effects.

所有这些随机对照试验的好处是它们能够很好地识别因果效应。

But they’re very poor about being able to say anything about why is it that we get these effects or in fact whether the same effects would occur in other contexts elsewhere.

但他们无法说出为什么我们会受到这些影响，或者事实上相同的影响是否会在其他地方的其他情况下发生。

So, it worked here.

所以，它在这里起作用了。

We don’t know if it’s going to work somewhere else.

我们不知道它是否会在其他地方发挥作用。

It’s crowding out the kind of work that .

它正在挤出那种工作。

.

。

.

。

The good thing about all these RCTs is they’re very good about being able to identify causal effects.

所有这些随机对照试验的好处是它们能够很好地识别因果效应。

But they’re very poor about being able to say anything about why is it that we get these effects or in fact whether the same effects would occur in other contexts elsewhere.

但他们无法说出为什么我们会受到这些影响，或者事实上相同的影响是否会在其他地方的其他情况下发生。

There was a time, when I came out of graduate school, if you were doing development economics and you were doing something empirical, you could never get a job.

曾经有一段时间，当我从研究生院毕业时，如果你研究发展经济学并且做一些实证研究，你永远找不到工作。

Probably in development economics at the time, you couldn’t get a job period.

也许在当时的发展经济学中，你找不到工作。

But the point was, doing empirical economics would not make you sort of rise up.

但关键是，研究实证经济学并不会让你有所提升。

I think that was terrible, and I we’ve now basically moved all the way to the other extreme, where empirical work also means doing something where you put 100 percent weight on internal validity, but very little thought into issues of external validity or the basic theory.

我认为这太糟糕了，我们现在基本上已经走向了另一个极端，即实证工作也意味着做一些你百分百重视内部有效性的事情，但很少考虑外部有效性或基本理论的问题。

I think we just have to correct some of that balance.

我认为我们只需要纠正一些平衡。

It’s almost like a very sort of 19th century sense of nationalism that is driving it.

这几乎就像是一种 19 世纪的民族主义意识在推动着它。

I sort of think that we should be beyond that.

我认为我们应该超越这个范围。

I think that in a thriving European Union, hopefully, if we get there, that basically a lot of regions can do a lot more things than they can do on their own.

我认为，在一个蓬勃发展的欧盟中，如果我们能够实现这一目标，基本上很多地区都可以做比它们自己能做的更多的事情。

I think the right evolution of political authority is up for grabs.

我认为政治权威的正确演变是有待争夺的。

Breaking up Spain I don’t think is going to really help that bigger goal of having a politically richer and deeply democratic Europe.

我认为分裂西班牙并不会真正有助于实现政治上更加富裕和深度民主的欧洲这一更大目标。

I don’t see what the upside really is except for this deep sense of 19th century ressentiment.

除了这种 19 世纪的深深怨恨感之外，我看不出真正的好处是什么。

On the other hand, when you look at how they’re dealing with this situation it’s incredibly impressive.

另一方面，当你看到他们如何处理这种情况时，你会发现令人印象深刻。

It’s something that even in an advanced country you wouldn’t think would happen, that there you have these prosecutors and judges who are actually following the rule of the law.

即使在发达国家，你也不会想到会发生这样的事情，因为那里有真正遵守法治的检察官和法官。

To me, when I look at Brazil, they’re demonstrating a political maturity in the way that their system operates that is decades ahead of even the advanced industrial countries.

对我来说，当我观察巴西时，他们的制度运作方式展现出政治成熟度，甚至比先进工业国家领先数十年。

I think the fact that they’re dealing with this and are going to have it behind them five years from now, eventually, it’s going to put them .

我认为事实上，他们正在处理这个问题，并将在五年后将其抛在脑后，最终，这将使他们……。

.

。

.

。

I would put in the long play for Brazil.

我会为巴西队打持久战。

When I look at Brazil, they’re demonstrating a political maturity in the way that their system operates that is decades ahead of even the advanced industrial countries.

当我观察巴西时，他们的制度运作方式表现出政治成熟度，甚至比先进工业国家领先数十年。

I think India can grow at 4, 5 percent per year on a sustainable basis.

我认为印度可以在可持续的基础上以每年 4%、5% 的速度增长。

I don’t think it’s going to be 8 or 9 percent.

我认为不会是 8% 或 9%。

When this sinks in, I think there’s going to be a negative overreaction, would be my fear.

当我明白这一点时，我认为将会出现负面的过度反应，这将是我的恐惧。

On the need for gap years in graduate economics

论经济学研究生间隔年的必要性

If you were allowed to make one change in the economics profession or academia — ” this is an institutional change or rules change, not an attitudinal change, but an actual change in how things are done, a change in a graduate program.

如果你被允许在经济学专业或学术界做出一个改变 —— ”这是一种制度的改变或规则的改变，而不是态度的改变，而是做事方式的实际改变，研究生课程的改变。

“If you could make one change to help produce more Dani Rodriks for all the rest of us, what would that be?”

“如果你能做出一项改变来帮助我们为我们所有人生产更多的丹尼·罗德里克，那会是什么？”

I think anything that would get them a little bit more cognizant of the problems of the real world.

我认为任何能让他们更多地认识现实世界问题的事情。

I would say that there are parts of political science that have become even worse than economics right now.

我想说，政治学的某些部分现在变得比经济学更糟糕。

I’m not sure that that would work.

我不确定这是否有效。

I don’t know.

我不知道。

Maybe a gap year, spending a year in a developing country between your first and second year?

也许是间隔年，在第一年和第二年之间在发展中国家度过一年？

Q&A

问答

Please head up to the mics with your questions and I will call on you and you will hear responses.

请向麦克风提出您的问题，我会打电话给您，您会听到答复。

At the mic over here.

就在这儿的麦克风处。

Please just announce your name, also.

也请宣布你的名字。

I always tell my students that they should always go to a country, when they have that chance to spend a summer or a year, to go somewhere which is as different from where they have some experience as possible.

我总是告诉我的学生，当他们有机会度过一个夏天或一年时，他们应该总是去一个国家，去一个与他们有经验的地方尽可能不同的地方。

That comparative .

那个对比。

.

。

.

。

there are so many things you take for granted that you don’t even understand are things to be questioned.

有很多事情你认为是理所当然的，但你甚至不明白这些事情是值得质疑的。

It’s only when you see another country that’s so different, then you start asking, “But how come that is working there?

只有当你看到另一个如此不同的国家时，你才会开始问：“但是为什么这在那里起作用呢？

It’s not working here?”

这里不工作吗？”

For that, as many opportunities as you have to be asking that question, which is as different a place you can imagine from where you’ve been to.

为此，你必须有尽可能多的机会提出这个问题，这是一个你可以想象的与你去过的地方截然不同的地方。

I wondered what your explanation is for whether there are structural causes for premature deindustrialization.

我想知道您对过早去工业化是否存在结构性原因有何解释？

If Luxemburg were here she would be talking about the effects of imperialism.

如果卢森堡在这里，她就会谈论帝国主义的影响。

I wonder how you would explain it.

我想知道你会如何解释。

But, of course, we also have cases like Japan, which in the late 19th century, despite having very low tariffs, being able to develop its own domestic industry.

当然，我们也有像日本这样的例子，在19世纪末，尽管关税非常低，但仍能够发展自己的国内产业。

We have at least one exception, even back then, of a country that could industrialize despite those circumstances.

即使在当时，我们也至少有一个例外，那就是一个尽管存在这种情况仍能实现工业化的国家。

The late 20th and 21st century analogue of that imperialism, if you will, is China because it’s been China that has been essentially swamping the world with manufactured goods.

如果你愿意的话，20世纪末和21世纪的帝国主义的类似物就是中国，因为正是中国基本上用制成品淹没了世界。

You go to a country like Ethiopia today in Africa and basically everything is imported from China.

今天你去非洲的埃塞俄比亚这样的国家，基本上所有东西都是从中国进口的。

Fifty years ago, a country like Ethiopia would be manufacturing very simple things, from footwear to tables and chairs to cardboard boxes.

五十年前，像埃塞俄比亚这样的国家会制造非常简单的东西，从鞋类到桌椅再到纸板箱。

But now, everything is coming from China.

但现在，一切都来自中国。

The fact that we moved to a stage of the world where a country like China is able to exert such strong effect on world markets in manufacturing means that the opportunities for import substitution in manufacturing is significantly less today in the low income countries that have opened themselves up.

事实上，我们已经进入了一个像中国这样的国家能够对世界制造业市场产生如此强大影响的阶段，这意味着如今在开放的低收入国家中，制造业进口替代的机会明显减少。

It’s not, obviously, imperialism but it’s sort of like, if you will, the imperialism of free trade might be one way of putting it for our current experience.

显然，这不是帝国主义，但如果你愿意的话，这有点像自由贸易的帝国主义可能是我们当前经验的一种表达方式。

That’s clearly one.

这显然是一个。

It’s also, in terms of the fact that earlier I was saying that traditionally manufacturing has had the ability to absorb a lot of unskilled labor.

而且，就我之前所说的事实而言，传统制造业有能力吸收大量非熟练劳动力。

Manufacturing has become more and more capital-intensive over time.

随着时间的推移，制造业变得越来越资本密集型。

That means that now even garments or textiles, footwear, they’ve become fairly skill-intensive activities.

这意味着现在即使是服装、纺织品、鞋类，它们也已成为相当技能密集型的活动。

The Chinese entrepreneur I mentioned, when she goes to Ethiopia and opens up a footwear plant, she’s using a very different kind of labor.

我提到的那位中国企业家，当她去埃塞俄比亚开设一家鞋厂时，她使用的是一种非常不同的劳动力。

University graduates and many, many fewer of them compared to what the Chinese experience was.

与中国的情况相比，大学毕业生数量要少得多。

I think changes in technology and globalization have been, I think, the two structural factors behind pushing for premature deindustrialization.

我认为技术和全球化的变化是推动过早去工业化背后的两个结构性因素。

Given this, what would be your position on nuclear proliferation?

鉴于此，您对核扩散问题持什么立场？

Aren’t you, by virtue of this, beholden to the position that the more countries with nukes, the more crosscutting there would be and the more effective, better functioning democracy?

难道你不认为拥有核武器的国家越多，交叉性就越强，民主制度就越有效、运转越好吗？

I think the question you were asking is extending the notion that more crosscutting cleavages imply greater political stability and tolerance and moderation.

我认为你问的问题是延伸这样一种观念，即更多的交叉分歧意味着更大的政治稳定、宽容和温和。

Can we take that idea to the international sphere, in particular apply it to nuclear proliferation?

我们能否将这一想法应用于国际领域，特别是应用于核扩散？

If more states have nuclear weapons, would that make the world safer?

如果更多国家拥有核武器，世界会更安全吗？

I’m not quite sure about the analogy, the way that you’ve taken that idea and extended it to the global sphere because the notion of crosscutting cleavages has to do with when you’re operating not in a state of anarchy, so to speak, but when you’re operating in a well-ordered polity.

我不太确定这个类比，以及你采用这个想法并将其扩展到全球范围的方式，因为横切分裂的概念与你不是在无政府状态下运作时有关，可以这么说，而是与你在一个秩序良好的政体中运作时有关。

I’m not sure that that analogy carries to what is effectively the state of anarchy at the global level, where there is no global government so the nature of competition is very different.

我不确定这个类比是否适用于全球层面的无政府状态，因为没有全球政府，所以竞争的性质非常不同。

The idea of nuclear proliferation globally greatly worries me.

全球核扩散的想法让我非常担心。

Not because I think that the marginal country is going to be less responsible than the countries that already have nuclear weapons, but just because the more countries that have them, the greater the chance that at least one of them will be irresponsible rises.

并不是因为我认为边缘国家会比已经拥有核武器的国家更不负责任，而是因为拥有核武器的国家越多，至少其中一个国家不负责任的可能性就越大。

I think just probabilistically that makes me very, very nervous.

我认为这很有可能让我非常非常紧张。

The analogy, I don’t think really quite applies.

我认为这个类比并不完全适用。

Still, beside your words of hope, crony capitalism and draconian regulations are more the rule than the exception in Brazil.

尽管如此，除了你的希望之言外，裙带资本主义和严厉的监管在巴西更多的是规则而不是例外。

I would like to know if you believe that Brazil — is there a way of Brazil ever overcoming that in those five, six years that you said?

我想知道你是否相信巴西——巴西有没有办法在你所说的那五六年里克服这个问题？

Or, putting it in another way, do those issues actually matter?

或者，换句话说，这些问题真的重要吗？

It’s not like Turkey has had an easy time economically but the way that the financial markets have treated Turkey is incomparable to how badly Brazil has been treated.

土耳其在经济上并不是一帆风顺，但金融市场对待土耳其的方式与巴西所受到的恶劣对待是无法比拟的。

I look at crony capitalism.

我关注裙带资本主义。

I see at least that in Brazil, we have a system that’s actually dealing with it, and they’re dealing with it in a way that’s as clean as one could hope for.

我至少看到在巴西，我们有一个真正处理这个问题的系统，而且他们正在以一种正如人们所希望的那样干净的方式处理它。

What’s happening in Turkey?

土耳其发生了什么？

What’s happening in Turkey is that the extent of corruption and crony capitalism, the part of it that we have already seen, is vastly superior than anything that has come out in Brazil.

土耳其正在发生的事情是，腐败和裙带资本主义的程度（我们已经看到了其中的一部分）远远超过巴西所发生的一切。

We know that the president and his immediate family have been greatly implicated in vast amounts of corruption.

我们知道，总统及其直系亲属与大量腐败行为有很大牵连。

We know that.

我们知道这一点。

It’s the kind of thing that Dilma could be guilty of pales in comparison.

相比之下，迪尔玛在这种事情上的罪责就显得相形见绌了。

The fact that anything in Turkey, in terms of trying to delete the judiciary when it went into trying to clean this system up, it did it in a way that was explicitly politically motivated.

事实上，在土耳其，当试图清理司法系统时，任何试图删除司法机构的行为都是出于明显的政治动机。

Therefore, it made it much easier for Erdoğan to clamp down on it because it was clear that it was a politically motivated attack on him, which makes neither side really right.

因此，这让埃尔多安更容易对其进行压制，因为很明显，这是对他的出于政治动机的攻击，这使得双方都不是真正正确的。

This essentially means that in a country like Turkey, basically you’re postponing all these problems into the future.

这本质上意味着在土耳其这样的国家，基本上你将所有这些问题推迟到未来。

They’re going to hamper your development, hamper your politics for decades to come.

它们将阻碍你们的发展，阻碍你们未来几十年的政治。

At least in Brazil, you’re dealing with these things.

至少在巴西，你正在处理这些事情。

You’re trying to overcome them.

你正在努力克服它们。

Maybe it won’t be five years.

也许不会是五年。

Maybe you’ll find other things that are happening.

也许你会发现其他正在发生的事情。

My recommendation to you is at least take pride that you have a system that is actually trying to clean it up.

我对您的建议是，至少要为您拥有一个实际上正在尝试清理它的系统感到自豪。

That’s really rare.

这实在是很少见。

It’s not happening in Turkey.

这并没有发生在土耳其。

It’s not happening in Thailand.

这不会发生在泰国。

It’s not happening in most developing countries that I know of.

据我所知，这种情况在大多数发展中国家都没有发生。

I think, in that way, Brazil is exemplary.

我认为，从这方面来说，巴西堪称典范。

I hate the notion of best practice.

我讨厌最佳实践的概念。

I think this is probably a very harmful notion.

我认为这可能是一个非常有害的观念。

I was a student of Avinash Dixit, who was a great economist at Princeton.

我是阿维纳什·迪克西特（Avinash Dixit）的学生，他是普林斯顿大学一位伟大的经济学家。

He likes to say, “The world is second best at best.”

他喜欢说：“世界充其量只是第二好。”

You always have to think in those terms.

你必须始终以这些方式思考。

The notion of a best practice is based on the idea that you can simply just have something that worked somewhere and take it and copy it and apply it somewhere else.

最佳实践的概念基于这样的想法：您可以简单地拥有在某个地方有效的东西，然后将其复制并应用到其他地方。

Not only does that not work in general, it gives us a very lazy frame of mind.

这不仅在一般情况下不起作用，而且还给我们一种非常懒惰的心态。

We end up developing all these World Economic Forum scorecards where we have all these checklists of the business environment rankings, or even the sustainable development goals.

我们最终开发了所有这些世界经济论坛记分卡，其中我们有所有这些商业环境排名清单，甚至是可持续发展目标。

I think to some extent, these things can be important as public relations, as PR for it.

我认为在某种程度上，这些事情作为公共关系、公关来说可能很重要。

But you look at all successful countries and what you’ll see is that you’ve had their societies and leaders who have always distilled experience from elsewhere from the lens of their own local knowledge.

但你看看所有成功的国家，你会发现他们的社会和领导人总是从他们自己的当地知识的角度提炼其他地方的经验。

I think that when you get that combination is really when things work.

我认为，当你得到这种组合时，事情就真的有效了。

A best practice mindset, I think, is an enemy of that.

我认为，最佳实践心态是这一点的敌人。

The second part, if they do go ahead with the strategy, do you think global demand right now is strong enough to sustain an export-based growth strategy or will it largely fail?

第二部分，如果他们确实继续实施该战略，您认为目前的全球需求是否足以维持以出口为基础的增长战略，还是会基本上失败？

I think it relates to some of the things that we were discussing.

我认为这与我们正在讨论的一些事情有关。

Yes, I think the returns to industrial policy are lower now.

是的，我认为现在产业政策的回报较低。

The returns to any export-oriented strategy are also lower now.

现在任何出口导向型战略的回报也都较低。

We haven’t talked about this but I think there’s a sense in which the world economy isn’t going to be as much of an engine for growth for developing and emerging markets in the future as it has been until now.

我们还没有讨论过这个问题，但我认为，从某种意义上说，世界经济未来将不会像迄今为止那样成为发展中国家和新兴市场增长的引擎。

As will manufacturing industry will not be that.

制造业也不会那样。

I don’t see this trade off between fundamentals versus a more proactive government policy that’s trying to generate new industries, not just manufacturing but also services.

我不认为基本面与更积极主动的政府政策之间存在这种权衡，政府政策试图创造新的产业，不仅是制造业，还有服务业。

What I always look for is a very pragmatic kind of attitude towards the private sector and the business sector, which is a government that’s sort of saying, “What is it that we can do to unlock possibilities?” and keep an open mind on that.

我一直在寻找一种对待私营部门和商业部门的非​​常务实的态度，政府会说：“我们可以做些什么来释放可能性？”并对此保持开放的态度。

It doesn’t mean you’re going to be picking winners but it does mean that you’re going to be willing to get activity started that might not have started otherwise.

这并不意味着你会选出赢家，但它确实意味着你会愿意开始一些原本可能不会开始的活动。

Some of them will fail.

其中一些会失败。

That’s in the nature of things.

这是事物的本质。

I think having tried and failed is better often than not having tried at all.

我认为尝试过但失败往往比根本没有尝试要好。

There’s no trade-off, really.

确实，没有任何权衡。

You can do that and also work on your fundamentals, on your skills, and your capital base, and your infrastructure, certainly as India has to do.

你可以做到这一点，同时也致力于你的基础、你的技能、你的资本基础和你的基础设施，当然就像印度必须做的那样。

Indian economic policy has very much moved in that direction.

印度的经济政策已在很大程度上朝这个方向发展。

I think that’s fairly consistent with what the government is already doing except that I think they exaggerate how much growth and how much industrialization they can really get.

我认为这与政府已经在做的事情相当一致，只是我认为他们夸大了他们真正可以获得的增长和工业化程度。

The Mercatus Center gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Stephen M.

Mercatus 中心衷心感谢 Stephen M.

Jones in curating most of the hyperlinks found in this transcript.

琼斯策划了这份文字记录中的大部分超链接。

Editor’s note

编者注

As often happens, Tyler Cowen’s conversation with Dani Rodrik inspired an interesting online discussion on free trade before the event even occurred.

正如经常发生的那样，泰勒·考恩（Tyler Cowen）与丹尼·罗德里克（Dani Rodrik）的对话甚至在活动发生之前就引发了一场关于自由贸易的有趣的在线讨论。

Donald Boudreaux, a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center and professor of economics at George Mason University, suggested in a comment on Cowen’s Marginal Revolution blog post about the event that Cowen should ask Rodrik about his views on the differences between free trade within a nation-state and free trade between nation-states.

莫卡图斯中心高级研究员、乔治梅森大学经济学教授唐纳德·布德罗(Donald Boudreaux)在考恩的《边际革命》博客文章中就该事件发表评论时建议，考恩应该询问罗德里克对民族国家内部自由贸易与民族国家之间自由贸易之间差异的看法。

Rodrik posted a response that day on his own blog.

罗德里克当天在自己的博客上发表了回应。

Cowen highlighted the discussion at at Marginal Revolution, and Don Boudreaux responded at Cafe Hayek.

考恩强调了边际革命的讨论，唐·布德罗在哈耶克咖啡馆做出了回应。

Even economist Arnold Kling weighed in on the topic at his blog.

就连经济学家阿诺德·克林也在他的博客上对这个话题发表了看法。