Chris Blattman on Development, Conflict, and Doing What’s Interesting (Ep. 36)
Today, I am with Chris Blattman, economist, and he is at the Harris Public Policy School in Chicago.
今天，我和经济学家克里斯·布拉特曼在一起，他在芝加哥哈里斯公共政策学院。
Chris has worked on most of the central issues behind economic development.
克里斯致力于解决经济发展背后的大部分核心问题。
Thank you for coming, Chris.
谢谢你的到来，克里斯。
Thank you.
谢谢。
On cash transfers
关于现金转移
I want to start first with your work on cash transfers.
我想首先从您在现金转移方面的工作开始。
Say I have some extra money, and I want to do the world some good, and I’m thinking, “Should I just send money to some individuals in a poorer country, go to the Western Union office and send it off?” Is that the best thing that I can do with my money?
假设我有一些多余的钱，我想为世界做一些好事，我在想，“我应该把钱寄给较贫穷国家的一些人，然后去西联汇款办公室寄出吗？”这是我能用我的钱做的最好的事情吗？
I think if you don’t know anybody deserving of help or that needs something, or if you don’t have a personal connection to a place, as an impersonal way to give effectively, it’s probably the best way we have.
我认为，如果你不认识任何值得帮助或需要帮助的人，或者如果你与某个地方没有个人联系，作为一种有效的非个人方式给予，这可能是我们拥有的最好的方式。
I don’t do really any of that myself — or I do, but I’m sending cash transfers, in some sense, to very specific people.
我自己实际上并没有做任何事情——或者说我做了，但从某种意义上说，我正在向非常特定的人发送现金转账。
There’s very dynamic people I know who are getting through university or going through school, but I have this advantage of these personal connections.
我认识一些非常有活力的人，他们正在读大学或上学，但我拥有这些人际关系的优势。
Say I have connections to developing economies.
假设我与发展中经济体有联系。
I know some people.
我认识一些人。
I’m thinking of not only sending cash but packaging that with some kind of complementary benefit or intervention.
我不仅考虑发送现金，还考虑将其与某种补充利益或干预措施一起包装。
What’s the most effective thing I can package the cash with?
我能用什么东西来打包现金最有效？
Say I have some time, some resources, some expertise.
假设我有一些时间、一些资源、一些专业知识。
What’s actually going to help?
实际上有什么帮助？
That’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
If you were a large organization — and you’re not — but if you were a large organization or a government, I would start pointing you in the direction of bigger public services or infrastructure-like things, or things that could deliver to groups.
如果你是一个大型组织 — 而你不是 — 但是如果你是一个大型组织或政府，我会开始向你指出更大的公共服务或类似基础设施的东西，或者可以为团体提供的东西的方向。
But that’s not really what you’re asking.
但这并不是您真正要问的。
I’m going to give a person cash and something.
我要给一个人现金和一些东西。
Should it be cash and a banana, cash and a book, cash and an Apple watch?
应该是现金和香蕉、现金和书、现金和苹果手表吗？
A lot of people — and this would be true even of a young person in this country — don’t have a good sense of what their paths and options are.
很多人——“即使是这个国家的年轻人也是如此”——对他们的道路和选择是什么没有很好的认识。
I think of the time that I’ve spent helping people think through what their options are, and reevaluating those opportunities suddenly changes all of their returns to investment.
我想起我花时间帮助人们思考他们的选择是什么，重新评估这些机会突然改变了他们所有的投资回报。
So that kind of advising and mentoring and connection is unusually powerful.
因此，这种建议、指导和联系是异常强大的。
What’s the last important thing you learned about cash transfers?
关于现金转移，您学到的最后一件重要的事情是什么？
We recently went back to some cash transfers that were given almost 10 years ago, following up a randomized control trial in Uganda in the north, and we’re just, in some sense, putting out those results.
我们最近回顾了大约 10 年前进行的一些现金转移，跟进了北部乌干达的一项随机对照试验，从某种意义上说，我们只是公布了这些结果。
What we found is, the initial result after two and four years was like other places seeing big advances in incomes.
我们发现，两年和四年后的初步结果与其他地方一样，收入出现了大幅增长。
People get cash.
人们得到现金。
They’re poor.
他们很穷。
They couldn’t invest in some of their ideas, but they had good ideas, and so they take off.
他们无法对自己的一些想法进行投资，但他们有好的想法，所以他们就起飞了。
Now what we’ve seen is, essentially, they’ve converged with the people who didn’t get the cash.
现在我们看到的是，本质上，他们已经与那些没有拿到现金的人聚集在一起。
The people who didn’t get the cash have caught up because they saved and accumulated slowly and got up to the point where they have the same levels of success.
那些没有拿到现金的人已经赶上了，因为他们慢慢地储蓄和积累，并达到了同样水平的成功。
They converged to a good level.
他们收敛到了一个很好的水平。
But this means that cash transfers are much more of a temporary acceleration than they are some sort of permanent solution to poverty.
但这意味着现金转移更多的是暂时的加速，而不是某种永久的贫困解决方案。
So after 10 years, it might wash out?
那么10年后，它可能会被淘汰吗？
This is just one place.
这只是一处地方。
There’s a lot of these things around the world.
世界各地有很多这样的事情。
But we’ve based a lot of our optimism, really, off of a handful of transfers in Kenya and Uganda.
但实际上，我们的乐观情绪很大程度上来自于肯尼亚和乌干达的一些转会。
Looking back at those, we’re seeing convergence.
回顾这些，我们看到了融合。
That’s what we’d expect.
这正是我们所期望的。
To the extent there’s convergence — let’s say a 10-year horizon — what do you think is the mechanism?
在某种程度上，趋同性——“比如说 10 年的时间范围”——你认为其机制是什么？
Is it the people who get the money, they work less hard, or they give it away to kin who expect a form of social insurance, or the people who don’t get the money become more ambitious?
是那些拿到钱的人工作不那么努力，还是把钱送给了希望获得社会保险的亲戚，还是那些没有拿到钱的人变得更加雄心勃勃？
What’s your intuition?
你的直觉是什么？
One of the constraints that you see on people’s success is that these are incredibly volatile lives.
你看到的限制人们成功的因素之一是他们的生活极其不稳定。
If you ask someone to recount the last 10 years of their economic activity, you’ll get this incredible litany of terrible shocks and unexpected events that’s really quite amazing.
如果你让某人回顾一下他们过去 10 年的经济活动，你会得到一长串令人难以置信的可怕冲击和意外事件，这真的非常令人惊奇。
It’s amazing that anybody succeeds at all after you hear this list.
令人惊奇的是，当你听到这个清单后，任何人都成功了。
A lot of people are failing, but for the most part, people are doing well.
很多人都失败了，但大多数人都做得很好。
It’s the fact that a lot of these people getting cash transfers are young people who have a future, and it takes time to get there, especially if you have to slowly accumulate capital.
事实上，这些获得现金转移的人中有很多都是有未来的年轻人，而实现这一目标需要时间，特别是如果你必须慢慢积累资本的话。
It’s the fact that it takes a longer time for everyone else.
事实上，其他人需要更长的时间。
Given your current income, based on tenure of course, how high a permanent basic income would you have to get from the world for your life to change?
考虑到您当前的收入（当然是基于任期），您需要从世界获得多高的永久基本收入才能改变您的生活？
Maybe you feel the same way.
也许你也有同样的感觉。
I’d probably do what I do practically for free.
我可能会免费做我所做的事情。
People say that, but if they had, say, a billion dollars a year, I’m not convinced it would be true.
人们这么说，但如果他们每年有十亿美元，我不相信这是真的。
We work downwards from that, $200 million a year, $1 million a year.
我们以此为基础，每年 2 亿美元，每年 100 万美元。
Maybe if it was a million, at some point, I would quit my job and do what I do, but as a free agent.
也许如果是一百万，在某个时候，我会辞去工作并做我所做的事情，但作为一名自由球员。
I would probably write books, do media, and try to produce ideas outside of the university, unencumbered by a lot of the administration, the teaching.
我可能会写书，做媒体，并尝试在大学之外产生想法，不受大量管理和教学的阻碍。
The things that let me focus on the ideas and the reading, but I don’t know if that’s a big change.
这些事情让我专注于想法和阅读，但我不知道这是否是一个很大的变化。
For you, it would accelerate your career path.
对您来说，这将加速您的职业道路。
It wouldn’t lead to convergence for you, or would it?
这不会给你带来融合，不是吗？
The question would be, would my output be any greater than in the counterfactual?
问题是，我的输出会比反事实中的输出更大吗？
I’m not sure if that’s true.
我不确定这是否属实。
It would be different in a nonmeasurable way.
这将以不可测量的方式有所不同。
On civil wars
关于内战
Chris also works on violence and war and conflicts.
克里斯还致力于暴力、战争和冲突的研究。
I have a whole host of questions for him on these topics.
我有一大堆关于这些话题的问题要问他。
I’ll start with a real softball.
我将从真正的垒球开始。
There’s a survey article you did, and it showed in the data that civil wars seem to rise from 1960 to 1990, and then after that point, they fall dramatically.
你写了一篇调查文章，数据显示，从 1960 年到 1990 年，内战似乎有所增加，但在那之后，内战急剧减少。
Why do they first go up so much in terms of their number and then go down?
为什么他们的数量先上升这么多，然后又下降？
I think especially in sub-Saharan Africa, but certainly all over the world, you saw this period after the First World War and after decolonization.
我认为，尤其是在撒哈拉以南非洲，但当然在世界各地，你都看到了第一次世界大战后和非殖民化后的这段时期。
One of my favorite things ever written about this period is by Bob Bates and Jeff Williamson and John Coatsworth, who were these famous political and economic historians.
关于这一时期，我最喜欢的文章之一是鲍勃·贝茨、杰夫·威廉姆森和约翰·科茨沃斯写的，他们是著名的政治和经济历史学家。
They compare this period in Africa to the late 19th century and a period of war and instability and gradual political consolidation after a period of rapid and unexpected decolonization.
他们将非洲的这段时期与 19 世纪末期进行了比较，这是一段战争和不稳定的时期，在经历了快速和意外的非殖民化时期之后，政治逐渐巩固。
I think of Africa, which is the site of many of these wars, as undergoing a period of political instability followed by consolidation after a rapid and unexpected decolonization — at the same time that you’re having experimentation with economic systems and political organizations that turned out to be failures, which interacted with that to make it so much worse.
我认为非洲是许多此类战争的发生地，非洲正经历一段政治不稳定时期，随后在快速且出乎意料的非殖民化之后进行巩固——与此同时，你正在尝试经济体系和政治组织，但结果证明是失败的，两者相互作用，使情况变得更加糟糕。
The end of these wars and the political consolidation that comes from essentially identifying an economic system and a political system that tends to work a little bit better explains a lot of the peace since then.
这些战争的结束和政治巩固，本质上是确定一种经济体系和一种运作得更好的政治体系，解释了自那时以来的许多和平。
It seems, though, if you look at Latin America, they’ve been independent quite a long time.
不过，如果你看看拉丁美洲，你会发现他们已经独立了很长一段时间了。
There were many more civil wars in Latin America, say, when I was growing up than what we see now, or even the prospect thereof.
比如说，在我成长的过程中，拉丁美洲发生的内战比我们现在看到的要多得多，甚至比我们现在看到的还要多。
Do you think there’s some notion to there being a general spirit of the world that’s either more peaceful or less peaceful?
您是否认为世界上存在一种更和平或更不和平的普遍精神？
Now versus then?
现在与那时？
Because you see independent regions, the number of civil wars seem to be declining, and whether there’s any specific theory that would account for that, or is there some global contagion possibility?
因为你看到独立的地区，内战的数量似乎在下降，是否有任何具体的理论可以解释这一点，或者是否存在某种全球蔓延的可能性？
There’s always the chance of a global contagion.
全球蔓延的可能性总是存在的。
I usually think of the incentives as aligned for peace, so war is the puzzle to be explained.
我通常认为激励措施是为了和平，因此战争是需要解释的难题。
I don’t think of the .
我不认为。
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。
how would I say this?
我该怎么说呢？
What happened in your childhood was a reaction to a series of political and economic shocks and a search for equilibrium after that.
你童年发生的事情是对一系列政治和经济冲击的反应，以及之后寻求平衡的过程。
It’s possible that we will see very dramatic political and economic shocks to destabilize that many countries again, but I don’t see them coming very soon.
我们有可能会看到非常剧烈的政治和经济冲击，从而再次破坏许多国家的稳定，但我认为它们不会很快到来。
What does the median economist/global development thinker fail to appreciate regarding order and conflict and violence, someone who knows a lot about the topic, but you feel you have a key or core insight that they don’t?
对于秩序、冲突和暴力，中位经济学家/全球发展思想家无法理解什么，他们对这个话题了解很多，但你觉得你有一个他们没有的关键或核心洞察力？
If I think of two types, if there’s the academic economists or political scientists, they tend to ignore the human and the emotional and the erroneous aspects, the things that drive conflict out of mistakes.
如果我想到两种类型，如果有学院派经济学家或政治学家，他们往往会忽视人性、情感和错误的方面，以及那些因错误而引发冲突的因素。
At the same time that those passions and mistakes and greed are vastly overestimated by — I won’t even say the casual observer — I would say the very, very deep and experienced policymaker.
与此同时，这些激情、错误和贪婪被“——我什至不会说随意的观察者”——“我会说非常、非常深刻和经验丰富的政策制定者”大大高估了。
They actually look at the problem.
他们实际上是在看问题。
They’re both right, they both have a piece of the puzzle, but they both only have one piece of the puzzle.
他们都是对的，他们都有一块拼图，但他们都只有一块拼图。
One’s not looking at it with enough reason, and one is not looking at it with enough emotion.
一个人没有以足够的理由看待它，一个人没有以足够的情感看待它。
Why don’t economic risk factors matter more for predicting violence and civil war?
为什么经济风险因素对于预测暴力和内战不那么重要？
They do a good job of predicting how easy it is to mobilize somebody into a conflict.
他们很好地预测了动员某人参与冲突的容易程度。
If there’s been some drought, or there’s been some collapse in trade, or the one commodity that your country produces collapses in price and there’s a lot of people out of work, then it’s much easier to tempt people away from whatever middling economic opportunity they had to join a rebellion.
如果发生了一些干旱，或者贸易出现了一些崩溃，或者你的国家生产的一种商品价格暴跌，并且有很多人失业，那么就更容易诱惑人们放弃他们必须参加的任何中等经济机会来参加叛乱。
And you can get more of them for your money — that’s a very basic intuition.
而且你可以用你的钱得到更多的东西 ——这是一个非常基本的直觉。
But that doesn’t tell you why war broke out in the first place.
但这并不能告诉你战争最初爆发的原因。
Just because the pie grows or shrinks because of economic growth or collapse doesn’t necessarily mean that you have more or less incentives to fight over that pie.
仅仅因为蛋糕因经济增长或崩溃而变大或缩小，并不一定意味着你有或多或少的动机去争夺这块蛋糕。
You’re still trying to bargain over that pie.
你还在为那块馅饼讨价还价。
But wouldn’t it be like a standard model?
但它不是像一个标准模型吗？
There’s a country that sells a natural resource.
有一个国家出售自然资源。
The natural resource feeds the budget, makes it possible to buy off special interest groups.
自然资源满足了预算，使收买特殊利益集团成为可能。
The price of the commodity falls.
商品价格下跌。
There are no longer the bribes for all the different interest groups.
不再有针对所有不同利益集团的贿赂行为。
Someone attempts a coup d’état or a civil war for what is partly an economic reason.
有人试图发动政变或内战，部分原因是出于经济原因。
That doesn’t show up very strongly in the data in your papers, as I understand it.
据我了解，这在你论文的数据中并没有很明显地体现出来。
What do you think that model is missing?
您认为该模型缺少什么？
What’s the intervening factor, or what is that model overestimating?
干预因素是什么，或者模型高估了什么？
All of these models don’t really think about .
所有这些模型都没有真正考虑过。
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The way that a lot of economists and political scientists think about conflict is that it’s a bargaining process.
许多经济学家和政治学家认为冲突是一个讨价还价的过程。
If the pie has shrunk, it’s true that there’s less transfers.
如果蛋糕缩小了，那么转会确实会减少。
Then were you to capture that pie, one is, that pie is smaller.
那么如果你去抢那块蛋糕，一是那块蛋糕变小了。
So perhaps it’s less attractive to capture in the first place.
所以也许一开始就没有那么吸引人去捕捉。
That’s going to be a countervailing force.
这将是一股反作用力。
If you’re thinking about the cost of war, these wars are so long and so costly that you have a strong incentive to try to find some kind of bargain.
如果你考虑战争的成本，这些战争是如此漫长，成本如此之高，以至于你有强烈的动机去尝试寻找某种讨价还价的机会。
People typically find bargains.
人们通常会找到便宜货。
This is why you see these broad coalition governments.
这就是为什么你会看到这些广泛的联合政府。
You see lots of different ethnic groups included in a particular regime.
你会看到许多不同的种族群体都包含在一个特定的政权中。
Very stable regimes bring together lots of people and pay them off.
非常稳定的政权将很多人聚集在一起并给他们带来回报。
All of that bribery is a way to keep a peaceful bargain.
所有这些贿赂都是保持和平讨价还价的一种方式。
When the pie shrinks, there’s a risk of conflict because it initiates a new round of bargaining.
当蛋糕缩小时，就会存在冲突的风险，因为它会引发新一轮的讨价还价。
That’s hard, and things can happen, but most people still have incentives to try to find some kind of peaceful solution.
这很难，而且事情可能会发生，但大多数人仍然有动力尝试寻找某种和平的解决方案。
On the spread of conflict and violence
关于冲突和暴力的蔓延
As you may know, Moscona, Nunn, and Robinson have a recent paper.
如您所知，莫斯科纳、纳恩和罗宾逊最近发表了一篇论文。
They argue that a big risk factor for conflict and violence is when people have many extended relations who need to be defended, or their honor needs to somehow be held up.
他们认为，冲突和暴力的一大风险因素是当人们有许多需要捍卫的广泛关系，或者他们的荣誉需要以某种方式维护时。
And this makes it easier, in their opinion, for conflict or violence to spread.
他们认为，这使得冲突或暴力更容易蔓延。
What’s your take on that?
您对此有何看法？
All of this talk of — in this case, I think they talk about segmentary lineages — I’ve never seen it.
所有这些谈论————在这种情况下，我认为他们谈论的是分段血统————我从来没有见过。
It’s one of the things that resonates the least with me.
这是最不引起我共鸣的事情之一。
Any description of African society, African culture, conflict, or politics that relies on this, I have to believe it’s there because so many people have written books.
任何对非洲社会、非洲文化、冲突或政治的描述都依赖于此，我必须相信它的存在，因为有这么多人写过书。
But it doesn’t seem to be a first- or even second-order determinant of what’s going on when I think about the conflicts I know, the politicians I know, and the decisions that get made.
但当我想到我所知道的冲突、我所认识的政客以及所做出的决定时，它似乎并不是正在发生的事情的一阶甚至二阶决定因素。
Could it be a non-African or a Middle Eastern effect?
这可能是非非洲或中东的影响吗？
If a lot of people have married their cousins, then family lineages are maybe tighter, and they also reach further, and there’s an honor culture of some kind?
如果很多人都和表兄弟结婚了，那么家族血统可能会更紧密，而且也更远，还有某种荣誉文化？
My intuition would have said that the more horizontal ties you have to other parts of society, that the more you’re going to internalize some of the costs of conflict.
我的直觉是，你与社会其他部分的横向联系越多，你就越能将冲突的成本内在化。
In some sense, you’re going to be less likely to .
从某种意义上说，你这样做的可能性会降低。
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。
If I weren’t presented with this empirical fact that those things seem to be related to more conflict, I would have actually predicted the opposite.
如果我没有看到这些事情似乎与更多冲突有关的经验事实，我实际上会做出相反的预测。
On northern Ugandan child soldiers
关于乌干达北部儿童兵
Say I’m a child soldier in northern Uganda.
假设我是乌干达北部的一名儿童兵。
What’s worse for me, being abducted or having to fight in a war?
对我来说，什么是更糟糕的，是被绑架还是不得不参加战争？
You’re usually being abducted to fight in a war.
你通常会被绑架去参加战争。
Sure, but which of those two experiences is the one that does me the most harm?
当然，但这两种经历中哪一种对我伤害最大呢？
I think it’s the transition period.
我认为现在是过渡期。
It’s certainly different in every rebel organization.
每个叛乱组织的情况肯定有所不同。
The one I worked with — or studied, actually — was one where it was the transition from abduction to becoming a fighter because the training usually tried to dehumanize and desensitize you into committing violence.
与我一起工作的人——或者说研究过的人，实际上是——从绑架到成为一名战士的过渡，因为训练通常试图使你失去人性，使你对实施暴力失去敏感性。
You were often — not always — you were often asked to commit pretty heinous acts.
你常常被要求做出相当令人发指的行为。
It wasn’t just to desensitize you, that it was to try to convince you that your outside option was really terrible.
这不仅仅是为了让你麻木不仁，而是为了让你相信你的外部选择真的很糟糕。
The idea was to convince you that there’s no way you can go home.
这个想法是为了让你相信你不可能回家。
“We’re going to make you do a set of terrible things right now that will mean that you can never really go back.
“我们现在会让你做一系列可怕的事情，这意味着你永远无法真正回去。
Like it or not, your future is really with us.”
不管你喜欢与否，你的未来确实与我们同在。”
And later on, my earnings will be lower?
以后我的收入会不会更低？
There’s this famous paper on Vietnam veterans in the US where they find that being conscripted into fighting in Vietnam had positive effects on the wages of blacks and negative effects on the wages of whites.
美国有一篇关于越南退伍军人的著名论文，他们发现，应征入伍参加越南战斗对黑人的工资有积极影响，对白人的工资有负面影响。
The reason was, it was really down to, what was your alternative labor market and training experience in the absence of this war?
原因是，这实际上取决于，在没有这场战争的情况下，您的替代劳动力市场和培训经历是什么？
We found something similar in Uganda, something eerily familiar, which is that the women economically weren’t so worse off.
我们在乌干达发现了类似的情况，而且出奇地熟悉，那就是女性的经济状况并没有那么糟糕。
I wouldn’t say they were better off, but they weren’t necessarily affected adversely in an economic sense — they were adversely affected in other ways 5 or 10 or 15 years down the road — while the men were.
我不会说他们的境况更好，但他们不一定会在经济意义上受到不利影响——“5年、10年或15年后，他们会在其他方面受到不利影响”——而男性却受到了影响。
It spoke to just how terrible women’s options were.
它说明了女性的选择是多么糟糕。
Being conscripted and abducted to be a rebel wife, to some degree, wasn’t that different than what your marriage opportunities looked like if there wasn’t a war.
在某种程度上，被征召入伍并被绑架成为叛乱妻子，与没有战争的情况下的婚姻机会并没有什么不同。
For men, it just meant that you were out of the civilian labor market, getting a bunch of skills that had turned out not to be very useful.
对于男性来说，这仅仅意味着你退出了民用劳动力市场，获得了一堆后来证明并没有多大用处的技能。
It was bad for them.
这对他们来说很糟糕。
A different war, a different context, and a different labor market, and that can switch.
不同的战争、不同的背景和不同的劳动力市场，这些都可能发生变化。
How many northern Ugandan child soldiers have you interviewed?
您采访了多少名乌干达北部儿童兵？
A few hundred.
几百个。
At least a couple hundred, maybe more.
至少有几百个，也许更多。
It depends if you count someone who’s involved for a month versus two years.
这取决于你计算的是参与一个月还是两年的人。
Certainly, the long, long-term soldiers who were there for many, many years are few, maybe only a couple dozen.
当然，在那里呆了很多很多年的长期长期的士兵是很少的，也许只有几十个。
Those contacts, those conversations, how have they changed your outlook on life emotionally, intellectually, otherwise?
那些接触、那些谈话，它们如何在情感上、智力上或其他方面改变了你的人生观？
I’d never worked on conflict before I went to northern Uganda.
在去乌干达北部之前，我从未参与过冲突工作。
I followed a woman there who later I would marry.
我跟着一个女人到了那里，后来我嫁给了她。
I followed her because we had this idea for a research project.
我关注她是因为我们有一个研究项目的想法。
I’d been doing some work on children.
我一直在做一些关于儿童的工作。
After that, I could never do normal economic development again.
从此以后，我再也无法进行正常的经济发展了。
I’ve really only worked in violent contexts since then because it seemed so first-order important and just so neglected.
从那时起，我真的只在暴力环境中工作，因为它看起来是如此重要，却又如此被忽视。
I’d never worked on conflict before I went to northern Uganda.
在去乌干达北部之前，我从未参与过冲突工作。
I’d been doing some work on children.
我一直在做一些关于儿童的工作。
After that, I could never do normal economic development again.
从此以后，我再也无法进行正常的经济发展了。
I’ve really only worked in violent contexts since then because it seemed so first-order important and just so neglected.
从那时起，我真的只在暴力环境中工作，因为它看起来是如此重要，却又如此被忽视。
Overall, your take, is it that children — you now see them as more resilient than you used to believe or less?
总的来说，您的看法是，孩子们——您现在认为他们比您以前认为的更有弹性还是更少？
Certainly more.
当然更多。
If you’re a psychologist, you know that people are subjected to horrible things, and most people are incredible resilient.
如果你是一名心理学家，你就会知道人们会遭受可怕的事情，而且大多数人都具有令人难以置信的适应力。
This is a big, stylized fact, but I never knew that before doing this.
这是一个重大的、程式化的事实，但在这样做之前我从来不知道这一点。
You certainly see it firsthand over and over again.
您肯定会一遍又一遍地亲眼目睹它。
So I updated since then.
所以从那时起我就更新了。
I think there’s a lot more nuance.
我认为还有很多细微差别。
I tend to think we’re maybe a bit glib about saying that people are resilient because there’s a lot of pain or problems that don’t necessarily show up in our data but turn out to be really important.
我倾向于认为，我们说人们具有复原力可能有点油腔滑调，因为有很多痛苦或问题不一定会出现在我们的数据中，但事实证明它们非常重要。
The Stockholm syndrome — some people who are kidnapped or abducted start identifying with those who took them.
斯德哥尔摩综合症——一些被绑架的人开始认同绑架他们的人。
How true is this in your experience?
根据您的经验，这有多真实？
It takes work.
这需要工作。
If I look at the example of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, or some of the organizations in Liberia that I know people who are a part of, this really happens when the organization really, really dedicates itself to trying to do that.
如果我看看乌干达的圣主抵抗军的例子，或者我认识的利比里亚的一些组织，当这些组织真正、真正致力于做到这一点时，这种情况就会真正发生。
It works better with children, too.
它对儿童也更有效。
They were quite ingenious.
他们非常巧妙。
The Lord’s Resistance Army spent a lot of mental energy coming up with .
圣主抵抗军花费了大量的精神力才想出来。
.
。
.
。
they had a lot of time to experiment and a lot of people to experiment with, trying to actually indoctrinate, and they were good at it.
他们有很多时间进行实验，也有很多人进行实验，试图真正进行灌输，而且他们很擅长。
On micro violence
论微暴力
There’s now, as you know, a growing literature on what I call micro violence, studying scenes of crowds when a fight starts and using maybe video evidence to figure out why did the fight start?
如你所知，现在有越来越多的关于我所说的微暴力的文献，研究打斗开始时的人群场景，并使用视频证据来找出打斗开始的原因？
I was chatting with Mark Levine, a researcher in this area, not that long ago.
不久前，我正在与该领域的研究员马克·莱文(Mark Levine)聊天。
He told me in his research, it seems to be the case that crowds actually are a force for peace on that.
他在他的研究中告诉我，群众似乎实际上是和平的力量。
That it’s not that the crowd eggs people on, that bystanders try to stop conflicts.
这并不是人群怂恿人们，而是旁观者试图阻止冲突。
They don’t always succeed.
他们并不总是成功。
This, to him, was a kind of revelation, how individual the violent act is.
这对他来说是一种启示，暴力行为是多么个体化。
Your take on that?
你对此有何看法？
It’s interesting.
这很有趣。
I don’t know this.
我不知道这个。
You probably know this literature better than I do.
您可能比我更了解这些文献。
What little I’ve read thinks of those reactions as very individual, instinctive reactions to a threat.
据我所知，这些反应是非常个人化的、对威胁的本能反应。
They invoke the fight-or-flight mechanism.
他们调用战斗或逃跑机制。
I could imagine a set of circumstances where a nonhostile crowd reduces that sense of risk and personal danger.
我可以想象在一系列情况下，无敌意的人群会减少风险感和人身危险。
But I imagine a lot probably depends on the context: what that crowd is doing or who that crowd is, and whether or not you perceive that crowd as part of your in group, your out group, or part of the threat or not.
但我认为很大程度上可能取决于背景：该人群在做什么或该人群是谁，以及您是否将该人群视为您的内群体、外群体或威胁的一部分。
True or false, most humans are bad at violence?
是真是假，大多数人都不擅长暴力？
I think they learn quickly.
我认为他们学得很快。
Probably they’re bad at first.
也许他们一开始就很糟糕。
In the micro evidence on violence, and the more individual-level evidence, and then finally macro evidence — like will there be a civil war?
在关于暴力的微观证据，以及更多个人层面的证据，最后是宏观证据 ——比如会发生内战吗？
— do you think there’s ultimately an overarching theory that ties these all together?
— 你认为最终是否有一个总体理论将这些联系在一起？
Or are they just separate levels of investigation, where you have empirical results, and they stand somewhat separate, and they’ll always be distinct areas?
或者它们只是不同层次的调查，你有实证结果，并且它们在某种程度上是独立的，并且它们总是不同的领域？
How optimistic are you about a grand unified theory of violence?
您对暴力大统一理论有多乐观？
I think these individual, how I react in the moment, fight-or-flight-type mechanisms are quite distinct from the way that small groups or large groups or nations go to war.
我认为这些个人，我当时的反应，战斗或逃跑类型的机制与小团体或大团体或国家发动战争的方式截然不同。
But once you get beyond that to the level of small groups and larger groups and nations, I see a lot of unity in the theory.
但一旦你超越这一点，到达小群体、大群体和国家的层面，我就会看到理论中有很多统一性。
This combination of this more game theoretic view of bargaining, where we see conflict as arising from uncertainty, commitment problems, and melded with a set of more psychological issues around emotions, levels of self versus more social interest, and the mistakes people systematically make.
这种更多的博弈论讨价还价观点的结合，我们认为冲突是由不确定性、承诺问题引起的，并与一系列围绕情绪、自我水平与更多社会利益以及人们系统性犯的错误的更多心理问题融合在一起。
That framework, for me, explains an astonishing amount of violence.
对我来说，这个框架解释了数量惊人的暴力行为。
It continues to explain more phenomena, as I learn about more phenomena, be it drug gangs or urban disorder.
随着我了解更多现象，无论是贩毒团伙还是城市混乱，它继续解释更多现象。
I see it in more and more places, so I’m optimistic.
我在越来越多的地方看到了这一点，所以我很乐观。
This combination of this more game theoretic view of bargaining, where we see conflict as arising from uncertainty, commitment problems, and melded with a set of more psychological issues around emotions, levels of self versus more social interest, and the mistakes people systematically make.
这种更多的博弈论讨价还价观点的结合，我们认为冲突是由不确定性、承诺问题引起的，并与一系列围绕情绪、自我水平与更多社会利益以及人们系统性犯的错误的更多心理问题融合在一起。
That framework, for me, explains an astonishing amount of violence.
对我来说，这个框架解释了数量惊人的暴力行为。
René Girard, as you know, is one of the best-known theorists of violence.
如您所知，雷内·吉拉德是最著名的暴力理论家之一。
One of his hypotheses concerns the use of violence for purposes of ritual sacrifice, which he then traces throughout myths and literature.
他的假设之一涉及使用暴力进行仪式牺牲，然后他在神话和文学中追溯了这一点。
What’s your take on the René Girard worldview?
您对雷内·吉拉德的世界观有何看法？
The only reason I’m aware of the René Girard worldview is because I glanced at the “What should I ask Chris Blattman?” questions.
我了解雷内·吉拉德世界观的唯一原因是因为我浏览了“我应该问克里斯·布拉特曼什么？”问题。
I saw that name, and I thought, “Oh, I don’t know who that is.” My 10 minutes of investigation suggests that I find nothing about this idea resonates with my personal experience in particular wars.
我看到这个名字，我想：“哦，我不知道那是谁。”经过 10 分钟的调查，我发现这个想法与我在特定战争中的个人经历没有任何共鸣。
This is the danger of you also blogging your potential questions.
这就是你在博客中写下你的潜在问题的危险。
I didn’t go study so much that I have a coherent answer, other than to say it didn’t strike me as somebody who had spent a lot of time actually in or with people who commit violence.
我没有进行太多研究，以至于我没有一个连贯的答案，只是说，这并没有让我印象深刻，因为我是一个花了很多时间与实施暴力的人打交道的人。
What do we know about the causes of the Peloponnesian Wars?
我们对伯罗奔尼撒战争的起因了解多少？
This is something that I’m brand new to.
这是我全新的事情。
What you see is, a lot of political scientists like to write articles about grand theories of war, whatever theory that may be.
你看到的是，很多政治科学家喜欢写关于战争的宏大理论的文章，无论是什么理论。
And they like to cite Greek historians talking about things like the grand .
他们喜欢引用希腊历史学家谈论诸如盛大之类的事情。
.
。
.
。
First of all, the Spartans and the Athenians — Hollywood couldn’t imagine two more ideal types to talk about, two more different worldviews.
首先，斯巴达人和雅典人 ——好莱坞无法想象有两种更理想的类型可以谈论，两种更不同的世界观。
Then for them to embark on this war to end all wars for the period.
然后让他们开始这场战争，结束这一时期的所有战争。
People use it to think about something that we think of as bargaining and the commitment problem, which is that massive power shifts can lead to war, partly because it becomes difficult for the temporarily powerful person to be paid off not to exercise their advantage and, through a first strike, eliminate.
人们用它来思考一些我们认为是讨价还价和承诺问题的问题，即大规模的权力转移可能导致战争，部分原因是暂时有权势的人很难得到回报，不行使他们的优势，并通过先发制人的打击将其消灭。
This becomes potentially a model of that, but then no one has ever gone beyond this and actually really tried to see how it works.
这有可能成为其中的一个模型，但没有人超越这一点，并真正尝试看看它是如何工作的。
I’ve been reading it, and I’m more and more persuaded that it’s actually a good example of this, but it’s a little bit more complicated.
我一直在读它，我越来越相信它实际上是一个很好的例子，但它有点复杂。
On new world violence
论新世界暴力
I asked Charles C.
我问查尔斯·C.
Mann this same question: Why are so many parts of the New World, this hemisphere, so relatively violent compared to so many places in Asia — also in Africa, as you know — where you can walk around without any thought of violence whatsoever?
曼也提出了同样的问题：为什么这个半球的新世界的许多地方与亚洲的许多地方相比，暴力程度相对较高——正如你所知，在非洲，你可以到处走动而不会想到任何暴力？
Really, in a pretty significant part of our hemisphere, that’s not the case.
事实上，在我们半球的很大一部分地区，情况并非如此。
Canada, of course, is an exception.
当然，加拿大是一个例外。
Nonetheless, I’m sure you’ve noticed this difference.
尽管如此，我相信您已经注意到了这种差异。
What ultimately is your theory at the macro level?
您在宏观层面上的理论最终是什么？
I think you’re talking about personal security and crime.
我认为你在谈论人身安全和犯罪。
Personal security, crime, kidnapping, someone pulling a knife on me.
人身安全、犯罪、绑架、有人拿刀指着我。
In cities.
在城市。
In cities.
在城市。
A lot of that’s not particularly violent.
其中很多并不是特别暴力。
But murder rates are fairly high in this hemisphere.
但这个半球的谋杀率相当高。
Murder rates are fairly high.
谋杀率相当高。
First, I’m a little skeptical of that.
首先，我对此有点怀疑。
I don’t totally accept this as a stylized fact.
我并不完全接受这是一个程式化的事实。
I think there are other aspects of .
我认为还有其他方面。
.
。
.
。
probably the actual levels of violence in society are mostly going on in the home.
社会上的暴力行为可能主要发生在家庭中。
We’re talking about a very specific subset of violence that has more to do with rogues deciding that they can extract something from a stranger.
我们谈论的是暴力的一个非常具体的子集，它更多地与流氓决定他们可以从陌生人那里获取某些东西有关。
So my instinct is to say that has a lot to do with policing.
所以我的直觉是这与治安有很大关系。
It has a lot to do with the level of policing and the concentration and the dissuasion from a very specific kind of violence.
这与治安水平、集中程度以及对特定类型暴力的劝阻有很大关系。
It still seems odd, there’s this commonality across so many countries.
这看起来仍然很奇怪，很多国家都有这种共性。
Most of the cities where you see some of the highest murder rates — Latin American cities have very few police per capita when you compare them to American cities, and certainly if you compare them to Asian cities.
大多数谋杀率最高的城市 — 当你将拉丁美洲城市与美国城市进行比较时，尤其是与亚洲城市进行比较时，拉丁美洲城市的人均警察数量非常少。
I don’t like to be that crude because I’m actually a little bit of a skeptic of this knee-jerk to policing: “We need more police, and we need more investment in security resources.” But as a first-order approximation, I think that’s a big part of it.
我不喜欢这么粗鲁，因为我实际上对这种下意识的警务有点怀疑：“我们需要更多的警察，我们需要更多的安全资源投资。”但作为一阶近似，我认为这是其中的很大一部分。
You also then have subcultures.
然后你也会有亚文化。
Once you have cities and groups within cities that begin to do this — I’ve seen this in Uganda.
一旦城市和城市内的团体开始这样做 —— 我在乌干达就看到了这种情况。
It used to be that Nairobi was always a very violent place, but people would copy.
内罗毕曾经是一个非常暴力的地方，但人们会效仿。
It became a thing you could do.
这变成了一件你可以做的事情。
They now had a model.
他们现在有了一个模型。
This was a career or a vocation that existed in Nairobi, but it didn’t exist in Kampala, or it didn’t exist in Dar es Salaam.
这是内罗毕存在的职业或职业，但坎帕拉不存在，或者达累斯萨拉姆不存在。
People just didn’t do it.
人们只是没有这样做。
Then, once you had people prove that it could be done and it could be profitable, then you had this relatively small group who professionalize it and do it.
然后，一旦你让人们证明它可以完成并且可以盈利，那么你就会有这个相对较小的团队将其专业化并去做。
And now it becomes a thing, and it’s entrenched.
现在它已经成为一件事，并且根深蒂固。
It’s sort of a multiple equilibria story.
这是一个多重均衡的故事。
I’ve read that murder rates in New York City have fallen by a factor of about 20 from their peak, which was within my lifetime.
我读到，纽约市的谋杀率已从我一生中的峰值下降了约 20 倍。
Do you think the research you’ve done gives us any insight into that, or is that a fully separate phenomenon?
您认为您所做的研究是否让我们对此有任何见解，或者这是一个完全独立的现象？
I think of it as a fully separate phenomenon.
我认为这是一个完全独立的现象。
The stories that people tell when they have data, or when they tell something convincing, just sound very different from the kinds of stories that I’m used to thinking about for the kinds of violence I study.
人们在掌握数据或讲述令人信服的事情时讲述的故事听起来与我习惯于思考的关于我研究的暴力类型的故事截然不同。
Some of the stories that are plausible and have some good evidence, they’re successful efforts to get guns off the street, the police per capita, and then also going back to the old idea of many eyes and many people on the street in more neighborhoods.
有些故事是可信的，有一些充分的证据，它们是成功地让枪支从街上消失，人均警察数量减少，然后又回到了更多社区的街道上有很多眼睛和很多人的旧观念。
None of that really helps me understand civil war violence or recruitment of child soldiers or any of the things that I’ve worked on in the past.
这些都不能真正帮助我理解内战暴力或招募儿童兵或我过去从事的任何事情。
Twenty or thirty years ago, the nation of Colombia was much more violent and dangerous than it seems to be now.
二三十年前，哥伦比亚国家比现在看起来更加暴力和危险。
What has changed there?
那里发生了什么变化？
I know there are superficial answers you could give.
我知道你可以给出一些肤浅的答案。
They’re fighting each other less.
他们互相争斗的次数减少了。
Civil war has wound down.
内战已经结束。
But at the most fundamental level, how would you explain the significant decline in violence?
但从最基本的层面来看，您如何解释暴力事件的显着下降？
I’m still new to Colombia, and I spend most of my time in the cities, thinking about the kind of violence that frankly not even most Colombians think about, and less time thinking about the guerrilla violence and the paramilitary violence.
我对哥伦比亚还是个新手，我大部分时间都在城市里度过，思考坦率地说大多数哥伦比亚人都没有想到的暴力，而很少花时间思考游击队暴力和准军事暴力。
There was actually a relatively short period where the violence was very intense.
实际上有一个相对较短的时期，暴力事件非常激烈。
You had a relatively well-organized guerrilla group, the FARC, mount a credible assault on the state with a reasonable belief that they were going to win and maybe take over, and a state that was slow to respond.
哥伦比亚革命武装力量（FARC）是一个组织相对良好的游击队，他们有理由相信他们会获胜并可能接管国家，对国家发起可信的攻击，而国家却反应迟缓。
Eventually, under this existential threat, actually pulled it together, with some US support, and managed to counterattack, and managed to effectively defeat this force, or get it close enough to push them to the bargaining table.
最终，在这种生存威胁下，在美国的一些支持下，实际上将其团结起来，并成功反击，并成功有效地击败了这股力量，或者使其足够接近，将他们推到谈判桌上。
But it seems more deeply rooted in their history.
但它似乎更深深地植根于他们的历史中。
There’s a period starting in 1948 where 300,000 people die by La Violencia in Colombian history.
从 1948 年开始，哥伦比亚历史上曾有过 30 万人死于暴力事件的时期。
Nineteenth century, maybe we don’t have numbers.
十九世纪，也许我们没有数字。
But it has a reputation for being a violent place.
但它因暴力而闻名。
I’m trying to draw a distinction between a situation where you have a lot of relatively low-level persistent violence that might have to go with an insurgency like that in Colombia, but you could have said the same thing about northern Uganda.
我试图区分以下情况：存在大量相对低水平的持续暴力，可能与哥伦比亚这样的叛乱活动有关，但对于乌干达北部，你也可以说同样的事情。
It’s not actually that violent in the large scheme of things.
从整体上看，这实际上并没有那么暴力。
Draw a distinction between that and the much more high-death, high-intensity, much more violent conventional war that was fought for a period of time.
将这场战争与一段时间内发生的死亡人数更高、强度更高、暴力程度更高的常规战争区分开来。
Those aren’t distinct phenomena.
这些并不是独特的现象。
One existed as a precursor to the other, though it didn’t have to.
一个是作为另一个的先驱而存在的，尽管它不是必须的。
So I think of them distinctly in that case.
所以在这种情况下我会清楚地想到它们。
Medellin is a city I’ve spent a lot of time in.
麦德林是一个我待了很长时间的城市。
I don’t know that this is true, but in my head, the analogy is that in Medellin you had these elites.
我不知道这是真的，但在我看来，类比是在麦德林有这些精英。
You had the Colombians and the city at the bottom of the valley with a very nice city.
哥伦比亚人和山谷底部的城市都是一座非常漂亮的城市。
It was the industrial center.
那是工业中心。
And as people started to flood in from the countryside into the periphery of the city, and they built up these slums on the sides of the mountain slopes.
随着人们开始从农村涌入城市边缘，他们在山坡两侧建立了这些贫民窟。
The state essentially decided not to govern.
国家基本上决定不进行治理。
In the absence of any kind of government, in the absence of public services, those communities started to govern themselves, and often that meant criminal groups.
在没有任何政府、没有公共服务的情况下，这些社区开始自我管理，这往往意味着犯罪集团的出现。
It could have been paramilitaries or guerillas.
可能是准军事部队或游击队。
Eventually, it’s street gangs and mafias grow up.
最终，街头帮派和黑手党成长起来。
They provide order, and they provide certain services, and there’s a lot of violence.
他们提供秩序，提供某些服务，但也有很多暴力。
Eventually, the elite wakes up and realizes that this is an existential threat and has to fight it.
最终，精英们醒悟过来，意识到这是一个生存威胁，必须与之抗争。
That, in a microcosm, feels like the last hundred years of Colombian history, where you had elites in the cities essentially allowing the periphery to sort of be quasi-governed by fairly violent actors, and not being particularly concerned about it until it got so bad that it threatened them in their cities, and then they got serious about it and were fortunate to be able to eradicate it to some degree.
从一个缩影来看，这感觉就像哥伦比亚历史的最后一百年，城市中的精英基本上允许外围地区受到相当暴力的行为者的准统治，并且并不特别关心它，直到它变得如此严重，威胁到他们所在城市的他们，然后他们认真对待它，并幸运地能够在某种程度上根除它。
You have a recent paper where you suggest that people being exposed to violence can make them in the longer run more cooperative because they’re somehow scarred or scared by the violence, and they want to set things right.
您最近发表了一篇论文，其中指出，从长远来看，遭受暴力的人们可以使他们更加合作，因为他们在某种程度上因暴力而受到伤害或害怕，并且他们想要纠正事情。
They cooperate more.
他们合作更多。
Do you think, in general, there’s reversion to the mean when it comes to violence, and thus we should be optimistic about Honduras, El Salvador, and other places, and Colombia fits into that bigger story?
您是否认为，总的来说，暴力事件会回归平均水平，因此我们应该对洪都拉斯、萨尔瓦多和其他地方持乐观态度，而哥伦比亚也适合这个更大的故事？
Or no?
或者没有？
Exposure to a violent act for some reason .
由于某种原因遭受暴力行为。
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I think one reason might be a psychological reevaluation.
我认为原因之一可能是心理上的重新评估。
It might be a set of interactions you have with people within your group that are cooperative, and that reinforces future cooperative behavior.
这可能是你与团队中的人进行的一系列合作互动，并强化了未来的合作行为。
I think the evidence suggests — we don’t know the evidence suggests — that you’re much more cooperative with your in group, people who are like you.
我认为证据表明——“我们不知道证据表明——”你与你所在的群体、与你相似的人更加合作。
We have less evidence on cooperation with your out group, but the little we have suggests that you’re potentially less cooperative with your out group.
我们与你的外部团体合作的证据较少，但我们所掌握的少量证据表明，你与外部团体的合作可能较少。
So if you’re talking about community government in a city or decisions that you have to make with people in your region, maybe you’re slightly more pro-social, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you’re more peaceful overall.
因此，如果你谈论的是一个城市的社区政府或你必须与你所在地区的人们做出的决定，也许你会稍微更亲社会，但这并不一定意味着你总体上更和平。
If you’re, on net, less pro-social at a larger political entity, where you’ve got to interact with other groups, it’s not clear that there’s reversion to any mean there.
如果你在网上，在一个更大的政治实体中不那么亲社会，在那里你必须与其他群体互动，那么不清楚那里是否会回归任何平均值。
Is it possible that the fading of the memories of World War II, and also World War I, are a reason why previous levels of international cooperation can no longer be sustained, that reversion to the mean is kicking in again, but now against us?
第二次世界大战和第一次世界大战的记忆的淡化是否有可能是以前国际合作水平不再能够维持的一个原因，这种回归平均的现象再次出现，但现在对我们不利？
And thus, we’re headed to a G-Zero world, and the World Bank, the IMF, international order, as we knew it will become progressively weaker because of this mechanism?
因此，我们正在走向一个G-零世界，而世界银行、国际货币基金组织、国际秩序，正如我们所知，它会因为这种机制而逐渐变得脆弱？
This mechanism that we are reverting to the mean and away from .
我们正在恢复并远离这种机制。
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We’re not scared anymore.
我们不再害怕了。
We’re not scared anymore.
我们不再害怕了。
The Nazis come, Stalin.
纳粹来了，斯大林。
We do wonderful, heroic things.
我们做着精彩、英雄的事情。
We cooperate with the British, the French, even the Soviets, actually with Stalin, and then that sticks for a while.
我们与英国、法国、甚至苏联合作，实际上是与斯大林合作，然后这种情况会持续一段时间。
We’re all committed to the UN, the World Bank, the IMF.
我们都致力于联合国、世界银行、国际货币基金组织。
But now, my goodness, things have been so good for so long and pretty peaceful; those are all going to decay.
但现在，我的天哪，这么长时间以来一切都这么好，而且非常平静；这些都会腐烂。
The richer we are, which we’re much richer, and the more costly war is, and war is now much more costly — I think those stronger .
我们越富有，我们越富有，战争的代价就越高，而战争现在的代价要高得多 —— 我认为那些更强大的人……。
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the incentive we have not to have war.
我们没有战争的动机。
It makes it much less likely.
这使得这种情况的可能性大大降低。
If war happens, then it’s going to be that much more catastrophic, which is maybe a pattern we’ve seen over the past century.
如果发生战争，那么灾难性将会更大，这可能是我们在过去一个世纪中看到的模式。
But it comes back to this calculus of not feeling like there’s some equilibrium level of violence that just happens because violence happens, but that this is something that is often strenuously avoided because it just pulls people so far back.
但这又回到了这种计算，即感觉不会因为暴力的发生而产生某种均衡的暴力水平，但这种情况经常被极力避免，因为它只会把人们拉得很远。
On Botswana’s growth miracle
博茨瓦纳的增长奇迹
Back to economic development.
回到经济发展。
What, in your view, is the most underrated national development story that people should pay more attention to?
在您看来，人们应该更多关注、最被低估的国家发展故事是什么？
Which country or region?
哪个国家或地区？
Including me, Botswana, in the sense that this is the growth miracle of the late 20th century.
包括我，博茨瓦纳，从某种意义上说，这是20世纪末的增长奇迹。
There’s a few explanations, but there’s really only a handful of people who’ve paid any attention to what happened there.
有一些解释，但实际上只有少数人关注那里发生的事情。
There’s a few pat stories that say, “Well, they idiosyncratically established a parliamentary government before they discovered their diamonds and, through some magical set of circumstances, maintained this good governance.
有一些有趣的故事说：“嗯，他们在发现钻石之前就建立了一个特殊的议会政府，并通过一些神奇的环境维持了这种良好的治理。
And the diamonds fed growth and prosperity.”
钻石促进了增长和繁荣。”
But that doesn’t seem very persuasive.
但这似乎不太有说服力。
There’s another story that’s waiting to be told, and I don’t know the answer to it.
还有一个故事有待讲述，但我不知道答案。
Many people say that, for numerous parts of Africa, national borders are a problem, that they don’t correspond to ethnic groups or tribes in the right way.
许多人说，对于非洲的许多地区来说，国界是一个问题，它们与民族或部落的关系不正确。
If you look at the data, as I think Jeffrey Herbst just pointed out, among others, there are quite a few fairly small countries — Lesotho, Gambia, Guinea, Sao Tome.
如果你看一下数据，正如我认为杰弗里·赫布斯特刚才指出的那样，除其他外，还有很多相当小的国家——莱索托、冈比亚、几内亚、圣多美。
They’re not actually doing that well.
他们实际上做得并不好。
It’s not clear they’re doing better than the big countries.
目前尚不清楚他们是否比大国做得更好。
Does this refute the misdrawn borders story, or do you still think there’s something to that?
这是否反驳了错误绘制的边界故事，或者您仍然认为其中有什么道理？
Going back to this question you had earlier about why was there so much instability in the years after the war, I think a set of misdrawn borders and trying to find a political equilibrium where all of these groups have to live together is one source of that political shock and instability.
回到你之前提出的问题，即为什么战后几年会出现如此多的不稳定，我认为一系列错误划定的边界以及试图找到所有这些群体必须共同生活的政治平衡是政治冲击和不稳定的根源之一。
That said — and maybe I’m not understanding your question correctly — but I think that a lot of countries have been very successful at building national identities in a short period of time.
也就是说，“也许我没有正确理解你的问题”，但我认为很多国家在短时间内建立国家认同方面都非常成功。
Jeffrey Herbst is very fond of the idea that Rwanda, which is a very strong state and can exercise and project its power into the eastern Congo — maybe we should experiment .
杰弗里·赫布斯特非常喜欢这样的想法：卢旺达是一个非常强大的国家，可以在刚果东部行使和投射其力量——也许我们应该进行试验。
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I don’t know if he’d advocate this now, but 10 years ago, he thought this was a useful idea to propose, that maybe Rwanda should be governing eastern Congo.
我不知道他现在是否会提倡这一点，但十年前，他认为这是一个有用的想法，也许卢旺达应该管理刚果东部。
At the same time, I’m not sure there are many places in sub-Saharan Africa where you would go to a peripheral place and you would find a stronger national identity than eastern Congo, where they really think of themselves as Congolese.
与此同时，我不确定在撒哈拉以南非洲是否有很多地方，你去到一个边缘地区，你会发现比刚果东部更强烈的民族认同，在那里他们真的认为自己是刚果人。
There’s a bit of a paradox here.
这里有一点悖论。
The national identity project has been very successful in a pretty short period of time in a lot of these countries, which makes me think that these borders are no longer so unnatural as they were, say, in 1950 or ’60.
国家认同项目在相当短的时间内在许多国家取得了非常成功，这让我认为这些边界不再像 1950 年或 60 年代那样不自然。
There’s a much longer historical continuity of the state in Ethiopia than in almost any other part, maybe any other part, of Africa.
埃塞俄比亚国家的历史连续性比几乎任何其他地区（也许是非洲任何其他地区）都要长得多。
How much does this help Ethiopian development?
这对埃塞俄比亚的发展有多大帮助？
And does this make you more bullish on Ethiopia than most other parts of Africa economically?
这是否让您在经济上比非洲大多数其他地区更看好埃塞俄比亚？
It helps a lot, and it makes me much bullish.
这很有帮助，也让我更加乐观。
How does it help?
它有什么帮助？
If I had to pick one variable for a cross-country analysis — it’s interesting that nobody really does this cross-country analysis — but if you asked me, like I get to make just one bet, and to go back in 1800 or something — one bet about where you’re going to see development, I’d probably pick historical levels of state capacity.
如果我必须选择一个变量进行跨国分析 ——有趣的是，没有人真正进行这种跨国分析 ——但是如果你问我，就像我只做一个赌注，然后回到 1800 年或什么时候 ——关于你将在哪里看到发展的赌注，我可能会选择国家能力的历史水平。
First, my personal experience, whether it’s the little regression I get to run by working in places as diverse as Liberia and Uganda, in Ethiopia and Colombia, that correlation is more apparent than any other correlation.
首先，我个人的经验，无论是我在利比里亚和乌干达、埃塞俄比亚和哥伦比亚等不同地方工作所带来的小回归，这种相关性比任何其他相关性都更加明显。
Why do I think it’s there?
为什么我认为它在那里？
I think it’s there because partly it’s a proxy for a general level of social organization that we, as a society, have figured out a way to solve certain collective action problems, that we’ve figured out a way to make certain types of collective decisions in a way that does not have to devolve into conflict.
我认为它之所以存在，部分原因是它代表了社会组织的一般水平，我们作为一个社会，已经找到了解决某些集体行动问题的方法，我们已经找到了一种以不必陷入冲突的方式做出某些类型的集体决策的方法。
And as a result, we’re able to, on some sense, do everything more effectively — it’s like a general-purpose technology.
因此，从某种意义上说，我们能够更有效地完成所有事情 ——它就像一种通用技术。
Where else in Africa would you be especially bullish about, given what you just said?
鉴于您刚才所说的话，您对非洲还有哪些地方特别看好？
You can look at Rwanda, and you can see one of the most long-standing and coherent kingdoms that its borders happen to match.
你可以看看卢旺达，你可以看到最悠久、最连贯的王国之一，它的边界恰好匹配。
Its borders today are somewhat close.
今天它的边界有些接近。
Part of Uganda’s success has been .
乌干达成功的部分原因是。
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even though it’s a collection.
尽管它是一个集合。
It’s many other things, but it includes a collection of these historical kingdoms that also had a continuous existence up until the colonial period.
还有很多其他的东西，但它包括这些历史王国的集合，这些王国在殖民时期之前也一直持续存在。
Part of its reasonably effective state is a fact of that.
其相当有效的状态的一部分就是这个事实。
I’m not sure how Uganda, or Rwanda for that matter, will manage their next political transitions.
我不确定乌干达或卢旺达将如何管理下一次政治过渡。
That, to me, is maybe the biggest difference between them and Ethiopia, is they don’t have political parties or political systems to manage these difficult political transitions, so they could fall apart.
对我来说，这可能是他们与埃塞俄比亚之间最大的区别，就是他们没有政党或政治体系来管理这些困难的政治过渡，因此他们可能会崩溃。
But if they manage those transitions, I’m very bullish.
但如果他们能够实现这些转变，我非常看好。
Former American slaves, as you know, settled Liberia in the 19th century with quite a utopian vision of what a wonderful place it will be.
如您所知，前美国奴隶在 19 世纪定居利比里亚，他们对利比里亚抱有一种乌托邦式的愿景，认为这里将是一个多么美妙的地方。
That experiment seems to go badly.
那个实验似乎进展得很糟糕。
What’s your account as to the fundamentals, as to why the evolution of Liberia as a modern nation-state failed?
对于利比里亚作为一个现代民族国家的演变为何失败的根本原因，您有何看法？
Well, until the mid-1970s, it was an experiment that was going pretty well.
直到 20 世纪 70 年代中期，这项实验进展顺利。
It tended to be wealthier and better off and on a slightly healthier trajectory than other parts of Africa, not dramatically so.
与非洲其他地区相比，它往往更富裕、更富裕，而且发展轨迹略为健康，但情况并非如此。
Let’s say compared to Sri Lanka, Ceylon, or the Philippines.
比方说与斯里兰卡、锡兰或菲律宾相比。
It’s not obvious it was going that well.
事情进展得那么顺利并不明显。
Aha.
啊哈。
No, I was thinking relative to other sub-Saharan African countries.
不，我是在考虑相对于其他撒哈拉以南非洲国家的情况。
If we just use the state and the strength and cohesion of society as an example, you’re comparing a place that had absolutely no central organization or coherency as a region to places that had hundreds of years of a civil service and incredibly developed social structures and integration with global markets.
如果我们只用国家以及社会的力量和凝聚力作为例子，你就会将一个完全没有中央组织或作为一个地区的一致性的地方与拥有数百年公务员制度和极其发达的社会结构以及与全球市场融合的地方进行比较。
Not to underplay the general integration or state development in Africa, but if you had to put your finger on a point on the continent where all of those things were least together, you could do worse than put your finger on Liberia in 1821 or whenever they first landed the ships.
并不是要低估非洲的整体一体化或国家发展，但如果你必须把矛头指向这片大陆上所有这些事情最不统一的地方，你可能会比 1821 年的利比里亚或他们第一次登陆船只时的矛头更糟糕。
I think it was just a very naive development project about what could be transferred and built in that kind of environment.
我认为这只是一个非常幼稚的开发项目，关于在那种环境中可以转移和构建什么。
On things under- and overrated
关于被低估和高估的事情
As you may know, in all of these conversations, there’s a segment in the middle, overrated versus underrated.
如您所知，在所有这些对话中，中间有一个部分，即被高估和被低估。
I’ll toss out a few candidates.
我会淘汰一些候选人。
Of course, feel free to pass.
当然，随意通过。
Religion as a development force.
宗教作为发展力量。
Overrated or underrated?
被高估还是被低估？
Probably overrated.
可能被高估了。
I don’t think of it as having any real strong predictive or explanatory power for long-run differences in income.
我不认为它对收入的长期差异有任何真正强大的预测或解释能力。
So if a region in Nigeria becomes either Christian or Muslim, you don’t feel that changes the long-run forecast of per capita income?
因此，如果尼日利亚的一个地区成为基督教徒或穆斯林，你不认为这会改变人均收入的长期预测吗？
I don’t have a strong prior for the direction of that effect.
对于这种效果的方向，我没有很强的先验知识。
Fair trade coffee.
公平贸易咖啡。
Probably overrated, but I don’t really have a very strong opinion of fair trade coffee.
可能被高估了，但我对公平贸易咖啡并没有非常强烈的看法。
It strikes me as one of these things that is more of a marketing device than really an effective and large-scale strategy for improving the welfare of people.
在我看来，它更像是一种营销手段，而不是真正改善人们福利的有效和大规模战略。
The Canadian political system.
加拿大的政治制度。
Overrated.
被高估了。
In terms of the way the political institutions are set up, it strikes me as one of the most centralized in terms of power-advanced democracies.
就政治机构的建立方式而言，我认为它是权力发达的民主国家中最集权的国家之一。
The Senate, the upper house, is almost a rubber stamp, is relatively powerless.
参议院，即上议院，几乎是橡皮图章，相对无能为力。
Not entirely, but it’s unelected.
不完全是，但它不是选举产生的。
You have a prime minister who rules the lower house, and if he has a majority, essentially everybody needs to toe the line.
你有一位统治下议院的总理，如果他拥有多数席位，那么基本上每个人都需要遵守规则。
But say you have a very open economy.
但假设你有一个非常开放的经济。
Don’t you want more centralization because the openness of your country is itself the extra check and balance?
难道你们不想要更多的集权吗，因为你们国家的开放本身就是额外的制衡？
New Zealand is pretty centralized.
新西兰是相当集中的。
They’re quite an open economy.
他们是一个相当开放的经济体。
The US, of course, is not so open, and we need all of these layers of nonsense.
当然，美国没有那么开放，我们需要所有这些层层废话。
For me, the check and balance there that probably makes this work isn’t the openness.
对我来说，使这项工作成功的制衡因素可能不是开放性。
It’s the fact that there’re extremely strong informal social norms that govern what the government can and can’t do.
事实上，存在极其强大的非正式社会规范来规定政府能做什么和不能做什么。
This extremely centralized powerful political figure, the prime minister, or his cabinet, is very constrained by the larger populace, who have shown an ability to completely wipe out an entire party, if necessary, and within one election cycle if they really overstep.
这位极其集权的强大政治人物，总理或其内阁，受到广大民众的很大限制，民众已经表现出有能力在必要时彻底消灭整个政党，如果他们真的越界的话，可以在一个选举周期内彻底消灭整个政党。
That’s this magical, elusive, ill-defined thing that is protecting it.
正是这个神奇的、难以捉摸的、不明确的东西在保护着它。
Overrated or underrated?
被高估还是被低估？
United Nations peacekeeping.
联合国维和行动。
I’d say underrated.
我想说被低估了。
A lot of people are either cynical about United Nations peacekeeping and its effectiveness or just genuinely unsure.
许多人要么对联合国维和行动及其有效性持怀疑态度，要么只是真的不确定。
And then you have certain incidents like what’s gone on in Haiti with the spread of .
然后还有某些事件，比如随着新冠病毒的传播在海地发生的事情。
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Now I’m forgetting the disease.
现在我已经忘记了这个病。
Cholera.
霍乱。
Cholera, that have tarnished the name, and a lot of accurate assessments of the impact on the local sex work trade and women in places where there’s a lot of peacekeepers.
霍乱玷污了这个名字，以及对当地性工作贸易和有大量维和人员的地方的妇女的影响的许多准确评估。
These are all problems, but if you look at the data, they’re overwhelmingly effective.
这些都是问题，但如果你看一下数据，就会发现它们非常有效。
And if I had to say the one thing that really made me a stronger believer in this whole bargaining approach to conflict and the kinds of problems that actually lead violence to break out, the peacekeepers .
如果我不得不说一件事真正让我更加相信这一整个讨价还价的方式来解决冲突和实际导致暴力爆发的问题，那就是维和人员。
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In some sense, the everyday job of a peacekeeper is to solve all of these problems.
从某种意义上说，维和人员的日常工作就是解决所有这些问题。
It’s to create commitment.
这是为了创造承诺。
It’s to reduce uncertainty.
是为了减少不确定性。
It’s to temper emotions.
是为了调节情绪。
And they do that very well.
他们在这方面做得很好。
I’ve seen it.
我见过。
I was in a northern town in Liberia trying to do work.
我在利比里亚北部的一个小镇试图工作。
And a murder of a girl in one little village led to Christian and Muslim hostilities in that village, which turned into Christian-Muslim riots in the entire district, to the point where we were holed up in a hotel.
在一个小村庄里，一名女孩被谋杀，引发了该村里基督徒和穆斯林的敌对行动，进而演变成整个地区的基督徒和穆斯林骚乱，以至于我们躲在一家旅馆里。
And the building down the street, which is where the vice president’s giving a talk, is being stoned by an angry mob.
副总统发表演讲的沿街大楼正遭到愤怒的暴民投掷石块。
A Pakistani battalion, which for some reason took an extra 24 hours to act, but nonetheless came in and made that all go away within about three or four hours.
一个巴基斯坦营由于某种原因额外花了 24 小时才采取行动，但尽管如此，他们还是赶来了，并在大约三四个小时内让这一切都消失了。
The ability to do that over and over again — there’s a hundred stories like that in Liberia.
能够一次又一次地做到这一点——在利比里亚有一百个这样的故事。
We wouldn’t have peace there if it weren’t for those forces right now.
如果现在没有这些力量，我们就不会有和平。
Battlestar Galactica.
太空堡垒卡拉狄加。
I guess underrated by anybody who hasn’t watched it.
我想没看过的人都会低估它。
What have we learned about violent conflict from that show?
我们从该节目中了解到有关暴力冲突的哪些信息？
What I liked about it the most, actually, was less about what we learned about violent conflict than what we learned about authoritarian politics, mostly the fact that it got the average American reader to get on board with election stealing and terrorist violence by putting them in the position of either the elite or the subjugated group.
事实上，我最喜欢这本书的并不是我们对暴力冲突的了解，而是我们对威权政治的了解，主要是它让普通美国读者通过将他们置于精英或被征服群体的地位来参与窃取选举和恐怖主义暴力的行为。
It depended on the season in terms of what they were willing to do, what sort of violent and nondemocratic acts they were willing to do to achieve their political objectives.
他们愿意做什么，愿意采取什么样的暴力和非民主行为来实现他们的政治目标，这取决于季节。
The standing desk, over- or underrated?
站立式办公桌，被高估还是低估？
Overrated by people who have standing desks and underrated by everyone else.
被拥有站立式办公桌的人高估，而被其他人低估。
Do you still do it?
你还这样做吗？
I do both.
我两者都做。
Sometimes I sit, sometimes I stand.
有时我坐着，有时我站着。
I probably would like to stand more than I do, but I don’t always sleep as well as I once did because of my children, so that I sit more often right now.
我可能比以前更愿意站着，但因为我的孩子，我的睡眠质量并不像以前那么好，所以我现在更多地坐着。
Let’s say that I’m coming to you, and I’m a seasoned traveler.
假设我要来找你，而且我是一位经验丰富的旅行者。
I’ve been to a lot of countries, but let’s say that I’ve never been to Africa before, and you’re giving me your two-, three-minute pitch on how to think about where to go in Africa, and how to do it.
我去过很多国家，但假设我以前从未去过非洲，而你却给了我两三分钟的演讲，告诉我如何思考去非洲去哪里以及如何去做。
What’s your take?
你怎么看？
If you can go and spend a long period of time, like a couple of months, which most people can’t, then I think trying to find an excuse to live in a village is an incredible experience.
如果你可以去花很长一段时间，比如几个月，而大多数人做不到，那么我认为试图找到一个住在村庄的借口是一种令人难以置信的经历。
There’s more ways to do that than you’d think, than just voluntourism.
做到这一点的方法比你想象的要多，而不仅仅是志愿服务。
Barring that, I would say .
除此之外，我会说。
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How long do we have?
我们还有多久？
Do we have a week or two weeks?
我们有一周还是两周的时间？
Two or three weeks.
两三周。
Next trip, maybe there’ll be more if you give me good advice.
下次旅行，如果你给我好的建议，也许会有更多。
Exactly.
确切地。
I would say I would spend one week in Kenya and Tanzania seeing a mix of the large popular and small never-visited wildlife parks, partly because they’re amazingly well run, and they deserve to be rewarded with tourist dollars, but also because they’re incredible experiences.
我想说，我会花一周的时间在肯尼亚和坦桑尼亚参观各种大型的受欢迎的和小型的从未去过的野生动物园，部分原因是它们经营得非常好，值得游客花钱奖励，但也因为它们是令人难以置信的体验。
But I wouldn’t spend more than a few days on that.
但我不会花超过几天的时间。
Then I would probably send someone to see the thing I haven’t seen.
然后我可能会派人去看我没见过的东西。
In spite of working in Ethiopia for many years, I never went and properly saw this 800-year-old state, as you’ve noticed.
正如你所注意到的，尽管我在埃塞俄比亚工作了很多年，但我从未真正去过这个有 800 年历史的国家。
But seeing a state and its architecture and a culture that you’ve probably never thought about before and seeing that firsthand is not only spectacular, but I think you change some of your priors.
但是，亲眼目睹一个你以前可能从未想过的国家及其建筑和文化，不仅令人惊叹，而且我认为你会改变你的一些先验知识。
On factory jobs in Ethiopia
关于埃塞俄比亚的工厂工作
Ethiopia.
埃塞俄比亚。
You have a famous paper on sweatshop jobs in Ethiopia, and one thing you found, I believe, is how often people quit these jobs, or they become unhappy with the jobs.
你有一篇关于埃塞俄比亚血汗工厂工作的著名论文，我相信你发现的一件事是人们辞掉这些工作的频率，或者他们对这些工作不满意。
Why are they unhappy with the jobs?
为什么他们对工作不满意？
When I first started studying these jobs, I thought they were jobs that were a little bit like winning the lottery.
当我第一次开始研究这些工作时，我认为它们是有点像中彩票的工作。
I thought you got paid more than your alternatives, as miserable as that pay might be.
我以为你的薪水比其他人高，尽管薪水可能很悲惨。
More importantly, I thought you got full employment more naturally than your alternatives, and I thought that there was upward trajectory.
更重要的是，我认为你比其他人更自然地获得充分就业，而且我认为还有上升的轨迹。
Maybe that was the most part, that it would lead you on this virtuous path towards more productive work and better pay.
也许这才是最重要的，它会引导你走上这条良性道路，实现更有成效的工作和更高的薪酬。
Instead, I think they turned out to be more like McDonald’s or Walmart jobs.
相反，我认为它们更像是麦当劳或沃尔玛的工作。
Why does anyone take them at all, then?
那么为什么有人要拿它们呢？
A large number of people in Ethiopia were taking these jobs.
埃塞俄比亚有很多人正在从事这些工作。
The factory jobs were their social safety net.
工厂的工作是他们的社会安全网。
They were able to make more money doing their own business or working for a firm or working even in temporary wage labor, but all of these things were risky and volatile.
他们能够通过自己的生意或为公司工作或什至从事临时工资劳动赚更多的钱，但所有这些事情都是有风险和不稳定的。
So when that business went south, when the wage labor temporarily went away, with those three months of your life, you’d go work for the factory if you happen to need cash.
因此，当生意失败时，当雇佣劳动暂时消失时，在你生命的这三个月里，如果你碰巧需要现金，你就会去工厂工作。
Then you would go, and you would be looking for something better, and you would find it, and after a few months, you would leave.
然后你就会离开，你会寻找更好的东西，你会找到它，几个月后，你就会离开。
This was the social safety net — it was working in factories.
这就是社会安全网——它在工厂发挥作用。
The fieldwork I once did in Mexico, I also found that most people didn’t want these jobs.
我曾经在墨西哥做过实地调查，我也发现大多数人不想要这些工作。
Two factors I found that drove some people to take them.
我发现有两个因素促使一些人服用它们。
The first was just extreme boredom with rural life.
第一个就是对乡村生活极度厌倦。
The other was women being quite unhappy with all of their options where they were — in some cases, possibly even being hit or abused and just wanting a way out.
另一个是女性对她们所处的所有选择都非常不满意——在某些情况下，甚至可能受到殴打或虐待，只是想要一条出路。
This was one possible ticket.
这是一张可能的票。
Are those possible motives for Ethiopians?
这些是埃塞俄比亚人可能的动机吗？
Those were possible motives.
这些都是可能的动机。
I wouldn’t say they were the most common motives in this group.
我不会说它们是这个群体中最常见的动机。
Most of these firms weren’t in really rural areas.
这些公司大多数并不位于真正的农村地区。
A lot of the women — it was 80 percent women in our sample — had a lot of other options.
很多女性——“我们样本中 80% 的女性”——都有很多其他选择。
The thing I updated on most of all was the high quality of people’s options.
我更新的最重要的是人们的选择的高质量。
I had a very low opinion of their options.
我对他们的选择评价很低。
The thing that I learned as a result of this was mostly that the options for these young women were much better than I expected.
我从中学到的主要是这些年轻女性的选择比我预期的要好得多。
In a lot of typical economic development stories, you industrialize, there’s manufacturing, then you export, and there’s some kind of virtuous cycle, maybe with increasing returns.
在许多典型的经济发展故事中，工业化，制造业，然后出口，存在某种良性循环，也许回报递增。
If an Ethiopian takes a factory job — though many of them won’t like it, as you say — do you think the social return to that decision is higher than the private return, or the other way around?
如果一个埃塞俄比亚人接受了一份工厂工作 ——正如你所说，尽管他们中的许多人不喜欢它 ——你认为这一决定的社会回报高于私人回报，还是反之亦然？
At their level of industrialization, I don’t think it matters very much.
以他们的工业化水平，我认为这不是很重要。
I would say that .
我会这么说。
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It’s because you don’t buy into the virtuous cycle theory?
是因为你不相信良性循环理论？
You don’t think there are increasing returns?
你不认为收益递增吗？
Something else?
还有别的事吗？
At this point, it’s really quite a minor sector, and the missing ingredient that’s leading to any .
在这一点上，它确实是一个相当小的部分，也是导致任何 .
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Let’s suppose there are increasing returns to the existence of this sector.
假设这个行业的存在存在着递增的回报。
The mystery factor that needs to be there to make them successful has almost nothing to do with the availability of labor.
让他们成功所需的神秘因素几乎与劳动力的可用性无关。
I’d say it’s actually the availability of management talent, the availability of high-quality financial services.
我想说，其实就是管理人才、优质金融服务。
Things that you need to buy and split and merge and grow businesses, like banking and accounting, these are binding constraints on industrial development.
你需要购买、分拆、合并和发展企业的东西，比如银行和会计，这些都是对工业发展的约束。
Going to Ethiopia to be an investment banker or an accountant would probably be a far more individual development strategy than sending somebody cash transfers.
去埃塞俄比亚成为一名投资银行家或会计师可能比向某人汇款更适合个人发展策略。
On premature deindustrialization
论过早的去工业化
This idea of premature deindustrialization, the notion that because of automation, manufacturing now creates so few jobs that many parts of Africa perhaps can never build a middle class — because they could have factories maybe, but it would be done by machines, and there’s no wage-differential reason for pulling your factory out of China, bringing it to Africa the way, maybe, there had been in the past.
这种过早去工业化的想法，即由于自动化，制造业现在创造的就业机会如此之少，以至于非洲许多地区可能永远无法建立中产阶级——因为他们也许可以拥有工厂，但这是由机器完成的，并且没有工资差异的理由将你的工厂撤出中国，以过去的方式将其带到非洲。
What do you think of that?
你对此有何看法？
Are we seeing premature deindustrialization .
我们是否会看到过早的去工业化？
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How many industrial workers are there in China, maybe 50 million or something?
中国有多少产业工人，也许5000万左右？
Data in China seem to be bad, but you look at Brazil, India, South Africa — they seem to have declining shares of manufacturing employment before they’re really fully developed nations the way Denmark, US, and Germany are.
中国的数据似乎很糟糕，但你看看巴西、印度、南非——他们在像丹麦、美国和德国那样真正成为发达国家之前，制造业就业比例似乎在下降。
You know, I come from Canada.
你知道，我来自加拿大。
If I cut up Canada into 20 independent parts, I would find 18 prematurely deindustrialized places, I think.
我想，如果我把加拿大分成 20 个独立的部分，我会发现 18 个过早去工业化的地方。
Then I would find a couple of places, like southern Ontario, where you have a lot of industrial development.
然后我会找到几个地方，比如安大略省南部，那里有很多工业发展。
So I don’t think the fate of every nation in Africa is to — absent premature deindustrialization, supposing it exists — actually be highly industrialized.
因此，我认为非洲每个国家的命运并不是“不存在过早的去工业化，假设它存在”——实际上是高度工业化的。
I can see a lot of Africa ending up like Newfoundland and irrespective of any of these forces that .
我可以看到很多非洲的结局就像纽芬兰一样，无论这些力量如何。
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Minus the puffins.
减去海雀。
Minus the puffins.
减去海雀。
Yeah, I don’t think the technological change is the first-order thing.
是的，我不认为技术变革是首要任务。
I don’t know this very well, but I would have suspected that one thing that might be true is that there is a peculiar set of circumstances that exist in East Asia and Southeast Asia that have made it hypercompetitive in this particular sector.
我不太了解这一点，但我怀疑有一点可能是真的，那就是东亚和东南亚存在着一系列特殊的情况，使其在这个特定领域具有超强的竞争力。
You’ve seen whatever a lot of industrialization that existed elsewhere in the world, even if it’s from other developing countries, like the maquiladoras in Mexico, relocate there.
你已经看到了世界其他地方存在的大量工业化，即使它来自其他发展中国家，比如墨西哥的加工工厂，也搬到了那里。
Until the rest of these countries catch up in terms of, I’d say, their state development, which will be a very long time and until real wages rise in China, that to me is the first-order explanation of why there is less industrialization in a place like Africa, and it’s not this other set of forces that’s talked about.
我想说，直到其他国家在国家发展方面迎头赶上，这将需要很长的时间，直到中国的实际工资上涨，对我来说，这就是为什么像非洲这样的地方工业化程度较低的首要解释，而不是讨论的其他力量。
Paul Romer’s charter cities, would you want to try them anywhere?
保罗·罗默的特许城市，你想在任何地方尝试一下吗？
Can they work?
他们能工作吗？
Paul Romer and I had long debates — some in private, some in public — about this.
保罗·罗默和我对此进行了长期辩论——“有些是私下的，有些是公开的”。
I always worried about the fact that there was some risk, maybe a large risk, that these would be the Cabrini-Greens, like the housing projects of the 21st century.
我一直担心这样一个事实：存在一些风险，也许是很大的风险，这些风险将是卡布里尼-格林家族的，就像 21 世纪的住房项目一样。
There was some risk that they would go awry.
他们存在出错的风险。
I’m very suspicious of high-risk development strategies, especially when you’re playing with someone else’s life.
我对高风险的发展策略非常怀疑，尤其是当你拿别人的生命开玩笑时。
It struck me there’s a lot of ways for that to go dramatically wrong.
让我震惊的是，有很多方法会导致严重错误。
An attractive feature of a lot of development strategies is maybe low downside risk.
许多发展战略的一个有吸引力的特点可能是较低的下行风险。
As you know, if you think about Africa, parts of it are quite underpopulated.
如您所知，如果您考虑一下非洲，您会发现其中部分地区人口相当稀少。
You could find an area that had not so many people in it, set up a charter city, let people choose to migrate inwards if they wanted to.
你可以找一个人口不多的地区，建立一个包租城市，让人们选择向内迁移。
Other people could leave, but it wouldn’t cover that many people.
其他人可以离开，但覆盖不了那么多人。
And if continuity of rule is a binding constraint that makes you more bullish about Ethiopia than other places, why not import some of that?
如果统治的连续性是一个具有约束力的约束，让你比其他地方更看好埃塞俄比亚，为什么不引进一些呢？
What’s the risk really?
真正的风险是什么？
Right.
正确的。
A depopulated coastal area close to trade networks that has the potential to be like a Singapore — as an experiment, that’s a fair point.
一个靠近贸易网络的人口稀少的沿海地区有可能像新加坡一样——作为一个实验，这是一个公平的观点。
The concrete things that they were looking to do looked less like that than actually trying to take much more established settlements and try to turn them into charter cities.
他们想要做的具体事情看起来不像那样，而是实际上试图将更成熟的定居点变成特许城市。
I wonder about the practical feasibility of redoing the Singapore experiment of building a city in a swamp because they didn’t ever seriously seem to have a lead on doing that.
我想知道重做新加坡在沼泽地建设城市的实验的实际可行性，因为他们似乎从来没有认真地领导过这样做。
What’s it like coauthoring with your spouse?
与配偶共同创作是什么感觉？
Passes are allowed, of course.
当然，通行证是允许的。
No. I wish we could keep doing it, but we went off at certain points with slightly different interests.
不。我希望我们能继续这样做，但我们在某些方面的兴趣略有不同。
We were coauthors before we were spouses, so it’s a good selection mechanism.
我们在成为配偶之前就已经是共同作者了，所以这是一个很好的选择机制。
I’m not sure what we would do if we were both economists.
我不确定如果我们都是经济学家我们会做什么。
I think it might’ve been too close.
我想可能是太接近了。
She’s a political scientist?
她是政治学家？
She’s a psychologist.
她是一位心理学家。
Oh, psychologist, OK.
哦，心理学家，好吧。
It’s very useful for that other person to be a complete expert in their domain.
对于其他人来说，成为其领域的完全专家非常有用。
You can essentially defer on all of those decisions to them on that and vice versa.
您基本上可以将所有这些决定推迟给他们，反之亦然。
So you’re complementing — not competing — in the same space.
所以，你们是在同一空间中互补 ——而不是竞争 —— 。
You mentioned on your home page, when you were younger, you worked two years “cooking chicken at a vaguely militant KFC outlet.” What did you learn doing that?
你在主页上提到，当你年轻的时候，你“在一家有点激进的肯德基店煮鸡肉”工作了两年。这样做你学到了什么？
I had a boss who literally ran the place like a drill sergeant.
我有一位老板，他确实像教官一样管理着这个地方。
He was this hulking guy.
他就是这个身材魁梧的家伙。
This is in Canada now?
这是现在在加拿大吗？
This is in Canada.
这是在加拿大。
The KFCs in Canada — they’re run by a different company.
加拿大的肯德基 ——它们是由不同的公司经营的。
They’re a little cleaner and nicer.
它们更干净、更好一些。
Not much, but a little cleaner and nicer than in the US.
不多，但比美国干净一点。
This big hulking guy with a Hulk Hogan–style mustache would do the white glove test in the kitchen, on the ceiling, under the machines.
这个留着绿巨人霍根式小胡子的大块头会在厨房、天花板上、机器下面进行白手套测试。
I guess I’d look at that as taking this lazy teenager, who hadn’t worked really hard before, and getting them to do gruesome things, and realizing that you can grit your teeth and do some disgusting tasks and get through it.
我想我会把这看作是让这个懒惰的青少年，他以前没有真正努力过，让他们做可怕的事情，并意识到你可以咬紧牙关，做一些恶心的任务并完成它。
That was maybe a useful lesson.
这也许是一个有用的教训。
It demonstrated my perseverance to me or created my perseverance.
它向我展示了我的毅力或者说造就了我的毅力。
I don’t know which one.
我不知道是哪一个。
What does the University of Chicago do right that’s especially important?
芝加哥大学做了哪些特别重要的正确事情？
The number one reason I was excited to move to Chicago when my wife and I were deciding where we wanted to be, the one thing that was most appealing to it is that it has this intellectual atmosphere of .
当我和妻子决定我们想去的地方时，我很高兴搬到芝加哥的首要原因是，最吸引人的一件事是它具有这种知识氛围。
.
。
.
。
people are constantly talking about ideas.
人们不断地谈论想法。
You would think you could take this for granted at any university environment.
您可能认为在任何大学环境中您都可以认为这是理所当然的。
But I was living in New Haven in the small community around Yale and in New York in the small community surrounding Columbia, which were tremendous places full of brilliant people.
但我住在纽黑文耶鲁大学周围的小社区和纽约哥伦比亚周围的小社区，这些都是充满才华横溢的地方。
But very seldom were people always pushing themselves intellectually and pushing you intellectually in conversation.
但很少有人总是在谈话中不断地在智力上推动自己，并在智力上推动你。
How they’ve created that culture, I don’t know.
我不知道他们是如何创造这种文化的。
I haven’t been there long enough to guess.
我在那里待的时间还不够长，无法猜测。
The fact that they’ve created that and it persists is, to me, the most exciting thing about it.
事实上，对我来说，他们创造了这一点并持续存在，这是最令人兴奋的事情。
It’s what I thought every academic atmosphere was going to be before I started my PhD.
这就是我在开始攻读博士学位之前所认为的所有学术氛围。
I was surprised that it doesn’t really seem to exist in many places.
我很惊讶它在很多地方似乎并不存在。
I think it survives here a little bit at George Mason, but maybe not too many other places.
我认为它在乔治梅森大学还保留着一点，但在其他地方也许没有太多。
What’s your favorite Australian TV show?
您最喜欢的澳大利亚电视节目是什么？
It’s a comedy called Please Like Me, which is a comedy about mental illness and struggle by a young gay comedian in Sydney.
这是一部叫《请喜欢我》的喜剧，是悉尼一位年轻同性恋喜剧演员的一部关于精神疾病和挣扎的喜剧。
It doesn’t sound like the most promising premise for a television show, but it’s genius.
这听起来不像是电视节目中最有希望的前提，但它是天才。
Maybe it just appeals to my .
也许它只是吸引我的。
.
。
.
。
I do think those of us in the Commonwealth share a certain kind of sense of humor that’s different than the American sense of humor, but I think it travels well.
我确实认为我们英联邦国家的人都有一种不同于美国人的幽默感，但我认为它传播得很好。
On the Chris Blattman production function
关于克里斯·布拉特曼生产函数
Final question, and I ask this of many guests.
最后一个问题，我向很多客人问过这个问题。
It has to do with what I call the Chris Blattman production function.
它与我所说的克里斯·布拉特曼生产函数有关。
You’re still young.
你还年轻。
You’re at one of the very best schools in the world; some would say the best.
你就读于世界上最好的学校之一；有人会说最好。
You’re famous.
你很有名。
People ask me about you all the time.
人们总是问我关于你的事。
You’re very active on social media.
您在社交媒体上非常活跃。
You have a huge stack of very well-cited papers.
你有一大堆被广泛引用的论文。
You’re writing now a major book on war and violent conflict.
您现在正在写一本关于战争和暴力冲突的重要著作。
If someone was asking you, what is the insight you have into how to do this, or how you did it, that maybe other people wouldn’t immediately see?
如果有人问你，你对如何做到这一点或如何做到这一点有什么见解，而其他人可能不会立即看到？
Other than just, “Well, I worked hard” or “I went to a good school,” what is in the Chris Blattman production function that maybe we don’t see?
除了“嗯，我工作很努力”或“我上了一所好学校”之外，克里斯·布拉特曼的生产函数中还有什么是我们看不到的呢？
There’s an answer to what I think my production function looks like, but the answer for most people — when I was in my maybe third year, and you do something, as you know, in academia called your third-year review, where your senior colleagues debate what you’re doing right or wrong, and then give you basically no feedback.
我认为我的生产函数是什么样子的，但对大多数人来说答案是 —— 当我大概是第三年的时候，你知道，在学术界你会做一些叫做“第三年回顾”的事情，你的资深同事会争论你做对或做错的事情，然后基本上不给你任何反馈。
I persistently, I plowed into a senior colleague, a guy named Ian Shapiro, who’s a normative political theorist at Yale, to give me the feedback.
我坚持不懈地联系了一位资深同事，一位名叫伊恩·夏皮罗（Ian Shapiro）的人，他是耶鲁大学的规范政治理论家，请他给我反馈。
And he refused to tell me.
但他拒绝告诉我。
He refused to tell me.
他拒绝告诉我。
He said, “Well, you just need to do what you’re interested in.
他说：“好吧，你只需要做你感兴趣的事情就可以了。”
You’re clearly doing something you’re interested in.
很明显你正在做你感兴趣的事情。
You’re excited by it, and I’m not going to tell you what other people think you should do because it’s different.
你对此感到兴奋，我不会告诉你其他人认为你应该做什么，因为它是不同的。
That’s the secret to your happiness or to your success.”
这就是你幸福或成功的秘诀。”
So on some level, my production function was always doing the thing that really interested me, regardless of whether or not the people around me told me it was a good idea or not.
因此，在某种程度上，我的生产职能总是在做我真正感兴趣的事情，无论我周围的人是否告诉我这是一个好主意。
In my case, that happens to have been deciding that I like going to a place and spending a lot of time there.
就我而言，这恰好决定了我喜欢去一个地方并在那里度过很多时间。
I’ve done it three times.
我已经做了三遍了。
First I did it in Uganda, then I did it in Liberia, and now I’m doing it in Colombia.
首先我在乌干达这样做，然后我在利比里亚这样做，现在我在哥伦比亚这样做。
Each time, I went somewhere, and I spent maybe six months, just hanging out and talking to people and figuring out how I think things work in a very qualitative way.
每次，我都会去某个地方，大约花了六个月的时间，只是闲逛并与人们交谈，并以一种非常定性的方式弄清楚我认为事情是如何运作的。
Then, usually, it was studying something where there was no data on it.
然后，通常它会研究一些没有数据的东西。
That’s been my shtick.
这就是我的拿手好戏。
Most people look for existing data to analyze.
大多数人都会寻找现有数据进行分析。
I look for data I can create.
我寻找我可以创建的数据。
Then I would go and I would find a way to create data.
然后我会去寻找一种创建数据的方法。
Then, having created data, I would try to answer this question that interested me.
然后，在创建数据后，我会尝试回答这个我感兴趣的问题。
In my case, it’s usually something that is the intersection of economics, political science, sociology, and public policy.
就我而言，它通常是经济学、政治学、社会学和公共政策的交叉学科。
Then, often, I would try to find an experiment that I could run, just to have an excuse to be there.
然后，我经常会尝试找到一个我可以进行的实验，只是为了有一个借口去那里。
It usually wasn’t a very good experiment, but it was evaluating something that somebody was doing that was obviously common, it was useful to have some data on it.
这通常不是一个很好的实验，但它正在评估某人正在做的事情，这显然很常见，拥有一些数据很有用。
Then my strategy in every place is to go around and try to find some community organization or bureaucrat or somebody who has a good idea, who’s a true believer, who really believes in whatever cockamamie thing they’re doing to make the world a better place.
然后我在每个地方的策略就是到处寻找一些社区组织或官僚或有好主意的人，他们是真正的信徒，真正相信他们正在做的任何愚蠢的事情，让世界变得更美好。
Most people — least of all me — don’t really believe it should work, but then there seems to be something going on.
大多数人——至少是我——并不真正相信它应该起作用，但似乎有些事情正在发生。
And if it works, it challenges how we think about the world.
如果它有效，它将挑战我们对世界的看法。
The first time it was cash, just giving cash to poor people.
第一次是现金，只是给穷人现金。
The second time, in Liberia, it was somebody doing something that turned out to be cognitive behavior therapy that was trying to take these criminal adults and totally turn their lives around.
第二次是在利比里亚，有人做了认知行为疗法，试图彻底改变这些成年人的生活。
In Colombia, we’ve stumbled upon this little group that’s basically trying to take back governance in their communities from the gangs nonviolently, by relentlessly organizing their community, connecting it to the city government, and then trying to scale that up, test it, and see if it actually works.
在哥伦比亚，我们偶然发现了这个小团体，他们基本上试图以非暴力方式从帮派手中夺回社区的治理权，通过不懈地组织社区，将其与市政府联系起来，然后尝试扩大规模，进行测试，看看它是否真的有效。
Then usually, as the result, I change how I think about not just that question, but the whole business of violence and development.
然后，通常，结果是，我不仅改变了对这个问题的看法，而且改变了对整个暴力和发展问题的看法。
I recommend that you all follow Chris Blattman on Twitter.
我建议大家在 Twitter 上关注克里斯·布拉特曼 (Chris Blattman)。
Chris, thank you very much.
克里斯，非常感谢你。
Thank you.
谢谢。