Ben Thompson on Business and Tech (Ep. 52)

Ben, welcome to Mercatus.

本，欢迎来到 Mercatus。

The other big thing is, their business model is making people happy.

另一件大事是，他们的商业模式让人们快乐。

You can define happiness in all kinds of ways, in perhaps nefarious ones as well.

你可以用各种方式来定义幸福，或许也可以用邪恶的方式来定义幸福。

But people use Google because they find Google useful.

但人们使用谷歌是因为他们发现谷歌很有用。

They use Facebook because their friends and family are there.

他们使用 Facebook 是因为他们的朋友和家人都在那里。

They use these companies regularly.

他们经常使用这些公司。

They’re very different than the dominant companies of old that were like monopolies based on controlling distribution.

它们与过去的主导公司有很大不同，这些公司就像基于控制分销的垄断。

They had no need to service their customers well because their customers couldn’t go nowhere else.

他们不需要为客户提供良好的服务，因为他们的客户无处可去。

In this case, they succeed by virtue of being better than everyone else, and that gives them a leg up in the public eye, generally.

在这种情况下，他们的成功是因为比其他人都更好，这通常使他们在公众眼中占据优势。

It usually has very little to do with the stuff that I write about, which is business models and moats and network effects and that sort of thing.

它通常与我所写的内容没什么关系，即商业模式、护城河和网络效应等等。

No, “We are connecting the world” or “We are organizing all the world’s information” — very lofty sort of goals.

不，“我们正在连接世界”或“我们正在组织世界上所有的信息”——这是非常崇高的目标。

I think the more founder is there, the more that sense of mission is felt deep within the organization.

我认为创始人越多，组织内部就越能感受到使命感。

But that creates blind spots where you can’t even .

但这会造成你甚至无法做到的盲点。

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It’s not that they’re bad at public relations.

这并不是说他们不擅长公共关系。

It’s that they can’t even imagine the possibility of anyone thinking about them poorly because they know their own intentions, and their intentions, they feel, are good.

他们甚至无法想象有人对他们有不好的看法，因为他们知道自己的意图，而且他们觉得自己的意图是好的。

It’s the old attribution error, where “I know what I was trying to do, that guy down the road — he was just being a jerk.” It’s kind of that but in reverse.

这是古老的归因错误，“我知道我想做什么，路上那个家伙 ——他只是个混蛋。”有点像那样，但相反。

Amazon is also so customer focused that everyone uses Amazon, everyone likes Amazon.

亚马逊也非常以客户为中心，每个人都使用亚马逊，每个人都喜欢亚马逊。

It’s not part of the conversation in that regard.

这不是这方面对话的一部分。

I think to the extent Amazon has gotten poor public relations, it’s sort of being ginned up — ginned up sounds bad — it’s being built up by people that are concerned about its tremendous power in the economy.

我认为，就亚马逊的公共关系而言，它有点像被炒作了——“炒作听起来很糟糕”——它是由担心其在经济中的巨大影响力的人们建立起来的。

Arguably, they are the strongest of all, particularly if you look at them from a supplier perspective.

可以说，它们是最强的，特别是如果您从供应商的角度来看它们。

But that’s very different than a groundswell of political movement, which is almost the sentiment around Facebook these days.

但这与政治运动的浪潮有很大不同，而政治运动几乎是当今 Facebook 周围的情绪。

So it’s more a matter of their position relative to society and the dialogue generally that shields them.

因此，这更多的是他们相对于社会的地位以及保护他们的对话的问题。

The other thing they do, though, as far as a strategy goes, is they just don’t engage.

然而，就策略而言，他们做的另一件事是他们只是不参与。

When there was that big thing in the New York Times about working conditions, certainly they pushed back and pushed back very strongly.

当《纽约时报》发表有关工作条件的重大报道时，他们当然会予以反击，而且是非常强烈的反击。

But by and large, they aren’t generally in the thick of it, whereas Facebook and Google, particularly Facebook — they’re very eager to explain themselves.

但总的来说，他们通常不会深陷其中，而 Facebook 和 Google，尤其是 Facebook ——他们非常渴望解释自己。

It’s arguably that explaining themselves that gets themselves in trouble more than anything else.

可以说，解释自己比其他任何事情都更会给自己带来麻烦。

One of the go-to questions was always, “What’s a move this company made, or a product they made, that you disagree with or you think was a poor choice?” Everyone always — you know, they prepare for these — they always have an answer.

首要问题之一始终是：“您不同意这家公司采取的举措或他们生产的产品，或者您认为这是一个糟糕的选择？”每个人总是 ——你知道，他们为这些做好准备——他们总是有答案。

But the real killer is the follow-on question: “Why do you think they did that?”

但真正的杀手是接下来的问题：“你认为他们为什么这么做？”

“What’s a move this company made, or a product they made, that you disagree with or you think was a poor choice?” Everyone always has an answer.

“您不同意这家公司采取的举措或他们生产的产品，或者您认为这是一个糟糕的选择？”每个人总是有一个答案。

But the real killer is the follow-on question: “Why do you think they did that?”

但真正的杀手是接下来的问题：“你认为他们为什么这么做？”

That’s where it gets interesting, to look at companies, look at their culture, look at their business model, see what’s driving that sort of decision-making.

这就是有趣的地方，看看公司，看看他们的文化，看看他们的商业模式，看看是什么推动了这种决策。

You have a company like, say, Microsoft, for example, that achieved dominance in the consumer space by virtue of their network effect that emanated from the enterprise side.

例如，像微软这样的公司凭借来自企业方面的网络效应在消费者领域取得了主导地位。

But they started thinking they were good at consumer products, so they would make these consumer products that had no chance in the marketplace because they didn’t have that network effect to build on.

但他们开始认为自己擅长消费品，因此他们会制造这些在市场上没有机会的消费品，因为他们没有网络效应。

And it failed, but you could think about, like, the company had achieved so much success to that point.

它失败了，但你可以想一想，公司到目前为止已经取得了如此大的成功。

How did that influence their decision-making and create blind spots where they would do worse stupid things?

这如何影响他们的决策并造成盲点，让他们做出更糟糕的愚蠢事情？

You can do a similar analysis of all these companies.

您可以对所有这些公司进行类似的分析。

I just mentioned the context of Facebook.

我刚才提到了Facebook的背景。

They’re so convinced that they are a force for good and changing the world that they can’t even fathom that they’re not, which leaves them unprepared to answer very legitimate questions about their effects on the world because they don’t have the — I don’t know if empathy’s the right word — but they don’t have the empathy for the possibility that they might not be, which doesn’t allow them to even create the right response.

他们坚信自己是一股向善的力量，正在改变世界，但他们甚至无法想象自己并非如此，这让他们没有准备好回答有关自己对世界影响的非常合理的问题，因为他们没有“我不知道同理心这个词是否正确”，但他们对自己可能不是的可能性没有同理心，这甚至不允许他们做出正确的回应。

On tech strategies

关于技术策略

You might think, “Well three-quarters of the time, we’ll just be seeing mistakes, mistakes, mistakes.” And actually, so-called bad strategy is, in a sense, profit maximizing.

你可能会想，“四分之三的时间里，我们只会看到错误、错误、错误。”事实上，所谓的糟糕策略，从某种意义上来说就是利润最大化。

Do you agree?

你同意？

People sometimes ask, why do I spend more time on large companies?

人们有时会问，为什么我要花更多时间在大公司上？

In part, there’s more information; there’s more impact in general.

部分是因为有更多信息；总体而言影响更大。

But also, those are the ones that have made it and actually can afford to make strategic decisions.

而且，这些人已经做到了这一点，并且实际上有能力做出战略决策。

The venture capital model, in many respects, is not about having a great strategy and in finding the right team to implement it.

从很多方面来看，风险投资模式并不是要制定一个伟大的战略并找到合适的团队来实施它。

No, it’s funding a whole bunch of teams, get the ones that get traction, and then build up from there.

不，它是资助一大堆团队，找到那些受到关注的团队，然后从那里开始发展。

So, strategy is very much a follow-on to initial execution.

因此，战略在很大程度上是初始执行的后续行动。

initially gaining product market fit.

初步获得产品市场契合度。

Then, even with the large companies, you see failures all the time.

然后，即使对于大公司，你也总是会看到失败。

Google in particular is notorious for this, for launching products all the time that never succeed.

谷歌尤其因此而臭名昭著，因为它总是推出从未成功的产品。

But it doesn’t matter because they have that core product with the huge network effects that lets them do that end fail.

但这并不重要，因为他们拥有具有巨大网络效应的核心产品，这让他们最终失败。

Amazon’s made an entire business out of this.

亚马逊以此为基础打造了整个业务。

Amazon is spinning up new things all the time.

亚马逊一直在创造新事物。

Amazon’s almost like an internal VC sort of culture, where their money-making businesses throw off tons of profits that they reinvest in all these sort of initiatives, many of which don’t work out.

亚马逊几乎就像一种内部风险投资文化，他们的赚钱业务扔掉大量利润，然后再投资于所有这些类型的举措，其中许多都没有成功。

There is a lot of small-scale businesses that can be bootstrapped or a minimal investment to get started, that can build very, very niche products for very, very niche audiences that can be reached via social media, via digital marketing.

有很多小型企业可以通过引导或最少的投资来启动，可以为非常非常利基的受众打造非常非常利基的产品，这些产品可以通过社交媒体和数字营销来接触。

Basically, the entire world, which enables all these unprofitable niches that you could never serve geographically but can actually be something viable.

基本上，整个世界，它使所有这些无利可图的利基市场成为可能，你永远无法在地理上服务这些利基市场，但实际上可以成为可行的东西。

But all those businesses are not venture-style businesses.

但所有这些企业都不是风险投资式的企业。

Even, arguably, the companies that support them are not necessarily venture-style businesses.

甚至可以说，支持它们的公司也不一定是风险投资式的企业。

It’s going to be very tempting, and you see it a lot — venture capitalists and companies raising money to go into these spaces.

这将非常诱人，而且你经常看到风险资本家和公司筹集资金进入这些领域。

It’s not that the idea is bad or the business model is even bad.

并不是这个想法不好，也不是商业模式不好。

It’s that there’s not venture-level returns there to be had.

问题在于，那里没有风险投资级别的回报。

But I think the challenge from a venture capitalist perspective is, these big companies are so dominant that where is a similar level of return to be gained?

但我认为从风险资本家的角度来看，挑战是，这些大公司占据主导地位，哪里可以获得类似水平的回报？

Particularly on the consumer side, and that’s a little harder to see.

尤其是在消费者方面，这有点难以看到。

Basically, everything can be rented, particularly for a technology company.

基本上，一切都可以租用，特别是对于科技公司来说。

There’s all sorts of things that can be addressed and taken on.

有各种各样的事情可以解决和承担。

A lot of them may be less sexy than a Facebook or something along those lines.

其中很多可能不如 Facebook 或类似的东西那么性感。

But there’s tons of opportunities still to be explored.

但仍有大量机会有待探索。

The era we’re really in is .

我们真正所处的时代是。

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you know, tech spent many years eating itself.

你知道，科技花了很多年的时间来吞噬自己。

You had this sort of Darwinian process where you got these .

你有这种达尔文的过程，你得到了这些。

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the ones that won out in the end were these really well-executing, super well-funded, tons-of-cash-flow machines.

最终获胜的是这些运行良好、资金雄厚、现金流量巨大的机器。

Now they’re kind of turning their eyes out to the general world, and all these industries that used tech but were not fundamentally transformed by tech — they’re just being mowed down.

现在，他们将目光转向了整个世界，所有这些使用技术但没有被技术根本改变的行业——他们只是被摧毁了。

The carnage, I think, is going to be pretty epic when you get into broader industries.

我认为，当你进入更广泛的行业时，这场屠杀将是相当史诗般的。

Uber and the taxi industry is an obvious example.

Uber 和出租车行业就是一个明显的例子。

But I think you’re going to see that happen more broadly, which might be another thing that venture capitalists are underrating.

但我认为你会看到这种情况在更广泛的范围内发生，这可能是风险投资家低估的另一件事。

Tech, in general, is all about the heavy investment up front, and then basically zero marginal cost products on the back side.

一般来说，技术都是前期的大量投资，然后是后期的边际成本基本为零的产品。

The reality is, as you get more into the real world, those marginal costs become more and more difficult to escape.

现实是，随着你越来越深入现实世界，这些边际成本变得越来越难以逃避。

People say, “Why hasn’t tech done much in healthcare?” Well, everyone avoids healthcare because of all the regulatory overhead, despite this massive market.

人们会问：“为什么科技在医疗保健领域没有发挥多大作用？”好吧，尽管市场规模巨大，但由于所有监管费用，每个人都会避开医疗保健。

I think there’s going to be a mind shift, where we need to be willing to go into those areas with massive regulatory overhead, with massive red tape, because that’s the real growth opportunity.

我认为思维方式将会发生转变，我们需要愿意进入那些监管开销巨大、繁文缛节的领域，因为那是真正的增长机会。

People say, “Why hasn’t tech done much in healthcare?” Well, everyone avoids healthcare because of all the regulatory overhead, despite this massive market.

人们会问：“为什么科技在医疗保健领域没有发挥多大作用？”好吧，尽管市场规模巨大，但由于所有监管费用，每个人都会避开医疗保健。

I think there’s going to be a mind shift, where we need to be willing to go into those areas with massive regulatory overhead, with massive red tape, because that’s the real growth opportunity.

我认为思维方式将会发生转变，我们需要愿意进入那些监管开销巨大、繁文缛节的领域，因为那是真正的增长机会。

I think being willing to fund companies that are willing to do that — they’re willing to spend like that — is going to require a mind shift in venture capital generally, and also in founders looking at opportunities.

我认为，愿意为那些愿意这样做的公司提供资金——他们愿意这样花钱——需要风险投资以及寻求机会的创始人的思维转变。

But what makes blockchain–derived products interesting is, they can have that zero-distribution-cost aspect — obviously varying on the fees and whatnot, but theoretically — while also being scarce.

但区块链衍生产品的有趣之处在于，它们可以具有零分配成本方面 ——显然在费用等方面有所不同，但理论上 ——同时也很稀缺。

That’s a really interesting concept of being able to basically go over the whole entire world, yet there be only one of every particular item.

这是一个非常有趣的概念，基本上能够遍历整个世界，但每个特定项目都只有一个。

That’s fundamentally interesting, so I would not dismiss it outright.

这从根本上来说很有趣，所以我不会完全忽视它。

I don’t know how that’s actually going to manifest itself in the real world.

我不知道这在现实世界中会如何体现。

But the thing to remember is, every time there’s a new paradigm that comes along, everyone starts out trying to copy what came before, but in the new format.

但要记住的是，每次出现新的范式时，每个人都会开始尝试复制以前的范式，但采用新的格式。

When the internet came along, everyone slapped ads next to the articles because that’s the way they did it in the newspapers.

当互联网出现时，每个人都在文章旁边贴上广告，因为他们在报纸上就是这么做的。

Obviously that didn’t work, but you see this again and again and again.

显然这不起作用，但你会一次又一次地看到这种情况。

It’s the second wave that figures out what is native to the format.

这是第二波浪潮，它弄清楚了该格式的固有内容。

In the case of digital advertising, it’s putting it in the feed where it’s an ongoing stream of information that you can inject ads into — only possible on digital, tremendously profitable.

就数字广告而言，它将其放入源中，这是一个持续的信息流，您可以将广告注入其中——只有在数字广告上才可能实现，利润丰厚。

With blockchain-type companies, the initial wave is all trying to recreate stuff that already pretty much works.

对于区块链类型的公司来说，最初的浪潮都是试图重新创造已经基本有效的东西。

The key is going to be figuring out stuff that’s not possible, but is uniquely possible with blockchain.

关键是要找出那些不可能但通过区块链唯一可能实现的东西。

If I knew what that was, then maybe I wouldn’t be writing a newsletter every day.

如果我知道那是什么，那么也许我就不会每天写时事通讯了。

The other thing to note, too .

还有另一件事要注意。

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I was going to say all the difficulties in healthcare and regulation.

我想说的是医疗保健和监管方面的所有困难。

The thing Amazon does .

亚马逊所做的事情。

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Amazon does really hard problems.

亚马逊确实解决了一些难题。

I think I mentioned that: that venture capitalists need to change their mindset, generally, to be willing to go into spaces where upfront capital investment is not sufficient — there needs to be sufficient ongoing expenditure on a marginal basis for a product — and be willing to accept that.

我想我提到过：风险投资家需要改变他们的心态，一般来说，愿意进入前期资本投资不足的领域——“产品需要在边际基础上有足够的持续支出”——并愿意接受这一点。

Amazon does stuff like that.

亚马逊就是这么做的。

They actually go out, and they build a bunch of distribution centers, and they build out a logistics chain.

他们实际上走出去，建立了许多配送中心，并建立了物流链。

They do all this really hard, expensive stuff that everyone says doesn’t make sense, and how are you going to get a good return of capital from that, without realizing that the payoff is not in the three-to-five-year range.

他们做了所有这些非常困难、昂贵的事情，每个人都说没有意义，你如何从中获得良好的资本回报，却没有意识到回报不在三到五年的范围内。

It’s in the impenetrable moat that comes from actually having physical assets in the real world that no one can afford to compete with in the long run.

这是一条坚不可摧的护城河，它来自于现实世界中实际拥有的实物资产，从长远来看，没有人能够与之竞争。

On synergy in businesses

论业务协同

With Amazon specifically, Bezos has done a remarkable job of building a company that is not integrated.

尤其是亚马逊，贝佐斯在打造一家非整合型公司方面做得非常出色。

Amazon is the anti-Apple in many respects, where it all fits together absolutely perfectly.

亚马逊在很多方面都是苹果的反面，这一切都完美地结合在一起。

Whereas Amazon’s a very modular entity, where all the different teams have well-defined ways to work with other teams that lets it build other things that sit on top of that.

而亚马逊是一个非常模块化的实体，所有不同的团队都有明确定义的方式与其他团队合作，从而可以在此基础上构建其他东西。

You know, the famous story of AWS is, AWS — the idea was that Amazon should interact with this entity, and it should be able to scale to serve Amazon’s needs in a way that it would any third party.

你知道，AWS 的著名故事是，AWS ——其想法是亚马逊应该与这个实体进行交互，并且它应该能够以任何第三方的方式扩展以满足亚马逊的需求。

Then, well, might as well sell to third parties.

那么，不妨将其出售给第三方。

That’s a little bit of an oversimplified telling of the story because Amazon itself was on its own integrated platform for a long time after AWS started.

这个故事的讲述有点过于简单化了，因为在 AWS 启动后很长一段时间里，亚马逊本身都在自己的集成平台上。

It has shifted AWS over time, but I think the way AWS works is very emblematic of the way Amazon is structured internally that lends itself far better to expanding in a conglomeration structure in a way that even other tech companies are not well suited to do.

随着时间的推移，它已经改变了 AWS，但我认为 AWS 的工作方式非常典型地体现了亚马逊的内部结构方式，这种方式更适合在集团结构中进行扩张，而其他科技公司也不太适合这样做。

Amazon in particular, given their focus on infrastructure, on spending all that money, not just on AWS but the distribution centers and the logistics, and all those sorts of things.

尤其是亚马逊，考虑到他们对基础设施的关注，他们把所有的钱都花在了AWS上，而且还花在了配送中心和物流，以及所有这些方面。

All those are particularly good synergistic pieces because they are very capital intensive.

所有这些都是特别好的协同效应，因为它们是资本密集型的​​。

They’re very hard to duplicate in general.

一般来说，它们很难复制。

You’re going to get much more of the gain from synergy than you would with other tech products.

与其他科技产品相比，您将从协同效应中获得更多的收益。

Number two, a lot of acquisitions in tech are much smaller scale, buying technology that is going to be plugged into existing products, existing networks, existing people.

第二，许多科技领域的收购规模要小得多，购买的技术将融入现有产品、现有网络、现有人员中。

Again, the value of a particular innovation to Apple if they put it in an iPhone is just so much greater than it would be to anyone else to put in a similar phone.

再说一遍，如果苹果公司将一项特定创新应用到 iPhone 中，其价值将远远大于其他任何人将其应用到类似手机中的价值。

Or Facebook acquiring some sort of product they can incorporate into Facebook is so much more valuable because of Facebook’s network that they just don’t have competitors at that scale to gain those sort of .

或者，Facebook 获得某种可以整合到 Facebook 中的产品会更有价值，因为 Facebook 的网络让他们没有如此规模的竞争对手来获得这些产品。

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to compete with.

与之竞争。

Amazon having a presence here is something that is going to be important to the company.

亚马逊在这里开展业务对该公司来说非常重要。

I think it’s something that Bezos has thought about, and Amazon has been proactive like this in the past.

我认为这是贝佐斯已经考虑过的事情，亚马逊过去也曾这样做过。

You see this, for example, with the sales tax thing, where they fought the sales tax, or they refused to pay it in states for ages and ages.

例如，您可以在销售税问题上看到这一点，他们反对销售税，或者他们拒绝在各州缴纳销售税。

I remember being in business school and having to interview with them by phone because they would not send recruiters to the state of Illinois because they were in a sales tax dispute.

我记得在商学院时，我不得不通过电话与他们进行面试，因为他们不会派招聘人员到伊利诺伊州，因为他们陷入了销售税纠纷。

Then what’d they do?

然后他们做了什么？

When they saw the wind shifting, they said, “We’re going to pay sales tax everywhere, and oh, by the way, we’re building distribution centers next to all the major cities.” So they actually turn it into an advantage where they’re already everywhere.

当他们看到风向转变时，他们说：“我们将在各地缴纳销售税，哦，顺便说一句，我们正在所有主要城市旁边建立配送中心。”所以他们实际上把它变成了一种优势，他们已经无处不在。

They impose this idea of sales tax.

他们征收销售税。

You had the Wayfair decision come down — that’s going to weigh very heavily on e-commerce businesses.

Wayfair 的决定被驳回——这将对电子商务企业造成巨大压力。

You have a small e-commerce business — this is something that I’m dealing with right now — how do you calculate sales tax across 5,000-some tax jurisdictions?

您有一家小型电子商务企业 — 这是我现在正在处理的事情 — 您如何计算 5,000 多个税收管辖区的销售税？

Whereas for Amazon that’s going to be much more easier for them to handle.

而对于亚马逊来说，这对他们来说会更容易处理。

They did the same thing with this minimum wage thing.

他们在最低工资问题上也做了同样的事情。

California is already on its way to $15 minimum wage.

加利福尼亚州的最低工资已经达到 15 美元。

They have lots of distribution centers there.

他们在那里有很多配送中心。

They get out in front of it, get a ton of huge PR.

他们走在前面，获得了大量巨大的公关。

It doesn’t actually cost them much because they took away all the bonuses and whatnot.

实际上，他们并没有花多少钱，因为他们拿走了所有的奖金之类的。

So they’re more savvy about this stuff than you think.

所以他们对这件事比你想象的更了解。

Certainly setting up bridging Maryland and Virginia would make a lot of sense in that regard.

当然，在这方面建立马里兰州和弗吉尼亚州的桥梁是很有意义的。

On Apple’s products

关于 Apple 产品

The idea of something on your wrist that is with you even more is something that’s very compelling and fits with a broad arc, the broad narrative, I think, of Apple.

让你的手腕上的东西更能陪伴你的想法是非常引人注目的，并且符合苹果的广泛弧线，我认为是广泛的叙述。

What could be done with something on your wrist that connects to a pair of AirPods in your ears?

如果你的手腕上有一个东西可以连接到你耳朵里的一对 AirPods，那么它能做什么呢？

Or maybe there’s going to be something with augmented reality in the future.

或者也许未来会有增强现实的东西。

It’s hard to say.

很难说。

If you’re interested in the future and the way technology’s going, it’s inherently interesting.

如果您对未来和技术的发展方式感兴趣，那么它本身就很有趣。

I think Apple struggled originally because they had the same supposition that this is inherently interesting, so let’s build it.

我认为苹果最初陷入困境是因为他们有同样的假设，即这本质上很有趣，所以让我们来构建它。

And they didn’t know what it was for.

他们不知道这是做什么的。

They’ve really, over the last few years, honed in on a health and fitness angle, where this will help you with healthier, it will help you with exercise, be more active.

在过去的几年里，他们确实从健康和健身的角度进行了磨练，这将帮助您变得更健康，它将帮助您锻炼身体，变得更加活跃。

Now they have the heart rate sensor and things like that.

现在他们有了心率传感器之类的东西。

That’s a necessary step in why should you buy this product.

这是您为什么要购买该产品的必要步骤。

I find it useful — I do have one — the notifications can be useful.

我发现它很有用 — 我有一个 — 通知很有用。

Almost, actually, less of a distraction because you’re not pulling your phone out of your pocket.

事实上，几乎不会造成干扰，因为你不用从口袋里掏出手机。

You’re just glancing — “That’s not important.” But at the end of the day, honestly, for me, I like the simple life as well, and charging something every day just drives me — one more thing every day — drives me up the wall, and being nervous about that.

你只是扫了一眼 —— “那不重要。”但归根结底，老实说，对我来说，我也喜欢简单的生活，每天充电只会让我 —— 每天多做一件事 ——让我抓狂，并为此感到紧张。

Also, I want to look at my wrist and see the time immediately, not have to wait for it to turn on or whatever.

另外，我想看看我的手腕并立即看到时间，而不必等待它打开或其他什么。

So I have very little, very small-scale objections to it, but that’s the thing: the closer something is to you, the more the small stuff really matters.

所以我对此几乎没有什么反对意见，但事实就是这样：某件事离你越近，小事就越重要。

But when it comes to the entire experience of touching it, and interacting with it, and just the feel of it, which matters — again, I just said, the smaller something is and the closer it is to you, the more that matters, the more that plays to Apple’s strengths.

但当涉及到触摸它、与之交互的整个体验，以及它的感觉时，这很重要——我刚才说过，东西越小，离你越近，就越重要，就越能发挥苹果的优势。

You saw that going from computers to phones.

你看到了从电脑到手机的变化。

You see it with their watch, which is just leagues ahead of anything else.

你可以通过他们的手表看到这一点，它比其他任何东西都领先很多。

It’s likely to be the case with something that you would put on your face.

您可能会涂在脸上的东西可能就是这种情况。

Back when we were using flip phones, you would’ve said, “Oh, it’s going to do email, it’s going to do things like that.” You wouldn’t have imagined all the .

当我们使用翻盖手机时，你可能会说，“哦，它可以处理电子邮件，它可以做类似的事情。”你绝对想象不到这一切。

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You’d use it to find Pokemon.

你可以用它来寻找口袋妖怪。

Or you’re going to play these crazy involved games.

或者你会玩这些疯狂的复杂游戏。

Or spend tons of money on purchases.

或者花大量的钱购买东西。

Or whatever it might be.

或者无论它是什么。

There’s an aspect of you need to build it to figure out what is there.

您需要构建它的一个方面才能弄清楚其中有什么。

It’s the Silicon Valley model writ large.

这是明显的硅谷模式。

You figure stuff out, you build it, you throw it out there and see what happens.

你想出一些东西，你建造它，你把它扔在那里，看看会发生什么。

And that’s fine.

那很好。

That’s okay; we don’t need to know exactly how stuff goes.

没关系；我们不需要确切地知道事情是如何进行的。

We have a lot of history that trying to anticipate and plan everything generally results in a less dynamic outcome than experimenting and seeing what works.

我们有很多历史经验，试图预测和计划一切通常会导致比尝试和看看什么有效的结果更不动态的结果。

I think it’s a matter of, certainly, it’s important to pay attention to and be aware of potential downsides, but they’re here.

我认为，当然，关注并意识到潜在的缺点很重要，但它们就在这里。

It is what it is.

就是这样。

We’ve dealt with these upheavals previously, and I think we’ll figure it out.

我们之前已经处理过这些剧变，我想我们会解决这个问题的。

I tend to adopt the “the kids are going to be okay” mindset.

我倾向于采取“孩子们会没事的”的心态。

There’s going to be new things that arise about it, new mores.

将会出现新的事物、新的习俗。

Is there worries about things like bullying and being on phones all the time and isolated?

是否担心诸如欺凌、一直打电话和被孤立之类的事情？

Certainly, but that’s always been a problem and a question of new technology.

当然可以，但这一直是一个问题，也是一个新技术的问题。

I’m not trying to wave my hand and say it’s all going to be okay.

我并不是想挥挥手说一切都会好起来的。

I think it’s just a matter of, it’s here.

我认为这只是一个问题，就在这里。

Once you accept that it’s here, the best thing we can do is to figure out how to manage it going forward instead of pining for a world that is long gone.

一旦你接受它就在这里，我们能做的最好的事情就是弄清楚如何管理它向前发展，而不是渴望一个早已消失的世界。

The reality is — particularly when it comes to consumer products — is that in the long run, convenience always wins.

现实是“尤其是在消费品方面”，从长远来看，便利总是获胜。

You can be doing whatever you want; you can say something like, “Set a timer five minutes,” or “What temperature should I grill my steak to?” And you’ll get an answer with your hands busy, and altogether it’s going to be a more convenient answer than it would’ve been otherwise.

你可以做任何你想做的事；你可以这样说，“设置一个五分钟的计时器”，或者“我应该把牛排烤到什么温度？”你会在忙着双手的情况下得到答案，总的来说，这将是一个比其他方式更方便的答案。

Right now, is it always more convenient?

现在，是不是总是更方便？

No. To get everything working together, all the different pieces .

不。为了让所有不同的部分协同工作。

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。

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but again, that’s very normal in the development of something new.

但同样，这在新事物的开发中是很正常的。

At the beginning everyone’s figuring it out, and then someone’s going to nail it.

一开始每个人都在弄清楚，然后有人会解决它。

Then it will grow from there.

然后它就会从那里开始生长。

If you don’t want to have it, you can not have it.

如果你不想拥有它，你就不能拥有它。

That’s going to be fine.

那就没问题了。

But I think a lot of people will choose to have it because people love convenience.

但我认为很多人会选择拥有它，因为人们喜欢方便。

But again, is there going to be more than that?

但话又说回来，还会有更多吗？

We will see.

我们会看到。

I feel I’ve given you these platitudinal answers, like, “I don’t know, we’ll figure it out.” But that’s the way technology has always worked.

我觉得我已经给了你这些陈词滥调的答案，比如“我不知道，我们会弄清楚的。”但这就是技术一直以来的运作方式。

To the extent that’s Silicon Valley — you go all the way to what is Silicon Valley about?

从某种程度上说，这就是硅谷 —— 你一直在了解硅谷是什么？

Why is it successful?

为什么会成功？

It goes to this willingness to let people do crazy stuff, most of which is going to fail, and some of it will succeed.

正是这种让人们做疯狂事情的​​意愿，其中大部分会失败，而其中一些会成功。

To have that willingness to say, “I don’t know.

愿意说：“我不知道。

I don’t know if it’s going to succeed, but sure, give it a shot.” That drives innovation in a way that a top-down, it’s-going-to-be-used-for-this, create-this sort of process doesn’t.

我不知道是否会成功，但可以肯定的是，尝试一下。”这以一种自上而下的、用于此目的、创造这种过程所无法做到的方式推动创新。

So the platitudes are all I’ve got.

所以我所知道的就是这些陈词滥调。

On Facebook

在脸书上

But if you look at it from an advertiser perspective, they’re very much the same product.

但如果你从广告商的角度来看，它们几乎是相同的产品。

You buy the ads in the same way through the same platform.

您通过相同的平台以相同的方式购买广告。

You deal with the same salespeople.

您与相同的销售人员打交道。

You can build the same sort of ads, whether it be the feed ads or the story ads or whatnot.

您可以制作相同类型的广告，无论是信息流广告还是故事广告等等。

Frankly, that is the reason why Facebook owning Instagram is such a problem for competition in the digital advertising market.

坦率地说，这就是 Facebook 收购 Instagram 给数字广告市场竞争带来如此大问题的原因。

Because if you’re an advertiser — let’s say Snapchat is marginally more effective at reaching the demographic you want to reach.

因为如果您是一名广告商，那么 Snapchat 在接触您想要接触的人群方面稍微更有效一些。

Well, if Instagram is so much cheaper by virtue of you’re already on Facebook and it’s easy to add on Instagram, then it’s not even worth the effort to go elsewhere.

好吧，如果 Instagram 因为你已经在 Facebook 上而便宜得多，并且很容易添加到 Instagram，那么甚至不值得花精力去其他地方。

So I would say, from an advertising perspective, they’re already extremely integrated, and it’s the reason why Facebook is as dominant .

所以我想说，从广告的角度来看，它们已经高度整合，这就是 Facebook 占据主导地位的原因。

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。

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the company is as dominant as it is.

该公司目前占据主导地位。

I do think Facebook will be very hesitant in screwing up the user experience too much.

我确实认为 Facebook 会非常犹豫是否会过度破坏用户体验。

It’s their best asset.

这是他们最好的资产。

Even if Facebook does feel the need to drive increased revenue, I’m sure they are more aware of, than anyone, about what a jewel Instagram is in their portfolio.

即使 Facebook 确实觉得有必要增加收入，我相信他们比任何人都更清楚 Instagram 在他们的投资组合中是多么重要。

That’s part of the reason why having Facebook is actually a benefit for Instagram, because Facebook does all the junk, like events and birthdays and stuff, so that Instagram doesn’t need to.

这就是为什么拥有 Facebook 实际上对 Instagram 来说是一种好处的部分原因，因为 Facebook 会处理所有的垃圾，比如活动、生日之类的事情，所以 Instagram 不需要这样做。

I think the real concern is the monetization side.

我认为真正令人担忧的是货币化方面。

Social networks and advertising go hand in hand because advertisers want to be everywhere, and the value of social network is about how many people are on the service.

社交网络和广告齐头并进，因为广告商希望无处不在，而社交网络的价值在于有多少人使用该服务。

So it’s a natural business model.

所以这是一种自然的商业模式。

But as I just noted, because Facebook owns so much of the social advertising market, it’s very hard for a third entrant to gain traction in a meaningful way.

但正如我刚才指出的，由于 Facebook 拥有如此多的社交广告市场，因此第三方进入者很难以有意义的方式获得吸引力。

That’s what I’m more concerned about.

这才是我更关心的。

I’m not concerned about a service necessarily emerging over time.

我并不担心随着时间的推移一定会出现某种服务。

You think about the age groups that are the most polarized, and they tend towards — I think these are older generations — and you look at things like cable news, and how much is that actually driving the filter bubble effect?

你想想那些两极分化最严重的年龄段，他们倾向于 —— 我认为这些是老一辈 —— 你看看有线电视新闻之类的东西，这实际上在多大程度上推动了过滤泡沫效应？

I do think there is more of an effect than Facebook acknowledges.

我确实认为其影响比 Facebook 承认的还要大。

They released this study a few years ago that said there was no filter effect, and it was a very problematic study in all kinds of ways.

他们几年前发布了这项研究，说没有过滤效应，从各方面来看，这都是一个非常有问题的研究。

It’s bothered me that they never acknowledged those problems and updated that.

令我困扰的是他们从未承认这些问题并更新过。

At the same time, I think it’s a little easy and cliché to blame Facebook when Facebook may actually just be a reflection of society at large.

与此同时，我认为指责 Facebook 有点容易和陈词滥调，因为 Facebook 实际上可能只是整个社会的反映。

I think the attributing causation to these companies when, if you think about how they work and how they have power in the market, it is by giving people what they want, which it follows — people want to be polarized, they’re going to get polarized things.

我认为，如果你考虑一下这些公司如何运作以及他们如何在市场上拥有影响力，我认为这些公司的因果关系就是为人们提供他们想要的东西，接下来就是 —— 人们想要两极分化，他们就会得到两极分化的东西。

What is the chicken-and-egg connection there?

这里面有什么鸡生蛋蛋生鸡的关系呢？

I’m a little more skeptical than the general narrative that Facebook is to blame for everything.

我对 Facebook 应该为一切负责的普遍说法持怀疑态度。

On the Ben Thompson production function

关于本·汤普森生产函数

One place this manifested very clearly was, I was very bullish on Facebook very early, even when they were in their doldrums or on the IPO and things like that, saying this company — the potential here is just absolutely massive.

这一点表现得非常清楚的一点是，我很早就非常看好 Facebook，即使是在他们陷入低迷或 IPO 之类的时候，我说这家公司 ——这里的潜力绝对是巨大的。

Part of that came from the fact that, where I’m from in Wisconsin, Facebook is everything.

部分原因在于，在我来自威斯康星州的地方，Facebook 就是一切。

It is the social network.

这是社交网络。

No one’s on Twitter.

推特上没有人。

People know of Twitter; they don’t use it.

人们都知道 Twitter；他们不使用它。

They’re aware of it, but it’s not a thing.

他们知道这一点，但这不是一件事。

That really gets to Facebook’s power.

这确实发挥了 Facebook 的力量。

Facebook has penetrated so thoroughly everywhere.

Facebook 已经渗透到各个地方。

And why?

为什么？

Because Facebook is the digitization of your friends and family.

因为 Facebook 是你的朋友和家人的数字化。

Where I’m from, friends and family is very central in a way that in Silicon Valley — where a lot of people are running away from their friends and family to pursue this dream or to get away — is less cognizant of.

在我的家乡，朋友和家人在某种程度上非常重要，而在硅谷——“那里很多人为了追求这个梦想或逃离而逃离朋友和家人”——却很少有人意识到。

Sometimes it’s, oh, I disagree with you and it’s an opinion sort of thing, which is fine.

有时，哦，我不同意你的观点，这是一种意见之类的事情，这很好。

It’s good to gauge that.

衡量这一点很好。

One thing that was hard for me at the beginning — most writers have to figure out — is to understand you have a core group of readers that are going to send you messages and tweet you all the time, and they’re not representative of your audience as a whole.

一开始对我来说很难的一件事——“大多数作家必须弄清楚”——就是要了解你有一个核心读者群体，他们会一直向你发送消息并发推文，但他们并不代表你的整体受众。

Having a mental filter around that, to be aware of it.

对此有一个心理过滤器，以意识到这一点。

But it’s — one of the best things about writing on the internet is the immediate feedback, and it can adjust what you write the next day, as opposed to, if you’re writing a book or whatever, and you have to wait for the next book or the next paper or whatever it might be.

但在互联网上写作的最好的事情之一就是即时反馈，它可以调整你第二天写的内容，而不是，如果你正在写一本书或其他什么，你必须等待下一本书或下一篇论文或其他任何东西。

It’s a tremendous benefit.

这是一个巨大的好处。

That said, are you going to get an MBA and become some sort of strategic maven?

也就是说，您打算获得 MBA 学位并成为某种战略专家吗？

No, I don’t think so.

不，我不这么认为。

I think a lot of MBAs get a bad rap, deservedly so, for thinking they know everything when they’ve just read a few case studies.

我认为很多 MBA 都受到了不好的评价，这是理所应当的，因为他们在读了几个案例研究后就认为自己知道了一切。

On the other side, I think MBAs do do wonders for your salary, and I think that’s very well documented.

另一方面，我认为 MBA 确实会给你的薪水带来奇迹，而且我认为这有很好的记录。

It certainly paid off for me in that regard.

在这方面，它确实为我带来了回报。

I remember being in business school and reading studies and being like, there’s nothing here about internet companies, for example.

我记得在商学院读书时，我就想，这里没有任何关于互联网公司的内容。

Professors would say, “Well it’s universal concepts that you can apply them anywhere.” Yeah, but once you put zero marginal costs into the equation, you can think it through if you think really hard, but it’s a totally different business, and it’s hard to draw concepts from.

教授们会说：“这是普遍的概念，你可以将它们应用到任何地方。”是的，但是一旦你将零边际成本放入等式中，如果你认真思考，你就可以想清楚，但这是一个完全不同的业务，很难从中得出概念。

So one of the voids that I saw that I thought Stratechery could fill was much more practical, immediately useful analysis of decisions today.

因此，我认为 Stratechery 可以填补的空白之一是对当今决策进行更实用、更立即有用的分析。

So I guess I would say yes, it’s probably useful, but that’s more a .

所以我想我会说是的，它可能很有用，但这不仅仅是一个。

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Do I read a lot of academic papers about business and business models?

我是否阅读了大量有关商业和商业模式的学术论文？

No, not many, to be honest.

不，说实话，不多。

The books I find particularly useful for what I do is the founding stories of companies and going back to decisions made very early because going back — we talked at the beginning of the podcast about when companies do stupid things — it’s often embedded in their culture about why they do that, and understanding that is useful.

我发现对我所做的事情特别有用的书是公司的创立故事，以及回顾很早做出的决定，因为回顾 ——我们在播客开始时谈到了公司何时做愚蠢的事情—— 它通常根植于他们的文化中，说明他们为什么这样做，理解这一点是有用的。

But if you want one thing to read about business strategy, I do go back to Clay Christensen’s the original The Innovator’s Dilemma.

但如果你想读一读有关商业战略的内容，我会回顾一下克莱·克里斯滕森（Clay Christensen）的原著《创新者的困境》。

The reason I like that book and go back to it, even though I think he’s taken the concept a little too far, and one of the first articles I got traction on was saying why he got Apple so wrong, but what I like about that book specifically is the fundamental premise is managers can do the “right thing” and fail.

我喜欢这本书并回顾它的原因是，尽管我认为他对这个概念的理解有点太过分了，而且我最感兴趣的第一篇文章是说为什么他对苹果的理解如此错误，但我特别喜欢这本书的基本前提是管理者可以做“正确的事”并失败。

That gets into what I talked about before — why do companies do stuff that in retrospect was really dumb?

这就是我之前谈到的问题 ——为什么公司会做那些事后看来确实愚蠢的事情？

Often it’s done for very good, legitimate reasons.

通常这样做是出于非常好的、合法的理由。

That’s what they’re incentivized to do — they’re serving their best customer.

这就是他们被激励去做的事情 ——他们正在为最好的客户提供服务。

They were adding on features because people wanted them, and that actually made them susceptible to disruption.

他们添加功能是因为人们需要它们，但这实际上使它们容易受到干扰。

I think that’s very generalized, broadly it’s a very useful concept.

我认为这是非常普遍的，从广义上讲，这是一个非常有用的概念。

I would say the other thing though, when I was working there, is the scale of the internet is astronomical.

不过，我想说的另一件事是，当我在那里工作时，互联网的规模是天文数字。

Automattic and WordPress.com — the number of sign-ups they have every day and the number of new blogs being created.

Automattic 和 WordPress.com —每天的注册数量以及创建的新博客数量。

Even people who blog — who writes blogs anymore?

即使是那些写博客的人——还有谁还写博客呢？

There are a massive number of new blogs created every single day.

每天都会创建大量新博客。

Do a lot of them fail?

他们中的很多人都失败了吗？

Sure they do.

当然有。

But this idea of the internet being huge — it’s something that drives Stratechery.

但互联网的巨大理念 ——正是它推动了Stratechery。

I can write a paid newsletter, and because my market is the entire world, I can have plenty of subscribers all over the place.

我可以写付费时事通讯，而且因为我的市场是整个世界，所以我可以在各地拥有大量订阅者。

It makes it viable.

它使它可行。

Not just me, but you can write a newsletter about China — I just talked to my friend Bill Bishop here in DC.

不只是我，你也可以写一篇关于中国的时事通讯 —— 我刚刚和我在华盛顿的朋友比尔·毕肖普谈过。

You write a newsletter about basketball.

你写了一篇关于篮球的时事通讯。

I can write a newsletter about Apple specifically.

我可以专门写一篇关于苹果的新闻通讯。

That’s just one niche, one area is newsletters because the internet — it’s bigger than anyone thinks.

这只是新闻通讯的一个利基市场，因为互联网 ——它比任何人想象的都要大。

Even people in Silicon Valley, I think, underestimate at times just what it really means to be able to access billions of people.

我认为，即使是硅谷的人有时也会低估能够接触到数十亿人的真正含义。

If someone is rude to you, or someone doesn’t help you, or a taxi drives by you on the road and doesn’t pick you up, why?

如果有人对你无礼，或者有人不帮助你，或者出租车在路上从你身边驶过却没有接你，为什么？

Is that because I’m a white guy?

是因为我是白人吗？

That’s something that a lot of people have a hard time dealing with.

这是很多人都难以应对的事情。

When I went to Taiwan, I was an English teacher back in the day.

当我去台湾时，我当时是一名英语老师。

New teachers would come, and you could tell right away which ones would not make it because that sort of stuff would just drive them crazy, and they’d be gone in a month or two.

新老师会来，你可以立即看出哪些老师不会成功，因为这类事情只会让他们发疯，一两个月后他们就会离开。

Whereas, if you can chill out and be like, “It is what it is,” then you’ll have a better chance of surviving.

然而，如果你能冷静下来并说“事情就是这样”，那么你就有更好的生存机会。

On the NBA

关于 NBA

They are going to have a great year.

他们将会度过美好的一年。

Giannis is going to win MVP.

扬尼斯将赢得 MVP。

It’s going to be amazing, and we, being Bucks Twitter, is going to spend the whole time telling everyone that we were right and they were wrong.

这将是令人惊奇的，我们，作为雄鹿队的推特，将花全部时间告诉每个人我们是对的，他们是错的。

It took a long time to take root, in part because in the NBA, generally speaking, coaches and front-office executives — probably the majority or a fair number — are former players.

它花了很长时间才扎根，部分原因是在 NBA，一般来说，教练和管理层——“可能大多数或相当一部分”——都是前球员。

They came up through the game, and so they have 10, 20, 30, 40 years of conditioning about, “This is how you play basketball.”

他们是通过比赛成长起来的，所以他们有10年、20年、30年、40年的训练时间，“这就是你打篮球的方式。”

Whereas a lot of these teams that were the first to start doing this differently, had — like the Houston Rockets had Daryl Morey, who was a former MBA — I should say, in bringing in a completely different mindset that is more math based.

然而，许多首先开始以不同方式做这件事的球队——就像休斯顿火箭队有达里尔·莫雷，他是前 MBA——我应该说，引入了一种完全不同的、更多基于数学的思维方式。

But that’s coming from the outside.

但这是从外部传来的。

And that generates a reaction to it, and it takes a while for that to break through.

这会产生反应，需要一段时间才能突破。

And the Bucks — that was very much the case.

雄鹿队——情况确实如此。

They had a general manager that had been there in the league for ages, had a coach that was a former player and was insistent that “There’s a certain way to play, and we’re going to play that way,” even if it was objectively wrong.

他们有一位在联盟效力多年的总经理，有一位曾经是球员的教练，并且坚持认为“有某种特定的比赛方式，我们将按照这种方式比赛”，即使客观上这是错误的。

Oh, I would also give teams the option, when fouled, that they can either take penalty free throws, or they can take the ball out of bounds.

哦，我还会给球队一个选择，当被犯规时，他们可以选择罚球，或者可以将球带出界外。

And, at the end of game, there’s fouling — that would fix two problems.

而且，在比赛结束时，犯规——这可以解决两个问题。

One, the hacking bad players who don’t shoot free throws well, which just grinds the game to a halt, and isn’t in the spirit of basketball at all.

一是那些罚球不好的坏球员，这只会让比赛陷入停顿，根本不符合篮球精神。

The point of a foul is to punish the defense, not to punish the offense.

犯规的目的是惩罚防守方，而不是惩罚进攻方。

But then, two, at the end of game, you have this fouling constantly and the parade to the free throw line, but that would give people a harder time to come back at the end.

但是，第二，在比赛结束时，你会不断地犯规，并走向罚球线，但这会让人们在最后更难回来。

Well, then, they should do better the rest of the game.

那么，他们应该在剩下的比赛中做得更好。

I think that’d make the end of the games remarkably faster, make the whole game faster and more exciting.

我认为这会让游戏结束得更快，让整个游戏更快、更精彩。

But when you have a high school player or a college player that is just in it, and they’re going to have to go live a normal life afterwards, then it’s much more problematic from a moral perspective.

但是，当你有一个高中球员或大学球员，他们之后就必须过正常的生活，那么从道德角度来看，问题就更大了。

At the same time, the leagues are also incentivized to do the minimum necessary to avoid bad press.

与此同时，联盟也被激励采取最低限度的必要措施，以避免负面新闻。

Something that might be better would be to relax things like marijuana testing.

更好的办法可能是放松大麻测试之类的事情。

In the NBA, I think it’s very common for players to smoke weed.

在NBA，我认为球员吸食大麻是很常见的。

But because that’s wrapped into the drug-testing program, that drug-testing program, in some respects, is a little easier to dodge, in part because they don’t want to bust a star player for smoking weed.

但因为这包含在药物测试计划中，所以在某些方面，该药物测试计划更容易躲避，部分原因是他们不想因为明星球员吸食大麻而对其进行处罚。

Maybe, if they took weed out of the program and got a lot more strict on the other stuff, that would be more equitable to everyone involved.

也许，如果他们将大麻从该计划中剔除，并在其他方面更加严格，这对每个参与者都会更加公平。

All things with China start and end with the size of the market and the potential there.

与中国有关的所有事情的开始和结束都取决于市场的规模和潜力。

And you add on to that .

然后你再补充一下。

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This is beyond ByteDance specifically, but Chinese cities are so large and so dense that the level of services and possibilities there are a lot higher than they are in the US, where things are more spread out.

这超出了字节跳动的具体范围，但中国的城市如此之大、如此密集，其服务水平和可能性比美国高得多，美国的事物更加分散。

Also, there’s so much labor in China, generally, available that you can do more labor-intensive offerings.

此外，中国总体上有大量劳动力，因此您可以提供更多劳动密集型产品。

So the potential upside is just so massive that that drives, frankly, a lot of pretty crazy investing evaluations in China, but it’s just because the upside is so tremendous.

因此，坦率地说，潜在的上行空间是如此巨大，以至于引发了对中国的许多相当疯狂的投资评估，但这只是因为上行空间是如此巨大。

Generally speaking, to command the level and size of audience that ByteDance does, and to have demonstrably done it with an algorithmic approach that has really gained a lot of traction, the potential there for advertising, for driving to various services, is pretty significant.

一般来说，为了控制字节跳动所拥有的受众水平和规模，并且通过确实获得了很大吸引力的算法方法明显地做到了这一点，广告、推动各种服务的潜力是相当巨大的。

In the internet, generally, power comes from owning attention, from owning the consumer, and they have the attention of a lot of consumers in a way that, pretty much, no one in China, outside of Tencent, does.

一般来说，在互联网上，权力来自于拥有注意力，来自于拥有消费者，他们以一种除了腾讯之外的中国几乎没有人能做到的方式吸引了很多消费者的关注。

As far as a business decision of being there, broadly, the issue with being in China that needs to be weighed is the risk, which is, the more that your business is exposed to China, the more you’re going to have to deal with the government, and the government’s decision-making is, generally speaking, going to favor domestic companies.

就进入中国的商业决策而言，总的来说，进入中国需要权衡的问题是风险，即你的企业与中国的接触越多，你就越需要与政府打交道，而政府的决策一般来说都会有利于国内企业。

And second, is going to be, first and foremost, concerned with preserving their own power and whatnot.

其次，首先也是最重要的是，关心维护自己的权力等等。

This is something that Apple is going to have to deal with.

这是苹果必须要面对的事情。

Apple’s always been the most successful company in China because of their business model, selling devices, differentiated software, don’t have to worry about piracy, don’t have to worry about being copied on a hardware level because they’re unique in that regard.

苹果一直是中国最成功的公司，因为他们的商业模式，销售设备，差异化软件，不用担心盗版，不用担心在硬件层面被抄袭，因为他们在这方面是独一无二的。

But what that means is, Apple is uniquely exposed right now to the trade war that’s going on.

但这意味着，苹果目前面临着正在发生的贸易战的独特风险。

Yes, they’ve gotten exceptions so far, but if China really wants to put the squeeze on, they can squeeze Apple on both sides, on the supply side and on the demand side.

是的，到目前为止他们已经获得了例外，但如果中国真的想施加压力，他们可以从供给侧和需求侧对苹果进行双向挤压。

That’s a risk factor that most of the tech companies don’t have because China is not really a meaningful market for them.

这是大多数科技公司不具备的风险因素，因为中国对他们来说并不是一个真正有意义的市场。

Probably the most underrated event — I don’t want to say in human history, but in the last hundred years — is the Cultural Revolution in China.

也许最被低估的事件 ——“我不想说人类历史上，但在过去的百年里”——就是中国的文化大革命。

And not just that 60, 70 million people were killed, or starved to death, or what it might be, but it really was like a scorched earth for China as a whole.

不仅仅是60、7000万人被杀，或者饿死，或者可能是什么，而且对于整个中国来说，这真的就像一片焦土。

Everything started from scratch.

一切都从头开始。

And from an economic perspective, that’s why you can grow for so long — because you’re starting from nothing basically.

从经济角度来看，这就是为什么你可以增长这么长时间 ——因为你基本上是从零开始的。

But the way it impacts culture, generally, and the way business is done.

但它通常会影响文化以及开展业务的方式。

Taiwan, I think, struggles from having thousands of years of Chinese bureaucracy behind it.

我认为，台湾的困境在于其背后有数千年的中国官僚制度。

Plus they were occupied by Japan for 50 years, so you’ve got that culture on top.

另外，他们被日本占领了 50 年，所以你已经把这种文化放在了首位。

Then you have this sclerotic corporate culture that the boss is always right, stay in the office until he goes home, and that sort of thing.

然后你就有了这种僵化的企业文化，即老板总是对的，呆在办公室直到他回家，诸如此类。

It’s unhealthy.

这是不健康的。

Whereas China — it’s much more bare-knuckled competition and “Figure out the right answer, figure it out quickly.” The competition there is absolutely brutal.

而中国 ——这是一场更加赤裸裸的竞争，“找出正确的答案，尽快找出答案。”那里的竞争绝对是残酷的。

It’s brutal in a way I think is hard for people to really comprehend, from the West.

我认为这是西方人很难真正理解的残酷方式。

And that makes China, makes these companies really something to deal with.

这使得中国、这些公司真正成为一个需要对付的对象。

Whereas India did not have something like that.

而印度却没有这样的东西。

Yes, it had colonialism, but all that is still there, and the effects of that, and the long-term effects of India’s thousands of years of culture.

是的，它有殖民主义，但所有这些仍然存在，其影响以及印度数千年文化的长期影响仍然存在。

So it makes it much more difficult to wrap things up, to get things done.

因此，这使得结束事情、完成事情变得更加困难。

And that’s always, I think, going to be the case.

我认为情况总是如此。

The way India develops, generally, because they didn’t have a clear-the-decks event like the Cultural Revolution, is always going to be fundamentally different.

一般来说，印度的发展方式总是会发生根本性的不同，因为他们没有经历过像文化大革命这样的清场事件。

And that is by no means a bad thing.

这绝不是一件坏事。

I’m not wishing the Cultural Revolution on anyone.

我不希望任何人发生文化大革命。

I’m just saying it makes the countries really fundamentally different.

我只是说这让这些国家发生了本质上的不同。

But India — it’s going to be interesting because India is also .

但印度 ——这会很有趣，因为印度也是如此。

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English is one of the national languages.

英语是国语之一。

To what extent do they develop their own industry versus adopting US tech companies is going to be very different than China as well.

他们在多大程度上发展自己的产业，而不是采用美国科技公司，这也将与中国有很大不同。

I think that captures something about the Taiwanese psyche: looking to America, very favorable towards America.

我认为这反映了台湾人的心理：期待美国，非常喜欢美国。

I’ve always been very favorable towards Japan and generally aware of and pulling culture, whether it be popular culture or whatnot, from other countries.

我一直非常喜欢日本，并且普遍了解并吸收其他国家的文化，无论是流行文化还是其他文化。

Whereas my impression of South Korea — I haven’t lived there, so I don’t want to delve in too deeply — is it’s much more internally focused, which is to the benefit of Korean companies because they have a very strong base on which to build and then go abroad.

而我对韩国的印象 ——“我没有在那里生活过，所以我不想深入研究”—— 它更加注重内部，这对韩国公司有利，因为他们有一个非常强大的基础，可以在此基础上开展业务，然后走向海外。

If you’re a Korean, you buy a Samsung phone because it’s Korean, whereas no Taiwanese buys an HTC phone because it’s Taiwanese.

如果你是韩国人，你会因为它是韩国产品而购买三星手机，而台湾人不会因为它是台湾产品而购买 HTC 手机。

They buy whatever phone they think is the best one to buy.

他们购买任何他们认为最好的手机。

And they will keep doing so because, I think, they’re going to be even stronger in the European Union, in part because dealing with all the regulations like that, it’s going to be a traditional favorite; the incumbents are going to do better at it.

他们将继续这样做，因为我认为，他们在欧盟会变得更加强大，部分原因是处理所有类似的法规，这将成为传统的最爱；现任者将会在这方面做得更好。

So I don’t think it’s going to be a different internet in the way that China is different.

因此，我认为互联网不会像中国那样有所不同。

Is there going to be more things, like you can’t reach this site because of GDPR, and things on those lines?

是否还会出现更多情况，例如您因 GDPR 而无法访问此网站，以及类似的情况？

Probably.

大概。

But I don’t think that means it’s going to be different.

但我认为这并不意味着情况会有所不同。

It’s going to be the same city, maybe with a fence between it, as opposed to being a different country entirely.

这将是同一个城市，也许中间有栅栏，而不是完全不同的国家。

There was no real localization effort, and it was almost a flexing of “This is what we can do, and this is why we are competing asymmetrically with the traditional networks, which are focused on a single market.

没有真正的本地化工作，这几乎是一种“这就是我们能做的，这就是为什么我们与专注于单一市场的传统网络进行不对称竞争的原因。

And they’re focused on monetizing up front, whereas we’re thinking about the entire world and monetizing over many years.”

他们专注于预先实现货币化，而我们则着眼于整个世界，并在多年内实现货币化。”

It’s also more a demonstration of how their business model was different and why they could invest at the rates they do, as opposed to necessarily being a viable product that would get a lot of subscribers in all those countries.

这也更多地展示了他们的商业模式有何不同，以及为什么他们可以按照他们的利率进行投资，而不是一定是一个可行的产品，可以在所有这些国家获得大量订阅者。

I think that’s actually been more the last couple years, they’ve actually fleshed it out to being more accessible.

我认为这实际上是过去几年的事情，他们实际上已经充实了它，使其更容易访问。

And where do those products go?

这些产品去了哪里？

They go into big box retailers or they buy up shelf space, and they make deals through brand extensions and have it next to it.

他们进入大型零售商或购买货架空间，并通过品牌延伸进行交易并将其放在旁边。

And people drive there in their cars, and they pick it up and go home.

人们开着自己的车去那里，然后他们把车捡起来然后回家。

And what’s interesting is, all parts of that value chain are under threat by the internet, and it’s all together.

有趣的是，该价值链的所有部分都受到互联网的威胁，而且都是在一起的。

So my argument there was, the reason why TV advertising has remained stronger than people anticipated is because the TV advertisers are unique, are tied in.

所以我的论点是，电视广告之所以比人们预期的要强大，是因为电视广告商是独一无二的，是捆绑在一起的。

It’s all integrated.

一切都是集成的。

They’re integrated with the big box retailers, they’re integrated with the car companies, they’re integrated with sports and the big beer companies.

他们与大型零售商整合，与汽车公司整合，与体育和大型啤酒公司整合。

It’s all one big thing where the economy, as a whole, is all tied together around a certain way of thinking about the consumer and how you go to market.

这是一件大事，整个经济都围绕着某种思考消费者和如何进入市场的方式联系在一起。

And all parts of that are under threat by the internet simultaneously.

所有这些都同时受到互联网的威胁。

So it will stay stronger than you would think because if the weak all stand together, they can stand longer than they would by themselves.

所以它会比你想象的更强大，因为如果弱者都站在一起，他们就能比他们自己站得更久。

But when it collapses, it’s going to be a total collapse, and you’re going to have this rise of all the attention markets on the internet and all the niche products in the individualized marketing that you can do on platforms like Facebook.

但当它崩溃时，这将是彻底崩溃，互联网上的所有关注市场以及您可以在 Facebook 等平台上进行的个性化营销中的所有利基产品都会崛起。

It’s an almost completely separate economy that’s developing off to the side while they’re in it to the end.

这是一个几乎完全独立的经济体，在他们最终参与其中时却在一边发展。