Chris Blattman on War and Centralized Power (Ep. 149)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I am sitting down — yes, sitting down — with Chris Blattman once again.
今天，我再次与克里斯·布拉特曼坐下来。
There’s an earlier conversation with Chris.
之前有一次与克里斯的对话。
If you don’t remember, Chris is both an economist and a political scientist.
如果你不记得的话，克里斯既是一名经济学家，又是一名政治学家。
He does not let either discipline claim him.
他不会让任何一种学科夺走他的权利。
He is a professor at the University of Chicago, and, most importantly for our purposes, he has a new and wonderful book out, which I have blurbed.
他是芝加哥大学的教授，最重要的是，为了我们的目的，他出版了一本精彩的新书，我已经将其模糊化了。
It is called Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace.
它的名字是《我们为何而战：战争的根源与和平之路》。
Chris, welcome.
克里斯，欢迎。
Great to be back.
很高兴回来。
I have many questions about war.
我对战争有很多疑问。
Let’s start with demographics.
让我们从人口统计开始。
Richard Hanania made the argument recently in his Substack that countries where there was only one child per family were going to be much less likely or willing or interested to fight wars.
理查德·哈纳尼亚 (Richard Hanania) 最近在他的 Substack 中提出了这样的论点：每个家庭只有一个孩子的国家不太可能、愿意或有兴趣打仗。
Do you agree?
你同意？
Because they’d put their children at risk, and they —
因为他们会让自己的孩子处于危险之中，而且他们——
But also, it’s a sign they don’t care that much about the future, that they’re complacent.
但这也表明他们不太关心未来，他们很自满。
They’re not going to disrupt their lives just to have three kids.
他们不会仅仅为了三个孩子而扰乱自己的生活。
If they’re not going to disrupt their comfortable lives for three kids, they won’t disrupt it for a war either.
如果他们不想破坏三个孩子的舒适生活，他们也不会因为战争而破坏它。
That doesn’t resonate with me.
这并没有引起我的共鸣。
I don’t think that the average person’s weight on the future and the quality of their life is a first-order determinant.
我不认为普通人对未来和生活质量的重视是首要决定因素。
If it is, it’s the kind of a political system that I’m not too worried about going into war.
如果是的话，这就是一种我不太担心陷入战争的政治体系。
Why isn’t how they feel about their lives, their future, their country —
为什么他们对自己的生活、未来、国家的感受不是——
The way I think about this is that there’s usually a narrow set of people who decide whether or not to go to war, and those people are either accountable or not accountable to lots of people.
我的想法是，通常有一小群人决定是否发动战争，而这些人要么对很多人负责，要么不负责。
In the places where they’re accountable to everybody else, people have an enormous amount of stake not to go to war, and so, small gradations as to whether or not they have one child or two children or a little bit more weight on the future .
在他们对其他人负责的地方，人们有很大的利益不去参战，因此，他们是否有一个孩子或两个孩子或对未来的重视程度会小一些。
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War is just so hugely painful that, I think, if you give those people a lot of influence, they’re going to press their leaders not to go to war, in general.
我认为，战争是如此巨大的痛苦，如果你给这些人很大的影响力，他们就会向他们的领导人施压，让他们总体上不要参战。
I just don’t see this perturbation or this trend as fundamentally shaping that calculus, just because there’s already this overwhelming incentive not to have their leaders invade somebody.
我只是不认为这种扰动或这种趋势从根本上塑造了这种计算，只是因为已经有压倒性的动机不让他们的领导人入侵某人。
If you look at the marginal cases — since there are some wars — there’s a bunch of cases, even if unusual, where someone is right at the margin.
如果你看一下边缘案例 ——“因为有一些战争”—— 有很多案例，即使不寻常，但有人就处于边缘。
At the margin, what are the factors that are most likely to account for the explanatory variation in whether or not a country goes to war?
在边际上，最有可能解释一个国家是否发动战争的解释性差异的因素是什么？
For me, the one that people talk the least about that strikes me as the most important is how concentrated is power in the country.
对我来说，人们谈论得最少但我认为最重要的是这个国家的权力有多集中。
What’s holding back someone from considering all of the implications of their actions on other people, should they decide to take their society to war?
如果一个人决定将社会带入战争，那么是什么阻碍了他们考虑自己的行为对其他人的所有影响呢？
It’s maybe the most important margin in history, and it’s maybe the one that no one of my tribes — which are political economists — think and talk the least about.
这可能是历史上最重要的边缘，也可能是我的部落中没有一个人——政治经济学家——思考和谈论最少的边缘。
It’s the one that — in journalism, people leap to psychological explanations, and they try to understand the psychology of leaders, but they don’t try to understand the way in which they’re constrained.
在新闻业中，人们跳入心理学解释，他们试图理解领导者的心理，但他们不会试图理解他们受到约束的方式。
So, it’s this combination of the most important and the most ignored.
所以，这是最重要和最容易被忽视的组合。
So federal societies are less likely to go to war?
那么联邦社会不太可能发动战争？
The word I both loathe and love is polycentric, which is this word from Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, and it’s this idea where there are many centers of power.
我既厌恶又喜欢这个词“多中心”，这是文森特和埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆提出的这个词，正是这个想法存在着许多权力中心。
In the US, we’re programmed to think in terms of federalism, which is a great example, but I think there’re lots of other ways.
在美国，我们习惯于从联邦制角度思考，这是一个很好的例子，但我认为还有很多其他方式。
We can be polycentric in the sense of having lots of super-national powers, so we can delegate a lot of authority and bind our hands through international treaties and agreements and alliances.
我们可以是多中心的，即拥有许多超国家力量，因此我们可以通过国际条约、协议和联盟下放大量权力并束缚我们的手脚。
We focus a little bit too much, I think, on downward and federalist polycentrism in the United States.
我认为，我们有点过于关注美国的向下和联邦主义多中心主义。
I know it’s a small country, and it’s not near many other countries, but New Zealand is very non-polycentric.
我知道这是一个小国家，而且离其他国家也不近，但新西兰是一个非常非多中心的国家。
If we put them somewhere else, made them bigger, would you think they would be more likely to go to war than, say, Canada?
如果我们把它们放在其他地方，让它们变得更大，你认为它们会比加拿大等地更有可能爆发战争吗？
Well, it’s funny because I think of Canada as a not very polycentric place in, at least, a formal institutional sense.
嗯，这很有趣，因为我认为加拿大至少在正式的制度意义上不是一个多中心的地方。
Reasonably, they’re in a place where they don’t have a lot of temptation to go to war.
合理地说，他们所处的位置没有太多发动战争的诱惑。
I’ve never been to New Zealand, so I’m more projecting from other places I know, including Canada, onto it.
我从未去过新西兰，所以我更多地从我所知道的其他地方（包括加拿大）投射到那里。
They are polycentric in the sense that the country’s, in some ways, governed and restrained by informal norms and an understanding of what is acceptable behavior and what people would or would not accept.
它们是多中心的，因为国家在某种程度上受到非正式规范的管理和约束，并且了解什么是可接受的行为以及人们会或不会接受什么。
In that sense, I think it’s a very decentralized place.
从这个意义上说，我认为这是一个非常去中心化的地方。
But even the power, in the formal decision-making power, isn’t very decentralized.
但即使是正式决策权，也不是很分散。
It seems to me the United States launches a lot of military actions.
在我看来，美国发动了很多军事行动。
You may or may not want to call them wars, but something blows up.
你可能想也可能不想称其为战争，但总有一些事情发生了。
Russia, pre-Ukraine, launched a very large number of cyberattacks.
在乌克兰之前的俄罗斯发起了大量网络攻击。
Your theory of what makes war more likely — how is it different for an actual physical, violent war versus major cyberattacks?
您关于什么使战争更有可能发生的理论 —— 实际的物理暴力战争与重大网络攻击有何不同？
That’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
In one sense, cyberattacks can be less attributable and less clear.
从某种意义上说，网络攻击的可归因性和清晰度可能较低。
One of my colleagues, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, has thought about this.
我的一位同事伊森·布埃诺·德·梅斯基塔（Ethan Bueno de Mesquita）思考过这个问题。
This makes the world a more dangerous place in the sense that there’s a lot of uncertainty about who’s attacking you.
这使得世界变得更加危险，因为谁在攻击你有很多不确定性。
You’re always worried that somebody else is attacking you, and they’re cloaking it in this person, and you’ll be duped into a war.
你总是担心别人会攻击你，而他们却把这种恐惧隐藏在这个人身上，而你会被欺骗而陷入一场战争。
This just leads to a lot more complex strategic calculations that might lead to worse responses, so we should be wary, and probably nations are wary about using it for that reason because it could spin out of control more easily.
这只会导致更复杂的战略计算，可能会导致更糟糕的反应，所以我们应该保持警惕，而且各国可能因此而对使用它持谨慎态度，因为它可能更容易失控。
That’s probably top of my mind.
这可能是我最关心的。
If I had the hypothesis that the least responsible countries are most likely to do cyberattacks, and the sort of more responsible countries — even if you disagree with what they’re doing — are more likely to mount military actions.
如果我假设最不负责任的国家最有可能发动网络攻击，而那些更负责任的国家 ——即使你不同意他们正在做的事情—— 更有可能采取军事行动。
The earlier British Empire, in a way, may have done the wrong thing, but it proudly announced what it was doing.
早期的大英帝国在某种程度上可能做了错误的事情，但它自豪地宣布了它正在做的事情。
Does that make sense as a hypothesis?
作为一个假设，这有意义吗？
It does, but then it also gives actors in those larger places incentives to appear to be one of these more rogue actors.
确实如此，但它也给那些较大地方的演员提供了激励，让他们看起来像是这些更流氓的演员之一。
The thing we have to be worried about in this context is when the ability to conduct cyberattacks is very disaggregated.
在这种情况下，我们必须担心的是，进行网络攻击的能力非常分散。
The idea that — I don’t know — some CIA part-timer or consultant could potentially launch a cyberattack on his own if he was so aggrieved or vice versa in some other strategic .
“我不知道”的想法是，如果某些中央情报局兼职人员或顾问在其他战略中感到如此愤慨，他可能会自己发起网络攻击，反之亦然。
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The United States — I think we can’t do that with warfare very easily.
美国 —— 我认为我们不能轻易通过战争做到这一点。
Let’s say we wanted a theory of which nations were most likely to mount a geoengineering war or attack, which, probably, we haven’t seen yet, but imagine dumping iron filings in the ocean, change the climate, change the climate of your rivals.
假设我们想要一个关于哪些国家最有可能发动地球工程战争或攻击的理论，这可能我们还没有见过，但想象一下将铁屑倾倒在海洋中，改变气候，改变你的竞争对手的气候。
How is a theory of a geoengineering attack different?
地球工程攻击的理论有何不同？
I guess it would depend a lot on the extent to which you’re able to.
我想这在很大程度上取决于你能够做到的程度。
If I fire a missile at an enemy, I’m fairly confident that I’m going to only harm them, and I’m not going to harm me.
如果我向敌人发射导弹，我相当有信心我只会伤害他们，而不会伤害我自己。
Anytime anything you do is going to potentially blow back on you — for example, a nuclear bomb is one way to think about it — then it’s going to change your calculus because it’s going to be less attractive relative to the alternatives.
任何时候你所做的任何事情都可能会给你带来反击——例如，核弹是一种思考方式——那么它就会改变你的计算方式，因为相对于其他选择，它的吸引力会降低。
There’s always going to be a selection of instruments that you could use.
总会有一系列您可以使用的乐器。
I’ve never thought of these kinds of attacks before.
我以前从未想到过此类攻击。
It seems to me, their risk of blowback is actually much, much higher, and there’s just a lot of uncertainties.
在我看来，他们遭受打击的风险实际上要高得多，而且存在很多不确定性。
I’m not sure why somebody would want to use them vis-à-vis one of these other, more conventional things that are much easier.
我不确定为什么有人会想使用它们来代替其他更传统、更容易的东西。
Well, they’re very cheap, and it might be hard to trace.
嗯，它们非常便宜，而且可能很难追踪。
But in general, shouldn’t a theory of war be super technologically contingent?
但总的来说，战争理论不应该是超级技术偶然的吗？
If I look who’s likely to launch a drone war, of course, I think the US, but not only.
如果我看看谁可能发动无人机战争，我当然认为是美国，但不仅仅是美国。
Who’s likely to launch a soldier’s war — it’s maybe negatively correlated.
谁有可能发动士兵战争 ——可能是负相关的。
How can we have a general account of who’s likely to launch a war?
我们如何才能大致了解谁可能发动战争？
Isn’t it always per technology?
不总是根据技术吗？
There’s some cost-benefit calculus that is at the root of all of these.
所有这些的根源都是一些成本效益计算。
That, to me, is still going to be the first-order decision, so I’m struggling to think about .
对我来说，这仍然是首要决定，所以我正在努力思考。
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The technology’s going to change the cost, and it’s going to change the potential negative externalities, which is just another kind of cost and how much it blows back to you.
技术将改变成本，也将改变潜在的负外部性，这只是另一种成本以及它给你带来的影响。
Like a lot of economic theory, it’s always a good first-order principle for you to use to structure your thinking.
就像许多经济理论一样，它始终是一个很好的一阶原理，可以用来构建你的思维。
The second-order elements just don’t seem to me to be particularly large.
在我看来，二阶元素并不是特别大。
Say in your list of the five main factors that explain wars, as I understand it, technology isn’t one of them.
在你列出的解释战争的五个主要因素中，据我所知，技术不是其中之一。
Why shouldn’t technology be a clear number one?
为什么技术不应该成为明确的第一？
The US does a lot in Yemen that it probably wouldn’t do with soldiers, but it’s clearly willing to do with drones.
美国在也门做了很多可能不会用士兵做的事情，但它显然愿意用无人机做。
We do drone attacks, I don’t know in how many countries, but it’s a large number: West Africa, Sahel.
我们进行无人机袭击，我不知道有多少个国家，但数量很大：西非、萨赫勒。
So why isn’t technology the number one factor?
那么为什么技术不是第一因素呢？
Let me use a slightly different analogy.
让我用一个稍微不同的类比。
Let’s take Afghanistan and the US involvement in Afghanistan.
让我们以阿富汗和美国对阿富汗的介入为例。
I have no particular expertise in the region, but I try to understand it myself — why was that such a long war?
我对该地区没有特别的专业知识，但我自己尝试去理解它——“为什么那是一场如此漫长的战争？”
I think it’s because it was not particularly expensive to the United States.
我认为这是因为它对美国来说并不是特别昂贵。
The United States was saying, “This is going to cost us tens of lives per year, and maybe 1 percent of GDP, and in return for that, we are going to buy reputation for not tolerating rogue states and terror attacks by rogue states.
美国表示，“这将导致我们每年损失数十人的生命，或许相当于 GDP 的 1%，作为回报，我们将换取不容忍流氓国家和流氓国家恐怖袭击的声誉。”
In return for that, we’re going to have some probability, diminishing over time, of victory over this particular rogue group.
作为回报，我们将有一定的概率战胜这个特定的流氓组织，但随着时间的推移，这种概率会逐渐减小。
Given that this rogue group will not negotiate with us, and there doesn’t seem to be any ground where we can actually compromise because of our mutual intransigence, this is a cheap war and we’ll wage it.”
鉴于这个流氓组织不会与我们谈判，而且由于我们相互不妥协，似乎没有任何理由可以真正妥协，这是一场廉价的战争，我们会发动它。”
That’s not what they say to the public, but I think that’s, de facto, what happens.
这不是他们对公众所说的，但我认为这就是事实上发生的事情。
I think drones and technology doesn’t make war cheap.
我认为无人机和技术并不会让战争变得便宜。
If war’s cheap, then you’re going to be more likely to use that as an instrument, and that’s the first order that I think technology gives us.
如果战争成本低廉，那么你将更有可能将其用作工具，这是我认为技术赋予我们的第一个命令。
How much does state capacity predict war?
国家能力对战争的预测有多大？
Should that be in your list of five main factors?
这应该出现在您的五个主要因素清单中吗？
It’s really important to distinguish between the things that change your bargaining power vis-à-vis your rival, and things that actually change the probability of war.
区分那些改变你与对手讨价还价能力的因素和真正改变战争可能性的因素非常重要。
If I have state capacity, or if I have particularly cheap weapons, or if I have particularly effective weapons, then it changes what I can expect to get from my rival.
如果我拥有国家能力，或者如果我拥有特别便宜的武器，或者如果我拥有特别有效的武器，那么它就会改变我可以从对手那里得到的东西。
It doesn’t necessarily have any effect on this basic intuition that we should actually be trying to find some solution that is going to avoid war, which most of the time we do.
它不一定会对我们实际上应该尝试找到某种避免战争的解决方案的基本直觉产生任何影响，而大多数时候我们都是这样做的。
As you know, this is one of the main themes in the book.
如您所知，这是本书的主题之一。
I would just say, every time we say, “Does this cause war?” we have to say, “Am I talking about something that changes relative bargaining power, or am I talking about something that changes the incentives to avoid the cost of fighting?”
每次我们问“这会引发战争吗？”时，我都会说。我们必须说，“我是在谈论改变相对议价能力的事情，还是在谈论改变避免战斗成本的动机的事情？”
Now, in our last conversation, we were both fairly bullish about Ethiopia on the grounds of its high state capacity.
现在，在我们上次的谈话中，我们都相当看好埃塞俄比亚，因为它具有较高的国家能力。
That now seems wrong.
现在看来这是错误的。
What do you think we got wrong or you got wrong or I got wrong?
你认为我们错了，或者你错了，或者我错了？
Long run, I still have high expectations for Ethiopia.
从长远来看，我对埃塞俄比亚还是抱有很高的期望。
Short run, things have obviously gotten very bad.
短期来看，情况显然已经变得非常糟糕。
I have a couple of friends who work very closely there, and so, partly what I know is channeling them.
我有几个朋友在那里工作得非常密切，所以我所知道的部分是引导他们。
I think what was fundamentally problematic about that — like in a lot of African countries — is that, in spite of the state capacity, you have power that’s very concentrated in a handful of elite groups.
我认为，这个问题的根本问题在于——“就像在许多非洲国家一样”——尽管国家能力很强，但权力却非常集中在少数精英群体手中。
These elite groups happen to be ethnic groups, the Tigray, the Amhara, and the Oromo.
这些精英群体恰好是提格雷人、阿姆哈拉人和奥罗莫人等民族。
They’d cut a deal with one another.
他们彼此达成了一项协议。
They’d cut a deal that for a long time heavily, heavily, heavily favored the Tigrayans, and that started to fray, and the other two groups began to demand more, and they fumbled that.
他们达成了一项长期、非常、非常有利于提格雷人的协议，但这一协议开始出现问题，其他两个群体开始要求更多，但他们却搞砸了。
What surprises me, and I think surprises also the leaders of those three groups, is that they fumbled it.
令我惊讶的是，我认为这三个团体的领导人也感到惊讶的是，他们搞砸了。
One thing I’ve heard is that the prime minister was surprised at the time that this suddenly turned into violence, and he continued to be surprised for some time.
我听说的一件事是，首相当时对事情突然演变成暴力感到惊讶，并且持续了一段时间的惊讶。
Maybe people just underestimated the chance that these concentrated elite bargains can go wrong.
也许人们只是低估了这些集中的精英讨价还价出错的可能性。
That’s the thing that I always believed but I never really applied to that case.
这是我一直相信的事情，但我从未真正应用于该案例。
That, to me, goes back to the first thing I said.
对我来说，这又回到了我说的第一句话。
The fundamental thing we don’t pay enough attention to is concentrated power and how easy it is, then, for these deals to fall apart.
我们没有引起足够重视的根本问题是权力集中以及这些交易很容易破裂。
Let me tell you my worry and my account of what I got wrong.
让我告诉你我的担忧以及我对错误的解释。
I know this theory has only two data points, but I’m struck that Rwanda also has a reputation for high state capacity, which, whatever their failings, is in some sense true.
我知道这个理论只有两个数据点，但令我惊讶的是，卢旺达也以高国家能力而闻名，无论他们有什么缺点，这在某种意义上都是正确的。
Maybe high state capacity develops from a past where you had ethnic strife or war, and in part, you develop the high state capacity to keep some groups down or enforce some bargains.
也许高国家能力是从过去发生种族冲突或战争的历史中发展起来的，在某种程度上，你发展了高国家能力来压制某些群体或执行一些讨价还价。
Maybe, on average, it’s a good thing, but it’s also increasing your variance of outcomes.
也许，平均而言，这是一件好事，但它也会增加结果的方差。
There’s this new piece by O’Reilly and Murphy in Economica that shows the best predictor of state capacity today is historical prevalence of war.
奥莱利和墨菲在《经济》杂志上发表的这篇新文章表明，当今国家能力的最佳预测因素是历史上战争的普遍程度。
So when you see high state capacity in Africa, you should also be getting nervous a bit intrinsically — and indeed anywhere — because it’s a sign it was needed.
因此，当你看到非洲的高国家能力时，你也应该从本质上感到有点紧张 ——事实上在任何地方都如此——因为这是一个需要它的迹象。
It doesn’t come from nowhere.
它不是凭空而来的。
Just like you needed a fragmented Europe to develop a lot of advances in capitalism, but that, too, had a high cost: 17th-century wars, and so on.
就像你需要一个支离破碎的欧洲来发展资本主义的许多进步一样，但这也需要付出高昂的代价：17世纪的战争等等。
The two places we’ve picked here, which are Ethiopia and Rwanda, are places that have high state capacity and coherency today because they had high state capacity and coherency 400 years ago as well, relative to a lot of other places on the continent.
我们在这里选择的两个地方，即埃塞俄比亚和卢旺达，是今天具有较高国家能力和一致性的地方，因为相对于非洲大陆上的许多其他地方，它们在 400 年前也具有较高的国家能力和一致性。
This is a little bit — not a false correlation; I think it’s true — but the thing that strong states have — and I think political scientists would talk about state systems — is that you have lots of competing states close to one another, reasonably strong competing states.
这有点 ——并不是错误的相关性；而是相关性。我认为这是真的——但是强国所拥有的东西——而且我认为政治学家会谈论国家体系——就是有很多相互接近的竞争国家，相当强大的竞争国家。
And most of the thing that is generating the state capacity is that competition.
产生国家能力的大部分因素是竞争。
Nine years out of 10 or 99 years out of a hundred it’s peaceful, and then sometimes it’s not.
十年中有九年，一百年中有九十九年是和平的，但有时却并非如此。
That’s the high variance point.
这就是高方差点。
Right.
正确的。
The fundamental driver of that capacity are these competing state systems, and war is an occasional by-product of that.
这种能力的根本驱动力是这些相互竞争的国家体系，而战争只是其偶尔的副产品。
But when you run a regression — maybe they did; I don’t know this paper — of current state capacity and war, there’s just this omitted variable, which is the competitiveness of state systems.
但当你进行回归时 —— 也许他们做到了；我不知道这篇关于当前国家能力和战争的论文，只是遗漏了一个变量，那就是国家体系的竞争力。
I think we just ascribe a lot of explanatory power to the fighting part that we should attribute to competition, and historians would agree.
我认为我们只是将很多解释力归因于战斗部分，而我们应该将其归因于竞争，历史学家也会同意这一点。
They would call this defensive modernization.
他们称之为防御性现代化。
There are a lot of words and concepts like this that say, “Well, we actually revolutionized our society or technology in response to a competitive threat that never actually turned violent.” That’s first order.
有很多这样的词语和概念都在说：“实际上，我们彻底改变了我们的社会或技术，以应对从未真正演变为暴力的竞争威胁。”这是第一条命令。
I’m not saying competition is unlikely, I’m just saying it’s the actual .
我并不是说竞争不太可能，我只是说这就是现实。
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there’s an inefficient way to do that competition, and sometimes we devolve into that.
有一种低效的方式来进行这种竞争，有时我们会转向这种方式。
But we shouldn’t ignore the fact that most of the time that doesn’t happen.
但我们不应该忽视这样一个事实：大多数时候这种情况不会发生。
Why did the Irish Troubles heat up in 1968, ’69, and not earlier?
为什么爱尔兰麻烦在 1968 年、69 年而不是更早的时候升温？
In those years in particular?
特别是那几年？
Yes, because things seemed much better.
是的，因为事情看起来好多了。
A lot of the 1960s, there’s a sense the civil rights movement has come.
20 世纪 60 年代的很多时候，人们都感觉民权运动已经到来。
This could be nonviolent resistance.
这可能是非暴力抵抗。
We’ll work this out, and then it all explodes.
我们会解决这个问题，然后一切都会爆炸。
It’s hard to nail these things down to specifics.
很难将这些事情具体化。
If I remember the case, well, ex post, I think this is when the British army came in.
如果我记得这个案子，那么，事后，我想这就是英国军队介入的时候。
Which was also an unusual and somewhat surprising development, because they had not been coming in during a lot of earlier manifestations of trouble.
这也是一个不寻常且有些令人惊讶的发展，因为他们在许多早期的麻烦表现中都没有介入。
I think there was a genuinely fragile situation that could have been resolved different ways, and the decision to send the British army in, and then the decision to conduct themselves in the particular way that they conducted themselves, I think, helps start that actual violence.
我认为，当时的局势确实很脆弱，本来可以通过不同的方式解决，而派遣英国军队的决定，然后决定以他们自己的特定方式行事，我认为，有助于引发真正的暴力。
It’s a good question why it happened that year and not five years later or five years earlier.
这是一个很好的问题，为什么它发生在那一年，而不是五年后或五年前。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
What are the greatest risks to peace in Ireland long term, or is it just all over?
从长远来看，爱尔兰和平面临的最大风险是什么，还是一切都结束了？
I don’t think it’s all over.
我不认为一切都结束了。
I’ve spent a total of six days in Ireland, so I would say I think Brexit, and people feel like there’s a very real .
我在爱尔兰总共待了六天，所以我想说我认为英国脱欧，人们感觉这是一个非常真实的事情。
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A decrease in integration with neighboring places, both if it finds itself caught between unable to integrate with Republic of Ireland and de-integrating with England, strikes me as really problematic.
如果它发现自己陷入无法与爱尔兰共和国融合和与英格兰分离的困境，那么与邻国融合的减少在我看来确实是有问题的。
But that’s not the flashpoint I’m worried about in the near long term.
但这并不是我近期担心的热点。
What does a bad scenario look like then?
那么糟糕的情况是什么样的呢？
In Ireland?
在爱尔兰？
In Ireland.
在爱尔兰。
Northern Ireland, or the border, or wherever it’s going to happen.
北爱尔兰，或者边境，或者任何将要发生的地方。
My friend Richard English is a historian there, and what he and a lot of people think — which is what we were thinking before the pandemic, when I had lots of current knowledge about some of these things when I traveled — was this idea that in these fragile moments, where it’s not really in anyone’s interest to go to war, there will be some small splinter groups, essentially people who, for their own ideological reasons or mistakes or stupidity, will set in motion a series of events that it’s difficult to walk back from.
我的朋友理查德·英格利希（Richard English）是那里的一名历史学家，他和很多人的想法——这就是我们在大流行之前所想的，当时我在旅行时对其中一些事情有了很多当前的了解——是这样的想法：在这些脆弱的时刻，战争并不真正符合任何人的利益，将会有一些小团体，本质上是那些出于自己的意识形态原因、错误或愚蠢的人，将发起一系列的行动。难以回头的事件。
I think that does happen, and so people who are living in one of these border communities and want to protest violently against some change or lack of change — that’s what worried me.
我认为这种情况确实发生了，因此生活在这些边境社区之一的人们想要对某些变化或缺乏变化进行暴力抗议 ——这就是我担心的事情。
Nested games would be my phrase — that you have subgroups playing their own games, and they don’t care about how the whole game comes out.
嵌套游戏就是我的说法——“你有小组玩自己的游戏，他们不关心整个游戏的结果。
They want to optimize within their game, but what they do is a move in the larger game as well.
他们想要在自己的游戏中进行优化，但他们所做的也是在更大的游戏中采取行动。
To me, this is just a special case of my whole centralization-of-power story, which is to say that there are some groups in societies that are just not accountable to anyone but themselves, and their own peculiar set of preferences can determine outcomes.
对我来说，这只是我整个权力集中故事的一个特例，也就是说，社会中有些群体除了他们自己之外不对任何人负责，他们自己独特的偏好可以决定结果。
When I think about any splinter group, whether it’s some Northern Irish band of terrorists or a faction in Palestine or the Israeli government or wherever it may be, I think fundamentally it’s these groups who can act in their own self-interest because they have at least a temporary interest that can then push a situation into violence that was otherwise quite likely to be peaceful.
当我想到任何分裂的团体时，无论是北爱尔兰的恐怖分子团伙，还是巴勒斯坦或以色列政府的一个派别，或者其他任何地方，我认为从根本上来说，这些团体可以为了自己的利益而行动，因为他们至少有一个暂时的利益，可以将局势推向暴力，否则很可能是和平的。
It’s not just these macro autocrats are more likely to wage wars, which I think is true, but it’s also these little pockets of autocracy that we create in our own social movements that are really dangerous.
不仅这些宏观独裁者更有可能发动战争（我认为这是事实），而且我们在自己的社会运动中创造的这些小独裁政权也非常危险。
Isn’t that, in a way, the opposite of centralized power?
从某种意义上说，这难道不是中央集权的对立面吗？
You have a lot of nested games.
你有很多嵌套的游戏。
You have many autocracies.
你们有很多独裁政权。
The problem is that they’re interrelated, and no one of them is making a move for the whole side or the whole team.
问题是他们是相互关联的，他们中没有一个人会为整个球队或整个球队采取行动。
You can have your allies drag you into war.
你可以让你的盟友将你拖入战争。
World War I, in part, came about because smaller countries dragged in larger countries.
第一次世界大战的发生在一定程度上是因为较小的国家拖累了较大的国家。
It wasn’t very centralized.
它不是很集中。
That’s one of the most destructive wars of all time, and that seems to fit the nested games worry as the main driver of a lot of wars.
这是有史以来最具破坏性的战争之一，这似乎符合嵌套游戏作为许多战争主要驱动力的担忧。
Maybe not surprisingly, you very quickly brought us to the bleeding edge of conflict research and the thing we don’t understand very well.
也许并不奇怪，你很快就把我们带到了冲突研究的最前沿，以及我们不太了解的事情。
When I think about the one area I wish I understood better — the game theory, the strategic dynamics, the empirics — would be the difficulties of coalition formation and the fact that fragmenting coalitions and many decentralized actors with the means of violence is actually really destabilizing.
当我思考一个我希望我能更好地理解的领域时——博弈论、战略动态、经验——联盟形成的困难，以及使用暴力手段分裂联盟和许多分散的参与者这一事实实际上确实破坏了稳定。
I think we need more — I don’t know how to think about it systematically because I don’t think we’ve had 20 people with their shoulder behind the boulder, pushing and trying to understand that.
我认为我们需要更多 —— 我不知道如何系统地思考这个问题，因为我认为我们还没有 20 个人把肩膀放在巨石后面，推动并试图理解这一点。
We’re talking today at the very beginning of March, and we don’t know what’s going to happen with Russia and Ukraine, but we know a lot has happened.
我们今天在三月初进行讨论，我们不知道俄罗斯和乌克兰会发生什么，但我们知道已经发生了很多事情。
There’s one group of people that very confidently predicted disaster — Kasparov would be one.
有一群人非常自信地预测灾难 ——卡斯帕罗夫就是其中之一。
Really, many other people — I would say the mainstream — that until the attack actually came, they just thought it would be some bizarre limited police action in the east and not amount to much.
确实，许多其他人——“我想说的是主流”——在袭击真正发生之前，他们只是认为这只是东部地区警察采取的一些奇怪的有限行动，并不算什么。
What difference in theoretical approach accounts for who got it right and who got it wrong?
理论方法上的什么差异可以解释谁是对的、谁是错的？
Sometimes, any hugely confident prediction of a military action is more often wrong than not.
有时，任何对军事行动的高度自信的预测往往是错误的。
I’m not sure that there’s something, theoretically, that drives the hugely confident predictions because, in those instances, some people are simply too confident.
我不确定从理论上讲，是否有什么东西可以推动人们做出非常有信心的预测，因为在这种情况下，有些人就是太自信了。
I think the only reasonable way to look at the situation three months ago or two months ago was that this is, at best, even odds.
我认为看待三个月前或两个月前的情况唯一合理的方法是，这充其量只是偶数赔率。
I speak also as someone who was less than even odds.
我也是以一个赔率低于偶数的人的身份发言的。
Then it’s very hard to evaluate these claims after the fact.
那么事后就很难评估这些说法。
Was the person who said it was 80 percent likely to happen correct?
那个说80%可能性发生的人是对的吗？
Was the person who said it was 20 percent likely to happen correct?
那个说有20%的可能性发生的人是对的吗？
We don’t know.
我们不知道。
I don’t think they differed theoretically.
我不认为它们在理论上有什么不同。
They may have differed in empirical beliefs and the things they weighed.
他们的经验信念和衡量的事物可能有所不同。
I think the more that you are convinced that Putin has a personal stake in this military action and in taking Ukraine at all costs, and the more that you believe he and his cabal and his military apparatus are capable of complete misjudgment, then the more likely you perceived a risk of war.
我认为，你越相信普京在这次军事行动和不惜一切代价夺取乌克兰方面与个人利害攸关，你越相信他和他的阴谋集团以及他的军事机构有能力完全误判，那么你就越有可能感受到战争的风险。
In retrospect, the thing I think people should have used to predict a risk of war, but that I very seldom heard anyone talk about, was the degree to which you thought the Ukrainians would be unflinchingly intransigent on any compromise, the degree to which you thought the US government would be intransigent on any compromise whatsoever.
回想起来，我认为人们应该用来预测战争风险的东西，但我很少听到有人谈论，是你认为乌克兰人对任何妥协会毫不妥协地不妥协的程度，以及你认为美国政府对任何妥协都会不妥协的程度。
That’s mainly what I didn’t predict, but I don’t think anybody was talking about that, including me, a month ago.
这主要是我没有预料到的，但我认为一个月前没有人在谈论这个，包括我。
Let me tell you my sense.
让我告诉你我的感觉。
It may be close to yours, but tell me what you think.
它可能与您的想法接近，但请告诉我您的想法。
The people I know who took seriously the fact that Putin believed in his own stated ideas tended to predict this particular outcome better than the people who thought it was a game-theoretic calculation.
我认识的那些认真对待普京相信自己所阐述的想法这一事实的人往往比那些认为这是博弈论计算的人更好地预测了这一特定结果。
I don’t really think we should place a lot of value on speeches that politicians give as their actual intentions, as a general rule.
作为一般规则，我真的认为我们不应该太看重政治家的演讲，因为他们的实际意图是这样的。
I just don’t think that it’s going to lead us to accurate predictions.
我只是不认为这会让我们做出准确的预测。
It might have been consistent with what happened in this case.
这可能与本案中发生的情况一致。
I don’t think it’s a useful predictive tool.
我认为这不是一个有用的预测工具。
But there are clearly cases it applies to.
但它显然适用于某些情况。
Hitler more or less said what he wanted to do.
希特勒或多或少说出了他想做的事。
In fact, he did it — or tried to do it.
事实上，他做到了——或者试图做到这一点。
That would be a case where, if you pay attention to his ideas and speeches, you would do very well, but just in the abstract, you might think it’s crazy.
在这种情况下，如果你关注他的想法和演讲，你会做得很好，但只是抽象地讲，你可能会认为这很疯狂。
What guy would ever do this?
哪个男人会这么做？
But he did it.
但他做到了。
If we just took all the leaders and all the things they said, and then whether or not they did the things they said they were going to do, I guess my prediction is the correlation goes in the other direction, particularly with military exercises, but that might be wrong.
如果我们只考虑所有领导人和他们所说的所有事情，然后无论他们是否做了他们所说的要做的事情，我想我的预测是相关性会朝另一个方向发展，特别是在军事演习方面，但这可能是错误的。
I’ve never seen someone run that.
我从未见过有人运行它。
I think of political speech as more informative.
我认为政治演讲信息更丰富。
China is insisting that, within the hundred-year anniversary of the revolution, which would be 2049, it will bring Taiwan back into the fold.
中国坚称，在辛亥革命一百周年之际，即2049年，它将把台湾纳入其中。
Now, they may not succeed in doing that, but I strongly believe that as a result of their words, that’s what they intend to do, and they will try very hard to do it.
现在，他们可能无法成功做到这一点，但我坚信，由于他们的话，这就是他们打算做的事情，并且他们会非常努力地去做。
Why is that a mistake in inference?
为什么这是一个推理错误？
Why would they say it?
他们为什么要这么说呢？
What’s wrong with the simple, they say it because they’re selling the idea to their public, and they believe it, and a lot of their public believes it, and they want to do it?
简单有什么问题吗？他们这么说是因为他们向公众推销这个想法，他们相信这一点，而且很多公众也相信这一点，他们也想这样做？
I’m not saying there’s no information.
我并不是说没有信息。
Most of the time you have two parties .
大多数时候你有两个聚会。
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We have the word brinksmanship for a reason because people bring it to the brink, and then they walk back.
我们使用“边缘政策”这个词是有原因的，因为人们把它带到了边缘，然后又走回来。
And the language that is necessary to establish a bargaining position .
以及建立讨价还价地位所必需的语言。
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Let’s put it in a totally different situation.
让我们把它放在一个完全不同的情况下。
You’re negotiating in a market for a carpet, and you have to stake out and say, “Oh, I could never pay that.” Our whole ability to get a deal is actually contingent on me knowing that you have an incentive to actually say something that’s false about your own intransigence because it strengthens your bargaining power.
你在市场上就地毯进行谈判，你必须标定并说：“哦，我永远付不起这个钱。”我们达成交易的全部能力实际上取决于我知道你有动机实际上对你自己的不妥协态度说一些错误的话，因为这会增强你的讨价还价能力。
Maybe that’s why I don’t believe political speech — because the whole act of bargaining with an adversary is it’s necessary for you to pretend that you will give less than you won’t.
也许这就是为什么我不相信政治言论 ——因为与对手讨价还价的整个行为就是你有必要假装你会付出的比你不会付出的要少。
We all know this.
我们都知道这一点。
We all do this instinctually, and it’s a ritual.
我们都本能地这样做，这是一种仪式。
More often than not, you find the deal.
通常，您会找到优惠。
You don’t walk away, and eventually, you buy a carpet.
你不会走开，最终你买了一张地毯。
But how’s this for a theory?
但这对于一个理论来说怎么样？
Political speech really matters in cases where there’s no Solomonic solution where you can just split the baby.
如果没有所罗门式的解决方案，你可以把孩子分开，那么政治言论确实很重要。
You can’t give Putin half of Ukraine.
你不能给普京一半的乌克兰。
Taiwan can’t give China half of Taiwan.
台湾不能把一半的台湾交给中国。
Then, in those cases, it actually indicates there might be a likely conflict.
那么，在这些情况下，它实际上表明可能存在冲突。
In other cases, there’s plenty of bargaining, right?
在其他情况下，还有很多讨价还价的机会，对吗？
Right.
正确的。
I think the problem, though, is actually the fact that we create a set of institutional or ideological rigidities that keep us from compromising.
但我认为，问题实际上在于我们创造了一套制度或意识形态僵化，阻止我们妥协。
That hasn’t happened in Hong Kong.
这种事在香港还没有发生。
There are all these gradations of Chinese control over Hong Kong because there aren’t as many bright red lines.
中国对香港的控制有如此多的等级，因为没有那么多的鲜红线。
That’s why I wouldn’t predict violence in the case of Hong Kong.
这就是为什么我不会预测香港会发生暴力。
To the extent that you’re right, I don’t think it’s the statements that are the problem.
如果你是对的，我认为问题不在于陈述。
I’d look for these institutional rigidities that cannot adapt to changing relative bargaining power.
我会寻找这些无法适应不断变化的相对议价能力的制度僵化。
Given your understanding of the psychology behind decisions to go to war, what can we do to lower that risk?
鉴于您对战争决定背后的心理的了解，我们可以采取什么措施来降低这种风险？
Other than just make people nicer — sort of tautological answers, but substantively?
除了让人们变得更好之外 — 类似同义反复的答案，但实质上呢？
I think the answer is more organizational than psychological, in the sense that they’re related, but we make decisions as groups, and we make decisions as bureaucracies most of the time.
我认为答案更多的是组织性的，而不是心理性的，因为它们是相关的，但我们作为团体做出决策，而且大多数时候我们作为官僚机构做出决策。
Only in the most centralized countries do individuals make decisions, and even then, I don’t think it’s individuals.
只有在最集权的国家，个人才能做出决定，即使如此，我也不认为这是个人的决定。
There’s still this apparatus.
还有这个装置。
So, I like to pay attention to the errors that we make as a result, that maybe accentuate our psychological problems or psychological tendencies to probably process too little information and to just succumb to something like availability bias, which is the opinions in the room.
因此，我喜欢关注我们因此犯下的错误，这些错误可能会加剧我们的心理问题或心理倾向，可能会处理太少的信息，并屈服于诸如可用性偏见之类的东西，这是房间里的观点。
So, any type of organizational procedure.
因此，任何类型的组织程序。
I think a smart White House or a smart Kremlin or a smart military defense ministry would actually try to foster a way of reducing availability bias in the room and actually getting these red teams and these other types of ways of getting devil’s advocates into the room.
我认为聪明的白宫、聪明的克里姆林宫或聪明的军事国防部实际上会尝试找到一种方法来减少房间内的可用性偏见，并实际上让这些红队和其他类型的方式让魔鬼的拥护者进入房间。
What did Shakespeare understand about war that current social scientists do not?
莎士比亚对战争的理解有哪些是当前社会科学家所不了解的？
I’m one of these people who didn’t really read books until I was at the end of my college career and missed the induction into Shakespeare, and so, I fear I might be the last person —
我是那些直到大学生涯结束才真正读书的人之一，并且错过了莎士比亚的入门课程，所以，我担心我可能是最后一个人 -
But you talked about this in your book.
但你在书中谈到了这一点。
You talk about Henry the IV, right?
你说的是亨利四世，对吗？
Since I can’t name the particular insight that Shakespeare had, that to me is an instance of .
由于我无法说出莎士比亚的具体见解，这对我来说就是一个例子。
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。
.
。
and this was true of a lot.
很多人都是如此。
Again, I don’t want to beat this down because I do think there are a lot of other sources of instability.
再说一遍，我不想否定这一点，因为我确实认为还有很多其他不稳定因素。
But that period of European history was a period of concentrated autocratic power and a set of monarchs who could indulge not just any private interest they have in war, but actually per ideological or glory-driven preferences for status and status competition amongst themselves.
但那段欧洲历史是一个专制权力集中的时期，君主们不仅可以放纵自己在战争中的任何私人利益，而且实际上可以放纵于意识形态或荣耀驱动的地位偏好以及他们之间的地位竞争。
That’s a reading of history that echoes, very, very loudly in my ears, some of the patterns I see today.
这是对历史的解读，在我耳边非常非常响亮地回响着我今天看到的一些模式。
What do you think of the Steven Pinker thesis that basically war’s diminishing over time, consistently and for structural reasons?
您如何看待史蒂文·平克（Steven Pinker）的论点，即战争基本上随着时间的推移、持续且出于结构性原因而减少？
I think it’s a plausible hypothesis that seems not to be true, according to some of the people who have done the careful analysis of interstate and civil wars.
根据一些对州际战争和内战进行仔细分析的人的说法，我认为这是一个看似合理的假设，但似乎并不正确。
Then, if you look at other types of violence, particularly violence within societies, within cities — you look at homicide — it’s unassailably true.
然后，如果你看看其他类型的暴力，特别是社会内部、城市内部的暴力——“你看看凶杀案”——这是无可辩驳的事实。
You have to evaluate that depending on the type of violence.
你必须根据暴力的类型来评估这一点。
Interpersonal violence that can be controlled by the state — definitely going down, partly because we have stronger states that control violence.
国家可以控制的人际暴力肯定会减少，部分原因是我们有更强大的国家来控制暴力。
Violence between strategic actors — different polities or factions within a polity — I would like the trend to be downwards, and it might go down, but I don’t think that’s where the evidence points.
战略行为体之间的暴力——“不同政体或政体内的派系”——“我希望趋势是下降的，而且可能会下降，但我不认为这就是证据所指出的。
What do you think of the model where, maybe, there’s a downward trend for frequency, but there’s an upward ratchet in terms of destructiveness?
您如何看待这个模型，其中频率可能呈下降趋势，但破坏性却呈上升趋势？
From World War I to World War II — while it wasn’t that long, the second was more destructive.
从第一次世界大战到第二次世界大战——虽然时间不长，但第二次战争的破坏性更大。
Now it’s been a long time since World War II.
现在距离第二次世界大战已经过去很长一段时间了。
Weapons are much more powerful.
武器威力更强大。
If another world war happened again, the standard line, World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones, right?
如果再次发生世界大战，标准线，第四次世界大战将是用棍棒和石头打，对吗？
Is that the best model we have?
这是我们拥有的最好的模型吗？
It’s not always true, but as a first-order prediction, thinking that war is going to become less frequent but more deadly than it is, especially when it involves nuclear powers — yes, I think that’s basically right.
这并不总是正确的，但作为一阶预测，认为战争将变得不那么频繁，但更加致命，特别是当它涉及核国家时 - 是的，我认为这基本上是正确的。
You’re a pessimist for your grandchildren?
您对您的孙子是悲观主义者吗？
Yes.
是的。
Because the next one will be a doozy, right?
因为下一个将会是一件很酷的事，对吧？
We don’t know when it’s coming, but under that hypothesis, there’s a great deal to worry about.
我们不知道它什么时候到来，但根据这个假设，有很多事情值得担心。
You have to think it will be worse than World War II.
你必须认为这会比第二次世界大战更糟糕。
I think it will be, but worse than World War II and nuclear Armageddon are two very different things.
我认为会的，但比第二次世界大战和核末日更糟糕的是两件截然不同的事情。
The truth is going to be somewhere in between.
事实介于两者之间。
I think the probability of limited use of nuclear weapons in the next 50 years is extremely high.
我认为未来50年有限使用核武器的可能性极高。
The use of all-out mutually assured destruction is impossible to access.
使用全面的相互确保毁灭是不可能的。
I don’t see any reason to think it’s particularly high, but the fact that it’s small and possible is a little bit terrifying.
我看不出有任何理由认为它特别高，但事实上它很小而且可能有点可怕。
Where do you think is the most likely next target for a nuclear weapon?
您认为核武器最有可能的下一个目标是哪里？
Does this include dirty bombs?
这包括脏弹吗？
Not dirty bombs, but a major explosion.
不是脏弹，而是大爆炸。
So a state-sanctioned use of informal —
因此，国家批准使用非正式的 ——
It doesn’t have to be state-sanctioned but —
它不一定要经过国家批准，但是 -
That’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
I would be more worried about North Korea or using one of Pakistan or India than I am of Russia or the United States.
我会更担心朝鲜或使用巴基斯坦或印度之一，而不是俄罗斯或美国。
I think we differ on this, but maybe not.
我认为我们在这一点上存在分歧，但也许不是。
In the next three weeks, anything’s possible, sadly, and so this will come — this will look very dated.
在接下来的三周内，一切皆有可能，遗憾的是，所以这将会到来 - 这看起来非常过时。
I think it’s unlikely, but we’re recording this — when it comes to Russia — at the moment of tremendous uncertainty.
我认为这不太可能，但我们正在记录这一点——“当涉及到俄罗斯时”——在充满巨大不确定性的时刻。
We’re just three days, four days, five days into an invasion, depending on when you want to count the beginning.
入侵才刚刚三天、四天、五天，这取决于你想从什么时候算开始。
Anyways, this is so, but ignoring that, which is impossible, it’s probably in one of these smaller countries.
无论如何，事实就是如此，但忽略这一点，这是不可能的，它可能是在这些较小的国家之一。
If Putin thinks he can survive, I certainly would infer from that, that the chance of him launching a nuclear attack is very small.
如果普京认为他能活下来，我当然会由此推断，他发动核攻击的可能性很小。
But if he thinks he’s not going to survive, I would expect he would be willing to incur a strategy that just mixes up what’s happening, probably lowers his expected value, but boosts the variance.
但如果他认为自己无法生存，我预计他会愿意采取一种策略，这种策略只会混合正在发生的事情，可能会降低他的预期价值，但会增加方差。
Then I would think a nuclear attack is at least a few percent, maybe more, maybe up to 10 percent.
那么我认为核攻击至少是百分之几，也许更多，也许高达百分之十。
Am I thinking about that wrong?
我这样想是不是错了？
Is that the right distinction — whether he expects he can survive or not?
这是正确的区分吗？——“他是否期望自己能活下来？”
How would you think about that?
你对此有何看法？
Even ignoring the nuclear calculus, in some sense, I think the whole basis for this war, or the whole basis for the aggression and the aggressive bargaining, is Putin’s desire to preserve and advance his control and his vision.
即使忽略核算计，从某种意义上说，我认为这场战争的全部基础，或者说侵略和侵略性讨价还价的全部基础，都是普京想要保持和推进他的控制和愿景的愿望。
Or maybe that network and that elite group’s control is my .
或者也许那个网络和那个精英团体的控制权是我的。
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.
。
not being a Russia expert.
不是俄罗斯专家。
What possible threat does NATO or capitalism or democracy have to the average Russian?
北约、资本主义或民主对普通俄罗斯人有什么可能的威胁？
I don’t see it, and even if it existed, I don’t see a threat that’s worth this kind of aggressive posturing and brinksmanship and invasion and possible use of nuclear weapons with Ukraine.
我没有看到它，即使它存在，我也没有看到值得对乌克兰采取这种侵略性姿态、边缘政策、入侵和可能使用核武器的威胁。
It’s all predicated on the interests of this group that’s in power — all of the action.
这一切都以这个掌权群体的利益为基础——所有的行动。
And how far will they go to preserve that?
他们会采取什么措施来保护这一点？
How far will people around him let him go, and how personalized his power, actually?
他周围的人会让他走多远，他的权力到底有多个性化？
I don’t think we really know, or at least I don’t know.
我认为我们并不真正知道，或者至少我不知道。
Why is it you’re more likely to get randomly beat up on the street in England than, say, in Canada, America, or New Zealand?
为什么你在英国街上比在加拿大、美国或新西兰更有可能被随机殴打？
Are you more randomly likely to get beat up in England?
你在英格兰被殴打的可能性更大吗？
I think so.
我想是的。
At times, I’m slightly afraid.
有时，我有点害怕。
Is it an alcohol issue, or how gangs are organized?
是酒精问题，还是帮派的组织方式？
We live on different streets.
我们住在不同的街道上。
You live in Virginia, and I live on the South Side of Chicago.
你住在弗吉尼亚州，我住在芝加哥南区。
Then it’s not true.
那么这不是真的。
No one’s going to beat me up, but is someone going to come and knock me down and grab my phone?
没有人会打我，但有人会过来把我打倒并抢走我的手机吗？
Maybe.
或许。
That’s a very different kind of violence.
这是一种非常不同的暴力。
That’s a very different kind.
这是一种非常不同的类型。
In England, if you were beaten up, it might just be for sport.
在英国，如果你被殴打，那可能只是为了好玩。
By a bunch of .
由一群。
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。
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。
If there are bands of hooligans going around beating up people for sport, I would hypothesize that’s a social norm that exists in that society that somehow says, “We’re going to tolerate this particularly egregious set of behaviors.” We just tolerate different bad behavior in our own communities here.
如果有一群流氓为了运动而四处殴打人们，我会假设这是该社会中存在的一种社会规范，它以某种方式说：“我们将容忍这种特别令人震惊的行为。”我们只是容忍我们自己社区中的不同不良行为。
Some communities, to some extent, will tolerate one kind of violence, maybe, on the South Side of Chicago, and we tolerate and have become accustomed to maybe something different in England.
在某种程度上，一些社区会容忍一种暴力，也许在芝加哥南区，而我们容忍并已经习惯了英格兰的不同暴力。
That would be my suggestion.
这就是我的建议。
We used to have generations of American men — they’d fight in wars, they went away, they came back home.
我们曾经有几代美国男人——他们参加过战争，他们离开，他们回到家乡。
Maybe they were hailed as heroes, but they probably had a lot of PTSD.
也许他们被誉为英雄，但他们可能患有很多创伤后应激障碍。
That’s really not so much the case anymore.
现在情况已经不再是这样了。
How has that changed American society?
这如何改变了美国社会？
They probably did have PTSD.
他们可能确实患有创伤后应激障碍。
Sure, a lot of them.
当然，很多。
Now there’s less of that.
现在这样的事少了。
Obviously, some veterans coming back from Afghanistan, Iraq, but much smaller.
显然，有一些从阿富汗、伊拉克回来的老兵，但规模要小得多。
I would say the most important thing about this experience probably wasn’t the exposure to trauma and PTSD.
我想说，这次经历中最重要的事情可能不是遭受创伤和创伤后应激障碍。
I would’ve thought the organizational experience and the bonding.
我会想到组织经验和联系。
Maybe a small fraction would have PTSD, but everyone would’ve come back with the military socialization, for example, and maybe, depending on how that war conducted itself, potentially very poisonous and xenophobic views or, potentially, the opposite.
也许一小部分人会患有创伤后应激障碍，但每个人都会带着军事社会化回来，例如，也许，取决于战争如何进行，可能是非常有毒和仇外的观点，或者可能是相反的观点。
I think that would be very idiosyncratic to that particular war.
我认为这对于那场特定的战争来说是非常特殊的。
I would say we’re probably a society that is less socialized into large bureaucracies and obedience.
我想说，我们可能是一个不太社会化的大型官僚机构和服从的社会。
That would maybe be my first response.
这可能是我的第一反应。
I would think we’re more socialized into large bureaucracies.
我认为我们更多地融入了大型官僚机构。
More people work in big companies, government employment if you count contractors.
更多的人在大公司工作，如果算上承包商的话，还会在政府工作。
Society, to me, feels much more bureaucratic than when I was a kid.
对我来说，社会比我小时候更加官僚化。
I see.
我懂了。
I would say maybe it’s a particular group project.
我想说也许这是一个特定的小组项目。
And maybe I’m just projecting my own experience because, even though I’m in a large institution, I’m this very autonomous individual, and so I’m not seeing that.
也许我只是在投射我自己的经历，因为即使我在一个大型机构中，我也是一个非常自主的个体，所以我没有看到这一点。
I do think there’s something qualitatively different about being a, maybe, temporary member of a corporation for the next three years of my life to socialization into a mass war movement.
我确实认为，在我生命的未来三年里，作为一个公司的临时成员，与社会化为一场大规模的战争运动，有一些本质上的不同。
Even if it’s also for three years, I think it’s probably a very different psychological experience.
即使同样是三年，我想这也可能是一种非常不同的心理体验。
Especially for the younger members of Congress, is it a good thing that so few of them have served in the military?
尤其是对于年轻的国会议员来说，参军的人这么少是件好事吗？
Or should we be concerned?
或者我们应该担心吗？
We shouldn’t make too much of these correlations.
我们不应该过分重视这些相关性。
But it is interesting that if you look at some of the people who have run correlations of what kinds of leaders are most likely to end up taking their country to war, it’s ones who have been trained in the military but never fought in a war.
但有趣的是，如果你观察一下一些人，他们对哪种领导人最有可能最终将自己的国家带入战争进行了相关分析，你会发现，这些人接受过军事训练，但从未参加过战争。
You can imagine that there’s an inverse U-shape, that no military experience or military experience with actually fighting a war both lead you to be averse, and then there’s that middle ground.
你可以想象有一个倒U形，即没有军事经验或实际打仗的军事经验都会导致你厌恶，然后就是中间立场。
That seems intuitively plausible to me.
对我来说，这在直觉上似乎是合理的。
At the same time, I’m not sure that’s on my top-five list of things that would or would not make a congressperson go to war.
与此同时，我不确定这是否在我列出的会或不会促使国会议员参战的前五件事清单上。
Now, you’re doing quite a bit of work in Colombia recently.
现在，您最近在哥伦比亚做了很多工作。
Would you go long or short on the country and why?
您会做多还是做空该国股票？为什么？
I go long on the country on democracy and civic participation and stability to a degree, which is to say, I think it’s unlikely to get worse than it is now, and it’s quite good.
我在一定程度上看好这个国家的民主、公民参与和稳定，也就是说，我认为它不太可能变得比现在更糟，而且还不错。
I don’t go long on economic development.
我对经济发展的关注并不长。
I see them maybe getting stuck in the middle-income trap.
我认为他们可能陷入了中等收入陷阱。
What’s their problem there?
他们那里有什么问题？
I keep asking people who are in government or in industry, and it’s striking to me that nobody has an answer, and people haven’t been thinking about it.
我不断地询问政府或工业界的人，令我惊讶的是，没有人能给出答案，而且人们也没有思考过这个问题。
The fact that it’s not an energetic topic of discussion and focus is, in itself, maybe a problem.
事实上，这并不是一个充满活力的讨论和焦点话题，这本身可能就是一个问题。
I think that it’s also a country that faces some severe cost disadvantage at being either an industrial or service powerhouse.
我认为，无论是作为工业强国还是服务业强国，这个国家都面临着一些严重的成本劣势。
My whole view is that most places in the world are doomed to be part of a middle-income trap.
我的整体观点是，世界上大多数地方注定会陷入中等收入陷阱。
The lucky ones will find themselves in political union with a place that’s not.
幸运的人会发现自己与一个并非政治联盟的地方结成了政治联盟。
Newfoundland would be one of the poorer countries in the world if they didn’t have the good fortune of joining Canada 70 or 80 years ago.
如果纽芬兰没有在 70 或 80 年前有幸加入加拿大，他们将成为世界上最贫穷的国家之一。
If Colombia was in a political union with Mexico, I would be much more bullish on Colombian economic prosperity because I think they would siphon off a lot of the success that I would predict for Mexico.
如果哥伦比亚与墨西哥建立政治联盟，我会更加看好哥伦比亚的经济繁荣，因为我认为他们会夺走我预测墨西哥的很多成功。
Does Colombia have the problem that I associate with much of Central America?
哥伦比亚是否存在我与中美洲大部分地区联系在一起的问题？
The market size is actually quite small.
市场规模实际上很小。
The country appears moderately populous, but the different parts of the country are not well connected.
该国人口看似中等，但该国不同地区的联系并不紧密。
It’s a set of semi-isolated islands, and then their ideal major trading partner, the United States, is fairly far away.
这是一组半孤立的岛屿，而他们理想的主要贸易伙伴美国则相距相当遥远。
Maybe the best scenario for Colombia is to think of Panama as part of Colombia, which, of course, it once was, and Panama’s doing great.
也许对哥伦比亚来说最好的方案是将巴拿马视为哥伦比亚的一部分，当然，它曾经是哥伦比亚的一部分，而且巴拿马做得很好。
The rest of Colombia is the hinterlands.
哥伦比亚的其余地区是内陆地区。
You have the hinterlands with different cutoff parts, all with small market size and no great neighbor nearby at that.
腹地有不同的截止区域，所有区域的市场规模都很小，而且附近没有伟大的邻居。
I think it’s a general strategy for the Colombias and the Ugandas and all of the countries of the world that are not obviously going to be a center of agglomerations of industry or services or tech or ideas but are pretty good, would do better in the long run .
我认为这是哥伦比亚、乌干达以及世界上所有国家的总体战略，这些国家显然不会成为工业、服务、技术或思想的集聚中心，但相当不错，从长远来看会做得更好。
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They might not do better in other dimensions, but they would do better in terms of economic development by seeking more political union, maybe not with the Panamas, although Panama is important because of the trade networks and things.
他们在其他方面可能不会做得更好，但通过寻求更多的政治联盟，他们会在经济发展方面做得更好，也许不会与巴拿马人结盟，尽管巴拿马由于贸易网络和事物而很重要。
I would seek political union with the places with those agglomerations.
我会寻求与这些聚集地的政治联盟。
For Colombia, there’s no natural partner.
对于哥伦比亚来说，没有天然的合作伙伴。
It’s certainly not Venezuela.
这当然不是委内瑞拉。
Yeah, the tragedy for Colombia is that Brazil doesn’t speak Spanish as their principal language.
是的，哥伦比亚的悲剧是巴西的主要语言不是西班牙语。
Otherwise, that would be the natural .
不然的话，那就很自然了。
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No, Colombia is at a geographic disadvantage for long-run economic development.
不，哥伦比亚在长期经济发展方面处于地理劣势。
Why does the country have a relatively high-quality bureaucracy, given those problems?
鉴于这些问题，为什么这个国家拥有相对较高素质的官僚机构？
Every single researcher who works there asks themselves why they have this good fortune of working with amazing technocrats.
在那里工作的每一位研究人员都会问自己，为什么他们有幸与令人惊叹的技术官僚一起工作。
It’s a very unequal country in terms of access to education and in terms of access to these positions, but that’s also true of many other Latin American countries, so I’m not sure why Colombia seems better.
在接受教育和获得这些职位方面，这是一个非常不平等的国家，但许多其他拉丁美洲国家也是如此，所以我不确定为什么哥伦比亚看起来更好。
I’m not sure that’s entirely it.
我不确定这就是全部。
One self-serving hypothesis I have is that, in the United States, your path to political power and your generic degree is in law.
我的一个自私的假设是，在美国，你获得政治权力和普通学位的途径是法律。
In China, I’m told it’s engineering, and in Colombia, it’s political science and economics.
在中国，我被告知是工程学，而在哥伦比亚，是政治学和经济学。
It might just be that that idiosyncratically creates .
这可能只是一种特殊的创造。
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It takes these great people who might have become engineers, who might have become lawyers in another system, and then teaches them technocratic science.
它需要这些可能成为工程师、可能成为另一个系统中的律师的伟大人物，然后教给他们技术官僚科学。
That’s like the elite language.
这就像精英语言。
If someone has two weeks, and they want to take the perfect trip through Colombia, what is it?
如果有人有两周时间，想要在哥伦比亚进行一次完美的旅行，那是什么？
I enjoy renting a car and doing my own road trips, which is something that very few people do, even though it’s perfectly safe.
我喜欢租一辆车并自己进行公路旅行，这是很少有人做的事情，尽管它非常安全。
There are very few, if any, parts of the country where you would ever — that’s 10 or 20 years in the past — where you’d worry about that.
在这个国家，即使有的话，也很少有地方你会“——那是过去的 10 或 20 年了”——你会担心这个问题。
Then, my general strategy is to pick medium-size towns and sites.
然后，我的总体策略是选择中等规模的城镇和地点。
I avoid the big cities.
我避开大城市。
You probably have to see Bogotá and Medellín, but I would actually try to just skip over them.
您可能必须参观波哥大和麦德林，但实际上我会尝试跳过它们。
I would pick a quarter of the country, and I would drive around that for two weeks.
我会选择这个国家的四分之一，然后我会在那里开车两周。
The ones I’ve chosen — we did a two-week road trip.
我选择的那些 ——我们进行了为期两周的公路旅行。
Maybe one of my highlights is from Bucaramanga, through Colombia’s Grand Canyon, Villa de Leyva, Spanish colonial towns up in the mountains, down to Bogotá over two weeks.
也许我的亮点之一是从布卡拉曼加出发，穿过哥伦比亚的大峡谷、莱瓦镇、山上的西班牙殖民城镇，在两周内到达波哥大。
That was fabulous.
那太棒了。
Should I be optimistic about the future of violence in Mexico?
我应该对墨西哥暴力的未来感到乐观吗？
I am just starting to answer that question for myself.
我刚刚开始为自己回答这个问题。
The few days that I dipped my toe into it in person — and now I’m going back — makes me, in this paradoxical way, very bullish on Mexico in general, but wondering how they will ever solve this problem.
我亲自涉足的几天 ——现在我要回去了——让我以这种矛盾的方式总体上非常看好墨西哥，但想知道他们将如何解决这个问题。
I’m not sure how they will ever solve the problem of violence because solving the problem of violence requires recognizing that these armed groups and criminal cartels have an immense amount of power, and that they have to find a way to live with them.
我不确定他们将如何解决暴力问题，因为解决暴力问题需要认识到这些武装团体和犯罪卡特尔拥有巨大的权力，并且他们必须找到一种与他们共存的方法。
I’m not sure that’s the right choice.
我不确定这是正确的选择。
I think Mexicans have chosen.
我认为墨西哥人已经选择了。
They’ve said, “That’s unacceptable.
他们说：“这是不可接受的。
We refuse to do that, no matter the cost.
无论付出什么代价，我们都拒绝这样做。
We’re going to be engaged in a long, brutal, and possibly unwinnable war with these groups.”
我们将与这些组织进行一场漫长、残酷、可能无法获胜的战争。”
A lot of particular states will let the groups be.
许多特定的州都会让这些团体自由。
I think you’re going to see a mix.
我想你会看到混合的。
You see that everywhere.
你到处都可以看到这一点。
You see that in any country, including the United States.
你可以在任何国家看到这一点，包括美国。
Different municipal governments and different state governments agree to be conciliatory to their criminal gangs to different degrees.
不同市政府和不同州政府同意对其犯罪团伙进行不同程度的安抚。
One of the challenges is that tends to be democratically unpopular, and that’s certainly been true in Colombia.
挑战之一是这在民主上往往不受欢迎，哥伦比亚确实如此。
My first read is that might be what’s true, at least nationally, in Mexico.
我的第一个读到的是，这可能是墨西哥的真实情况，至少在全国范围内是这样。
So, as soon as you have transitions of government, I think there’s just a risk every X years of that conciliatory nature and that peace between the state and the gang falling apart.
因此，一旦政府换届，我认为每 X 年就会有一次这种和解性质以及国家与帮派之间的和平破裂的风险。
What about Wagner’s law of catch-up hypothesis, that for a country of its per capita income, the Mexican government is relatively small, and that if the share of government in GDP went up, say, four percentage points, that over time, they would just have more resources and beat the gangs, and Mexico would still be violent but, more or less, converge to where a lot of other countries are at?
瓦格纳的追赶定律假设又如何呢？即对于一个人均收入相同的国家来说，墨西哥政府相对较小，如果政府占GDP的份额上升，比如说四个百分点，随着时间的推移，他们就会拥有更多的资源并击败帮派，墨西哥仍然会暴力，但或多或少会向许多其他国家靠拢？
Is it that simple?
真有这么简单吗？
They just need more money?
他们只是需要更多的钱？
Well, no. That’s like saying if we arm more, do we expect to have less violence?
嗯，不。这就像说，如果我们配备更多武器，暴力事件会减少吗？
Once again, I think it’s about, we’re going to change the bargaining power.
我再次认为，我们将改变议价能力。
It’s one of these things — you’re not changing the probability of war.
这是其中之一 —— 你并没有改变战争的可能性。
You’re changing the bargaining power of the Mexican state versus the gangs.
你正在改变墨西哥政府与帮派讨价还价的能力。
What you might not have changed is the fact that they’re unwilling to compromise.
你可能没有改变的是他们不愿意妥协的事实。
So, unless you are able to become overwhelmingly more powerful than these gangs and cartels, and thus, either concede very little or just have an incessant war, but on the margins, which is a little bit like the war on drugs in the United States.
因此，除非你能够变得比这些帮派和卡特尔更加强大，否则要么只做出很少的让步，要么只是在边缘进行一场持续不断的战争，这有点像美国的禁毒战争。
We’ve decided we’re just going to go to an incessant war against these almost-impossible-to-eliminate gangs.
我们决定对这些几乎不可能消灭的帮派进行一场持续不断的战争。
They’re now very small and confined because we have an immense amount of bargaining power vis-à-vis these very weak gangs.
他们现在规模很小而且受到限制，因为我们对这些非常弱的团伙拥有巨大的讨价还价能力。
I just don’t see Mexico ever getting there because they’re the principal channel for drugs in the United States.
我只是不认为墨西哥会达到这一目标，因为他们是美国毒品的主要渠道。
Now, if we develop other channels of drugs in the United States, or if we somehow discover how to grow coca in other regions that lead to different transport networks, that would totally change it.
现在，如果我们在美国开发其他毒品渠道，或者如果我们以某种方式发现如何在其他地区种植古柯，从而形成不同的运输网络，那将彻底改变它。
Otherwise, that’s the sense in which I’m not bullish on Mexico.
否则，这就是我不看好墨西哥的原因。
You’re Canadian.
你是加拿大人。
Who predicted the Ottawa truckers convoy?
谁预测了渥太华卡车司机车队？
What is it they saw that other people did not?
他们看到了什么其他人没有看到的？
Well, I don’t know if anyone predicted it.
嗯，不知道有没有人预测到。
I would say most Canadians — because I don’t think it’s nearly as polarized a place, although I haven’t lived there in something like 20, almost 25 years — recognize that there’s a strong conservative and anti-establishment sentiment in the country, slightly fewer than in the United States but not dramatically different.
我想说的是，大多数加拿大人 ——因为我认为加拿大并不是一个两极分化的地方，尽管我已经有 20 年、近 25 年没有在那里生活了—— 认识到这个国家存在着强烈的保守和反建制情绪，比美国略少，但并没有太大不同。
Then, my distant view is that, because there are very few ICU beds, and because of the particular nature of the system — and for some reason they didn’t invest in them over the last two years — the government has to be super cautious and really had to crack down harder than in the United States, where we have many, many more ICU beds.
然后，我的远见是，因为 ICU 床位很少，而且由于该系统的特殊性 ——而且出于某种原因他们在过去两年里没有对其进行投资 ——政府必须非常谨慎，并且确实必须比美国更严厉地打击，因为我们有很多很多的 ICU 床位。
They may have just overstepped what people were willing to tolerate.
他们可能刚刚超出了人们愿意容忍的范围。
I don’t think people were surprised at the movement.
我认为人们对这一运动并不感到惊讶。
I think they might have been surprised that it emerged in this raucous, amateurish, violent way, and some of the weirdness at the fringes was extra weird for Canada.
我认为他们可能会感到惊讶，因为它以这种喧闹、业余、暴力的方式出现，而且一些边缘的奇怪现象对加拿大来说尤其奇怪。
Why didn’t the Ottawa police just arrest the truckers?
渥太华警方为何不直接逮捕卡车司机？
And as a follow-up to that, how much is the decision to arrest like the decision to fight?
作为后续行动，逮捕的决定与战斗的决定有多少相似之处？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I grew up in Ottawa, and that has given me precisely zero insight into the 21st-century policing in Ottawa, I would say.
我在渥太华长大，这让我对渥太华 21 世纪的警务工作的了解完全为零，我想说。
So the first part of your question, I don’t have an answer.
所以你问题的第一部分，我没有答案。
In general, violently disrupting or closing down protests is just an inherently risky political strategy, and if you don’t think you have to do it, you might just try to wait them out a little bit, especially if it’s –20 degrees.
一般来说，暴力扰乱或镇压抗议活动本质上是一种有风险的政治策略，如果您认为不必这样做，您可能只是尝试等待它们结束一点，尤其是在零下 20 度的情况下。
But is it like fighting?
但这就像打仗吗？
I think it is.
我认为是的。
In some sense, that’s the equivalent.
从某种意义上来说，这是等价的。
The world of ideas.
思想的世界。
What did von Clausewitz get wrong?
冯·克劳塞维茨做错了什么？
The basic insight that we get from him, which is maybe the only one I’ve internalized and remember, I think is basically right and is the thing we often forget.
我们从他那里得到的基本见解，这可能是我内化并记住的唯一一个，我认为基本上是正确的，也是我们经常忘记的。
I’m not answering your question because I actually don’t know.
我不回答你的问题，因为我真的不知道。
Presumably, we don’t talk about 99 percent of what else is in that book because it wasn’t particularly insightful, might be part of the answer.
据推测，我们不会谈论那本书中 99% 的其他内容，因为它不是特别有洞察力，可能是答案的一部分。
But I think this idea that politics and fighting are two sides of the same coin is a very deep insight that is surprisingly easy to never learn and to forget in spite of everyone being able to repeat his famous phrase.
但我认为政治和战斗是同一枚硬币的两面这一观点是一个非常深刻的见解，尽管每个人都能重复他的名言，但令人惊讶的是，它很容易永远不会学习和忘记。
What special insight do you think you have into Hayek?
您认为您对哈耶克有什么特别的见解？
None whatsoever.
一点也没有。
But do people either overrate or underrate him?
但人们是高估还是低估他呢？
How’s your take on him different?
你对他的看法有何不同？
I have four volumes by Hayek.
我有四卷哈耶克的著作。
The thinnest one I read 25 years ago.
我25年前读过的最薄的一本。
So maybe I suspect a lot of people are like me in that they have bought the volumes and aspired to read but have not fully read, so probably underrated.
所以也许我怀疑很多人和我一样，他们已经买了这些书并渴望阅读，但还没有完全阅读，所以可能被低估了。
What’s the thought of Albert Hirschman that’s influenced you most?
艾伯特·赫希曼 (Albert Hirschman) 的思想对你影响最大的是什么？
Development Projects Observed is probably like a whole set of volumes written by people of that generation and maybe the next generation.
《观察的开发项目》可能就像那一代人甚至下一代人写的一整套卷。
The idea I take from it is that development is a process of trial and error, or in some sense, it’s almost a process of creative destruction that requires lots of trial and error.
我从中得到的想法是，开发是一个反复试验的过程，或者从某种意义上说，它几乎是一个需要大量试验和错误的创造性破坏的过程。
It’s unfortunate that our general attitude towards international development, or the general attitude in most development organizations, is to absolutely ignore and remain institutionally and individually ignorant of the importance of trial and error and creative destruction in policy for decades.
不幸的是，我们对国际发展的普遍态度，或者大多数发展组织的普遍态度，是几十年来绝对忽视并在制度上和个人上对政策中试错和创造性破坏的重要性一无所知。
Jeff Sachs as a development thinker — overrated or underrated?
杰夫·萨克斯（Jeff Sachs）作为发展思想家 ——被高估还是低估？
Jeff Sachs was one of my teachers in letter writers and things.
杰夫·萨克斯是我在写信等方面的老师之一。
With great respect to Jeff Sachs, I think overrated only because there’s a handful of views .
非常尊重杰夫·萨克斯（Jeff Sachs），我认为被高估只是因为有一些观点。
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properly rated, but so many other ideas are just not read.
正确评价，但还有很多其他想法没有被阅读。
Jeff had a popular book and a clear message, as do a handful of others.
杰夫有一本很受欢迎的书，并且传达了明确的信息，其他一些人也是如此。
And all of those people — who are friends and I respect — are all overrated because it’s read too much, and everything else is read too little.
所有这些人————我尊敬的朋友——都被高估了，因为它读得太多了，而其他一切都读得太少了。
For bouldering, what’s a special skill that you need that most people don’t appreciate?
对于抱石，有什么是你需要但大多数人不欣赏的特殊技能？
I think it’s the fact that you have to not like other sports because it’s the kind of thing that rewards intense focus and practice, practice, practice.
我认为事实是你必须不喜欢其他运动，因为它是一种奖励高度集中注意力和练习、练习、练习的运动。
So to the extent that you like other physical activities — maybe all sports do this, but bouldering, in particular, rewards single-mindedness.
因此，如果您喜欢其他体育活动，也许所有运动都会这样做，但抱石尤其奖励专一的精神。
And so a lack of interest in other physical activities can be a benefit.
因此，对其他体育活动缺乏兴趣可能是一种好处。
You wrote some long while ago, maybe it was even 2007, that people who work for development agencies should not expect to fly business class.
您很久以前（也许是 2007 年）曾写过，为发展机构工作的人不应该期望乘坐商务舱。
What’s your current view of that hypothesis?
您目前对该假设有何看法？
I still live by that hypothesis, and I don’t know if I was at all influential on this.
我仍然坚持这个假设，我不知道我对此是否有影响。
I’d like to think I get 2 percent or 3 percent of the credit, but within a few years, the World Bank did severely limit the amount of business class travel or the conditions in which it’s possible.
我想我得到了 2% 或 3% 的信贷，但几年之内，世界银行确实严格限制了商务舱旅行的数量或可能的条件。
Given how many of my World Bank friends, previous to and after this, were mad at me is why I’m conceited enough to think I might have had a tiny bit of influence.
考虑到在此之前和之后我的许多世界银行朋友都对我生气，这就是为什么我自负地认为我可能有一点影响力。
Mostly, I hope it was just good sense.
大多数情况下，我希望这只是明智之举。
You think it’s correct to save money?
你认为省钱是正确的吗？
Or to remove the sense of entitlement or some other reason?
还是为了消除权利感或其他原因？
Listen, a lot of the development discourse and my own feelings are a little bit utilitarian in the sense that people are saying, “Listen, we can make choices here where we can spend $1,000 per person, or we can spend $500 on two people, and we’d like to decide which is better in terms of what can have more impact.
听着，很多发展讨论和我自己的感受都有点功利主义，因为人们会说，“听着，我们可以在这里做出选择，我们可以为每人花费 1,000 美元，也可以为两个人花费 500 美元，我们想决定哪一个更好，可以产生更大的影响。
Secondly, we’d like to find a bunch of innovations that really have low-cost impact so that we can take this limited — and sometimes increasingly limited — amount of development money and just do the most good with it.”
其次，我们希望找到一系列真正具有低成本影响的创新，这样我们就可以利用有限的——有时甚至越来越有限的开发资金，并充分利用它。”
The antithesis of that is just paying four times more for a slightly more roomy seat so you get slightly better sleep when you could do the same thing with a 5-cent Valium pill.
与此相反的是，只要花四倍的钱购买一个稍微宽敞的座位，这样你就可以得到更好的睡眠，而你可以用 5 美分的安定药丸做同样的事情。
What’s important about the thought of Harold Innis?
哈罗德·英尼斯的思想有何重要意义？
I was really influenced as a college student by these economic historians of Canada and South America, particularly Southern Cone, of whom Innis was very important in the importance of specific commodities and the characteristics of those commodities in determining a country’s development path.
作为一名大学生，我确实受到了加拿大和南美洲，特别是南锥体经济历史学家的影响，其中伊尼斯在特定商品的重要性以及这些商品的特征在决定一个国家的发展道路方面非常重要。
I think it’s a really underrated view of understanding different countries’ development paths.
我认为这种理解不同国家发展道路的观点确实被低估了。
Innis would say, if we really want to understand why Canada looks the way it does today, we would have to look at cod, or we would have to look at furs.
伊尼斯会说，如果我们真的想了解为什么加拿大看起来像今天这样，我们就必须看看鳕鱼，或者我们就必须看看毛皮。
And in Argentina, you would have to look at cows.
在阿根廷，你必须看看奶牛。
And in Colombia, you would think you have to look at coffee, but you actually have to look at all of the things that Colombia cycled through before they stumbled upon coffee as something where they had a global cost advantage.
在哥伦比亚，你可能认为你必须关注咖啡，但实际上你必须关注哥伦比亚在偶然发现咖啡具有全球成本优势之前经历的所有事情。
It’s just the idea that if we want to understand the economic geography and political paths and political stability of a country, we need to understand what commodities they started out with.
这只是一个想法，如果我们想了解一个国家的经济地理、政治路径和政治稳定性，我们需要了解他们从什么商品开始。
What this led me to do, and how I got started on the path of studying war, actually, is by realizing that some commodities are just hugely volatile in price for various circumstances, and some are not.
这促使我做的事情，以及我如何开始研究战争的道路，实际上是通过认识到有些商品的价格在不同情况下会大幅波动，而有些则不然。
So, if we wanted to understand long-term paths of development and why some places weren’t prosperous, it’s because they lost the commodity lottery, and they got a volatile commodity rather than a stable one.
所以，如果我们想了解长期的发展道路，以及为什么有些地方不繁荣，那是因为他们失去了商品彩票，他们得到了一种不稳定的商品，而不是稳定的商品。
Not unrelated to Russia, of course.
当然，这与俄罗斯不无关系。
Last question.
最后一个问题。
You teach at the University of Chicago.
您在芝加哥大学任教。
It still seems, to me, the place has a special ethos, a mix of seriousness, people teaching things to themselves, showing up meaning business, free speech, some cluster of ideas.
在我看来，这个地方仍然有一种特殊的精神，一种严肃性的混合体，人们自学东西，表现出商业的意义，言论自由，以及一些想法。
How has the University of Chicago maintained that?
芝加哥大学是如何保持这一点的呢？
What’s the secret there?
这里面有什么秘密呢？
I selected this place six years ago.
我六年前选择了这个地方。
In large part, that was one of its chief attractions, and I’ve asked myself that question.
在很大程度上，这是它的主要吸引力之一，我也问过自己这个问题。
There’s a cheap answer, which is cultural persistence, but then, the question is why?
有一个简单的答案，那就是文化持久性，但问题是为什么？
So many university cultures have changed, right?
很多大学文化都发生了变化，对吗？
Maybe I’m going to go back and contradict myself — the political speech point.
也许我会回去自相矛盾——政治言论观点。
I think the university built its social identity around being that, and the reason you can point out this thing is not .
我认为大学是围绕这一点建立其社会身份的，而你可以指出这件事的原因并非如此。
.
。
.
。
Even if you didn’t spend any time there, you would be able to say that is the identity of this university because that’s what they say they are, and they show up in the news because they’re the university that does that.
即使你没有在那里呆过任何时间，你也可以说这就是这所大学的身份，因为这就是他们所说的，他们出现在新闻中，因为他们是这样做的大学。
It shouldn’t be surprising that a university has done that.
一所大学这样做并不奇怪。
The question is, why haven’t more universities done that?
问题是，为什么没有更多的大学这样做呢？
I was faculty at Yale, and I was faculty at Columbia, and they were many great things, but they were not places that self-consciously define themselves as places to be about ideas and about ideas at all costs.
我曾在耶鲁大学和哥伦比亚大学任教，它们有很多伟大的东西，但它们并不是自觉地将自己定义为关于思想和不惜一切代价谈论思想的地方。
So it’s only in retrospect that I wonder why not.
所以只有回想起来，我才想知道为什么不这样做。
Thank you very much, Chris.
非常感谢你，克里斯。
Again, Chris’s new book, Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Path to Peace, is now out — highly recommended.
克里斯的新书《我们为何而战：战争的根源与和平之路》现已出版——强烈推荐。
It’s been a pleasure.
这是一种乐趣。
Thank you.
谢谢。