Benjamin Friedman on the Origins of Economic Belief (Ep. 114)

Counter to most people, who think of our modern economics as a secular product of the enlightenment, I think that there are very deep intellectual roots behind the creation of modern Western economics, and I think those roots have resonances that are still with us today.

大多数人认为我们的现代经济学是启蒙运动的世俗产物，我认为现代西方经济学的创造背后有着非常深厚的思想根源，而且我认为这些根源至今仍然与我们产生共鸣。

There are many people who complain that economics is a form of religion, and I think in a deeper sense there’s something to the idea.

很多人抱怨经济学是宗教的一种形式，我认为从更深层次的意义上来说，这个想法是有道理的。

I think we believe — when I say we, I’m picking up on your question about Americans — we believe what we believe about markets and the role of competition and the role of capitalism in our economy because there are religious roots behind the ideas that gave us those.

我认为我们相信——当我说我们时，我是在回答你关于美国人的问题——我们相信我们对市场、竞争的作用以及资本主义在我们经济中的作用的看法，因为这些想法背后有宗教根源。

I think that’s important.

我认为这很重要。

There are many people who believe in what scientists would call supernatural phenomena, and I am aware that that’s a part of religion, but I’m uncomfortable with describing that as superstitious.

有很多人相信科学家所说的超自然现象，我知道这是宗教的一部分，但我不愿意将其描述为迷信。

But knowing what you mean, I don’t think that it has a lot to do with our economic views.

但我知道你的意思，我认为这与我们的经济观点没有太大关系。

It’s certainly not a part of my argument about the role of religion in standing behind many of our economic ideas.

这当然不是我关于宗教在支持我们许多经济理念中的作用的论点的一部分。

I think this is not at all unrelated to the fact that Americans have a deeper and more active commitment to the ideas of market competition.

我想这与美国人对市场竞争理念有更深入、更积极的认同不无关系。

It goes back to the question that I was raising a minute ago of where do our ideas of market competition come from in the first place?

这又回到了我刚才提出的问题，我们的市场竞争理念从何而来？

What I suggest in my book is that we got those ideas 200, 300 years ago from what were then new and hotly contended ideas about religion, theology within the English-speaking Protestant world, in which people like Adam Smith and David Hume lived.

我在书中提出的是，我们在 200、300 年前就从当时关于宗教、神学的新观念和激烈争论的英语新教世界中获得了这些观念，亚当·斯密和大卫·休谟等人就生活在这个世界中。

And I think that influence is still with us today.

我认为这种影响至今仍然存在。

So no, it’s not at all an accident that the country on the planet where we probably have the greatest commitment to market competition as the driver of economics, is precisely, as you say, an outlier in terms of commitment to religion and religious activities.

因此，正如您所说，在这个星球上，我们可能对市场竞争作为经济驱动力做出最大承诺的国家，在对宗教和宗教活动的承诺方面恰恰是一个异常值，这绝不是偶然的。

It’s not at all an accident that the country on the planet where we probably have the greatest commitment to market competition as the driver of economics, is precisely, as you say, an outlier in terms of commitment to religion and religious activities.

正如您所说，在这个星球上，我们可能对市场竞争作为经济驱动力做出最大承诺的国家，在对宗教和宗教活动的承诺方面恰恰是一个异常值，这绝非偶然。

Communism, at least as advocated at that time, had a unique feature of being simultaneously the existential enemy of lots of things that we hold dear.

共产主义，至少像当时所提倡的那样，有一个独特的特征，即它同时是我们所珍视的许多事物的生存敌人。

It was the enemy of Western-style political democracy, but it was also the enemy of Western-style market capitalism, and importantly for purposes of this line of argument, it was the enemy of Western-style religion.

它是西式政治民主的敌人，但它也是西式市场资本主义的敌人，而且重要的是，就这一论点而言，它是西式宗教的敌人。

I think the religious conservatives and the economic conservatives realized that they had an enemy in common, and they took the threat seriously, and this led them to come together.

我认为宗教保守派和经济保守派意识到他们有一个共同的敌人，他们认真对待威胁，这导致他们走到了一起。

The person I think who played the greatest role in bringing them together was Bill Buckley.

我认为在将他们聚集在一起方面发挥最大作用的人是比尔·巴克利。

Now, Buckley was not a theologian, but he was a religious man.

现在，巴克利不是一个神学家，但他是一个宗教人士。

By coincidence, he was a Roman Catholic; he wasn’t a Protestant.

巧合的是，他是一名罗马天主教徒。他不是新教徒。

But I think, under the leadership of Buckley and also ministers — I think of Billy Graham as being very active in this process, but others too — religious conservatism and economic conservatism came together at mid–20th century America, and I think they’ve been together ever since.

但我认为，在巴克利和部长们的领导下——“我认为比利·格雷厄姆在这一过程中非常积极，其他人也如此”——宗教保守主义和经济保守主义在 20 世纪中叶的美国走到了一起，我认为从那时起他们就一直在一起。

On varying cultural commitments to capitalism

论对资本主义的不同文化承诺

But by the time you get to the 18th century, as you note, it’s Adam Smith, David Hume.

但当你进入 18 世纪时，正如你所注意到的，那就是亚当·斯密、大卫·休谟。

The United States, which starts off as quite a Protestant republic, obviously is very capitalistic.

美国一开始就是一个新教共和国，显然是非常资本主义的。

How does that transformation happen?

这种转变是如何发生的？

Yes, I’m aware that there were these trade fairs.

是的，我知道有这些贸易展览会。

Yes, I’m aware that the Italians led the way in banking.

是的，我知道意大利人在银行业处于领先地位。

I don’t think that’s the same thing.

我不认为这是一回事。

I think these were not really market economies in the way that we know today.

我认为这些并不是我们今天所知道的真正的市场经济。

For that matter, 17th-century Britain wasn’t either, but it was an awful lot closer.

就这一点而言，17 世纪的英国也不是，但更接近。

I think it was in Northern Europe — I think of Holland, I think of Britain — that’s where the commercial economy developed, and that’s where the great debate over not just the advantages, but the morals of a commercial economy came to the fore.

我认为是在北欧——“我想到荷兰，我想到英国——”那里是商业经济发展的地方，也是关于商业经济的优势和道德的激烈争论的地方。

It was people like Smith and Hume in the mid to latter part of the 18th century who finally, finally had a real story about why market economies work and why market economies should not be thought of as inimical to our morals.

18 世纪中后期，像斯密和休谟这样的人终于有了一个真实的故事，说明市场经济为何有效，以及为什么市场经济不应该被认为有悖于我们的道德。

The good news would be that a half a century is — while not a short period of time — is nonetheless temporary.

好消息是，半个世纪是“虽然不是很短的一段时间”，但仍然是暂时的。

I would say the good news would be, going forward in time, we would see them — maybe not you and I in our lifetimes, but our children would see them — moving beyond their current authoritarian difficulties.

我想说的好消息是，随着时间的推移，我们会看到他们——“也许在我们的有生之年看不到你和我，但我们的孩子会看到他们”——超越目前的独裁困境。

But maybe not.

但也许不是。

Maybe there are forces that are deeper than just their experience under Soviet Communism.

也许还有比他们在苏联共产主义统治下的经历更深刻的力量。

The other parts — they’re not doing that well.

其他部分 ——他们做得不太好。

They have fascist movements.

他们有法西斯运动。

They had civil wars.

他们发生了内战。

Whether you look at before the Soviets or cases where the Soviets weren’t that strong, there just seems to be underperformance.

无论你看苏联之前的情况，还是苏联不那么强大的情况，似乎都表现不佳。

It’s as if there’s a line in Europe.

就好像欧洲有一条线。

What does that line signify?

那条线代表什么意思？

What does it correlate with?

它与什么相关？

But I understand that there are all sorts of cultural features.

但我知道有各种各样的文化特征。

Look at a country like Poland, for example.

以波兰这样的国家为例。

Poland never had the experience of democracy the way the West did.

波兰从未像西方那样经历过民主。

Poland was a country that got partitioned, what?

波兰是一个被瓜分的国家，什么？

Three times in the course of the last few hundred years.

近百年来有过三次。

Look at a country like Hungary.

看看像匈牙利这样的国家。

Hungary was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

匈牙利是奥匈帝国的一部分。

Look at, where else?

看看还有哪里？

The Czechs I think are doing better.

我认为捷克人做得更好。

The Czechs at least come out of a quasi-democratic experience.

捷克人至少经历了准民主的经历。

I certainly don’t want to suggest that the Soviet experience was the only thing going on there.

我当然不想说苏联的经历是那里唯一发生的事情。

In the same way, I don’t want to suggest that the religious influence is the only thing that was driving our Western economics at its creation.

同样，我不想说宗教影响是推动西方经济诞生的唯一因素。

But I think these are both very important.

但我认为这两点都非常重要。

Another truly great book that I would point to along those lines is by my late colleague David Landes, who wrote about the cultural influence on the development of markets, capitalism, economic growth.

我想提到的另一本真正伟大的书是我已故同事大卫·兰德斯写的，他写了关于文化对市场发展、资本主义和经济增长的影响。

Landes’s book was very aptly titled The Wealth and Poverty of Nations.

兰德斯的书的标题非常恰当：《国家的财富与贫困》。

The issue is, why do some countries, some societies flourish economically and others don’t?

问题是，为什么有些国家、有些社会经济繁荣，而另一些却不然？

Long before it was fashionable, Landes pointed to cultural influences.

早在它流行之前，兰德斯就指出了文化的影响。

Landes didn’t point so much to the church, but Landes pointed to geography.

兰德斯并没有过多地指出教堂，但兰德斯指出了地理。

What was very interesting in the beginning of his book was his story about the geography of Western Europe compared to the geography of China.

他的书的开头非常有趣的是他将西欧地理与中国地理进行比较的故事。

He raised the following question: Suppose in, say, some period like what you’re talking about, say 1400, 1500 — something like that — somebody had come along and said, “Tyler, tell me which part .

他提出了以下问题：假设在某个时期，就像你所说的那样，比如 1400、1500 —— 类似的事情 —— 有人走过来说，“泰勒，告诉我哪一部分。

.

。

.”

”。

They would have had to explain to you what an industrial revolution was.

他们必须向你解释什么是工业革命。

Then somebody had said, “Okay, Tyler, now that I’ve explained it to you, I’m going to tell you that one region of the world is going to experience an industrial revolution, and on the strength of that, is going to dominate most of the world for the next 500 years.

然后有人说：“好吧，泰勒，现在我已经向你解释过了，我要告诉你，世界上的一个地区将经历一场工业革命，并且凭借这一革命的力量，它将在未来 500 年里主宰世界大部分地区。

Which one would it be?” David’s argument was that you would probably have predicted China.

会是哪一个呢？”大卫的论点是，你可能会预测到中国。

Then the question was, well, why not?

那么问题是，为什么不呢？

One part of his answer was that with its geography being relatively flat and requiring these large-scale canal water systems, the Chinese society lent itself to centralization in a way that Western Europe, with all of these mountains and other geographical features, didn’t, so that while you could travel for thousands of miles in China and you’re still under the same emperor, in Western Europe, all you had to do is go over some set of hills and you’re in a different principality.

他的回答之一是，由于地势相对平坦，需要大规模的运河水系，中国社会适合集权化，而西欧则没有这些山脉和其他地理特征，因此，在中国，你可以长途跋涉，但你仍然在同一个皇帝的统治下，而在西欧，你所要做的就是翻过一些山丘，你就处于不同的公国。

Well, I think all of these things are very important.

嗯，我认为所有这些事情都非常重要。

I don’t know whether political systems are driven by the fact that we in the West have a kind of Judeo-Christian culture.

我不知道政治制度是否是由我们西方拥有某种犹太基督教文化这一事实驱动的。

We’re going to find out over time, but it does seem to be the case, at least so far.

随着时间的推移我们会发现答案，但至少到目前为止，情况似乎确实如此。

What’s certainly the case historically is that modern, liberal with a small l, democracy with a small d, originated in Protestant countries.

历史上确实如此，现代的、带有小l的自由主义、带有小d的民主，起源于新教国家。

I think what’s clear so far is that those are the predominant ones.

我认为到目前为止很清楚的是，这些是主要的。

If we had been having this conversation, say, 20 years ago, we might have had a different view.

如果我们在 20 年前进行这样的对话，我们可能会有不同的看法。

Twenty years ago, we might have pointed to some of these data from Freedom House and other institutions and said, “Look, it started in the West, and it’s spreading everywhere.” Well, here we are.

二十年前，我们可能会指着自由之家和其他机构的一些数据说：“看，它始于西方，正在向世界各地传播。”好吧，我们到了。

Democracy seems to be on the retreat at the moment, but I’m optimistic that that trend will turn around, too.

目前民主似乎正在倒退，但我乐观地认为这种趋势也会扭转。

So why is it that so few Islamic nations have embraced liberal democratic capitalism?

那么，为什么拥抱自由民主资本主义的伊斯兰国家如此之少呢？

And very few are democracies, right?

民主国家很少，对吗？

Malaysia, to some extent, Indonesia, but overall, the record is not that democratic.

马来西亚，在某种程度上，印度尼西亚，但总的来说，记录并不那么民主。

The second view is that the Islamic view of lending is particularly inimical to economic development.

第二种观点是，伊斯兰的贷款观特别不利于经济发展。

Now, this is a view in which one doesn’t lend at interest, which originates in the Hebrew Bible and was taken up by the early Christian thinkers as well.

这是一种不借利息的观点，它起源于希伯来圣经，也被早期基督教思想家所接受。

Many historians of the economic development point to the movement away from the ban on lending at interest under Luther, and then especially under Calvin, as the key step that freed Western society to move toward a more financially based, and therefore expansive, economic posture.

许多研究经济发展的历史学家指出，在路德统治下，尤其是在加尔文统治下，摆脱利息借贷禁令的运动是解放西方社会走向更加以金融为基础、因而更加扩张的经济态势的关键一步。

That’s been blocked in the Islamic world by the strictures on banking and lending.

在伊斯兰世界，银行业和贷款业的限制阻碍了这一点。

I think there’s something to both of these views, but they’re very different.

我认为这两种观点都有一定道理，但又截然不同。

But it is certainly true that in our American society, Mormons have been extremely successful economically.

但毫无疑问，在我们的美国社会中，摩门教徒在经济上取得了极大的成功。

On the moral consequences of economic growth

论经济增长的道德后果

In fact, I would argue the opposite.

事实上，我的观点恰恰相反。

I would argue that what makes room for these people to come to societies where they are not indigenous, and to do well, and to do well in ways that integrate them in the society, is precisely the feature of economic growth.

我认为，经济增长的特征恰恰是为这些人来到非土著社会并取得良好成绩并以融入社会的方式取得良好成绩创造了空间。

Now, that’s an answer about economic growth, not about capitalism versus communism versus something else, but the historical fact is that we haven’t seen that kind of economic growth except under market-oriented economies, and therefore, what’s true of societies that experience economic growth, by and large, turns out to be a statement about market-oriented economies as well.

现在，这是一个关于经济增长的答案，而不是关于资本主义与共产主义与其他东西的答案，但历史事实是，除了市场导向型经济体之外，我们还没有看到过这种经济增长，因此，经历经济增长的社会的真实情况，总的来说，结果也是关于市场导向型经济体的陈述。

Is it the case that benefits of economic growth for tolerance only kick in much later, and first you have to go through what are actually a number of centuries where economic growth is very bad for tolerance and mutual coexistence?

经济增长对宽容的好处是否会在很久以后才显现出来，首先你必须经历实际上几个世纪以来经济增长对宽容和相互共存非常不利的情况？

We haven’t in recent years seen very many of the major economic powers go off and take over other people’s lands the way people did.

近年来，我们还没有看到很多主要经济大国像人们那样接管别人的土地。

Think of the British in Australia.

想想在澳大利亚的英国人。

Think of Europeans in South America.

想想南美洲的欧洲人。

Think of British and French and Spanish in North America.

想想北美的英国人、法国人和西班牙人。

That ultimately got sorted out in the British favor, but it’s true that in these pre-modern eras, there was a lot of colonial expansion.

这最终得到了对英国有利的解决，但在前现代时期，确实存在大量的殖民扩张。

There was a lot of taking over of other people’s countries, and of course, when you take over other people’s countries, that’s not good for the people who were there before you got there.

有很多接管别人的国家的事情，当然，当你接管别人的国家时，这对你到达那里之前那里的人来说并不是好事。

That’s pretty easy to see, but I don’t think of that as much of a feature of modern economic growth.

这很容易看出，但我不认为这是现代经济增长的一个特征。

I don’t see who’s being exploited in modern economic growth.

我看不出谁在现代经济增长中受到剥削。

What I’ve written is a book about the influence of religion on economic thinking.

我写的是一本关于宗教对经济思维影响的书。

It’s a book of intellectual history, not economic history.

这是一本思想史而不是经济史的书。

It’s a book about where our ideas about modern economics come from.

这是一本关于我们现代经济学思想从何而来的书。

The fact that different people with different religious orientations have participated in economics in a different way, I don’t think matters.

我认为，具有不同宗教倾向的不同人以不同的方式参与经济活动这一事实并不重要。

Now, importantly, although I characterize my hypothesis as “Weber upside down,” referring to the German sociologist, Max Weber — and I’d be glad to explain why — but one element of Weber that I do take and retain is the idea that religious impulses, religious influences on how people think are very long-lasting and persist long after people no longer believe in the particular religious impulse, to begin with.

现在，重要的是，虽然我将我的假设描述为“颠倒的韦伯”，指的是德国社会学家马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber）——我很乐意解释为什么——但我确实采纳并保留了韦伯的一个要素，那就是宗教冲动，宗教对人们思维方式的影响是非常持久的，并且在人们不再相信特定的宗教冲动之后仍然持续很长时间。

Now, that, I think, is directly responsive to your question because even if it turns out that Americans, over time, become distinctly less religiously committed than they were, I think in this Weberian way, the fact that the country came out of a certain era of Protestant thought will serve as a catalyst, a catalyst in the sense that a catalyst is something that triggers a chemical reaction, and then after the catalyst is gone, the reaction is still there, and the result of the reaction is still there.

现在，我认为，这直接回答了你的问题，因为即使事实证明，随着时间的推移，美国人的宗教信仰明显不如以前，我认为以韦伯式的方式，这个国家走出新教思想的某个时代的事实将充当催化剂，催化剂是指引发化学反应的东西，然后在催化剂消失后，反应仍然存在，反应的结果仍然存在。

I think the role of religious thinking in shaping our early economic thinking in modern Western economics is going to persist, and even if the current trend continues for another decade, another half-century toward Americans becoming less religiously committed, I think it’ll still be there.

我认为宗教思维在现代西方经济学中塑造我们早期经济思维的作用将持续存在，即使目前的趋势再持续十年，再持续半个世纪，美国人的宗教信仰会变得越来越少，我认为它仍然会存在。

If we think about India, people use the phrase Hindu rate of growth in a derogatory fashion.

如果我们想想印度，人们会以贬义的方式使用“印度教增长率”这个词。

Of course, we wouldn’t talk that way anymore, but more importantly, India has had many years with high rates of economic growth, and people who leave India have done especially well earning.

当然，我们不会再这样说了，但更重要的是，印度多年来经济高速增长，离开印度的人收入特别好。

I believe immigrants to America from India are now, by far, the highest earners.

我相信，迄今为止，从印度移民到美国的移民是收入最高的人。

Does that indicate persistence?

这是否表明了坚持？

Isn’t that showing that once the environment changes, people’s ideas are quite malleable and they evolve to fit the new environment?

这不正说明，一旦环境发生变化，人的思想具有很强的可塑性，会不断进化以适应新的环境吗？

Is there persistence in rates of economic growth across countries?

各国经济增长率是否具有持续性？

I don’t think there is.

我认为不存在。

There’s persistence in who’s rich and who’s poor, but persistence in economic growth rates is harder to pin down.

谁富谁穷固然存在，但经济增长率的持久性却更难确定。

By contrast, is there persistence in the way people think, in what they believe?

相比之下，人们的思维方式和信仰是否持久？

Well, I think there certainly is.

嗯，我想肯定有。

Just look around at the way in which Americans have different ideas about lots of things than Chinese do, than Russians do.

只要环顾四周，美国人对很多事情的看法就与中国人和俄罗斯人不同。

You were asking before about the fact that Eastern Europeans have been unsuccessful for the most part in mounting stable, liberal democracies.

你之前问过这样一个事实：东欧人在建立稳定的自由民主国家方面大部分都没有成功。

Well, I think this is a matter of persistence of something.

嗯，我认为这是一个坚持某件事的问题。

I was pointing to the Soviet experience.

我指的是苏联的经验。

You were suggesting it’s a persistence of something from earlier on, and I’m sympathetic to that too.

你暗示这是早期某些事情的持续存在，我也对此表示同情。

But I would distinguish the persistence of thinking from the persistence of behavior

但我会区分思想的持久性和行为的持久性

If you just drew the trend line, and you looked at what happened in World War I, World War II, and so forth, you would say, “My goodness, in the Western world, that’s an extraordinary increase in the volume of killing within the lifetime of certainly my parents and, I’m guessing, yours as well.”

如果你画出趋势线，然后看看第一次世界大战、第二次世界大战等发生的事情，你会说，“天哪，在西方世界，在我父母的有生之年，杀戮数量急剧增加，我猜，你的父母也一样。”

So what do you do with that?

那么你用它做什么呢？

Well, by and large, Steve treats this as an aberration.

嗯，总的来说，史蒂夫认为这是一种反常现象。

It would be an extreme characterization of what he does to say he throws it out as an outlier.

如果说他将其视为异常值，那将是对他所做事情的极端描述。

That would be unfair.

那是不公平的。

But if you remove World War I and World War II from the scatter plot, then the trend line sure points downward.

但如果你从散点图中删除第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战，那么趋势线肯定会向下。

Now he’s interested in things more than just wartime deaths.

现在他对其他事情的兴趣不仅仅是战时死亡。

He’s interested in who gets murdered walking down the street so somebody can steal his wallet.

他感兴趣的是谁在街上被谋杀，这样有人就可以偷他的钱包。

He’s interested in that sort of thing.

他对这类事情很感兴趣。

But to me at least, it’s the wars that dominate.

但至少对我来说，战争才是主导。

Look at Islam, for example.

以伊斯兰教为例。

In the early years of Islam, Muslim forces conquered all of Africa, conquered large parts of Southern Europe, conquered essentially all of Spain.

在伊斯兰教早期，穆斯林军队征服了整个非洲，征服了南欧的大部分地区，基本上征服了整个西班牙。

Islamic armies went up as far as, what was it?

伊斯兰军队的进攻到底是什么？

I’m now trying to remember my high school history.

我现在正在努力回忆我的高中历史。

Was it the Battle of Poitiers when the French finally turned around the Muslim advance?

是法国人最终扭转穆斯林进攻的普瓦捷战役吗？

Later on, under Suleiman, the Muslim forces again conquered much of Southern Europe, going up as far as the battle at Vienna.

后来，在苏莱曼大帝的领导下，穆斯林军队再次征服了南欧大部分地区，直至维也纳之战。

I think Islam is certainly a very militaristic religion in its early days.

我认为伊斯兰教在其早期无疑是一个非常军国主义的宗教。

Judaism as well.

犹太教也是如此。

Again, I mentioned a few minutes ago the foundational myth in the Hebrew Bible of the Hebrew slaves fleeing Egypt, and what did they do when they fled Egypt?

几分钟前，我再次提到了希伯来圣经中有关希伯来奴隶逃离埃及的基本神话，以及他们逃离埃及时做了什么？

They then conquered Canaan, the Holy Land.

然后他们征服了圣地迦南。

So there’s certainly a militaristic strain there.

所以那里肯定存在军国主义压力。

So, the answer is no, I would not particularly point to Christianity as uniquely militaristic, certainly not among Western religions.

所以，答案是否定的，我不会特别指出基督教是独特的军国主义，当然不是西方宗教中的。

When I arrived at Harvard as an undergraduate, or when I worked in investment banking in New York, I never thought of it that I have this great difference in outlook from my Harvard classmates.

当我以本科生的身份来到哈佛时，或者当我在纽约从事投资银行工作时，我从未想过我与哈佛同学的观点有如此大的差异。

I mention Harvard because in those days, Harvard undergraduates were much less geographically diversified than they are now.

我提到哈佛是因为当时哈佛本科生的地域多元化远不如现在。

When I worked in investment banking in New York, that was a pretty New York-y, New England-y culture.

当我在纽约的投资银行工作时，那是一种非常纽约式、新英格兰式的文化。

I never thought of myself as having a background that was terribly different from anybody else.

我从来不认为自己的背景与其他人有很大不同。

On the importance of maintaining economic growth

论保持经济增长的重要性

One, it was a warning against our being complacent.

第一，这是对我们自满的警告。

It’s a warning that no matter how rich our society is, if we get into a situation in which large numbers of people feel that they no longer have a sense of forward progress in their material lives, and they don’t see that turning around anytime soon, and they don’t have optimism either that their children will face a better economic future, that’s the circumstance under which people turn away from these small-l liberal, small-d democratic values, like tolerance and respect for diversity, generosity, openness of opportunity, even respect for democratic political institutions.

这是一个警告，无论我们的社会多么富有，如果我们陷入这样一种情况：大量的人感到他们的物质生活不再有进步的感觉，他们看不到这种情况很快就会好转，他们也不乐观地认为他们的孩子将面临更好的经济未来，那么人们就会远离这些小自由、小民主价值观，比如宽容和尊重多样性、慷慨、开放的机会，甚至尊重。对于民主政治机构。

So, an important aspect of the rate-of-growth aspect of the argument — as opposed to the level aspect — is a warning about our potentially being complacent when we shouldn’t.

因此，论证中增长率方面的一个重要方面——与水平方面相反——是对我们可能在不应该自满的情况下感到自满的警告。

My former colleague, Alexander Gerschenkron, had this marvelous phrase about a democracy without democrats.

我的前同事亚历山大·格申克伦（Alexander Gerschenkron）曾说过一句关于没有民主人士的民主的精彩言论。

Well, he was referring to Weimar Germany, but I think it’s a warning for us very much today in the United States when so many people’s incomes are stagnating.

嗯，他指的是魏玛德国，但我认为这对我们今天的美国来说是一个警告，因为很多人的收入都停滞不前。

Then, at the same time, the second implication of the fact that it’s a rate-of-growth argument is some optimism that countries around the world, where income levels are far below ours, don’t have to wait until they reach our level of income before they can develop into liberal democracies.

与此同时，这是一个增长率论点这一事实的第二个含义是一些乐观情绪，即世界上收入水平远低于我们的国家不必等到达到我们的收入水平才可以发展成自由民主国家。

Now, as I was saying a minute ago, 20 years ago when I wrote that book, the data gave me much more reason to be optimistic than I am — at least for the short run — now about low-income countries’ democratic prospects.

现在，正如我在 20 年前写那本书时所说的那样，这些数据让我有更多的理由对低收入国家的民主前景持乐观态度——至少在短期内如此。

But I still believe in the hypothesis in the long run.

但从长远来看，我仍然相信这个假设。

Haven’t we seen a fairly large number of countries with much slower growth, and whatever their problems or flaws, they seem to be more tolerant — gay rights, rights of women, many different issues?

我们难道没有看到相当多的国家增长速度要慢得多，无论它们有什么问题或缺陷，它们似乎都更加宽容——同性恋权利、妇女权利，以及许多不同的问题？

I would be confident that in the greater number of cases, those societies which are able to mount serious, sustained, widely distributed economic growth will do better on these dimensions — like tolerance and democracy and generosity and provision of opportunity — than those that do not.

我相信，在更多情况下，那些能够实现认真、持续、广泛分布的经济增长的社会将在这些方面——比如宽容、民主、慷慨和提供机会——比那些不能实现的社会做得更好。

On things under and over-rated

关于低估和高估的事情

I happened to have been working at the Federal Reserve.

我碰巧一直在美联储工作。

I don’t know if you’re — yes, you’re old enough to remember.

我不知道你是否——是的，你已经足够大了，可以记得了。

I happened to have been working in the Federal Reserve Board one summer.

有一年夏天，我碰巧在美联储工作。

This was in an earlier era in which security in buildings like this was much less, so we would just come and go and walk in and out.

那是在较早的时代，像这样的建筑物的安全性要低得多，所以我们只是来来去去，进进出出。

One day, out in front of the building, this enormous flatbed truck pulled up, stacked high with lumber.

有一天，一辆巨大的平板卡车停在大楼前，车上堆满了木材。

We all went down and looked at it, and what was it?

我们都下去一看，那是什么？

The truck driver gets out and he says, “I have a delivery for a Mr. Volcker.” We all said, “Well, what is that about?”

卡车司机下了车，说道：“我要给沃尔克先生送货。”我们都说：“好吧，那是关于什么的？”

Eventually, we got to see the letter that came with it.

最终，我们看到了附带的信。

I can’t remember whether it was from the same firm, Lone Star Industries, or not, but it was from some construction company.

我不记得它是否来自同一家公司，孤星工业公司，但它来自某个建筑公司。

Basically, the note said, “Paul, because of you, I can no longer use this lumber.

基本上，这张纸条上写着：“保罗，因为你，我不能再使用这种木材了。

So here, you take it.

所以在这里，你拿着它。

You take it.” Well, this was the kind of stuff that was going on.

你拿着吧。”嗯，这就是正在发生的事情。

Was Paul Volcker overrated, underrated?

保罗·沃尔克是被高估了还是被低估了？

As much praise as he received, I think he’s one of the most underrated people I’ve ever known.

尽管他收到了很多赞扬，但我认为他是我所认识的最被低估的人之一。

Why doesn’t the market for annuities work better?

为什么年金市场没有更好地运作？

It’s because of what economists call adverse selection.

这是因为经济学家所说的逆向选择。

That is to say, people who sign up to buy annuities have knowledge about themselves that the sellers of annuities don’t.

也就是说，签约购买年金的人对自己有了解，而年金的卖家则不了解。

If you look at the data on who buys annuities in the United States, annuity buyers have a distinctly longer mortality experience than the general population.

如果您查看美国年金购买者的数据，您会发现年金购买者的死亡率经历明显长于一般人群。

They know that they’re going to live longer.

他们知道自己会活得更久。

Now, once that experience becomes clear, then the sellers of annuities have to price the annuities not on the assumption that their customers will be ordinary Americans, but that their customers will be long-lived Americans.

现在，一旦这种经验变得清晰，年金卖家在为年金定价时就不能假设他们的客户是普通美国人，而是假设他们的客户将是长寿的美国人。

Well, that just makes the annuities even less attractive for ordinary people and makes the adverse selection even worse.

好吧，这只会使年金对普通人的吸引力更小，并使逆向选择变得更糟。

So what is the market for annuities?

那么年金市场如何？

It’s a market with groups.

这是一个有团体的市场。

Why does that matter?

为什么这很重要？

Because if some annuity provider like TIAA, the big insurance company, provides annuities to the universe of all college professors in the United States, then they at least have some way of getting around the adverse selection.

因为如果像大型保险公司 TIAA 这样的年金提供商向美国所有大学教授提供年金，那么他们至少有某种方法来规避逆向选择。

But I think we are in a bad equilibrium, and individuals are not attracted to individual life annuities.

但我认为我们处于一个糟糕的平衡状态，个人对个人终身年金没有吸引力。

I think it’s because of the adverse selection, and it’s very unfortunate.

我认为这是因为逆向选择，这是非常不幸的。

Take your most recent question as an example.

以您最近的问题为例。

Suppose the government provides some enhanced form of life annuity.

假设政府提供某种增强形式的终身年金。

We already have a form of life annuity provided publicly in the United States.

我们已经在美国公开提供了一种形式的终身年金。

The word for that is Social Security.

这个词就是社会保障。

But suppose there was some big change in the Social Security system.

但假设社会保障体系发生了一些重大变化。

The Lucas critique idea would be that people will understand the implications of this for their own and everybody else’s behavior and, as a result of that understanding, will take actions that, once everybody has taken that action, will undo the intended effect of whatever the policy reform is.

卢卡斯的批评观点是，人们会理解这对他们自己和其他人的行为的影响，并且由于这种理解，他们会采取行动，一旦每个人都采取了行动，就会抵消政策改革的预期效果。

I think that just places much too much burden on the knowledge and understanding of ordinary citizens, and therefore, my answer is “Overrated.”

我认为这给普通公民的知识和理解带来了太大的负担，因此，我的答案是“被高估了”。

On debt and fiscal sustainability

关于债务和财政可持续性

A question that I put to my students now that it would never have occurred to me to put to you and your classmates 30-odd years ago is the following.

我现在向我的学生们提出了一个30多年前我绝不会想到向你们和你们的同学们提出的问题，如下：

You are a young graduate student just getting married, and you and your wife would like to buy a house.

您是一名刚结婚的年轻研究生，您和您的妻子想买一套房子。

Or you and your husband would like to buy a house.

或者你和你的丈夫想买房子。

Because nowadays, unlike when you were a student, we have lots of women graduate students, which is a good thing.

因为现在，与学生时代不同，我们有很多女研究生，这是一件好事。

You and your wife or husband would like to buy a house, and some bank is willing to lend to you to buy that house at a zero interest rate.

您和您的妻子或丈夫想买房子，一些银行愿意以零利率贷款给您购买房子。

How big a house do you buy if somebody is willing to lend to you at a zero interest rate?

如果有人愿意零利率借给你，你会买多大的房子？

Well, it’s an extreme version of what you’re saying.

嗯，这是你所说的一个极端版本。

If interest rates remain super low, then government, business, households can all afford higher levels of debt without it becoming in any way unsustainable.

如果利率保持超低水平，那么政府、企业、家庭都可以承担更高水平的债务，而不会变得不可持续。

Now, I kept emphasizing if interest rates remain low, and we don’t know that they will.

现在，我一直强调利率是否会保持在低位，但我们不知道利率是否会保持在低位。

Now, if I can put in a plug for a policy idea, this is why I have been recommending to anybody who will listen that this is a great time for the United States Treasury to lengthen out the maturity of the US government’s outstanding debt.

现在，如果我能提出一个政策想法，这就是为什么我一直向任何愿意倾听的人建议，现在是美国财政部延长美国政府未偿债务期限的好时机。

The average maturity of the outstanding debt is around six years, and we happened to have super-low interest rates, it would be lovely to think that they’re going to be here forever.

未偿还债务的平均期限约为六年，而我们碰巧拥有超低利率，如果认为它们将永远存在，那就太好了。

Some economists think they will be.

一些经济学家认为他们会的。

I’m more cautious.

我比较谨慎。

I would use the current market environment as a way to lock in those interest rates because we know that we’re going to have a high government debt level for a very long period of time and much better it not be a burden.

我会利用当前的市场环境作为锁定利率的一种方式，因为我们知道我们将在很长一段时间内保持较高的政府债务水平，而且最好不要成为负担。

Let’s take your question seriously and say we’re going to put the pandemic aside.

让我们认真对待你的问题，并说我们将把大流行放在一边。

In the year before the pandemic — we’re talking about the government’s fiscal year 2019, so ended September 30, 2019 — none of us had talked about pandemics yet.

在大流行病爆发前一年——“我们谈论的是政府的 2019 财年，截至 2019 年 9 月 30 日”——我们还没有人谈论过大流行病。

In that year, the US government spent $4.5 trillion, and it only took in, in revenues, $3.5 trillion.

那一年，美国政府支出了4.5万亿美元，但收入却只有3.5万亿美元。

That $1 trillion deficit, even at a time of a fully employed economy and, of course, before the pandemic hit, that was nearly 5 percent of our national income — even though our economy was growing nicely, more rapidly than the rate of interest that the government was paying on the debt, we were on the other side of the equation, adding new debt so rapidly that the debt-to-income ratio was going up instead of down.

即使在经济充分就业的情况下，当然，在大流行爆发之前，这 1 万亿美元的赤字也接近我们国民收入的 5%——尽管我们的经济增长良好，比政府支付的债务利率还要快，但我们却处于等式的另一边，新债务的增加如此之快，以至于债务与收入之比不断上升而不是下降。

So simply pointing to the so-called R-minus-G factor, I think, is a very incomplete way to look at the question of sustainability.

因此，我认为，简单地指出所谓的 R 减 G 因素是看待可持续性问题的一种非常不完整的方式。

With interest rates as low as they’ve been in the last few years, I think it’s very difficult to point to a crowding-out story and say that somehow, magically, because the government has issued a lot of debt, businesses haven’t been investing or homeowners haven’t been building houses.

由于利率在过去几年中一直处于低位，我认为很难指出一个挤出的故事，并以某种方式神奇地说，因为政府发行了大量债务，企业没有投资，或者房主没有建造房屋。

Because credit has been pretty available, the rate of interest on that credit has been low.

由于信贷相当容易获得，因此信贷的利率一直很低。

Again, I was asking my graduate students about the hypothetical example of a zero interest rate, not a prohibitively high one.

我再次向我的研究生询问零利率的假设例子，而不是高得令人望而却步的利率。

So, I would say, no, I don’t see the story whereby there’s been a lot of crowding out.

所以，我想说，不，我没有看到存在大量排挤的故事。

But those interest rates are just super, super low, so if you had had an idea for a business and had wanted to go in and get a loan, I don’t think the fact that the Federal Reserve was crediting reserve balances would have made any difference whatsoever.

但这些利率实在是太低了，所以如果你有创业的想法并且想进去获得贷款，我认为美联储将准备金余额记入贷方这一事实不会产生任何影响。

Levels of economic activity — back when Milton did his great work in the 1950s and 1960s, there had been, for quite some years, a very stable, reliable relationship between at least long-run rates of growth of money and long-run price inflation.

经济活动水平——当米尔顿在 20 世纪 50 年代和 1960 年代完成他的伟大工作时，相当长的一段时间里，至少在长期货币增长率和长期价格通胀之间存在着非常稳定、可靠的关系。

My contribution — I still like to think it was a contribution at that time — was to point out that similar relationships, just as empirically valid, were there for at least some measures of credit.

我的贡献——“我仍然认为这是当时的贡献”——指出至少在某些信用衡量标准中存在类似的关系，正如经验上一样有效。

Importantly, not just bank credit, but broader credit, including the bond market.

重要的是，不仅仅是银行信贷，还有更广泛的信贷，包括债券市场。

Now, over time, these measures lost their close relationship with the national income, prices, whatever.

现在，随着时间的推移，这些措施失去了与国民收入、价格等的密切关系。

Therefore, I wouldn’t recommend either one today — neither money nor credit.

因此，我今天不会推荐任何一种——无论是金钱还是信贷。

On NGDP Targeting

关于 NGDP 目标

I would prefer to be somewhat more sophisticated about the analysis.

我更愿意对分析进行更复杂的分析。

I would prefer to think of real economic growth as separate from price inflation.

我更愿意将实际经济增长与价格通胀分开。

When real economic growth, or when the level of economic activity is far below full employment, that’s a time when real economic growth doesn’t have the cost of potentially creating inflation pressures.

当实际经济增长时，或者当经济活动水平远低于充分就业时，此时实际经济增长不存在潜在造成通胀压力的成本。

By contrast, in a fully employed economy, we do have to worry about price inflation.

相比之下，在充分就业的经济中，我们确实必须担心价格通胀。

I would prefer to keep those two items separate in the analysis, so I’m not a fan of nominal GDP targeting.

我更愿意在分析中将这两个项目分开，所以我不喜欢名义 GDP 目标。

It’s not the worst idea ever, but I would prefer to do it in a more sophisticated way.

这不是最糟糕的想法，但我更愿意以更复杂的方式来做。

That said, I would leave it alone because my sense is that, with the current politics of our country, I am sorry to say, I think if we open that box, we are much more likely to come out with something that’s worse than what we have.

也就是说，我不会去管它，因为我的感觉是，根据我们国家当前的政治，我很遗憾地说，我认为如果我们打开这个盒子，我们更有可能得到比我们现有的更糟糕的东西。

So, while I don’t know anybody who would defend, in the abstract, the structure we’ve got, I wouldn’t change it, at least not now.

因此，虽然我不知道有谁会抽象地捍卫我们现有的结构，但我不会改变它，至少现在不会。

In the book that I’ve just written, if my readers had grown up in a rigorous Presbyterian Sunday school, the book would have been 100 pages shorter because I wouldn’t have had to walk my readers through all sorts of things.

在我刚刚写的书中，如果我的读者是在一所严格的长老会主日学校长大的，这本书就会短 100 页，因为我不必引导我的读者经历各种各样的事情。

If I had grown up in a rigorous Presbyterian Sunday school — which I didn’t — I could have written the book at least two years more rapidly because I wouldn’t have had to go off and learn all that stuff.

如果我是在一所严格的长老会主日学校长大的————但我没有————我至少可以快两年写这本书，因为我不必离开去学习所有这些东西。

But I did, so I undertake these projects.

但我做到了，所以我承担了这些项目。

Why do I learn these things?

我为什么要学这些东西？

In part, because enjoy learning about them, but in part, because I think they’re important for the questions that I want to answer.

部分是因为我喜欢了解它们，但部分是因为我认为它们对于我想回答的问题很重要。

I didn’t start this most recent project from the direction of saying, “Let’s think about the influence of religion.” I started from the other end.

我并不是从“让我们考虑一下宗教的影响”的方向开始这个最近的项目的。我从另一端开始。

I started by saying, “I want to know.

我一开始就说：“我想知道。

I want to explore where our current modern Western economics came from.”

我想探讨一下我们现在的现代西方经济学从何而来。”

That then led me to seeing the importance of these religious influences on our economic thinking.

这让我认识到这些宗教影响对我们经济思维的重要性。

Then I realized that I had to go off and learn a lot of things that I didn’t know about.

然后我意识到我必须离开并学习很多我不知道的东西。

Well, I did it.

好吧，我做到了。

But it so happened that I won one of these fellowships to study abroad for a few years.

但碰巧的是，我获得了其中一项奖学金，可以出国留学几年。

This was in Britain.

这是在英国。

Once I got there, I had to study something.

一旦我到达那里，我就必须学习一些东西。

Since I had been doing economics as an undergraduate, and I had found it interesting, I kept going with economics.

因为我本科时就学过经济学，而且我发现它很有趣，所以我就一直选择经济学。

By the time I’d done economics at a graduate level for a couple of years in England, then I said, “Well, this is really more interesting than what I think my lawyer friends do, and so I’m going to stick with it.” It wasn’t that anybody particularly steered me into economics.

当我在英国读了几年经济学研究生后，我说：“嗯，这确实比我认为我的律师朋友所做的更有趣，所以我会坚持下去。”并不是有人特别引导我进入经济学。

It was more by happenstance.

这更多是出于偶然。

To me, economics is interesting because it’s about the world, and the world is throwing up all sorts of interesting questions.

对我来说，经济学很有趣，因为它是关于世界的，而世界正在提出各种有趣的问题。

Whether it’s about why economies grow.

无论是关于经济增长的原因。

You’ve asked in this conversation about price inflation, about how we conduct monetary policy, about fiscal policy.

您在这次对话中询问了价格通胀、我们如何实施货币政策和财政政策。

Many of my colleagues are interested in more microeconomic issues of labor markets and education and health and how industries organize themselves.

我的许多同事对劳动力市场、教育和健康以及行业如何自我组织等更微观的经济问题感兴趣。

But I try to encourage our graduate students to look at the world, look at what’s interesting out there.

但我试图鼓励我们的研究生看看世界，看看外面有什么有趣的事情。

There’s so much we don’t know, so much we don’t understand, so much we’d like to explain.

有太多的事情我们不知道，有太多的事情我们不明白，有太多的事情我们想要解释。

Get their questions from there, and then turn to the literature to see if you can figure out how to come up with some answers.

从那里获取他们的问题，然后查阅文献，看看你是否能找到一些答案。

I once had a conversation with an older man, and we went on for some time.

我曾经和一位年长的男子交谈过，我们聊了一段时间。

He just thought about life in a very different way than I did.

他只是以与我非常不同的方式思考生活。

The more we went at it, the more it turned out that this was somebody who didn’t himself have any kind of religious background, religious affiliation, religious commitment, religious training.

我们越研究，就越发现这个人本身没有任何宗教背景、宗教信仰、宗教信仰、宗教训练。

That didn’t make him right, didn’t make him wrong, didn’t make me right, didn’t make me wrong.

这并不意味着他是对的，也不意味着他是错的，也不意味着我是对的，也不意味着我是错的。

But what that conversation drove home to me is that he just had very different ideas about how to live life than I do.

但那次谈话让我明白，他对于如何生活的想法与我截然不同。

Surely, that’s got to be the most important thing people take away from it.

当然，这一定是人们从中得到的最重要的东西。

I have persuaded myself that the greatest economic challenge…

我说服自己最大的经济挑战......

or to put it the other way, the greatest societal challenge we will be facing over the next generation that stems from the economic sphere is going to come from our increasing reliance on robots and AI.

或者换句话说，我们下一代将面临的来自经济领域的最大社会挑战将来自我们对机器人和人工智能的日益依赖。

I’m not pretending to reinvent myself as a labor economist any more than in this new book, I’ve reinvented myself as a theologian.

我并不是假装将自己重塑为一名劳动经济学家，就像在这本新书中一样，我将自己重塑为一名神学家。

I didn’t.

我没有。

Or in the previous one, I didn’t reinvent myself as a social historian.

或者在上一篇中，我并没有将自己重塑为一名社会历史学家。

I’m going to learn a lot about things like that.

我会学到很多类似的东西。

But I think I would like to see if I can say something about how we can handle the challenges to our society, to our politics, to our way of moral thinking that I think are going to come from automation and AI.

但我想看看我是否可以谈谈我们如何应对我们的社会、我们的政治、我们的道德思维方式的挑战，我认为这些挑战将来自自动化和人工智能。

It’s a tough challenge.

这是一个艰巨的挑战。

I’ve started, but I haven’t made much progress.

我已经开始了，但还没有取得太大进展。