Austan Goolsbee on Central Banking as a Data Dog
Thanks to an anonymous listener for sponsoring this transcript.
感谢一位匿名听众赞助这份文字记录。
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I’m very happy to be chatting with Austan Goolsbee.
今天，我很高兴能与 Austan Goolsbee 聊天。
Austan is one of my favorite economists.
奥斯坦是我最喜欢的经济学家之一。
He always thinks like an economist, is how I would put it.
我会这么说，他总是像经济学家一样思考。
He has had a long-standing teaching post at the University of Chicago, served in the Obama administration, and now is president of the Chicago Fed.
他曾长期在芝加哥大学任教，曾在奥巴马政府任职，现任芝加哥联储主席。
Austan, welcome.
奥斯坦，欢迎。
Tyler, thank you for having me.
泰勒，谢谢你邀请我。
What a treat for me this is.
这对我来说是多么大的享受啊。
I really appreciate it.
我真的很感激。
What is it in academic macroeconomics, or just economics, that you found surprisingly useful being a Fed president?
您发现学术宏观经济学或经济学中的哪些内容对担任美联储主席非常有用？
I was a data guy, as you know, in the field of economics.
如你所知，我是经济学领域的数据专家。
Soon as I got there, there’s all this pressure from the press and from others: “Are you a dove?
我一到那里，就受到来自媒体和其他人的压力：“你是鸽派吗？
Are you a hawk?” I used to say, “Look, I’m not one of the birds.
你是鹰吗？”我曾经说过：“看，我不是鸟中的一员。
I’m in the data dogs.” The first rule of the data dogs is, there’s a time for walking and a time for sniffing, and knowing the difference between those.
我属于数据狗。”数据狗的第一条规则是，有散步的时间，也有嗅闻的时间，并了解它们之间的区别。
I would say that discipline of academic economics — getting into the data — is super useful.
我想说学术经济学的学科——“深入数据”——非常有用。
Then, we are used to thinking about causality and identification.
然后，我们习惯于思考因果关系和同一性。
I do think we could use a little more of that in a macro context.
我确实认为我们可以在宏观背景下多使用一点。
Say you’re trying to figure out the connection between the money supply and the rate of price inflation.
假设您正在尝试找出货币供应量与价格通胀率之间的联系。
What’s the first mental model you put on as a hat?
你戴上的第一个思维模型是什么？
You might disregard it when the data tells you otherwise, but where do you start?
当数据告诉你相反的情况时，你可能会忽略它，但你从哪里开始呢？
You sniff around.
你四处嗅嗅。
I’d say there are multiple models.
我想说有多种型号。
There’re some people, and embodied in the machinery of the FRB/US — official Federal Reserve Bank model — is probably aKeynesian ‘inflation comes from overheating’ idea.
有些人，在 FRB/US 机制中体现的——“官方联邦储备银行模式”——可能是凯恩斯主义的“通胀源于过热”的理念。
I’d say the old-style ‘money supply is what’s correlated with inflation’ — a lot of those relationships between M2 and inflation, or that sort of thing, feel a little antiquated.
我想说的是，旧式的“货币供应量与通货膨胀相关”——M2 和通货膨胀之间的许多关系，或者诸如此类的东西，感觉有点过时了。
They broke down in the data.
他们在数据中崩溃了。
Why are those wrong?
为什么这些都是错的？
What’s the theory in your mind?
你心中的理论是什么？
You’re trying to teach me.
你想教我。
I’m in your class.
我在你们班。
Let me finish one thought, and then let’s come back to what’s wrong about it.
让我说完一个想法，然后让我们回到它的问题所在。
I still like, most of all, the basic supply-and-demand framework, and before you can conclude anything, you’ve got to get a taste of, is this a supply shock or is this a demand shock?
最重要的是，我仍然喜欢基本的供需框架，在得出任何结论之前，你必须先了解一下，这是供给冲击还是需求冲击？
In a way, a lot of the machinery of central banking and macro analysis, let’s call it, is oriented around demand.
在某种程度上，中央银行和宏观分析的许多机制（我们称之为）都是以需求为导向的。
I’m not disputing that, in the past, that has been the source of the most frequent business cycle variations, but I’ve tried to caution everybody in weird moments, like when you’re getting major developments on the supply side — whether they’re labor supply, or supply chain, or productivity growth, or a number of things that are hitting the supply side.
我并不否认，在过去，这是最频繁的经济周期变化的根源，但我试图在奇怪的时刻提醒大家，比如当供应方取得重大进展时——无论是劳动力供应、供应链、生产率增长，还是影响供应方的许多因素。
Maybe all bets might not be off, but the training sample LLM version of being a central banker is going to be prone to hallucination problems because it’s going to give you things that are wrong because supply shocks might be driving inflation, not demand.
也许并非所有的赌注都成功，但作为中央银行家的训练样本法学硕士版本很容易出现幻觉问题，因为它会给你一些错误的东西，因为供应冲击可能会推动通货膨胀，而不是需求。
Then go back to your other question of, “Well, what’s wrong with taking M2?
然后回到你的另一个问题：“那么，选择 M2 有什么问题吗？
And why would it no longer be as correlated with price inflation?” I think that a lot of that is because of financial innovation that we have at great pride, and I love the cash vault at the Chicago Fed.
为什么它不再与价格通胀相关？”我认为这很大程度上是因为我们非常自豪的金融创新，而且我喜欢芝加哥联储的现金库。
They don’t like it if I say exactly how much money is in there.
如果我确切地说出里面有多少钱，他们不喜欢。
I’ll just say, many tens of billions of dollars of cash are in that vault, and we run hundreds of millions a day in and out.
我只想说，金库里有数百亿美元的现金，我们每天进出数亿美元。
There was a time when that cash use was central to the payments of the United States, and bank accounts, and checking accounts, and writing a physical check — again, central to the function of the financial system.
曾经有一段时间，现金的使用对于美国的支付、银行账户、支票账户以及签发实物支票至关重要——同样，这也是金融体系功能的核心。
As we’ve spread to electronic payments and credit cards and debit cards and that sort of thing, it has made .
随着我们扩展到电子支付、信用卡和借记卡等领域，它已经成为现实。
.
。
.
。
I guess in the old model, you would say it’s radically changed the velocity of money.
我想在旧模型中，你会说它从根本上改变了货币流通速度。
It wasn’t just M equals PY.
不仅仅是 M 等于 PY。
It was M times V.
这是 M 乘 V。
If M is moving around, and V is moving around at the same time, you’re going to get a little mixed-up interpreting to over-indexing on that theory.
如果 M 四处移动，而 V 同时移动，那么你会对该理论的过度索引产生一些混乱的解释。
Okay, if the instability comes from the velocity side, that means that we should favor a monetary-growth rule to target the growth path of a nominal GDP, M times V, right?
好吧，如果不稳定来自速度方面，那就意味着我们应该支持货币增长规则，以名义 GDP 的增长路径为目标，M 乘以 V，对吧？
Yes, and now you’re going to get me in trouble, Tyler.
是的，现在你会给我带来麻烦，泰勒。
Here’s the thing I’ve known —
这是我所知道的 ——
You can just say yes.
你可以直接说是。
You’re not in trouble with me.
你没有为难我。
I’m not going to say yes because, remember, I don’t like making policy off accounting identities.
我不会说“是”，因为请记住，我不喜欢根据会计恒等式制定政策。
There’s no economic content in accounting identity.
会计恒等式中没有经济内容。
If you are trying to design a rule, that rule may work if the shocks are the same as what they always were in previous business cycles.
如果你试图设计一条规则，如果冲击与之前的经济周期中的冲击相同，那么该规则可能会起作用。
I called it the golden path.
我称之为黄金之路。
When we came into 2023, you’ll recall the Bloomberg economists said there was a 100 percent chance of recession in 2023.
当我们进入 2023 年时，你会记得彭博社经济学家表示 2023 年经济衰退的可能性是 100%。
They announced it at the end of 2022.
他们在 2022 年底宣布了这一消息。
That’s when I came into the Fed system, the beginning of ’23.
那是我进入美联储系统的时候，23 年初。
That argument was rooted in the past.
这种论点源于过去。
There had never been a drop of inflation of a significant degree without a very serious recession.
在没有出现非常严重的衰退的情况下，通货膨胀从未出现过大幅下降。
Yet in 2023, there was.
然而到了 2023 年，事情就发生了。
Inflation fell almost as much as it ever fell in one year without a recession.
通货膨胀率的下降幅度几乎达到了没有经济衰退的一年内的下降幅度。
If you over-index too much on a rule that implicitly is premised on that everything is driven by demand shocks, I just think you want to be careful over-committing.
如果你对一条隐含的前提是一切都是由需求冲击驱动的规则过度索引，我只是认为你要小心过度承诺。
I’m a little confused at the theoretical level.
我在理论层面上有点困惑。
On one hand, you’re saying M times V is an identity, but on the other hand, it drives inflation dynamics.
一方面，你说 M 乘以 V 是一个恒等式，但另一方面，它驱动了通货膨胀动态。
It’s why I started back from the — I bring a micro sentiment to the thinking about causality and supply and demand.
这就是为什么我从 开始—— 我将微观情感带入对因果关系和供需的思考中。
I sense that you want to bring us to agreeing on a monetary policy rule, and I’m inherently a little uncomfortable.
我感觉到你想让我们就货币政策规则达成一致，而我本质上有点不舒服。
I want to see what the rules say, but I fundamentally don’t want us to pre-commit to any given rule in a way that’s not robust to shocks.
我想看看规则是怎么说的，但从根本上来说，我不希望我们以一种对冲击不稳健的方式预先承诺任何给定的规则。
On whether post-pandemic inflation was mostly from demand or supply
关于大流行后的通货膨胀主要来自需求还是供给
Now, you mentioned the post-pandemic inflation and the role of the supply side.
您刚才提到了疫情后的通胀和供给侧的作用。
When I look at that inflation, I see prices really haven’t come back down.
当我看到通货膨胀时，我发现价格确实没有回落。
They’ve stayed up, and I see service prices are also quite high and went up a lot, so I tend to think it was mostly demand side.
他们熬夜了，我看到服务价格也相当高，而且上涨了很多，所以我倾向于认为这主要是需求方面的。
Now, why is that wrong?
现在，为什么这是错误的？
There’re two parts to that.
这有两个部分。
I won’t say why it’s wrong, but here are my questions.
我不会说为什么这是错误的，但这是我的问题。
If you’re firmly a ‘this-all-came-from-demand’ guy, (A) you’ve got to answer, why did inflation begin soaring in the US when the unemployment rate is over 6 percent?
如果你坚定地认为“这一切都来自需求”，那么你必须回答，为什么美国失业率超过 6% 时通胀却开始飙升？
Or we could turn it into potential output terms if you want, but output is below our estimate of potential.
或者，如果您愿意，我们可以将其转换为潜在产出项，但产出低于我们对潜力的估计。
Unemployment is way higher than what we think of as the natural rate, and inflation is soaring.
失业率远高于我们所认为的自然率，通货膨胀率也在飙升。
That already should make you a little questioning.
这应该会让你产生一些疑问。
I can cite M2.
我可以引用M2。
You may not like it.
你可能不喜欢它。
M2 went up 40 percent over a few-year period, right?
M2 在几年内增长了 40%，对吗？
Two, the fact that the inflation is taking place simultaneously in a bunch of countries of similar magnitudes that did not have the kind of aggregate demand, fiscal or monetary stimulus that we had in the US is also a little bit of a puzzle.
第二，通货膨胀同时发生在许多规模相似的国家，而这些国家没有像美国那样的总需求、财政或货币刺激措施，这一事实也有点令人困惑。
Then the third is, if you don’t think it was supply, then you need to have an explanation for why, when the stimulus rolls off, everything about the stimulus is delta from last year.
第三个是，如果你不认为这是供应，那么你需要解释为什么当刺激措施推出时，有关刺激措施的一切都是去年的增量。
We pass a big fiscal stimulus, we have substantial monetary stimulus that rolls off, the inflation doesn’t come down.
我们通过了大规模的财政刺激，我们有大规模的货币刺激，但通胀并没有下降。
Then in ’23, when the supply chain begins to heal, you see inflation come down.
然后到了 23 年，当供应链开始修复时，你会看到通胀下降。
Those three things suggest there’s a little bit of a puzzle if you think it was all demand.
这三件事表明，如果您认为这都是需求，那就有点令人困惑了。
No, I don’t think it was all demand, but you mentioned other countries.
不，我不认为这全是需求，但你提到了其他国家。
Switzerland and Japan — they import a lot.
瑞士和日本——他们进口很多。
They were more restrained on the demand side.
他们在需求方面更加克制。
They had much lower rates of price inflation.
他们的物价通胀率要低得多。
That seems to me strong evidence for being more demand than supply.
在我看来，这似乎是需求大于供给的有力证据。
Wait a minute.
等一下。
I’m waiting.
我在等。
You’re going to bring in Japan?
你要带去日本吗？
Yes.
是的。
And you’re going to try to claim that Japan’s low inflation is the result of something in COVID?
你会试图声称日本的低通胀是新冠疫情造成的吗？
Japan had lower inflation all along, for decades before.
几十年前，日本的通胀率一直较低。
They were going through deflation.
他们正在经历通货紧缩。
But if it was mostly supply, a supply shock would’ve gotten them out of the earlier deflation, right?
但如果主要是供应，供应冲击将使他们摆脱早期的通货紧缩，对吗？
A demand shock would not have.
需求冲击不会发生。
Let’s back up and try to look at big countries that are not export-oriented, that are primarily domestically driven like the United States.
让我们回过头来看看那些非出口导向型、主要以国内驱动的大国，比如美国。
I think imports are what, 10 percent, 12 percent of personal consumption.
我认为进口占个人消费的10%、12%。
You take Nigeria, you take India, you take a series of big economies that are primarily domestically driven.
以尼日利亚为例，以印度为例，以一系列主要由国内驱动的大型经济体为例。
Why was inflation high in all of these places simultaneously?
为什么所有这些地方的通货膨胀率同时很高？
I do think there’s a puzzle.
我确实认为有一个谜题。
I don’t think it’s 100 percent supply.
我不认为这是100%的供应。
I do think there was a serious demand component, but you’ve still got to explain when the demand stimulus rolls off, inflation doesn’t go down, and then when the negative supply shock rolls off, inflation does go down.
我确实认为存在严重的需求因素，但你仍然需要解释当需求刺激结束时，通胀不会下降，然后当负供应冲击结束时，通胀确实下降。
I’m still curious about it, but I find the argument that this was predominantly or entirely demand unpersuasive for some of those reasons.
我仍然对此感到好奇，但我发现，由于其中一些原因，这种主要或完全是需求的论点缺乏说服力。
Let me try a question from the other extreme.
让我尝试从另一个极端提出一个问题。
Why does money matter at all?
为什么金钱很重要？
Isn’t it a very close substitute for T-bills?
它不是国库券的非常接近的替代品吗？
You’re paying interest on reserves.
您需要支付准备金利息。
You balance that rate with other interest rates.
您可以将该利率与其他利率进行平衡。
There are slight differences in terms of maturity and liquidity profiles, but it could be like the proverbial swap of two nickels for a dime.
期限和流动性状况方面存在细微差异，但这可能就像众所周知的两枚五分钱兑换一毛钱。
Maybe money just doesn’t matter.
也许钱并不重要。
Could you teach me why that’s wrong?
你能教我为什么这是错的吗？
I need to ask you to teach me why it’s wrong.
我需要请你教我为什么这是错的。
I know you’ve raised this before, and it’s not really an answer to say the market seems to feel like they’re not the same, that there’s some yield to safety that we don’t quite understand, I’d say, and it becomes more relevant perhaps in a world where people are creating money-like deposits all over the place.
我知道你之前已经提出过这个问题，但说市场似乎感觉不一样，存在一些我们不太理解的安全收益，这并不是一个真正的答案，我想说，在人们到处创造类似货币的存款的世界中，它可能变得更加相关。
We’ve got stablecoins as well as the use of credit cards, debit cards, a whole bunch of things that look like old-fashioned bank accounts or checking accounts.
我们有稳定币，也有信用卡、借记卡和一大堆看起来像老式银行账户或支票账户的东西。
I guess the long answer is the definition of a money-like deposit — why is it different from explicit money?
我想长的答案是类货币存款的定义 ——为什么它与显性货币不同？
I don’t totally know, but part of me wants to caution you back from going back to M2 in a world like that, where there are imperfect substitutes for money.
我不完全知道，但我想提醒你，在这样的世界里，不要再回到 M2 时代，因为金钱没有不完美的替代品。
It’s weird that we economists can’t explain it, right?
奇怪的是我们经济学家无法解释，对吧？
Yes, probably.
是的，可能是。
It is probably weird.
这可能很奇怪。
But look, you’re going to find yourself back into the data dog caucus and out of the pure theory.
但是你看，你会发现自己又回到了数据狗核心小组，脱离了纯粹的理论。
Do stablecoins increase the true money supply or the rate of price inflation?
稳定币会增加真实货币供应量还是价格通胀率？
It is a kind of intermediation.
这是一种中介。
Say they’re backed fully by treasuries.
假设他们得到了财政部的全力支持。
Let’s say it’s for real; it’s not fraud.
假设这是真的；这不是欺诈。
Now, you just sent a chill down my spine when you said it’s backed by treasuries.
现在，当你说它有国债支持时，我的脊背发凉。
They have the treasuries in there?
他们那里有国库吗？
Yes, 100 percent reserves, and someone creates a stablecoin.
是的，100% 储备，有人创造了稳定币。
I’m liking the sound of that.
我喜欢这个声音。
I’m not anti-crypto.
我并不反对加密货币。
There’s a lot of anti-crypto, but I am nervous.
有很多反加密的声音，但我很紧张。
If you tell me you’re going to create money-like deposits, that people are going to put their money in there, and they can take it out whenever they want, I feel like either (a) there better be some deposit insurance, or (b) there better be some pretty serious restrictions on the assets backing that or restrictions on what the entity can do with the money, or else that thing ends in bank runs and tears.
如果你告诉我你要创造类似货币的存款，人们会把钱存进去，他们可以随时取出来，我觉得要么（a）最好有一些存款保险，要么（b）最好对支持这种存款的资产或实体可以用这些钱做什么进行一些相当严格的限制，否则事情就会以银行挤兑和撕裂而告终。
We have 500 years of financial history that tell us that.
我们 500 年的金融历史告诉我们这一点。
I’ll come back to the stablecoin.
我会回到稳定币。
I’m just a little nervous about that.
我只是对此有点紧张。
You ought to be very nervous, though.
不过，你应该非常紧张。
We’ll come back to stablecoins, but if you look at banking as a whole, I’ve seen figures that formal legal banks are about one-fifth of the lending total.
我们会回到稳定币，但如果你把银行业作为一个整体来看，我看到有数据显示，正规合法银行约占贷款总额的五分之一。
Private equity is more important.
私募股权更重要。
It’s that low.
就是这么低。
The real sector of the economy, and that’s not FDIC insured, and a lot of that is, in fact, runs-prone, as we learned in 2008, so you’ve just got to be hyper, super nervous.
正如我们在 2008 年了解到的那样，实体经济部门并没有 FDIC 承保，而且其中很多部门实际上很容易出现挤兑，所以你必须非常非常紧张。
Yes.
是的。
Look, that’s the very essence of financial stability.
看，这就是金融稳定的本质。
The conundrum of financial stability that we face as a society and as central banks around the world are exactly this — that there is an official banking sector that we have oversight of.
作为一个社会和世界各地的中央银行，我们面临的金融稳定难题正是这样的——我们有一个受我们监督的官方银行部门。
Then there’s a shadow banking sector, which is getting bigger and bigger every year and can be prone to runs, and that runs.
然后是影子银行部门，它每年都变得越来越大，并且很容易发生挤兑，而且这种情况正在发生。
What is the role of a central bank as a lender of last resort in an environment where it doesn’t play?
在无法发挥作用的环境中，央行作为最后贷款人的作用是什么？
By trying to keep banks special, haven’t we created a world where 80 percent of the lending is outside banks, which is much harder for the Fed to deal with, even if you should sometimes step in, and that at the current margin, it’s counterproductive to keep banks legally special because we drive more and more business out of banks.
通过试图保持银行的特殊性，我们不是创造了一个80%的贷款都在银行外部的世界，这对美联储来说更难处理，即使你有时应该介入，而且在目前的利润率下，保持银行在法律上的特殊性会适得其反，因为我们将越来越多的业务从银行中赶走。
That was two different statements.
这是两种不同的说法。
One is, how is that a problem?
一是，这怎么会是一个问题呢？
The second was the normative — isn’t it useless, and so we shouldn’t do it?
第二个是规范性的——是不是没用，不应该做？
Jeremy Stein is an old friend, and I’m a massive admirer of his work.
杰里米·斯坦因是我的老朋友，我非常崇拜他的作品。
When he was a governor at the Fed, he highlighted exactly this, that we have to strike a balance in financial stability.
当他担任美联储理事时，他明确强调了这一点，即我们必须在金融稳定方面取得平衡。
If you squeeze really, really hard on one side, there can be regulatory arbitrage, and it can lead to activity to shift to the area where we don’t control, and oftentimes, don’t even have the information.
如果你真的非常非常努力地挤压一侧，可能会出现监管套利，并可能导致活动转移到我们无法控制的领域，而且通常甚至没有信息。
I agree with you on that part.
我同意你的观点。
I don’t know if I would go so far as your second statement, that therefore it’s counterproductive oversight.
我不知道我是否会接受你的第二个陈述，因此这是适得其反的监督。
Raising capital ratios on official banks is not effective because it leads to shadow banks.
提高官方银行的资本比率并不有效，因为它会导致影子银行的产生。
Very early, I arrived at the Fed, and then the Silicon Valley Bank events happened.
我很早就到了美联储，然后硅谷银行事件发生了。
I was there back in 2009 when the big banks were the centerpiece of the problem.
2009 年我就在那里，当时大银行是问题的核心。
The fact that in March of ’23, the big banks were not the problem, I think a lot has to do with all of the efforts that were put in place to raise capital at those larger banks.
事实上，在 23 年 3 月，大银行并不是问题所在，我认为这很大程度上与这些大银行为筹集资金而做出的所有努力有关。
We can argue about whether it was done right, but you’ve got to admit it, it made you feel better that it wasn’t the biggest official banks that were facing critical deficiencies in capital.
我们可以争论这样做是否正确，但你必须承认这一点，这让你感觉更好，因为并不是最大的官方银行面临严重的资本短缺。
On housing and construction
关于住房和建筑
On the Great Financial Crisis, I have a question.
关于金融危机，我有一个问题。
I’m curious how you frame this.
我很好奇你是如何构建这个的。
In 2009, I was convinced we had had a housing bubble.
2009年，我确信我们已经出现了房地产泡沫。
Today, I look at real estate prices, and I think most of the country didn’t.
今天，我看看房地产价格，我认为全国大部分地区都没有。
Maybe suburban Orlando did.
也许奥兰多郊区就是这样。
The prices were right, and we had some anti-bubble panic, and that was the problem.
价格合适，而且我们有一些反泡沫恐慌，这就是问题所在。
That’s a fascinating point.
这是一个有趣的点。
What’s your view?
你的看法是什么？
I hadn’t thought of it that way.
我没有那样想过。
My view has been more, part of the job of the Reserve Bank presidents is we have a district, and our district in Chicago is heart of the Midwest — most of Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan.
我的观点是，储备银行行长工作的一部分是我们有一个选区，而我们在芝加哥的选区是中西部的中心——威斯康星州、爱荷华州、伊利诺伊州、印第安纳州、密歇根州的大部分地区。
I’m out talking to business people.
我出去和商人谈话。
I’m talking to individuals, and overwhelmingly, what you hear is despair — I would even call it despair — about the cost of housing.
我正在与个人交谈，绝大多数，你听到的是绝望 —— 我什至称其为绝望 —— 对住房成本的绝望。
That housing — they can’t move.
那个房屋 ——他们无法移动。
This is not just in cities where you could argue a lot of it maybe has to do with building codes and zoning.
这不仅仅发生在城市，你可能会认为这可能与建筑规范和分区有关。
We went out to the Iowa Farm Bureau, and in rural Iowa, I asked them, “What’s the biggest problem?” They said, “Attracting workers.” I said, “Why is it so hard to attract workers?” They said, “Because they can’t afford to buy housing.”
我们去了爱荷华州农业局，在爱荷华州农村，我问他们，“最大的问题是什么？”他们说：“吸引工人。”我说：“为什么招工这么难？”他们说：“因为买不起房。”
I’ve spent a long time trying to think that through.
我花了很长时间试图思考这个问题。
It’s not wrong that it’s just more extreme.
这并没有错，只是更加极端。
The last couple of years, house price inflation has been radically higher than goods price inflation.
过去几年，房价通胀远远高于商品价格通胀。
If you just compare buying a house to buying stuff at Costco or Target, there’d been a big differential, but what’s important is that’s not new in the last three years.
如果你只是将买房与在 Costco 或 Target 买东西进行比较，就会发现差别很大，但重要的是，这在过去三年里并不是什么新鲜事。
That’s been going on literally for decades.
这种情况实际上已经持续了几十年。
If you take the 12 years before COVID, house price inflation was 3.5 percent or 4 percent a year, and goods price inflation was actually deflation of around 1 percent a year.
如果以新冠疫情爆发前的 12 年为例，房价通胀率为每年 3.5% 或 4%，而商品价格通胀实际上是每年 1% 左右的通货紧缩。
The relative price of housing has been rising 4 percent, 5 percent per year for a decade and a half.
十五年来，住房相对价格每年上涨 4%、5%。
It doesn’t take a PhD by any means to recognize that something compounding at 5 percent a year is going to add up to a big number.
无论如何，即使是博士学位也能认识到，每年 5% 的复利加起来会是一个很大的数字。
I think it goes to your question of, “Well, maybe it wasn’t a bubble.” I don’t fully understand why the relative price of housing has been trending upward like this.
我认为这涉及到你的问题：“好吧，也许这不是泡沫。”我不太明白为什么房价的相对价格一直呈这样的上涨趋势。
I find it hard to explain.
我觉得很难解释。
I have a paper, you might’ve seen, with Chad Syverson, that’s about negative productivity growth in the construction industry over long periods of time, which is itself a puzzle.
你可能已经看过我和查德·西弗森 (Chad Syverson) 合作的一篇论文，内容是关于建筑行业生产率长期负增长的，这本身就是一个谜题。
Maybe that’s part of it.
也许这就是其中的一部分。
Some component of it may be regulatory in nature, but as I say, you see it in rural areas, too, where the land use regulation is not as prevalent.
其中某些组成部分本质上可能是监管性的，但正如我所说，你也会在农村地区看到它，那里的土地使用监管并不那么普遍。
I think that’s a real puzzle.
我认为这是一个真正的难题。
On the construction productivity puzzle, what do you think is the main reason for that?
关于建筑生产力难题，您认为主要原因是什么？
That it’s negative.
那是负面的。
If it were zero — that would be a little easier to understand, but we’re forgetting how to build homes?
如果它是零 — 那就更容易理解了，但我们忘记了如何建造房屋？
Yes, somehow, we’re forgetting.
是的，不知何故，我们忘记了。
We’re doing it worse.
我们做得更糟。
We tried every way we could think of to analyze this.
我们尝试了一切能想到的方法来分析这个问题。
Maybe it’s just mismeasurement, so we got evidence on the physical number of homes and the value of those homes that you could deflate by the very localized price deflators.
也许这只是错误的测量，所以我们得到了有关房屋实际数量和这些房屋价值的证据，您可以通过非常本地化的价格平减指数来缩小这些房屋的价值。
At the best, it’s zero, and it mostly looks like we’re getting worse at it.
最好的情况下，它是零，而且看起来我们在这方面的表现越来越差。
Ed Glaeser, who’s an old friend of mine — and I know you’re a fan of his work as well — he believes that it is very much tied to land use regulation and other regulations on the construction industry, that if you go back to the 1970s or ’60s, they were moving in a modular direction.
Ed Glaeser，我的老朋友 ——我知道你也是他作品的粉丝 ——他认为这与土地使用法规和建筑行业的其他法规密切相关，如果你回到 20 世纪 70 年代或 60 年代，它们正在朝着模块化的方向发展。
Think of it as a higher-brow prefab housing, turning construction more into manufactured good, and that the regulations, in some sense, have forced an inefficient scale on our producers, but I don’t know.
可以将其视为高级预制房屋，将建筑更多地转化为制成品，从某种意义上说，这些法规迫使我们的生产商形成低效的规模，但我不知道。
We left it.
我们留下了它。
We documented it, we showed what it was not, but we weren’t able to find a smoking gun for what it was.
我们记录了它，我们展示了它不是什么，但我们无法找到确凿的证据来证明它是什么。
Now, in your role in running the Chicago Fed, which is like running a corporation, right?
现在，在你管理芝加哥联储的角色中，这就像管理一家公司，对吧？
Yes.
是的。
What is it from microeconomics that you have found especially useful or helpful?
您发现微观经济学中的哪些内容特别有用或有帮助？
Because you face a lot of managerial problems that have nothing to do with headlines about the Fed, right?
因为你面临很多管理问题，这些问题与美联储的头条新闻无关，对吗？
Yes, it’s true.
是的，这是真的。
The first thing to know about the Reserve Banks is there is a professional COO, called the first vice president.
关于储备银行，首先要了解的是有一位专业的首席运营官，称为第一副行长。
Chicago’s first vice president is a woman named Ellen Bromagen who’s the best.
芝加哥的第一副总统是一位名叫埃伦·布洛马根的女性，她是最优秀的。
Everyone says amazing.
大家都说神奇。
I was at an early meeting.
我正在参加一个早期的会议。
I’d been at the Fed for — I don’t know — maybe five months, and one of the other presidents said — it seemed like he was being nice — he said, “It seems like it’s going great.
我在美联储工作了“——我不知道”——“也许五个月了，其他一位总统说：“他似乎很友善”——他说，“看起来一切进展顺利。
You’ve been really doing a good job.” I said, “Thank you.” He said, “Well, that’s what I was thinking.
你真的做得很好。”我说：“谢谢。”他说：“嗯，我就是这么想的。
Then I realized Ellen is your first vice president, and Anna is your research director, Anna Paulson.
然后我意识到艾伦是你们的第一副总裁，安娜是你们的研究总监安娜·保尔森。
How big of an idiot would you have to be not to look like you were doing a good job?” There’s something to that.
你得有多白痴才会显得你干得不错？”这是有原因的。
The micro theory of delegation, I think, is important.
我认为授权的微观理论很重要。
And things that have a marginal cost of zero — it’s fine if you do more of those things.
而那些边际成本为零的事情 ——如果你做更多这些事情就很好。
That’s the idea of what is a cost, what is an opportunity cost, and what is a marginal cost, are some of the most important microeconomic ideas that I think we can apply to management.
这就是什么是成本、什么是机会成本、什么是边际成本的概念，这些是我认为我们可以应用于管理的一些最重要的微观经济思想。
What would be an example of something with a marginal cost of zero?
边际成本为零的例子是什么？
Well, I don’t want to reveal anything about our operations and get myself in trouble about the Federal Reserve operations.
好吧，我不想透露任何有关我们运作的信息，也不想让自己因美联储的运作而陷入麻烦。
If you look at marginal cost of zero things, opening meetings to include others and having folks work together, sharing of information can often have very low cost — if not literally zero — and strong benefits.
如果你考虑零事物的边际成本、召开会议让其他人参与以及让人们一起工作，那么信息共享通常可以带来非常低的成本（如果不是真正的零成本）和巨大的好处。
In the same way in our growth models, knowledge is a public good, information can have a very low marginal cost and can help us facilitate working together, and so I’ve tried to emphasize those internally.
同样，在我们的增长模型中，知识是一种公共物品，信息的边际成本非常低，可以帮助我们促进合作，所以我试图在内部强调这些。
On reforming the Fed system
关于改革美联储体系
Now, we live in an age of fiscal pressures, as you know, and recent experience with DOGE has shown that even if the amounts of money at stake are small, people will go after highly visible targets.
如您所知，现在我们生活在一个充满财政压力的时代，最近 DOGE 的经验表明，即使所涉及的资金数额很小，人们也会追求高度可见的目标。
Do you think, say, 10 years from now, that we’ll have so many different Federal Reserve branches that each have their own research staff in any large numbers?
你是否认为，从现在起 10 年后，我们将拥有如此多不同的美联储分支机构，每个分支机构都有自己的大量研究人员？
You mean, might they kill that system?
你的意思是，他们可能会杀死那个系统吗？
That’s a system we have.
这是我们拥有的系统。
Or someone.
或者某人。
Right, that’s a system we have.
是的，这就是我们拥有的系统。
Someone might ask, why does the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas need as many research staff as it has?
有人可能会问，为什么达拉斯联储需要这么多研究人员呢？
Then let’s back up to a little bit to how the Fed is created.
然后让我们回顾一下美联储是如何创建的。
It was made in 1913, so it’s a little bit kludgy, and like every politically created thing, it involves some compromises, but there are a couple of pieces, I think are genius, or at least very durable, important contributions about how the Fed is built that we should not lose.
它是在 1913 年制定的，所以有点笨拙，就像每一个政治创造的东西一样，它涉及一些妥协，但我认为有几个部分是天才的，或者至少是关于美联储如何建立的非常持久的重要贡献，我们不应该失去。
The first thing to note is, we have a hybrid federal system in which, yes, there is a chair, and there are seven governors that are political appointees named by the president and confirmed by the Senate.
首先要注意的是，我们有一个混合联邦制度，是的，有一个主席，还有七名州长，他们是由总统任命并经参议院确认的政治任命者。
In 1913, as today, people were deeply uncomfortable with the idea that either Washington, DC, or New York City, or just a combination of those two, would control the US financial system with no input from the rest of the country.
1913 年和今天一样，人们对于这样的想法深感不安：华盛顿特区或纽约市，或者两者的结合，将在没有美国其他地区参与的情况下控制美国金融体系。
So, they didn’t set it up that way.
所以，他们没有那样设置。
They added 12 Reserve Banks from around the nation to be part of the FOMC, and we go and we sit around the table.
他们将全国各地的 12 家储备银行纳入 FOMC，然后我们就去坐在桌子旁。
There’re 19 people; 7 of them are political appointees, and 12 of the people sitting around the table are not political appointees.
有19人；其中7人是政治任命者，坐在桌子旁的人中有12人不是政治任命者。
They’re chosen by boards of directors out in the flyover states like us, where business leaders, civic leaders, and people from the region choose to have representation.
他们是由像我们这样的立交桥州的董事会选出的，商界领袖、公民领袖和来自该地区的人们选择拥有代表权。
I think it’s critically important that we maintain that kind of monetary policy, independent thought, that it’s not just New York City and Washington, DC, that are coming with one perspective.
我认为至关重要的是，我们要维持这种货币政策，独立的思想，不仅仅是纽约市和华盛顿特区持有一种观点。
You’ve probably seen some of the analyses over the years, a lot of the new ideas about monetary policy, about banking and supervision that came out of the Reserve Banks.
你可能已经看过多年来的一些分析，以及储备银行提出的许多关于货币政策、银行业和监管的新想法。
That’s why we have our own research departments, and that’s why we take very seriously the idea that when we go to the FOMC meeting, I love hearing what the other presidents and the governors have to say.
这就是为什么我们有自己的研究部门，这就是为什么我们非常认真地对待这样的想法：当我们参加联邦公开市场委员会会议时，我喜欢听其他总统和州长所说的话。
I said with no irony, “I consider the FOMC to be the world’s greatest deliberative body at this point.” No offense to the US Senate or to anyone else, it’s an amazing group.
我毫不讽刺地说，“我认为联邦公开市场委员会是目前世界上最伟大的审议机构。”无意冒犯美国参议院或其他任何人，这是一个了不起的团体。
If you’re an econ nerd, you go into that room, and it is just about the coolest thing there is on this planet.
如果你是一个经济迷，当你走进那个房间时，你会发现它几乎是这个星球上最酷的东西。
The shades come down.
阴影落下。
There’s a giant table, and they go around the table and Jay Powell is going to say, “Here’s what I see in the economy.” And then it’s going to go to Chris Waller, and it’s going to go to President Barkin and President Bostic.
有一张巨大的桌子，他们围着桌子走，杰伊·鲍威尔会说：“这就是我在经济中看到的情况。”然后将交给克里斯·沃勒、巴尔金总统和博斯蒂克总统。
“What do you think?”
“你怎么认为？”
I think that’s really important.
我认为这非常重要。
If we put ourselves on a path that we’re going to go chip away at that, and that somehow it would be more efficient to hammer away and get rid of the national representation on the FOMC, I think that’d be a terrible mistake.
如果我们让自己走上一条我们要逐步消除这一点的道路，并且以某种方式消除并消除联邦公开市场委员会的国家代表会更有效，我认为这将是一个可怕的错误。
Now, I like the structure of the committee.
现在，我喜欢委员会的结构。
I think that’s excellent.
我认为这非常棒。
But if someone said to me, “Well, there should only be five Feds with a staff, but, say, you should have complete access to all of them.
但如果有人对我说：“好吧，应该只有五位联邦官员和一名工作人员，但是，比如说，你应该可以完全接触到他们所有人。
If macro was mainly about data rather than new theories” — and I agree with that — “five staffs should be enough.” It’s not like the old days where you needed the Minnesota School, monetarism in St. Louis.
如果宏观主要是数据而不是新理论” — 我同意 — “五名员工就足够了”。这不像过去你需要明尼苏达学派，圣路易斯的货币主义。
Then why any?
那为什么有呢？
Why not just one?
为什么不只有一个呢？
Why not say, “Hey, here are the data sets.
为什么不说：“嘿，这是数据集。
We’ll give you all the data sets.
我们将为您提供所有数据集。
We only need one opinion.” You, of all people, Tyler, you know how dangerous that is.
我们只需要一种意见。”泰勒，在所有人中，你知道这有多危险。
Look, we need to let some flowers bloom because monocultures are prone to groupthink.
看，我们需要让一些花朵绽放，因为单一栽培容易产生群体思维。
That’s why I say five.
这就是为什么我说五个。
You could talk me down to three, perhaps.
也许你可以说服我减少到三个。
Look, as I say, the thing was invented.
看，正如我所说，这东西被发明了。
There’re two of them in Missouri at the time in 1913 —
1913 年，密苏里州有两个这样的人——
It’s like baseball teams, right?
这就像棒球队，对吧？
There’s nothing in this.
这里面什么也没有。
Yes, it’s like baseball teams.
是的，就像棒球队一样。
In an era where almost all the teams are in New York City, baseball’s the worse for it.
在几乎所有球队都在纽约市的时代，棒球的情况更糟。
What should the regional Feds be doing managerially to prepare for the arrival of AGI?
地区联储应该采取哪些管理措施来为 AGI 的到来做好准备？
Or just very strong AI, whatever you want to call it.
或者只是非常强大的人工智能，无论你想怎么称呼它。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I’m still curious, and I hope we’ll .
我仍然很好奇，我希望我们会。
.
。
.
。
Let’s have a little extended discussion about AI, and what it means for productivity, and how real is it?
让我们对人工智能进行一些深入的讨论，以及它对生产力的意义，以及它的真实性如何？
The thing that banks do — I always say it’s a handful of things.
银行所做的事情 —— 我总是说这是少数几件事。
It’s five basic functions, one of which is monetary policy.
它有五项基本职能，其中之一是货币政策。
I consider that the opposable thumb.
我认为是对生拇指。
That’s what separates us from the animals.
这就是我们与动物的区别。
You’ve got monetary policy, and then there’s directing the payment system of the United States.
你有货币政策，然后还有指导美国的支付系统。
People probably don’t understand, unless they get into it, that the plumbing of the financial system — wired transfers, ACH direct deposit, FedNow — there’re a whole bunch of payment system things that are operated by the Fed system that are critically important.
人们可能不明白，除非他们深入了解，金融体系的管道 ——电汇、ACH 直接存款、FedNow——由美联储系统运营的一大堆支付系统事物至关重要。
The biggest thing in terms of employees is bank supervision and regulation and oversight to make sure that our official banks are safe and sound.
对员工来说最大的就是银行监管和监管，确保我们官方银行安全稳健。
We are a bank to banks, so the fourth is financial services, like we send cash for their ATM machines.
我们是一家银行对银行，所以第四个是金融服务，比如我们为他们的 ATM 机发送现金。
We do a whole bunch of financial services for the member banks.
我们为成员银行提供一系列金融服务。
Then the fifth is to participate, be upstanding members of the community.
那么第五就是参与，做社区的正直成员。
We have a community development function.
我们有社区发展职能。
We have a regional economics focus.
我们的重点是区域经济。
We are absolute experts in Chicago, for example, on the auto industry.
例如，我们是芝加哥汽车行业的绝对专家。
We have by far the most auto production and the highest manufacturing intensity of all the districts, so we have expertise in that.
我们是目前各地区汽车产量最多、制造强度最高的地区，所以我们在这方面有专业知识。
I think all five of those are quite important that we maintain them.
我认为这五个因素对于我们维护它们都非常重要。
Where AI fits in — I could see it fitting in supervision and alerting you, at least red flagging, here’s a place to look more.
人工智能适合的地方 ——我可以看到它适合监督和提醒你，至少是危险信号，这是一个需要更多关注的地方。
As of now, though, there is a rule forbidding the use of AI tools for general Fed usage, and I understand it.
不过，到目前为止，有一条规则禁止将人工智能工具用于美联储的一般用途，我对此表示理解。
If you take secret information, confidential information, and start plugging it into these and it starts getting out, I think that would be a problem.
如果你获取秘密信息、机密信息，然后开始将其插入其中，然后它就开始泄露，我认为这将是一个问题。
You could put this on your hard drive, right?
你可以把它放在你的硬盘上，对吗？
We’re very close to being able to do that.
我们非常接近能够做到这一点。
The Fed has incredible data.
美联储拥有令人难以置信的数据。
You could take everything, all the Feds know about banking failures, build an AI, keep it on the Fed hard drive, and they would do much better than any human in predicting bank failures.
你可以利用一切，所有美联储都知道银行倒闭，建立一个人工智能，将其保存在美联储硬盘上，他们在预测银行倒闭方面会比任何人做得更好。
Maybe.
或许。
That’s a hypothesis.
这是一个假设。
I had this theory before we ever started talking about LLM models.
在我们开始谈论 LLM 模型之前，我就已经有了这个理论。
I had this theory with academics on the job market that would come in with a structural IO paper.
我与就业市场上的学者讨论了这个理论，该理论将随一篇结构性 IO 论文一起发表。
I believe that down deep in the human psyche, there are what I always call the fundamental human.
我相信，在人类心灵深处，存在着我一直所说的基本人性。
Some people believe in magic, and some people fundamentally don’t believe in magic.
有些人相信魔法，有些人根本不相信魔法。
How it would play out is, if a person had a paper that was so complicated that you could not understand it, there would be some people who would say, “Wow, was that job candidate impressive.
结果是，如果一个人的论文非常复杂，以至于你无法理解它，那么有些人会说，“哇，那个求职者令人印象深刻吗？
They had such a machinery.
他们有这样的机器。
I couldn’t even tell what was going on.” Then there would be people like Gene Fama who would say, “That guy was a complete bullshitter.
我什至不知道发生了什么。”然后会有像吉恩·法玛这样的人会说：“那家伙完全是胡说八道。
I couldn’t understand anything that they were saying.”
我听不懂他们在说什么。”
That idea, do you believe in magic or not believe in magic, now transpires a little bit into the AI world.
“你相信魔法还是不相信魔法”这个想法现在已经在人工智能世界中有所体现。
You might believe in magic, Tyler, if you think that that will automatically be, in near term, better than any human.
泰勒，如果你认为魔法在短期内会自动比任何人类更好，你可能会相信魔法。
The only caution I would have is, back up to 2023 and ask the question, “Could an LLM replace the FOMC and do it better?” I have some severe qualms that it could because you’re only as good as the training sample.
我唯一要注意的是，回到 2023 年，问一个问题：“法学硕士能否取代 FOMC 并做得更好？”我对此有一些严重的疑虑，因为你的表现与训练样本一样好。
The training sample would’ve said, as you went into 2023, inflation’s way too high.
当你进入 2023 年时，训练样本会说通货膨胀太高了。
What should happen?
应该发生什么？
What is going to happen?
将会发生什么？
The LLM would’ve said, “It’s a lead-pipe cinch guarantee.
法学硕士会说：“这是铅管的保证。
You need to jack up the interest rate and have a massive recession.
你需要提高利率并经历大规模衰退。
Otherwise, inflation will not come down.” It’s only the thinking, hey, wait a minute, might there be a supply shock here, that we’re getting a positive supply shock, a massive labor force participation increase, more flexible labor markets, so disabled workers can come into the workforce, women are coming back into the workforce.
否则，通货膨胀就不会下降。”只是想，嘿，等一下，这里可能会出现供应冲击，我们正在遭受积极的供应冲击，劳动力参与率大幅提高，劳动力市场更加灵活，因此残疾工人可以进入劳动力市场，女性也可以重返劳动力市场。
The LLM would not catch that.
法学硕士不会明白这一点。
On CBDCs
关于 CBDC
I want you to talk me into the correct view on a central bank–issued digital currency.
我希望你能说服我对央行发行的数字货币有正确的看法。
Let me explain to you my dilemma.
让我向你解释一下我的困境。
Okay.
好的。
It seems, on one hand, the Fed or other central banks — if they do nothing, stablecoins simply proliferate.
一方面，美联储或其他央行似乎如果不采取任何行动，稳定币就会激增。
You lose control.
你失去了控制。
There are prudential issues, maybe, eventually money supply issues.
也许存在审慎问题，最终是货币供应问题。
If you do something and, say, create a CBDC through the Fed, there’s the risk of disintermediating community banks, regional banks, smaller banks, and Americans seem to hate the idea for reasons that to me are partly irrational, maybe somewhat justified.
如果你做某事，比如通过美联储创建一个 CBDC，那么就存在社区银行、区域银行、小型银行脱媒的风险，而美国人似乎讨厌这个想法，因为对我来说有些不合理，但也许有些合理。
What exactly is the right view to have on this?
对此到底正确的看法是什么？
I find myself torn.
我发现自己被撕裂了。
You must think about this.
你必须考虑一下这一点。
I’ve seen you ask.
我看到你问了。
I’ve seen you ask Mark Carney and others about this very topic.
我看到你向马克·卡尼和其他人询问过这个话题。
The first thing I’ll say, I’m at Chicago Fed.
我要说的第一件事是，我在芝加哥联储。
We don’t set policy on stuff like that.
我们不会对此类事情制定政策。
That’s Washington has to set that.
这是华盛顿必须设定的。
Yes, but they ask you for advice.
是的，但他们会向你寻求建议。
You’re a renowned economist.
您是一位著名的经济学家。
Congress has to set that policy.
国会必须制定该政策。
I think the thought that Grandma is going to have a CBDC and forget her password, and the Fed is going to have a customer service line that Grandma’s going to call and say, “How do I get my password back?” I don’t know.
我认为奶奶将拥有 CBDC 并忘记密码，而美联储将设立客户服务热线，奶奶会打电话询问“我如何取回密码？”我不知道。
I don’t see that.
我不这么认为。
That seems pretty far from the world that the Fed’s going to focus in.
这似乎与美联储关注的领域相去甚远。
CBDCs that are a wholesale thing, I at least have more understanding, and some of the central banks do that.
CBDC 是一种批发产品，我至少有更多的理解，一些央行就是这样做的。
But there, I wonder, how different is that from wire transfer?
但我想知道，这与电汇有何不同？
What does it mean?
这是什么意思？
What does a wholesale —
批发是什么意思 —
I mean retail, like we have retail stablecoins.
我的意思是零售，就像我们有零售稳定币一样。
You’re talking about retail.
你说的是零售业。
A true CBDC, yes, like a $10 bill.
是的，真正的 CBDC，就像 10 美元的钞票。
Do you advocate postal savings accounts or government-run bank alternatives?
您主张邮政储蓄账户还是政府运营的银行替代方案？
There are countries where they have that.
有些国家有这样的能力。
I feel like it’s approaching that space.
我感觉它正在接近那个空间。
It’s worked okay in the past.
过去效果很好。
I suppose I’m willing to live with the proliferation of stablecoins, but all the paths make me nervous.
我想我愿意忍受稳定币的激增，但所有的路径都让我感到紧张。
All the paths make you nervous.
所有的路径都让你紧张。
Then all the paths make me nervous.
然后所有的路都让我紧张。
Grandma calling on the Fed line you might prefer to managing all these stablecoins, and Grandma emailing her rep or Grandma’s AI emailing the rep saying, “Hey, I couldn’t get my stablecoins back because the private supplier screwed me.
奶奶打电话给美联储，你可能更喜欢管理所有这些稳定币，奶奶给她的代表发电子邮件，或者奶奶的人工智能给代表发电子邮件说：“嘿，我无法拿回我的稳定币，因为私人供应商搞砸了我。
What’s the Fed going to do about this?” That’s not a fun phone call, either.
美联储对此将采取什么行动？”这也不是一个有趣的电话。
That’s not a fun phone call, either.
这也不是一个有趣的电话。
I agree with that.
我同意这一点。
To the extent that there are non- .
在某种程度上，有非。
.
。
.
。
In a way, it’s back to our thing of what’s a bank and what’s not a bank.
在某种程度上，这又回到了我们关于什么是银行、什么不是银行的问题。
Your argument is, in some sense, stablecoins are shadow banks, and the disintermediation of community banks or the like will create a lot of upheaval, and there will be a lot of jockeying in a world like that, and I agree.
你的论点是，从某种意义上说，稳定币是影子银行，社区银行等的去中介化会造成很多剧变，在这样的世界里会有很多竞争，我同意。
The thing is, the risk so far associated with cryptocurrency makes me nervous.
问题是，迄今为止与加密货币相关的风险让我感到紧张。
Again, I want to reiterate, I’m just at a Reserve Bank.
我想再次重申，我只是在储备银行工作。
We don’t set policy on this.
我们对此没有制定政策。
Congress has to set this policy, and in conjunction with the Board of Governors, Washington sets the policy here.
国会必须制定这项政策，华盛顿与理事会一起制定政策。
I find the prospect that the stablecoins — if we’re going to go back to the free banking era in the United States, they end the Second Bank of the United States, and we go through decades where anybody can start a bank.
我发现稳定币的前景——如果我们要回到美国的自由银行时代，它们会结束美国第二银行，我们将经历几十年来任何人都可以创办银行。
If you go look at the free banking era, it is an era of massive numbers of bank failures and recurrent financial crises.
如果你看看自由银行时代，就会发现这是一个银行大量倒闭、金融危机频发的时代。
The Panic of 1847, the Panic of 1857, and close to panic in 1860, massive numbers of recessions in the flavor of a person shows up, starts a bank.
1847 年的恐慌、1857 年的恐慌，以及 1860 年接近恐慌的情况，出现了大量的经济衰退，人们开始创办银行。
They’re supposed to be backed by the equivalent of treasuries, but they start the bank, print their own money, and get out of town.
他们应该得到相当于国债的支持，但他们创办了银行，印了自己的钱，然后离开了城镇。
That seems problematic to me, to be in the space.
对我来说，在太空中这似乎是有问题的。
Anything where you’re going to have cyberattacks and fraud, associating the Fed’s name with it, we just need to be careful.
任何与美联储的名字相关的网络攻击和欺诈行为，我们都需要小心。
In a way, the Fed will always be the fuddy-duddy of the financial system, and that’s how it should be.
在某种程度上，美联储将永远是金融体系的老古董，而且也应该如此。
You might have seen my colleague at the University of Chicago, Eric Budish, had this paper about, let’s call it the blockchain in centrally controlled versus not centrally controlled — not controlled but central oversight crypto versus non-central oversight crypto.
你可能看过我在芝加哥大学的同事埃里克·布迪什（Eric Budish）写的这篇论文，我们将其称为“集中控制与非集中控制的区块链”——“不受控制但中央监督加密货币与非中央监督加密货币”。
It’s just a theory paper, but it goes off of the idea that everybody collectively agrees to history, what happened, and who made a transaction.
这只是一篇理论论文，但它的理念是每个人都同意历史、发生的事情以及谁进行了交易。
That’s the essence of what’s happening on the blockchain, and the potential attack, that if you could get 50 percent plus 1 of the miners or of the blockchain to say, “No, no, there was a transaction, and all of that coin is actually, they sent it to us for nothing,” you could get 51 percent of the instantaneous flow, and that would allow you to snipe-attack a giant stock of crypto.
这就是区块链上发生的事情以及潜在攻击的本质，如果你能让 50% 加 1 的矿工或区块链说，“不，不，有一笔交易，所有这些硬币实际上都是，他们免费发送给我们的，”你可以获得 51% 的瞬时流量，这将允许你狙击攻击大量的加密货币。
That’s a very interesting paper, and it’s —
这是一篇非常有趣的论文，它是 ——
Oh, I know that piece.
哦，我知道那一段。
It’s great.
这很棒。
— a bit challenging.
——有点挑战性。
You know that piece.
你知道那件作品。
I get that problem, but just concretely, Tether is chartered abroad, right?
我明白这个问题，但具体来说，Tether 是在国外特许的，对吧？
Yes.
是的。
What are you all going to do about it?
你们都打算怎么做呢？
Like I said —
就像我说的 ——
There’s no great firewall in the United States.
美国没有强大的防火墙。
— I don’t set the policy.
— 我不制定政策。
But they come to you for advice.
但他们会向您寻求建议。
What do you tell them they should do?
你告诉他们应该做什么？
Who?
WHO？
Tether?
系绳？
I would tell them —
我会告诉他们 —
No, the US government.
不，是美国政府。
Well, the US government — do everything you can to make sure that they have the assets that they claim to have.
好吧，美国政府 ——尽一切努力确保他们拥有他们声称拥有的资产。
Can we do anything?
我们能做点什么吗？
They’re chartered abroad.
他们是在国外特许的。
Is it Cayman Islands?
是开曼群岛吗？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
The question of what’s inside the safety net and what’s outside the safety net is a super important problem.
安全网之内和安全网之外的问题是一个非常重要的问题。
You probably know, I was very close friends with Paul Volcker, and he was a mentor to me and really one of my personal heroes.
你可能知道，我和保罗·沃尔克是非常亲密的朋友，他是我的导师，也是我个人的英雄之一。
We went through the analysis of the financial crisis of ’07 and into ’08 and Bear Stearns and the financial crisis and the response.
我们分析了07年的金融危机和08年的贝尔斯登以及金融危机和应对措施。
He, early, early on, identified this question that it’s all going to come out.
他很早就发现了这个问题，一切都会水落石出。
At some point soon, they’re going to be like, “Who gets rescued and who doesn’t?” Anything that’s too risky has got to stay outside the shadow of rescue, if you want to think of it that way.
很快的某个时候，他们就会问，“谁能获救，谁没有？”如果你想这样想的话，任何风险太大的事情都必须远离救援的阴影。
If it’s risky, it can’t get it.
如果有风险，它就无法得到它。
Where I start to get nervous — and as I say, I’m not anti-crypto.
我开始感到紧张的地方 ——正如我所说，我并不反对加密货币。
I like innovation and financial innovations.
我喜欢创新和金融创新。
If we start attaching risky things to the payment system, now I’m getting nervous because we know that in financial crises, we must make sure that people can still make their payments, that they’re not getting evicted, and they make their house payment, or they can buy groceries, or they can buy whatever.
如果我们开始将有风险的东西附加到支付系统上，现在我会感到紧张，因为我们知道在金融危机中，我们必须确保人们仍然可以付款，他们不会被驱逐，他们可以支付房屋付款，或者他们可以购买杂货，或者他们可以购买任何东西。
If stablecoins started turning into actually the money that we’re using to pay —
如果稳定币开始变成我们用来支付的货币 ——
And they are turning into that.
他们正在变成这样。
They want to, but I don’t know if they are.
他们愿意，但我不知道他们是否愿意。
But to the extent that they start to do that, I think we’ve got to take seriously the risk that that poses to financial stability.
但只要他们开始这样做，我认为我们就必须认真对待这对金融稳定构成的风险。
That’s the argument, though, for CBDC because, otherwise, they can proliferate abroad.
但这就是 CBDC 的论点，因为否则它们可能会在国外扩散。
Is it, though?
是吗？
Yes, I guess maybe it is.
是的，我想也许是这样。
If there were a Fed stablecoin, you would crush the market, right?
如果有美联储稳定币，你会压垮市场，对吗？
That would dominate.
那将占主导地位。
Maybe.
或许。
I don’t think it’s a maybe.
我不认为这是一个可能。
People would love to use a well-run Fed stablecoin.
人们愿意使用运行良好的美联储稳定币。
Well, you added the “well-run.” Then we’re back to, well, would Grandma be calling the Fed for a retail stablecoin, asking, “What’s the login again?” I don’t know.
好吧，你添加了“运行良好”。然后我们又回到了，奶奶会不会打电话给美联储要求零售稳定币，并询问“再次登录是什么？”我不知道。
If you can manage a payment system and prudential supervision of US banks, you can run a stablecoin.
如果你可以管理支付系统和美国银行的审慎监管，你就可以运行稳定币。
Maybe, but in our operation of payments, we’re fundamentally a behind-the-scenes plumbing operation where you have a bank, and that bank sends wire transfers a lot of times on the Fed rails.
也许吧，但在我们的支付运作中，我们基本上是一个幕后管道运作，你有一家银行，而该银行在美联储的轨道上多次发送电汇。
But you don’t know that that’s going over the Fed rails, and I think that’s fine.
但你不知道这超出了美联储的规定，我认为这很好。
This is critical national security financial infrastructure in my view, and I understand why the Fed operates that.
在我看来，这是至关重要的国家安全金融基础设施，我理解美联储为何如此运作。
Look, it’s Edmund Burke.
看，这是埃德蒙·伯克。
There is daylight.
有日光。
Though twilight be long, there is a difference between day and night.
黄昏虽长，但昼夜之别。
There’s somewhere in there where a central bank should be doing it, and there’s somewhere that the central bank clearly should not be doing it.
有些地方央行应该这样做，有些地方央行显然不应该这样做。
I don’t know exactly where that line is, but I like safe.
我不知道那条线到底在哪里，但我喜欢安全。
On AI’s prospects for boosting productivity
论人工智能提高生产力的前景
How much do you think strong AI will boost rates of economic growth or productivity growth?
您认为强大的人工智能将在多大程度上促进经济增长率或生产率增长？
Any number you care to give?
您愿意提供任何号码吗？
High uncertainty, but if you had to make a stab at a number.
高度不确定性，但如果你必须尝试一个数字。
Over what time period?
在什么时间段内？
The next 10 to 20 years.
未来10到20年。
Not next year.
不是明年。
It’s zero for next year, right?
明年为零，对吗？
I think it could be a decent .
我认为这可能是一个不错的选择。
.
。
.
。
I gave a speech at Stanford that was kind of about the topic.
我在斯坦福大学做了一次关于这个话题的演讲。
We have seen, over the last two years, a pretty remarkable surge in productivity growth, faster than the pre-COVID trend, and on the first glance, a lot of people said, “Yes, of course, it’s faster than trend because it’s going to bring us back up to the trend of where we would’ve been, and then it will slow down.” But it didn’t slow down yet.
在过去的两年里，我们看到生产力增长相当显着，比新冠疫情之前的趋势还要快，乍一看，很多人都说，“是的，当然，它比趋势要快，因为它会让我们回到原来的趋势，然后就会放缓。”但它还没有放缓。
It may still, but we’re actually up above the pre-COVID trend extended to the future.
也许仍然如此，但我们实际上已经超越了新冠疫情之前的趋势，并延续到了未来。
There are several explanations that the economists have come up with for that, most of which are one-time explanations, like people started working hybrid or working from home, and that raised productivity by X percent.
经济学家对此提出了几种解释，其中大多数都是一次性解释，比如人们开始混合工作或在家工作，这使生产率提高了 X%。
If you’re a believer in that — I know you talked to Nick Bloom.
如果你相信这一点——我知道你和尼克·布鲁姆谈过。
Nick Bloom — in his head, he absolutely believes that, but that’s a one-time.
尼克·布鲁姆（Nick Bloom）——在他的脑海里，他绝对相信这一点，但那只是一次性的。
The labor reallocation — suddenly we had the Great Resignation, and people could reallocate to jobs that they’re better suited to.
劳动力重新分配——突然之间，我们发生了“大辞职”，人们可以重新分配到他们更适合的工作。
Again, one-time.
再一次，一次。
Increase in the level of business dynamism.
商业活力水平增强。
New firm creation went from whatever — 100,000 to 150,000.
新公司的创建从 100,000 家增加到 150,000 家。
Mostly one-time.
大多是一次性的。
Only a new technology has the potential, I think, to slowly work its way through the economy, going from sector to sector.
我认为，只有新技术才有潜力慢慢地在经济中从一个部门渗透到另一个部门。
If AI is a general-purpose technology like computers, like electricity, like telephones — that sort of thing — those played out over decades.
如果人工智能是一种通用技术，就像计算机、电力、电话一样——诸如此类的东西——那些已经发展了几十年的技术。
There’s work done here at Chicago Fed, looking at the industry concentration of this surge of productivity.
芝加哥联邦储备银行已开展工作，研究生产率激增的行业集中度。
Is it broad-based or is it concentrated in certain industries?
是基础广泛还是集中在某些行业？
The answer is, it’s concentrated in certain industries.
答案是，它集中在某些行业。
Despite the skepticism of economists that AI is not big enough yet to explain, it looks to be concentrated in a bunch of tech-related, AI-intensive areas.
尽管经济学家怀疑人工智能还不够大，无法解释，但它似乎集中在一系列与技术相关的人工智能密集型领域。
If true, it’s entirely possible that this goes like computers, where first you saw the productivity growth in the computer production sector.
如果这是真的，那么这完全有可能像计算机一样，首先你会看到计算机生产部门的生产力增长。
Then five, ten years later, you saw a surge of productivity in the computer-using sectors.
然后五年、十年后，您会看到计算机使用行业的生产力激增。
Then, after a decade or more, Walmart incorporates IT into the inventory management system.
然后，经过十年或更长时间，沃尔玛将 IT 纳入库存管理系统。
The rental car companies — people are equipped with handheld computers.
租车公司 ——人配备了掌上电脑。
They’re coming out and checking in, and checking in your car, and you get productivity that’s spread through there.
他们出来办理登机手续，并办理您的汽车登机手续，您将获得通过那里传播的生产力。
Could be a high number, but so far, I think the adoption rate is not high enough to explain very big.
可能是一个很高的数字，但到目前为止，我认为采用率还不足以解释很大。
There is a risk of over-anticipation of productivity growth that, if equity values surge and business investment surges in AI infrastructure-type capital investment on the anticipation of the bounty that is to come, I think there’s a high danger that you encounter the over-capacity, the capacity constraint problem that we always face in the short run when you get a surge in demand.
存在对生产率增长过度预期的风险，如果股票价值飙升，企业对人工智能基础设施类型的资本投资因对即将到来的丰厚回报的预期而激增，我认为你很可能会遇到产能过剩，即当需求激增时我们在短期内总是面临的产能约束问题。
Or if wealth effect leads to a big increase in consumption here and now based on these high equity valuations, again, you can get overheating if you’re not careful.
或者，如果基于这些高股票估值，财富效应导致此时此地的消费大幅增加，那么，如果你不小心，你可能会过热。
On 01 Pro
01 Pro 上
If I gave, say, a 50-question quiz to new assistant professors at top-20 departments, and I gave the same quiz to o1 Pro, how many of the professors do you think could beat o1 Pro?
比如说，如果我对前 20 个院系的新助理教授进行 50 个问题的测验，然后对 o1 Pro 进行同样的测验，您认为有多少教授可以击败 o1 Pro？
At what?
在什么时候？
Getting the quiz right.
正确完成测验。
What’s your question?
你的问题是什么？
No, what’s the quiz?
不是啊，试题是什么？
What’s the quiz?
测验是什么？
Some’s micro, some’s macro, some econometrics.
有些是微观的，有些是宏观的，有些是计量经济学的。
You and I draw up the quiz.
你和我一起制定测验。
If this is a BuzzFeed listicle, then whoever’s looking on BuzzFeed is going to succeed the best on the quiz.
如果这是 BuzzFeed 列表文章，那么无论谁在浏览 BuzzFeed，都将在测验中获得最佳成绩。
Analysis.
分析。
If it’s judgment, fundamentally, I’m skeptical of magic.
如果是判断的话，从根本上来说，我对魔法持怀疑态度。
I think, in my experience, where the greatest opportunities arise in the short run are on things where, in a way, there’s not a correct answer.
我认为，根据我的经验，短期内出现的最大机会是在某种程度上没有正确答案的事情上。
The hallucination problem, I think, is actually an extremely damaging problem for a lot of applications of AI.
我认为，幻觉问题对于人工智能的许多应用来说实际上是一个极具破坏性的问题。
I’ve seen you describe the joy that you felt in being able to ask about historical — what was the cause of the Boer War?
我看到您描述了能够询问历史问题时的喜悦——布尔战争的原因是什么？
— and that it would answer questions.
——并且它会回答问题。
But how do you balance that off of, what if it’s giving you bogus answers?
但是，如果它给了你虚假的答案怎么办？
I think o1 Pro hallucinates less, say, than what’s in JSTOR.
我认为 o1 Pro 的幻觉比 JSTOR 中的幻觉要少。
I hope that’s true.
我希望这是真的。
However, though, the hallucinating in JSTOR — I will abide no insults to JSTOR.
然而，JSTOR 中的幻觉—— 我不会容忍对JSTOR的侮辱。
We ride at dawn.
我们黎明时骑行。
That’s the hill I’ll die on.
那是我将死在的山上。
The thing is, you are old enough to remember, as am I: Before there were laser printers, there were those dot-matrix printers.
问题是，你已经足够大了，我也记得：在激光打印机出现之前，就有了点阵打印机。
Sure.
当然。
The thing is, the essence was adding more and more dots, and the advocates of dot-matrix printers would say, “There’re so many dots.
问题是，本质是添加越来越多的点，点阵打印机的拥护者会说，“点太多了。
You can’t even tell that this is not a typewriter.” Only, the thing is, you could.
你甚至看不出这不是一台打字机。”只是，问题是，你可以。
You would look and say, “No, look, this is better than it used to be, but I can tell this isn’t a typewriter.” “No, you can’t.” Then he says, “No, you can’t.
你会看着并说：“不，看，这比以前好多了，但我可以看出这不是一台打字机。” “不，你不能。”然后他说：“不，你不能。
It’s indistinguishable.”
这是无法区分的。”
If I say to AI’s biggest advocates, “Here have been some exciting use cases, but here have been ones that I’ve found troubling.” If your first reaction is to say, “Well, what version did you use?” That’s, to me, kind of the dot-matrix printer problem.
如果我对人工智能的最大拥护者说，“这里有一些令人兴奋的用例，但也有一些我觉得令人不安的用例。”如果您的第一反应是：“那么，您使用的是哪个版本？”对我来说，这就是点阵打印机的问题。
If you’re going to steer me to o1 Pro, all we’re going to identify is that I’m too cheap to shell out the money for the higher and higher levels.
如果你要引导我去 o1 Pro，我们要确定的是，我太便宜了，无法为越来越高的级别掏钱。
The Fed won’t pay it for you?
美联储不会帮你付钱吗？
Yes, it’s true.
是的，这是真的。
I’m going off of these older ones that are free or cheap, but I don’t accept that it’s like, “Oh, well, if you just upgrade to the higher-priced one, then those hallucination problems would stop.” So far, they’ve got to work on that side of the equation.
我将放弃这些免费或便宜的旧产品，但我不接受这样的说法：“哦，好吧，如果你只是升级到价格更高的产品，那么那些幻觉问题就会停止。”到目前为止，他们必须在等式的这一方面开展工作。
Otherwise, it still could have amazing impacts, but there are some things for which making a mistake is an unforgivable error.
否则，它仍然可以产生惊人的影响，但有些事情犯了错误就是不可原谅的错误。
You see what I mean?
你明白我的意思吗？
You’ve got to change the penalty function in that thing.
你必须改变那个东西的惩罚函数。
Put aside opinions on AI.
抛开对人工智能的看法。
Just think of your knowledge as an economist, econometrician.
想想你作为经济学家、计量经济学家的知识。
You can just run a few AI models and aggregate and get rid of almost all the hallucinations that way.
你只需运行几个人工智能模型，然后聚合起来，就可以消除几乎所有的幻觉。
You can do that now.
你现在就可以这么做。
It costs a little more, but it’s obvious you can get hallucinations down as much as you want.
它的成本要高一点，但很明显你可以随心所欲地减少幻觉。
You’re getting dangerously close, I think, to the position that if we have enough observations, then we have solved the causality problem.
我认为，你已经危险地接近这样的立场：如果我们有足够的观察，那么我们就已经解决了因果关系问题。
“All we need, if we get enough observations, we’ll just be able to predict anything with 100 percent accuracy.” I don’t know if it still flies too close to the sun.
“我们所需要的就是，如果我们获得足够的观察结果，我们就能以 100% 的准确度预测任何事情。”我不知道它是否还飞得离太阳太近了。
I’m not sure what just happened there.
我不确定那里刚刚发生了什么。
Did that motion create hearts?
这个动作创造了爱心吗？
Created hearts.
创造了心。
It created hearts.
它创造了心灵。
Oh.
哦。
I think that’s from your system.
我认为这是来自您的系统。
That is deep in my heart I believe —
我相信这在我内心深处 ——
The Chicago Fed loves us.
芝加哥联储爱我们。
That you better be careful.
那你最好小心一点。
Here’s my second question about AI and its impact on productivity.
这是我关于人工智能及其对生产力的影响的第二个问题。
How much of the improvement in AI .
人工智能的改进有多大。
.
。
.
。
I’ll tell you the thought experiment I like to do is to ask, what jobs would be replaced with the AI that exist right now, not extrapolating it forward?
我会告诉你，我喜欢做的思想实验是问，哪些工作会被现有的人工智能取代，而不是向前推断？
Because a lot of the grandest dreams for AI and rapid adoption, I think, are premised on extrapolating a growth rate.
因为我认为，人工智能和快速采用的许多最宏伟的梦想都是以推断增长率为前提的。
To the extent that some of the improvement in AI is not coming from improvements of AI theory or new algorithms, but instead from bigger and bigger data sets and more and more computing power, data sets and computing power have diminishing returns that will kick in pretty quickly.
在某种程度上，人工智能的一些改进并不是来自人工智能理论或新算法的改进，而是来自越来越大的数据集和越来越多的计算能力，数据集和计算能力的回报递减很快就会开始。
So, it would behoove us to remember that there was a time 15 years ago when self-driving cars were improving so rapidly that people were predicting that within five years, there would not be a single professional driver in the United States.
因此，我们有必要记住，15 年前，自动驾驶汽车发展得如此之快，以至于人们预测五年之内，美国将不会再出现一个职业司机。
Then, basically, what happened is, the rate of improvement didn’t go negative; it didn’t go to zero.
然后，基本上，发生的事情是，改善率并没有变成负数；而是发生了变化。它没有归零。
It just slowed way down.
它只是减慢了速度。
Now, we’re having some self-driving taxis in different cities, but we’re nowhere near what, 15 years ago, there was a group of real advocates who said, by 15 years from now, people are going to be like, “Dad, what do you mean people used to drive their own car?
现在，我们在不同的城市拥有一些自动驾驶出租车，但我们还远远没有达到 15 年前的水平，一群真正的拥护者说，从现在起 15 年后，人们会说，“爸爸，你说人们过去常常开自己的汽车是什么意思？
How dumb were people?” We’re still a long, long way from that.
人们有多愚蠢？我们距离这个目标还有很长很长的路要走。
How should we reform the MBA business graduate education?
MBA商科研究生教育该如何改革？
You’re an expert on that.
你是这方面的专家。
I am only an expert in that I taught the MBAs, and I taught a class on platform competition.
我只是一个专家，我教过MBA，我教过平台竞赛课程。
I had hundreds and hundreds of students over the years.
多年来我有成百上千的学生。
I found the MBAs to be very data-minded and very intellectually curious.
我发现 MBA 非常注重数据，并且非常求知欲。
Now, it might be the University of Chicago MBAs are a high-powered group.
现在，芝加哥大学的 MBA 可能是一个权力很大的群体。
I think the market for MBAs, as you know, all the pressure is on the opportunity cost side, trying to shorten the programs.
我认为，正如你所知，MBA 市场的所有压力都集中在机会成本方面，试图缩短课程时间。
There are new master’s programs in finance and management and things that are one year in nature or a year and a half in nature.
有新的金融和管理硕士课程以及一年或一年半的课程。
I think the MBA, whether you use it as a market test — what does the market demand — or you just go look at the content of what people know, I think it’s a pretty well-functioning market.
我认为MBA，无论你把它作为一个市场测试 —— 市场需求是什么 —— 或者你只是看看人们所知道的内容，我认为这是一个运作良好的市场。
It’s a valuable degree, and it teaches a lot of skills.
这是一个很有价值的学位，它教授很多技能。
Final question.
最后一个问题。
What’s the story of how you beat Ted Cruz as a debater, and he was a national champion, as were you, right?
作为一名辩手，你如何击败特德·克鲁兹（Ted Cruz），他是全国冠军，你也是如此，有什么故事吗？
How was it you won?
你是怎么赢的？
Well, I was big at speech and debate.
嗯，我很擅长演讲和辩论。
I was in high school speaking and then went to college.
我当时在读高中，然后上了大学。
I was a year older than Ted.
我比特德大一岁。
My partner and I — we were the National Team of the Year, and Ted and his partner were second.
我和我的搭档——我们是年度最佳国家队，特德和他的搭档位居第二。
The thing is, I kind of had kryptonite on poor Ted, which was, when we would debate .
问题是，当我们辩论时，我对可怜的特德有点氪石。
.
。
.
。
You don’t debate face to face; there’s a judge.
你们不是面对面辩论；有一位法官。
Ted was an excellent debater, and his greatest strength was plotting.
泰德是一位出色的辩手，他最大的优势就是策划。
“We’ll say this, and that’ll lay a trap and get them to say this, and then we’ll respond in this way.” His weakness was thinking on his feet, especially if he got mad, so I would, to the judge, start teasing.
“我们会这么说，那会设下陷阱，让他们这么说，然后我们就会这样回应。”他的弱点是思维敏捷，尤其是当他生气的时候，所以我会向法官开玩笑。
I would tell jokes at Ted’s expense, and many of our rounds would end with Ted red in the face.
我会拿特德讲笑话，我们的很多回合都会以特德脸红而告终。
“How dare you say that?” I was, “Ah, we got him again.” That was the secret.
“你怎么敢这么说？”我当时想，“啊，我们又抓到他了。”这就是秘密。
Austan Goolsbee, thank you very much.
奥斯坦·古尔斯比，非常感谢你。
Tyler, you come to Chicago.
泰勒，你来芝加哥吧。
I’m going to have to take you on the food tour.
我得带你去美食之旅。
I have, for many decades, followed your advice, and I’ve got some great places out here that are going to be right up your alley.
几十年来，我一直听从你的建议，我这里有一些很棒的地方，正合你的胃口。
That would be great.
那太好了。
Thanks so much.
非常感谢。
Thank you.
谢谢。