Annie Jacobsen on Nuclear War, Intelligence Operations, and Conspiracy Realities (Ep. 250)
Thanks to Roger Barris for sponsoring this transcript.
感谢罗杰·巴里斯赞助这份文字记录。
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I’m chatting with Annie Jacobsen.
今天，我正在与安妮·雅各布森聊天。
Annie started off by studying at Princeton.
安妮开始在普林斯顿大学学习。
She now has, I think, eight books, most recently and prominently is a favorite of mine.
我认为她现在有八本书，最近最突出的是我最喜欢的一本书。
It’s called Nuclear War: A Scenario.
这就是所谓的“核战争：一个场景”。
It was one of my favorite books of last year.
这是我去年最喜欢的书之一。
The book is also being turned into a screenplay and will be directed by the Dune director Denis Villeneuve.
这本书也正在被改编成剧本，并将由《沙丘》导演丹尼斯·维伦纽夫执导。
Annie also has co-written three episodes of Tom Clancy’s Jack Ryan TV series for Amazon Studios.
安妮还为亚马逊工作室共同创作了汤姆克兰西的杰克瑞恩电视剧的三集。
Annie, welcome.
安妮，欢迎。
Thank you so much for having me.
非常感谢你邀请我。
Now, your last book, of course, focuses on nuclear weapons and nuclear war.
当然，你的最后一本书关注的是核武器和核战争。
Would it actually help if we were more afraid of nuclear weapons and thinking about them more often?
如果我们更害怕核武器并更经常地思考它们，这真的会有帮助吗？
Or does that just not help at all?
或者这根本没有帮助？
I think it certainly helps, and you probably gathered that from reading my book.
我认为这肯定有帮助，您可能是通过阅读我的书了解到这一点的。
Sometimes people say, “Why did you write such a terrifying book?” The answer is very simple.
有时人们会问：“你为什么要写一本如此可怕的书？”答案很简单。
I wanted to demonstrate in appalling detail just how horrific nuclear war would be as a way, perhaps, for people to have precisely the kind of conversation that you and I are having.
我想以令人震惊的细节来展示核战争将是多么可怕，作为一种方式，也许，人们可以进行你我正在进行的那种对话。
When I was a kid, people thought about nuclear weapons much more.
当我还是个孩子的时候，人们更多地想到核武器。
It seemed more dangerous.
看起来更加危险了。
It actually seemed more thinkable then.
当时看起来确实更值得思考。
If we’re just obsessed with nuclear weapons and nuclear war, can’t that raise the risks by making it psychologically more salient?
如果我们只是沉迷于核武器和核战争，难道不会因为在心理上变得更加突出而增加风险吗？
I would say certainly not.
我想说当然不是。
Also, what we perceive and what we think about is not necessarily what happens.
而且，我们所感知和所想的并不一定会发生。
I doubt many people imagined a pandemic was going to show up and shut down the whole world as it did.
我怀疑很多人都想象过一场流行病会出现并导致整个世界关闭。
I do think it’s valuable to think about things, not in any hypochondriacal way, if that is an exact word, but more about people asking, why is it that I focus on subject A rather than subject B?
我确实认为思考事物是有价值的，而不是以任何疑病症的方式思考，如果这是一个确切的词的话，但更多的是人们问，为什么我关注主题 A 而不是主题 B？
Maybe even one more degree of that is, what do I want to think about and what is important to me?
也许还有一个程度是，我想思考什么以及什么对我来说是重要的？
If I think about the experts in the immediate post-World War II period, there’s John von Neumann, there’s Herman Kahn.
如果我想想二战后时期的专家，有约翰·冯·诺依曼，有赫尔曼·卡恩。
It seems they got most things wrong, so maybe they thought there’d be another world war or nuclear war quite soon, or they might have favored a first strike on the Soviet Union.
看来他们大部分事情都错了，所以也许他们认为很快就会发生另一场世界大战或核战争，或者他们可能倾向于首先打击苏联。
We almost did a first strike against China.
我们几乎对中国发起了第一次打击。
Isn’t that an example of how expertise can just lead us to go badly wrong?
这难道不是专业知识如何导致我们犯严重错误的一个例子吗？
And this more common-sense approach — maybe we had it with Ronald Reagan, and we actually do better with that.
这种更符合常识的方法——也许我们和罗纳德·里根就采用过这种方法，而且我们实际上做得更好。
Oh boy.
噢，孩子。
It depends how you define expert, I suppose.
我想这取决于你如何定义专家。
I think of wisdom more than I think of “expertise.” I’ve met a lot of experts in my day, and I’ve met many people whose wisdom outperforms — and again, just in my opinion — their expertise.
我更多地想到的是智慧，而不是“专业知识”。我这一代遇到过很多专家，也遇到过很多人，他们的智慧胜过他们的专业知识——再次强调，在我看来——他们的专业知识。
Which doesn’t mean you throw out the opinions of the so-called experts, but no one has a crystal ball and can predict anything.
这并不意味着你要抛弃所谓专家的意见，但没有人有水晶球可以预测任何事情。
Boy, we could have such an interesting discussion about all of these Cold War thinkers, from Herman Kahn on down.
天哪，我们可以对所有这些冷战思想家（从赫尔曼·卡恩以下）进行如此有趣的讨论。
You yourself were, if I’m not mistaken, a student of the fascinating Thomas Schelling.
如果我没记错的话，你本人就是迷人的托马斯·谢林的学生。
Of course.
当然。
So, you have a front row seat with the experts.
因此，您与专家坐在前排。
I think my career has been such that I have a front row seat with the ground operators, if you will, the people, maybe even, you could say doing the dirty work.
我认为我的职业生涯是这样的，我和地面操作员坐在前排，如果你愿意的话，还有人，甚至，你可以说做肮脏的工作。
On moving toward disarmament
关于走向裁军
Let’s put aside the Trump administration, which some people would say is anomalous.
让我们先把特朗普政府放在一边，有些人会说这是反常的。
Say we have a more typical president, and there’s a six-minute decision window when deciding whether or not to launch.
假设我们有一位更典型的总统，在决定是否启动时有六分钟的决策窗口。
Yourself aside, but who is it that you want advising the president?
撇开你自己不谈，你想为总统提供建议的人是谁？
This is the heart of the matter.
这就是问题的核心。
I don’t want anyone to have to make a decision in six minutes.
我不希望任何人在六分钟内做出决定。
Would you?
你愿意吗？
We get that from Ronald Reagan himself, one of the rare presidents who spoke about this six-minute window on the record in his memoir, I quote him in Nuclear War: A Scenario, where he says, “This is an irrational concept,” which it is, that any person, let alone one single man, the president of the United States, would make a decision, which we now know from war games would essentially end civilization, and that is America launching a counterattack.
我们从罗纳德·里根本人那里得到了这一点，他是在他的回忆录中公开谈论这个六分钟窗口的罕见总统之一，我在《核战争：一种情景》中引用了他的话，他说，“这是一个非理性的概念”，任何人，更不用说美国总统，都会做出一个决定，我们现在从战争游戏中知道，这将基本上结束文明，那就是美国发动反击。
I don’t think you can say, “Who would you want?” I think more the question is why would you want?
我认为你不能说：“你想要谁？”我认为更多的问题是你为什么想要？
Let me give you a two-part response to that.
让我对此做出两部分的回应。
The first part: even if one agrees with you completely, in the meantime, we do have the system.
第一部分：即使完全同意你的观点，同时我们也有这个系统。
It won’t be gone tomorrow.
明天它不会消失。
So, you get to choose the advisor.
所以，你可以选择顾问。
You don’t want it to be Kanye West, right?
你不希望它是坎耶·维斯特，对吧？
Who is it you want?
你想要的人是谁？
I can’t not laugh at that.
我对此不能不笑。
That is funny, and it’s not what I expected from you, so bravo.
这很有趣，这不是我对你的期望，太棒了。
You didn’t expect me to be funny, or you didn’t expect that I liked Kanye West?
你没想到我会很有趣，或者你没想到我喜欢 Kanye West？
I just didn’t expect the fantastic pop culture reference when we are talking about the possible end of the world.
我只是没想到当我们谈论可能的世界末日时，会有奇妙的流行文化参考。
I think that I’m going to really insist on saying no human should have that power or have to make that decision.
我想我真的会坚持说任何人都不应该拥有这种权力或必须做出这样的决定。
Which is why, even though it’s a conundrum, a puzzle, a Gordian knot, if you will — sure nuclear weapons aren’t going away tomorrow, but the movement toward disarmament makes us all safer.
这就是为什么，尽管这是一个难题、一个难题、一个棘手的结，如果你愿意的话——可以肯定核武器明天不会消失，但裁军的运动让我们所有人都更安全。
If that begins tomorrow or later today, the chances of the six-minute window arising reduces drastically.
如果明天或今天晚些时候开始，六分钟窗口出现的机会就会大大减少。
But as we move toward disarmament, don’t either we — or some other countries in that process — lose second-strike capability?
但当我们走向裁军时，我们——或者其他一些处于这一进程中的国家——难道不会失去二次打击能力吗？
And that makes the situation more dangerous.
这使得情况变得更加危险。
I’m very glad Israel has second-strike capability now, and they didn’t a few decades ago.
我很高兴以色列现在拥有二次打击能力，而几十年前他们还没有。
Yes, yes and no, no. We could drill down on second strike and what that means, and we could talk about the submarines, “the handmaidens of the apocalypse,” as they were referred to when I was interviewing the commander of the nuclear submarine forces and others.
是的，是的，不，不。我们可以深入研究二次打击及其含义，我们可以谈论潜艇，“天启的使女”，正如我在采访核潜艇部队指挥官和其他人时所提到的那样。
Let me just make sure I’m not ducking the question.
让我确保我没有回避这个问题。
Are you saying, don’t more nuclear weapons make us safe?
你是说，更多的核武器不是让我们更安全吗？
That’s a question, too.
这也是一个问题。
I’m raising the question.
我提出这个问题。
It’s not obvious to me that fewer of them make us safer.
对我来说，它们的数量越少，我们的安全性就越高，这一点并不明显。
Let’s put it that way.
这么说吧。
We could have had World War II without nuclear weapons, right?
如果没有核武器，我们也可以爆发第二次世界大战，对吗？
Yes.
是的。
And we’ve had relative peace since then.
从那时起我们就处于相对和平的状态。
Yes.
是的。
If you read Nuclear War closely, as I know, it sounds like you did, perhaps .
据我所知，如果你仔细阅读《核战争》，也许听起来你就读过。
.
。
.
。
If you’re me — because I wrote it — you come to the conclusion that this is madness.
如果你是我 —— 因为这是我写的 —— 你会得出这样的结论：这太疯狂了。
You know what, if I may, I’m going to take this moment to quote your former professor.
你知道吗，如果可以的话，我会借此机会引用你以前的教授的话。
Sure.
当然。
I quote him in the notes of my book, and this is perhaps the only regret I have in the entire book, that I put this quote from Schelling in the notes rather than in the text.
我在书中的注释中引用了他的话，这也许是我在整本书中唯一的遗憾，因为我将谢林的这句话放在注释中而不是在正文中。
Maybe it’s more interesting for your listeners if we drill down on this than the big platitudes of, “Do more nuclear weapons make us more safe?” It goes like this.
如果我们深入探讨这一点，也许对听众来说更有趣，而不是“更多的核武器让我们更安全吗？”这样的陈词滥调。事情是这样的。
This was Schelling in an interview with WGBH Radio in 1986 in Boston.
这是谢林 1986 年在波士顿接受 WGBH 广播电台采访时的情景。
He says, “The problem with applying game theory to nuclear war is that nuclear war, by its very nature, does not involve rational men.
他说：“将博弈论应用于核战争的问题在于，核战争本质上不涉及理性人。
It can’t.
不可以。
What sane person would be willing to kill hundreds of millions of people, ruin the earth, and end modern civilization in order to make somebody called the enemy doesn’t win first?”
哪个理智的人会愿意为了让一个被称为敌人的人不先获胜而杀死数亿人，毁灭地球，结束现代文明？”
But Schelling did favor nuclear weapons.
但谢林确实赞成核武器。
That was his dark sense of humor, I would say.
我想说，这就是他的黑色幽默感。
You think what I just read was his sense of humor?
你以为我刚才读到的是他的幽默感？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
I believe it was a man in his elder years coming to the conclusion that nuclear war is insane, which is the fundamental premise that I make in the book.
我相信这是一个人在晚年得出的结论：核战争是疯狂的，这是我在书中提出的基本前提。
You can hold both views.
你可以持有两种观点。
It is insane, but it might be the better insanity of the ones available to us.
这很疯狂，但它可能是我们所能得到的更好的疯狂。
Yes.
是的。
From my take, he, like so many others that I have interviewed, because, for some reason — call it fate and circumstance — I have spent my career interviewing men in their 80s and 90s, who are defense officials who spent their entire life making war or preventing war.
在我看来，他和我采访过的许多其他人一样，因为出于某种原因——“称之为命运和环境”——我在职业生涯中采访了 80 多岁和 90 多岁的男人，他们是一生都在制造战争或阻止战争的国防官员。
I watch them share with me their reflections in that third act of their life, which are decidedly different — in their own words — than those that they would have made as a younger man.
我看着他们与我分享他们对人生第三幕的反思，这些反思与他们年轻时的反思截然不同——用他们自己的话来说。
I find that fascinating, and that’s my takeaway from the Schelling quote, that he came to terms with the fact that intellectualizing game theory — like von Neumann, who never got to his old age — is madness.
我觉得这很有趣，这也是我从谢林的引言中得到的启示，他接受了这样一个事实：将博弈论理性化——就像永垂不朽的冯·诺依曼——是疯狂的。
On nuclear retaliation
关于核报复
Let’s say that Russia or China, by mistake, did a full-scale launch toward the United States, and they couldn’t call the things back, and we’re in that six-minute window, or whatever it would be with hypersonics.
假设俄罗斯或中国错误地向美国进行了全面发射，他们无法收回这些东西，而我们正处于六分钟的窗口期，或者无论高超音速技术是什么。
What do you think is the probability that we would do a full-scale launch back?
您认为我们全面推出的可能性有多大？
I think the probability is certain.
我觉得这个概率是肯定的。
That is based on all the interviews that I conducted with individuals who literally had the power to make sure that happened.
这是基于我对那些确实有能力确保这一切发生的人进行的所有采访。
But those are interviews.
但那些都是采访。
Do you disagree?
你不同意吗？
Well, I don’t know.
好吧，我不知道。
I don’t think it’s p=1.
我不认为p=1。
It might be about 50 percent, but there’s some chance that in the actual heat of the moment, with everything at stake, and speaking to an outsider, someone who’s investigating, such as yourself, you don’t want to say, “I’m not going to do my job.” But in fact, I don’t know, I would put the probability at 60 percent that they launch back, 70 percent.
可能是 50% 左右，但有可能在最激烈的时刻，一切都处于危险之中，在与局外人、正在调查的人（比如你自己）交谈时，你不想说：“我不会做好我的工作。”但事实上，我不知道，我认为他们发射回来的可能性是 60%，70%。
If you follow through with that thinking, which I get as an intellectual exercise, then you’re saying it’s great we have so many nuclear weapons because, if by accident, China launches against us, then at least we’ll show morality, or at least you’re saying a 60 percent chance of showing morality in the final moments.
如果你坚持这种想法，我把它当作一种智力练习，那么你会说我们拥有这么多核武器真是太棒了，因为如果中国不小心向我们发射核武器，那么至少我们会表现出道德，或者至少你会说在最后时刻有 60% 的机会表现出道德。
All of America will die, and all the Chinese will live, which would be exactly the premise of many of the individuals who are for more nuclear weapons in the first place.
所有的美国都会死，所有的中国人都会活，这正是许多最初支持更多核武器的人的前提。
I would say a 60 percent to 70 percent chance that we retaliate, not that we do nothing.
我想说的是，我们有 60% 到 70% 的可能性会进行报复，而不是说我们什么也不做。
But a decent chance we do nothing.
但很有可能我们什么也不做。
Who understands really what goes on in the president’s mind?
谁真正了解总统心里在想什么？
Because it is up to the president, as you point out repeatedly.
因为正如您反复指出的那样，这取决于总统。
Yes, no, okay.
是的，不，好吧。
Again, we’re intellectualizing here.
再说一遍，我们在这里正在智能化。
Doesn’t what you are suggesting really underscore this idea that this is madness to even have these arsenals that are capable of such things?
你的建议难道没有真正强调这样的想法：即使拥有这些能够做到这些的武器库也是疯狂的吗？
Now remember, I’m not a peace activist.
现在请记住，我不是和平活动家。
That’s not my job.
那不是我的工作。
My job is, as a national security reporter, to tell you the story of what would happen, what could happen in nuclear war: a scenario, not nuclear war: the only scenario.
作为一名国家安全记者，我的工作是告诉你们核战争中会发生什么、可能发生什么：一个场景，而不是核战争：唯一的场景。
The takeaway, I believe, is that more nuclear weapons make us less safe, and I think you might be saying the same thing.
我认为，结论是更多的核武器使我们的安全性降低，我想你可能也会说同样的事情。
The word madness doesn’t have much force with me.
疯狂这个词对我来说没有太大的力量。
My life is a lot of different kinds of madness.
我的生活充满了各种各样的疯狂。
I’ve heard people say marriage is madness.
我听人说婚姻是疯狂的。
A lot of social conventions seem to me to be madness.
在我看来，许多社会习俗都是疯狂的。
The question is getting the least harmful form of madness out there.
问题是要采取危害最小的疯狂形式。
Then, I’m not convinced that those who wish to disarm have really made their case.
然后，我不相信那些希望解除武装的人真的提出了自己的理由。
Certainly, saying nuclear war is madness doesn’t persuade me.
当然，说核战争是疯狂并不能说服我。
If anything, if enough people think it’s madness, we won’t get it, and it’s fine to have the nuclear weapons.
如果有的话，如果有足够多的人认为这是疯狂的，我们就不会明白，拥有核武器也很好。
Which is precisely the fundamental, I think, underpinning of deterrence.
我认为，这正是威慑的根本基础。
There’s no question that .
毫无疑问。
.
。
.
。
Of course, your Schelling schooling is sneaking through here because this is exactly that idea.
当然，你的谢林学校教育在这里偷偷溜过，因为这正是这个想法。
Again, this is a puzzle because, “Deterrence will hold, deterrence will hold, deterrence will hold.” That is what the Defense Department says time and time again.
这又是一个谜题，因为“威慑将会持续，威慑将会持续，威慑将会持续。”这是国防部一次又一次说的话。
But if you look deep enough, as I did, you find number two at Stratcom saying, “If it doesn’t hold, it all unravels.”
但如果你像我一样看得足够深入，你会发现 Stratcom 的二号人物说：“如果它不成立，一切都会崩溃。”
So, we can talk about madness.
所以，我们可以谈论疯狂。
What is madness?
什么是疯狂？
Is marriage madness?
婚姻是疯狂吗？
Certainly, nuclear war unfolding, unraveling.
当然，核战争正在展开、瓦解。
The unraveling of deterrence is madness.
威慑力的瓦解是疯狂的。
It’s madness because it ends civilization for what, for why?
这是疯狂的，因为它结束了文明，为了什么，为什么？
Keep in mind, the alternative to nuclear weapons — it’s not sticks and stones or pistols.
请记住，核武器的替代品 不是棍棒、石头或手枪。
It could be biological weapons, chemical weapons, many other nasty things.
它可能是生物武器、化学武器或许多其他令人讨厌的东西。
It could be AI as a kind of weapon.
它可能是人工智能作为一种武器。
So, maybe the logic of mutual deterrence we can’t escape.
所以，也许我们无法逃避相互威慑的逻辑。
We can choose in which physical form we want to manifest it.
我们可以选择我们想要以哪种物理形式来体现它。
We have more experience with nuclear weapons.
我们在核武器方面拥有更多经验。
In that sense, they may be safer.
从这个意义上说，他们可能更安全。
It’s been since 1945 that we’ve worked with them in some way.
自 1945 年以来，我们就以某种方式与他们合作。
Should we trade that all in for mutual assured destruction with biological weapons?
我们是否应该用这一切来换取生物武器的相互毁灭？
I don’t see the case for doing that.
我不认为这样做的理由。
Different lane, biological weapons, I would argue, and we can talk about that.
我认为不同的路线，生物武器，我们可以讨论这个。
But I think what you’ve hit upon would be exactly another scary point when you talk about “we.” The royal “we” have had these systems, and deterrence has held for 75 years since the Russians got the bomb in 1949.
但我认为，当你谈论“我们”时，你所想到的正是另一个令人恐惧的点。皇家“我们”拥有这些系统，自 1949 年俄罗斯获得原子弹以来，威慑力已经持续了 75 年。
Very good point.
非常好的一点。
You could say that the likelihood of a US-Russian full-scale nuclear exchange on purpose is therefore lessened because deterrence has held between these two superpowers.
可以说，美俄有意进行全面核交锋的可能性因此而降低，因为这两个超级大国之间存在着威慑力。
One must imagine, assume — choose your word — that Putin is schooled in deterrence.
人们必须想象、假设————选择你的措辞————普京接受过威慑教育。
He knows, even though he’s changed his policy recently — we can get into the fine points — we agree on this point, that the danger lies in the newcomers to the field that do not have decades of precedent, that did not grow up watching and fearing, like your point in the very opening of our discussion.
他知道，尽管他最近改变了政策——“我们可以讨论细节”——“我们同意这一点，危险在于这个领域的新来者，他们没有几十年的先例，没有在成长过程中观察和恐惧，就像你在我们讨论一开始的观点一样。
That is why, in Nuclear War: A Scenario, I chose the mad king scenario, which is North Korea launching, because this is a very new and formidable foe, if you will, a nuclear-armed superpower with rogue tendencies.
这就是为什么在《核战争：一个情景》中，我选择了朝鲜发动的“疯王”情景，因为这是一个非常新的、可怕的敌人，如果你愿意的话，是一个有流氓倾向的拥有核武器的超级大国。
They’re not ruled by a committee, right?
他们不是由委员会统治的，对吧？
I think of committees as more conservative on average than individuals.
我认为委员会平均比个人更加保守。
Yes, and that brings us back to the six-minute window that you have to believe .
是的，这让我们回到了你必须相信的六分钟窗口。
.
。
.
。
Although, one of the most shocking things for me in reporting the book was learning from at least two former secretaries of defense, Bill Perry and Leon Panetta, that in their opinion, most US presidents are not well learned about nuclear weapons, about their role in nuclear war because it’s assumed that deterrence will hold.
尽管如此，在报道这本书时，对我来说最令人震惊的事情之一是从至少两位前国防部长比尔·佩里和莱昂·帕内塔那里了解到，在他们看来，大多数美国总统对核武器及其在核战争中的作用并没有很好的了解，因为人们认为威慑会持续下去。
Now, perhaps that is changing, but you could say that this idea of having grown up with this concept would help in the decision-making process, but to your point and to my point in the book, when you have North Korea, where you have a myopic lane of vision, and one hardly can imagine anyone giving the leader of North Korea advice that is something he might not want to hear.
现在，也许这种情况正在改变，但你可以说，带着这种观念长大的想法将有助于决策过程，但就你和我在书中的观点而言，当你面对朝鲜时，你的视野是短视的，很难想象有人会给朝鲜领导人提供他可能不想听到的建议。
Then you have a real problem of talk about sole authority.
那么你就面临着谈论唯一权威的真正问题。
On the chance of intercepting an ICBM
拦截洲际弹道导弹的机会
Let’s say a single rebellious, crazy North Korean general launched a nuclear missile toward Washington, DC, and it was on its way, but there’s only one.
假设一位叛逆、疯狂的朝鲜将军向华盛顿特区发射了一枚核导弹，导弹正在发射途中，但只有一枚。
What do you think is the probability we would be able to intercept it?
你认为我们能够拦截它的概率是多少？
I just wanted to make sure I caught you.
我只是想确定我抓住了你。
Did you say a North Korean individual?
你说的是朝鲜人吗？
North Korean.
朝鲜人。
Yes, okay.
是的，好的。
Which is the premise in my book.
这是我书中的前提。
That it has more range than maybe today.
它的范围可能比今天更大。
It can make it to Washington.
它可以到达华盛顿。
It’s coming in.
它进来了。
We get the alert.
我们收到警报。
We think it’s a missile.
我们认为这是一枚导弹。
What’s the actual chance we can blow it up and stop it?
我们炸毁并阻止它的实际机会有多大？
Just a couple of technical points to drill down on.
只需要深入研究几个技术点。
North Korea does have missiles that can reach the East Coast of the United States presently.
朝鲜目前确实拥有可以到达美国东海岸的导弹。
That is the precise scenario I choose in my book because it was actually Richard Garwin who told me that was what he was most afraid of.
这正是我在书中选择的场景，因为实际上是理查德·加文告诉我这是他最害怕的。
He died last week at 97, the most knowledgeable person on the technical and the theoretical aspects of this, having looked at it since the ’50s and advised presidents since the ’50s.
他于上周去世，享年 97 岁。他是该技术和理论方面知识最渊博的人，自 50 年代以来一直在研究该问题，并自 50 年代以来一直为总统提供建议。
Now you’re asking about, can our interceptor program shoot down that incoming single missile?
现在你问，我们的拦截程序可以击落来袭的单枚导弹吗？
That is a problem that the Missile Defense Agency faces.
这是导弹防御局面临的一个问题。
I write about it specifically.
我专门写了一下。
My answer would be no. There is technically a 50 percent chance of one interceptor missile on the US side being able to shoot down one incoming ICBM, but you have to remember those statistics are from a curated test.
我的回答是否定的。从技术上讲，美国一侧的一枚拦截导弹有 50% 的可能性能够击落一枚来袭的洲际弹道导弹，但你必须记住这些统计数据来自精心策划的测试。
Sure.
当然。
It’s a test — just for listeners — which is like Vandenberg Air Force Base says, “Oh, we’re doing whispers to the powers that be.” They’re doing a test, and they know it’s coming, and less than 50 percent of the time, actually, it succeeds.
这是一个测试 —— 只针对听众 —— 就像范登堡空军基地所说的那样，“哦，我们正在对当权者低声说话。”他们正在进行一项测试，并且知道它即将到来，而且实际上只有不到 50% 的时间会成功。
You can’t have all your probabilities at one or zero.
你不可能让所有的概率都为一或零。
What’s your probability?
你的概率是多少？
I’d say 20 percent, but what’s your number?
我想说 20%，但你的数字是多少？
You mean what is my mathematical equation for what — ?
你的意思是我的数学方程是什么 — ？
Yes, the betting odds.
是的，投注赔率。
You’re indifferent on taking the bet or not.
你是否下注并不重要。
I’ll say 20 percent that we’d nail it.
我想说 20% 的人认为我们会成功。
To my eye, it’s either all or nothing.
在我看来，要么全有，要么全无。
Again, I’m not a mathematician.
再说一遍，我不是数学家。
I’m an author and a journalist, but it’s all or nothing.
我是一名作家和记者，但要么全有，要么全无。
In the scenario I write, it’s nothing.
在我写的场景中，这没什么。
We do not hit it with four missiles.
我们不会用四枚导弹击中它。
I ran that by several former NORAD commanders, and they did not say, “Annie, not true.” Their odds are unfortunately, even with the technology that we have on our interceptor systems, would not be capable of shooting down a warhead.
我向几位前北美防空司令部指挥官报告了这一点，他们并没有说：“安妮，这不是真的。”不幸的是，即使我们的拦截系统拥有先进的技术，他们也无法击落弹头。
Let’s give listeners some specs just so that they can understand, so that you can visualize this, because that’s what helped me.
让我们给听众一些规格，以便他们能够理解，这样你就可以想象这一点，因为这对我有帮助。
The warhead coming in is traveling at about 14,000 miles an hour, 500 to 700 miles above the earth.
进来的弹头以每小时约 14,000 英里的速度行进，距离地球 500 至 700 英里。
The interceptor is trying to shoot it down, essentially, like a giant bowling ball at 20,000 miles an hour, 500 to 700 miles above the earth.
拦截器试图将其击落，本质上就像一个每小时 20,000 英里的巨型保龄球，距离地球 500 至 700 英里。
The technology involved is exquisite, and it fails time and time again.
所涉及的技术非常精湛，却一次又一次失败。
To me, the poetics of that are more important than to try and use a defense that we should have more interceptors, because that leads to, “Let’s just have as many interceptor missiles as the other guys have nuclear weapons.” Then you’re talking about bankrupting the United States.
对我来说，这比尝试使用我们应该拥有更多拦截弹的防御更重要，因为这会导致“我们拥有与其他国家拥有核武器一样多的拦截导弹”。然后你就在谈论让美国破产。
Israel has done a great job.
以色列做得很好。
They don’t stop literally everything, but it’s quite impressive.
他们并没有真正阻止一切，但这令人印象深刻。
I know it’s a smaller country, but it can be done along some margins, right?
我知道这是一个较小的国家，但可以在一定程度上做到这一点，对吗？
No, absolutely not.
不，绝对不是。
Wrong science.
错误的科学。
The Iron Dome you’re referring to shoots down short-range and some medium-range, including ballistic missiles.
您所指的铁穹可以击落短程和一些中程导弹，包括弹道导弹。
They come from either land-based systems, like the THAAD system, or they come from sea ships, the Aegis system, but they cannot shoot down ICBMs — intercontinental ballistic missiles — traveling, as I just mentioned, 500 miles above the earth’s surface.
它们要么来自陆基系统，如萨德系统，要么来自海上舰艇，宙斯盾系统，但它们无法击落洲际弹道导弹——正如我刚才提到的，在距地球表面 500 英里的地方飞行的洲际弹道导弹。
That is an extraordinary distinction, and people incorrectly mix them, because it sounds great and it’s quite fantasy hopeful to think, “Wow, I can just build a system, an Iron Dome or a golden dome over the United States, over my head, and I will be free from nuclear attack.”
这是一个非同寻常的区别，人们错误地把它们混为一谈，因为这听起来很棒，而且非常有希望地想，“哇，我可以在美国上空、在我的头顶上建造一个系统、一个铁穹或一个金穹，我就能免受核攻击。”
Now, because I have brought the golden dome up.
现在，因为我已经把金顶提到了。
I also must say, having interviewed Charles Townes, for example, who was the Nobel Laureate who invented the laser, and spoke to him a decade ago about whether or not an Iron Dome–type system could work.
我还必须说，例如，我采访了发明激光的诺贝尔奖获得者查尔斯·汤斯（Charles Townes），并在十年前与他讨论了铁穹型系统是否可行。
He said unequivocally no.
他明确表示不。
Now we are in a different field of technology that is above my access, because I don’t have a top-secret clearance.
现在我们处于一个不同的技术领域，超出了我的访问范围，因为我没有绝密许可。
When you’re talking about cube sets, and you’re talking about space-based interception, none of us that are not inside that golden dome rubric that’s happening right now know what’s happening.
当你谈论立方体集时，当你谈论天基拦截时，我们中没有一个不在现在正在发生的金顶标题内的人知道发生了什么。
We don’t know about the future, but the past tells us that the Iron Dome is a different situation.
我们不知道未来，但过去告诉我们，铁穹是不同的情况。
Surely, if we spent 5 percent of GDP, we could come up with something.
当然，如果我们花费 GDP 的 5%，我们就能想出一些办法。
It wouldn’t be perfect, but it could protect Washington and New York, right?
它并不完美，但它可以保护华盛顿和纽约，对吧？
If nuclear war is so unthinkable, so crazy, so destructive, so possible, then we ought to spend that 5 percent of GDP.
如果核战争如此不可想象、如此疯狂、如此具有破坏性、如此可能，那么我们应该花掉 GDP 的 5%。
You are welcome .
不客气 。
.
。
.
。
Listen, it’s a land of ideas here.
听着，这里是一片创意之地。
It is a land of ideas, and if that is yours, that is yours.
这是一片充满思想的土地，如果那是你的，那就是你的。
But it’s not my idea; it’s a question.
但这不是我的主意；这是一个问题。
You’re the one saying it’s so terrible, and it’s not so impossible, so you ought to be the one charging ahead with this idea.
你是那个说这太可怕的人，而且这也不是那么不可能，所以你应该是第一个提出这个想法的人。
Charging ahead with which idea?
带着哪个想法继续前进？
That I would spend —
我会花 ——
Spending 5 percent of GDP to construct whatever defensive system we need.
花费 GDP 的 5% 来建造我们需要的任何防御系统。
Five percent of GDP is a lot.
GDP 的百分之五已经很多了。
It’s very noticeable.
这是非常引人注目的。
Taxes go up, spending goes up, interest rates go up.
税收增加，支出增加，利率上升。
We did it with the Manhattan Project.
我们通过曼哈顿计划做到了这一点。
That was a pretty decent sized chunk of GDP, and that seemed impossible.
这是 GDP 中相当大的一部分，但这似乎是不可能的。
This is something we probably could do.
这是我们可能可以做的事情。
Maybe it’s only 4 percent of GDP.
也许只占GDP的4%。
Seeing as I’m not an advisor on the Defense Science Board, I would no sooner suggest or even put my brain to think about such things, because fundamentally, that is not what the solution is.
鉴于我不是国防科学委员会的顾问，我不会很快提出建议，甚至不会用我的大脑去思考这些事情，因为从根本上来说，这不是解决方案。
The only solution I have seen in any of this .
这是我见过的唯一解决方案。
.
。
.
。
If I may, shall I tell you a short story?
如果可以的话，我可以给你讲一个小故事吗？
Sure.
当然。
Reagan, a nuclear hawk, takes office and absolutely believes that more nuclear weapons make us more safe.
核鹰派里根上台后绝对相信更多的核武器会让我们更安全。
Not only that, comes up with the original idea of space-based defense, like what you had alluded to with the 5 percent GDP.
不仅如此，还提出了天基防御的最初想法，就像你提到的GDP的5%一样。
This is back in the ’80s, and this is his position.
这是八十年代的事，这就是他的立场。
Then one night ABC television releases a movie called The Day After, and Reagan decides to watch it.
然后有一天晚上，美国广播公司 (ABC) 电视台发行了一部名为《后天》的电影，里根决定观看它。
His chief of staff says, “Sir, don’t watch it,” but he does anyway.
他的幕僚长说：“先生，别看。”但他还是看了。
He writes in his White House journal that he became greatly depressed — his word, depressed.
他在白宫日记中写道，他变得非常沮丧——用他的话来说，很沮丧。
As a result, he reached out to the then archenemy, the USSR.
结果，他向当时的宿敌苏联伸出了援手。
He reached out to Gorbachev.
他向戈尔巴乔夫伸出了援手。
That led to Reykjavík.
这导致了雷克雅未克。
The two of them together took the world from the dangerous precipice of 70,000 nuclear warheads in 1986–70,000, you heard me correctly — to the approximately 12,300 that we have today.
他们两人共同将世界从 1986 年拥有 70,000 枚核弹头的危险悬崖——你没听错，是 70,000 枚核弹头——发展到今天大约 12,300 枚核弹头。
That is because disarmament, and that is because of communication.
那是因为裁军，那是因为沟通。
Reagan realized that he could no longer treat the nuclear-armed Russia as the enemy that you want to kill.
里根意识到，他不能再把拥有核武器的俄罗斯视为想要杀死的敌人。
Enemies you kill in the Defense Department.
你在国防部杀死的敌人。
They had to be an adversary.
他们一定是对手。
He had to work with them, and that is the only mental pathway, theoretical pathway I can see as a viable solution to this madness, and I own that word.
他必须与他们合作，这是我认为解决这种疯狂的可行解决方案的唯一心理途径、理论途径，我拥有这个词。
It’s madness.
这太疯狂了。
But he did start with the big arms buildup and higher defense spending, and he called them the evil empire.
但他确实从大规模的军备建设和更高的国防开支开始，他称它们为邪恶帝国。
He was hardly a nuclear pacifist.
他算不上一个核和平主义者。
You need to be strong first, and then you can get the other party to disarm partly —
你要先强大起来，然后才能让对方部分缴械 ——
Absolutely.
绝对的。
— but 12,000 weapons is still enough to create the scenario in your book.
—— 但是12,000件武器仍然足以创造你书中的场景。
I don’t really feel safer now.
我现在并没有真正感到安全。
Well, no, but their intention was to disarm.
嗯，不，但他们的目的是解除武装。
Okay, you don’t have to go to nuclear zero.
好吧，你不必去核零。
People can have .
人们可以拥有。
.
。
.
。
Their intention was to continue, and that didn’t happen.
他们的意图是继续下去，但这并没有发生。
One note on Reagan, lest anybody get upset with themselves and think, “Oh no, I thought the Iron Dome could save us.” Lest anyone feel badly for not being aware of nuclear weapons, let me quote.
关于里根的一张纸条，以免有人对自己感到不安并想：“哦，不，我以为铁穹可以拯救我们。”为了避免有人因为不了解核武器而感到难过，让我引用一下。
Ronald Reagan himself didn’t even know the capability of sub-launched ballistic missiles.
罗纳德·里根本人甚至不知道潜射弹道导弹的能力。
In a press conference, he once said incorrectly that sub-launched ballistic missiles could be recalled.
他曾在新闻发布会上错误地表示可以召回潜射弹道导弹。
They can’t.
他们不能。
I think this speaks to the world in which there is so much misinformation about what could happen, what these weapon systems do.
我认为这说明了这个世界对于可能发生的情况以及这些武器系统的作用有很多错误信息。
It’s really something I tried to demonstrate in my book, that you can’t win.
这确实是我在书中试图证明的事情，即你无法获胜。
You cannot win.
你不可能赢。
As you well know, there was a recent conflict between Pakistan and India.
众所周知，最近巴基斯坦和印度之间发生了冲突。
They’re both nuclear armed states.
他们都是核武器国家。
For the moment it’s died down.
目前它已经平息了。
Pakistan, of course, has inferior conventional forces, a smaller and poorer country.
当然，巴基斯坦的常规力量较差，国家更小、更贫穷。
Say Pakistan, out of desperation, had launched some nuclear weapons.
假设巴基斯坦出于绝望发射了一些核武器。
What happens next?
接下来会发生什么？
What does the United States do?
美国做什么？
Do we just sit there and watch?
我们只是坐在那里观看吗？
Do we threaten?
我们威胁吗？
Do we tell India, “Hey, don’t retaliate or we’ll zap you?” Do we threaten Pakistan?
我们是否会告诉印度，“嘿，不要报复，否则我们会消灭你？”我们威胁巴基斯坦吗？
Do we preemptive on Pakistan?
我们要对巴基斯坦先发制人吗？
What’s your scenario?
你的情况是什么？
You just got yourself a new book.
你刚刚给自己买了一本新书。
There’s your scenario.
这就是你的场景。
But you’ve thought about this.
但你有想过这个问题。
You read the news, and you said, “Wow.” In your scenario, what happens?
你读了新闻，然后说：“哇。”在你的场景中，会发生什么？
In my scenario — and we’re literally talking about the book I wrote — I make something painfully clear.
在我的场景中——我们实际上是在谈论我写的书——我把一些令人痛苦的事情说清楚了。
Again, this is from sources.
再次强调，这是来自消息来源。
This is from Defense Department officials.
这是来自国防部官员的。
This is from your former professor’s war game, Proud Prophet.
这是来自你前教授的战争游戏《骄傲的先知》。
What we know from Proud Prophet is that no matter how nuclear war begins, whether NATO’s involved — I’m talking about the United States here, and I’ll get to Pakistan and India — no matter how nuclear war begins, whether NATO’s involved, not involved, China’s involved, not involved.
我们从《骄傲的先知》中了解到的是，无论核战争如何开始，无论北约是否参与——“我这里谈论的是美国，我将谈到巴基斯坦和印度”——无论核战争如何开始，无论北约是否参与、中国是否参与。
No matter how nuclear war begins, if the United States is involved, it ends in total annihilation, in Armageddon.
无论核战争如何开始，如果美国卷入其中，最终都会以世界末日的彻底毁灭告终。
We know that from the declassification.
我们从解密中得知这一点。
Those people have been wrong about so many things.
这些人在很多事情上都错了。
They were wrong about Joe Biden not being senile.
他们错误地认为乔·拜登没有衰老。
My scenario is —
我的场景是 —
Well, I’m talking about nuclear war.
好吧，我说的是核战争。
— India would retaliate and take out equivalent parts of Pakistan, and then China would twist Pakistan’s arm, and we and Russia would twist India’s arm.
— 印度会进行报复，拿走巴基斯坦的同等部分，然后中国会扭转巴基斯坦的手臂，而我们和俄罗斯会扭转印度的手臂。
I think that would be the end of it.
我想事情就这样结束了。
It would be terrible.
那就太可怕了。
Millions of people would die, but I don’t think it would escalate beyond that.
数百万人会死亡，但我认为情况不会升级到更多。
Is that wrong?
这是错误的吗？
What I just said was, what I am aware of and wrote the book about is, what happens if the United States gets involved?
我刚才说的是，我知道并写这本书的目的是，如果美国介入会发生什么？
I would have to really put my mind on that scenario to discern what the outcome would be.
我必须认真考虑这种情况才能确定结果是什么。
I don’t know necessarily if America would get involved.
我不一定知道美国是否会参与其中。
It doesn’t seem to me that there would be a reason.
在我看来，这似乎没有理由。
Now, what I am familiar with is understanding the effects of, let’s say, a 200-nuclear-weapons exchange between those two nuclear-armed countries, and what would happen to the soot that would loft into the atmosphere and block out the sun, impacting all of us.
现在，我所熟悉的是了解这两个核武器国家之间进行 200 枚核武器交换的影响，以及烟灰会如何进入大气层并遮挡阳光，影响我们所有人。
That’s a different conversation.
那是一次不同的对话。
But that’s why we would get involved.
但这就是我们参与其中的原因。
It’s one reason of many, right?
这是众多原因之一，对吗？
What would be the reason?
原因是什么？
Not wanting that to happen.
不希望这种事发生。
The second- and third-order effects of nuclear weapons would mean the US and China and Russia would call up the two parties and read them the riot act.
核武器的二阶和三阶效应意味着美国、中国和俄罗斯将召集双方并宣读防暴法案。
I think we actually would get it under some kind of partial control.
我认为我们实际上会将其置于某种部分控制之下。
I believe that would — well, witness what we just saw — would happen prior to the first launch.
我相信这会在第一次发射之前发生。
Sure, but you could have an angry, rebellious general.
当然可以，但你可能会遇到一位愤怒、叛逆的将军。
He controls a few nukes; he sends them toward Delhi.
他控制着一些核武器；他派他们去德里。
These things can happen, as you point out, right?
正如您所指出的，这些事情可能会发生，对吧？
Yes.
是的。
I don’t point that out in my book, but yes, I would agree with you that such things could happen.
我没有在我的书中指出这一点，但是，是的，我同意你的观点，这种事情可能会发生。
Very specifically, in Nuclear War: A Scenario, I don’t get involved with geopolitics.
非常具体地说，在《核战争：一个场景》中，我没有涉及地缘政治。
Tyler, I take readers from nuclear launch to nuclear winter, and it happens in 72 minutes.
泰勒，我带领读者从核发射到核冬天，这一切发生在 72 分钟内。
That’s because the former commander of Stratcom, General Kehler — when I asked him what would happen in a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and the United States, he said to me, “Annie, the world could end in the next couple of hours.” That is my focus when I think about and talk about nuclear war.
那是因为前战略司令部司令凯勒将军——当我问他俄罗斯和美国之间的全面核交锋会发生什么时，他对我说：“安妮，世界可能会在接下来的几个小时内终结。”当我思考和谈论核战争时，这就是我关注的焦点。
But there are scenarios that last longer than 72 minutes, and presumably, you’ve thought about those.
但有些场景持续时间超过 72 分钟，想必您已经考虑过这些情况。
That’s obviously going to be your next book.
这显然将是你的下一本书。
I just said that.
我只是这么说的。
But I can ask you about things you’ve thought about, but are not in your book.
但我可以问你一些你想过但书里没有的事情。
Are you asking me, did I think about writing a different scenario?
你问我，我有没有想过写一个不同的场景？
No, I’m asking you just a question about a scenario that’s not in your book, but you must have thought about, where there’s a limited exchange and then uncertainty hanging in the air, and something happens other than complete escalation.
不，我只是问你一个关于你书中没有的场景的问题，但你一定考虑过，在这种情况下，交流有限，然后不确定性悬而未决，除了完全升级之外，还会发生一些事情。
Many people have written books about what they believe could be the lead-up to various nuclear war scenarios.
许多人写了一些书，讲述他们认为可能导致各种核战争场景的情况。
That’s not my book.
那不是我的书。
Are you surprised there’ve been no real drone attacks in the domestic United States yet?
您是否对美国国内尚未发生真正的无人机袭击感到惊讶？
Wow.
哇。
I was on a podcast with a former CIA officer, and I said that I was waiting for that to happen and got a little bit of pushback.
我和一位前中央情报局官员一起参加播客，我说我正在等待这件事发生，但遭到了一些阻力。
Obviously, that has been my position for a while.
显然，这已经是我的立场有一段时间了。
I’m actually surprised that we haven’t seen that.
事实上，我很惊讶我们没有看到这一点。
Do you think we’ll need to develop defenses against that?
您认为我们需要针对这种情况制定防御措施吗？
Which would cost a lot.
这会花费很多。
There’re a lot of targets, right?
有很多目标，对吗？
We’re a big country.
我们是一个大国。
I’m interested and worried about mimetics in that kind of a situation, that you don’t have something like that happen, but if you did, it would suddenly involve mimicry.
我对这种情况下的模仿很感兴趣，也很担心，你不会发生类似的事情，但如果你发生了，它会突然涉及模仿。
I think that is shocking, and dangerous, and terrifying.
我认为这令人震惊、危险、可怕。
Again, I haven’t put my .
再说一次，我还没有把我的。
.
。
.
。
There’s another book for you.
还有另一本书给你。
On conspiracy theories
关于阴谋论
To ask about your work more generally.
更广泛地询问您的工作。
How many conspiracy theories do you think you believe in?
你认为你相信多少种阴谋论？
A lot, a few, zero?
很多，一些，零？
Maybe you have to define conspiracy theory for me.
也许你得给我定义一下阴谋论。
Well, if you think a group of people in the US government, say the CIA, plotted to kill Kennedy, that would be a conspiracy theory.
好吧，如果你认为美国政府的一群人，比如中央情报局，密谋刺杀肯尼迪，那将是一个阴谋论。
If you think Jeffrey Epstein did not really commit suicide, that would be a conspiracy theory.
如果你认为杰弗里·爱泼斯坦并没有真正自杀，那将是一个阴谋论。
If you think there are aliens hidden at Roswell, that would be a conspiracy theory.
如果你认为罗斯威尔隐藏着外星人，那就是阴谋论。
Maybe the definition has gray areas, but there’re plenty of cases where you can point to it and say, “Yes, that would be a conspiracy theory.” I would say I believe in a very small number of them.
也许这个定义存在灰色地带，但在很多情况下你可以指出它并说：“是的，这将是一个阴谋论。”我想说我相信其中的极少数人。
How many do you think you believe in?
你认为你相信多少？
Tell me which ones you believe in.
告诉我你相信哪些。
I think the COVID vaccine was held up by the pharma companies to help Biden’s chances of winning the election.
我认为制药公司推迟了新冠疫苗的研发，以帮助拜登赢得选举。
I used to be 50/50 on single gunman for Kennedy.
我曾经对肯尼迪的单一枪手持50/50的态度。
Now, I think it was a single gunman with the new document dump.
现在，我认为是一名枪手携带了新的文件转储。
I think there’s more cheating related to sports betting than people think.
我认为与体育博彩相关的作弊行为比人们想象的要多。
That’s a kind of weak conspiracy theory.
这是一种弱阴谋论。
That’s about my whole list.
这就是我的全部清单。
I don’t think there are many more.
我认为还有更多。
I do think Epstein killed himself.
我确实认为爱泼斯坦自杀了。
Even Dan Bongino said so recently.
就连丹·邦吉诺最近也这么说。
I’m so interested in the way people think and their belief systems.
我对人们的思维方式和他们的信仰体系非常感兴趣。
I spend so much time interviewing people at the very center of these issues which you would call conspiracies.
我花了很多时间采访这些问题的核心人物，你可以称之为阴谋。
I suppose I have a different definition of it, per se.
我想我对它本身有不同的定义。
I’ll just give you an example, so I’m specific and not vague.
我只是举个例子，所以我很具体，不会含糊。
When I was writing Area 51, I interviewed the first director of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology.
当我写《51区》时，我采访了中央情报局科技局第一任局长。
His name was Dr. Bud Wheelon.
他的名字叫巴德·惠伦博士。
He had his finger on everything that you might call a conspiracy.
他对所有你可能称之为阴谋的事情都指手画脚。
Meaning he was in the basement with Dulles.
这意味着他和杜勒斯一起在地下室。
He was one of the five people that was brought down there after JFK was killed.
他是肯尼迪遇害后被带到那里的五人之一。
Dr. Wheelon was the originator of the Corona Satellite Program.
惠隆博士是科罗娜卫星计划的创始人。
Science and Technology was just coming online at the CIA in the ’60s when he was there.
20 世纪 60 年代，当他还在中央情报局时，科学技术刚刚在中央情报局上线。
He was also the mayor of Area 51 by his own definition.
根据他自己的定义，他也是51区的区长。
I report on actual stories based on interviews of high-ranking officials about the landscape around what you have suggested is conspiracy, like that people love to think about JFK, aliens at Roswell.
我根据对高级官员的采访来报道真实的故事，这些故事涉及你所说的阴谋，比如人们喜欢思考肯尼迪、罗斯威尔的外星人。
I put those in quotes on the record for people to contemplate.
我把这些放在引号中记录下来，供人们思考。
Operation Paperclip, another case in point — so many of what you would call conspiracies around that.
回形针行动，另一个例子 ——围绕这个有很多你所说的阴谋。
I tend to be someone who doesn’t.
我倾向于成为一个不这样做的人。
I think sometimes, when you say that’s a conspiracy theory, it sounds so finger-pointing to me.
我想有时候，当你说这是一个阴谋论时，这听起来对我来说是一种指责。
I don’t mean it in a negative way.
我的意思并不是消极的。
There’re plenty of other countries that have a lot of conspiracies, right?
还有很多其他国家有很多阴谋，对吗？
Yes.
是的。
Maybe just ask me specifically, and then I could answer earnestly what I think about a certain subject, because I have written about all of those subjects.
也许只要具体问我，然后我就可以认真地回答我对某个主题的看法，因为我写过所有这些主题。
Well, say the Kennedy assassination.
好吧，就说肯尼迪遇刺事件吧。
I’ll continue with the Dr. Wheelon story if I may.
如果可以的话，我会继续讲惠伦博士的故事。
Yes?
是的？
First, just tell us what you think, and then tell us the story.
首先，请告诉我们您的想法，然后告诉我们这个故事。
I don’t have any information on Kennedy that isn’t already in the public domain that one can either say, “Okay, that’s actually what I would call a legitimate source.” Or, “Actually, I’m not sure I believe that individual.” I do have a feeling that Dr. Wheelon was someone who knew because famously — you may or may not know this, but after Kennedy was killed, Allen Dulles, then director of CIA, took five directors of the directorates down into the basement.
我没有任何关于肯尼迪的信息尚未进入公共领域，人们可以说：“好吧，这实际上就是我所说的合法来源。”或者，“事实上，我不确定我是否相信那个人。”我确实有一种感觉，惠伦博士是一个知道这一点的人，因为众所周知，“你可能知道，也可能不知道，但在肯尼迪被杀后，时任中央情报局局长的艾伦·杜勒斯将五名董事会董事带到了地下室。
They were all there for a number of hours.
他们都在那里呆了好几个小时。
When they came up, witnesses said they were pale-faced.
当他们出现时，目击者称他们脸色苍白。
Whatever they learned was something shocking.
无论他们学到了什么，都是令人震惊的。
When I was interviewing Dr. Wheelon for Area 51, my handler — when you interview these former CIA guys, you have — I call them a handler.
当我采访 51 区的惠隆博士时，我的上司 — 当你采访这些前中央情报局人员时， — 我称他们为上司。
They’re called a liaison.
他们被称为联络员。
This person said to me, “Dr. Wheelon will answer all your questions about 51, about the spy planes, about the Corona satellites, and whatnot, but you may not ask him about JFK.”
这个人对我说：“惠伦博士会回答你关于 51、关于间谍飞机、关于科罗娜卫星等等的所有问题，但你不能问他关于肯尼迪国际机场的问题。”
Of course, obviously, I wanted to ask him about JFK, but I didn’t because I was focusing on my Area 51 book.
当然，很明显，我想问他有关肯尼迪的事，但我没有问，因为我正在专注于我的 51 区书。
Dr. Wheelon said a very interesting thing to me when we finished up our interviews.
当我们结束采访时，惠伦博士对我说了一件非常有趣的事情。
He said, “You may call me anytime that you like before the book publishes.
他说：“在这本书出版之前，你可以随时给我打电话。
I’ll check quotes.” He gave me this long list, being very helpful.
我会检查报价。”他给了我这个长长的清单，非常有帮助。
He said, “But once the book publishes, you and I will never speak.”
他说：“但是一旦这本书出版了，你我就永远不会说话了。”
It’s very CIA to say such a thing.
说出这样的话，真是太CIA了。
That was that.
就是这样。
Sure enough, book publishes, never hear from him.
果然，书出版了，却再也没有他的消息。
Flash forward one year or so, my phone rings.
快进一年左右，我的电话响了。
I can’t find my phone.
我找不到我的手机。
I find it, and it says, “Missed call.
我找到它，上面写着：“未接来电。”
Dr. Bud Wheelon.” I said to my husband, “Oh my God.” You know what he said?
巴德·惠伦博士。”我对丈夫说：“天哪。”你知道他说什么吗？
“He’s going to tell you who killed JFK.
“他会告诉你谁杀了肯尼迪。
Call him back.” I call him back.
叫他回来。”我给他回电话。
A woman answers the phone and says, “Annie, it was a missed call.” I said, “I’m sure he wanted to get in touch with me.”
一位女士接电话说：“安妮，这是一个未接电话。”我说：“我确信他想与我联系。”
He died a few days later.
几天后他去世了。
He must have known .
他一定知道。
.
。
.
。
Forgive the long-winded story, but I think it speaks to why these hidden mysteries are interpreted as conspiracies, because people know things that for whatever reason, they cannot say.
请原谅这个冗长的故事，但我认为它说明了为什么这些隐藏的奥秘被解释为阴谋，因为人们知道一些事情，无论出于何种原因，他们都不能说出来。
My takeaway was that Dr. Whelan was going to tell me something.
我的收获是惠兰博士要告诉我一些事情。
That’s why he called me on his deathbed.
这就是为什么他在临终前给我打电话。
Pure speculation on my part.
纯粹是我的猜测。
What’s your view on UAPs, formerly called UFOs?
您对 UAP（以前称为 UFO）有何看法？
That is a three-hour Joe Rogan podcast, Tyler, I’m afraid.
那是一个三小时的乔·罗根播客，泰勒，恐怕。
The short version is, I report in Area 51, that they were not UAPs, that they were something else.
我在 51 区报告说，简短的版本是，它们不是 UAP，而是其他东西。
A terrible human experiment program.
一个可怕的人体实验计划。
That really is a longer conversation because it’s so dark, so ugly, and deeply controversial.
这确实是一个较长的对话，因为它是如此黑暗、如此丑陋，而且充满争议。
But I have no reason to believe that off-planet extraterrestrial beings or intelligence have come to the United States or anywhere on Earth.
但我没有理由相信地外的外星生物或智慧生物已经来到美国或地球上的任何地方。
I have interviewed almost all of those players involved because they have crossed into some of my other books.
我采访了几乎所有参与其中的玩家，因为他们已经出现在我的其他一些书中。
A lot of what I don’t report is because it’s not an area that I want to spend a lot of time proving or disproving.
我没有报告的很多内容是因为这不是我想花大量时间证明或反驳的领域。
I think it falls into the category of people’s beliefs.
我认为它属于人们信仰的范畴。
But if there’s no actual thing that happened, what makes it so dark and ugly?
但如果没有实际发生的事情，又是什么让事情变得如此黑暗和丑陋呢？
If there’s no actual — ?
如果没有实际的 —— ？
Oh, there is an actual thing that happened.
哦，有一件真实的事情发生了。
There’re no alien bodies.
没有外星人的尸体。
In your view, no alien craft, UFOs are not alien spacecraft.
在你看来，没有外星飞船，不明飞行物也不是外星飞船。
Why is it dark and ugly?
为什么又黑又丑？
Because one of my sources, the primary mover and shaker in that whole world that everyone knows — he told me that it was a human experiment program and that he was involved in it.
因为我的消息来源之一，众所周知的整个世界的主要推动者和推动者，他告诉我这是一个人体实验计划，并且他参与了其中。
You have to read the whole Area 51 book to swallow that.
你必须阅读整本 51 区的书才能接受这一点。
That was the position he maintained until he died.
这是他一直保持的立场，直到去世。
Do you think people are overly inclined to believe in conspiracy theories?
您是否认为人们过于倾向于相信阴谋论？
Just as we used to attribute the weather to gods, we anthropomorphize many things.
正如我们过去将天气归因于神一样，我们将许多事物拟人化。
It’s easier to think in terms of the people we don’t like as plotting against us rather than things being a series of accidents.
将我们不喜欢的人视为对我们的密谋，而不是将事情视为一系列意外，会更容易。
I think we overly resort to conspiracy theorizing.
我认为我们过度诉诸阴谋论。
Do you agree or disagree?
你同意还是不同意？
I disagree with the nomenclature because I think of a conspiracy in legal terms.
我不同意这个术语，因为我认为这是法律术语中的阴谋。
It’s like two or more people plotting something.
这就像两个或更多的人在密谋某事。
That is a word that exists in my brain in that lane.
那是一条存在于我大脑中的词。
The other lane that you’re talking about, to me, is beliefs.
对我来说，你所说的另一条道路是信仰。
If you really wanted to get flowery with your language, you could say crazy beliefs.
如果你真的想让你的语言变得华丽，你可以说疯狂的信念。
You could attach any kind of poetic word to it, which I would, because it seems to me to fall more into the category of desire.
你可以给它加上任何一种诗意的词，我会的，因为在我看来，它更属于欲望的范畴。
On the best run parts of the deep state
深层政府运行最好的部分
Of all the parts of government you’ve had contact with, which do you think is the best run?
在您接触过的所有政府部门中，您认为哪一个部门运作得最好？
Wow.
哇。
That’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
As you know, from all of my books, I report on the Pentagon, the military, and the intelligence community.
如你所知，在我所有的书中，我都报道五角大楼、军队和情报界。
Many people do not realize that there are 17 or 18 intelligence agencies in the United States of America.
许多人没有意识到美国有 17 或 18 个情报机构。
The CIA is just one of them.
中央情报局只是其中之一。
I’ve written about a number of them.
我写过关于其中一些的文章。
Some of them, like NRO, for example, are extraordinarily classified.
其中一些，例如 NRO，是非常机密的。
What’s the best run?
最好的跑步是什么？
They’re run differently.
他们的运作方式不同。
The mindset of the Pentagon is fascinating to me in terms of order and systematic control.
五角大楼在秩序和系统控制方面的思维方式令我着迷。
The mindset of the Central Intelligence Agency is fascinating to me in terms of what I perceive to be individual action.
就我所认为的个人行为而言，中央情报局的思维方式对我来说很着迷。
They almost are diametrically posed in that regard that when you’re at the Pentagon, you are following the system.
他们在这方面几乎是截然相反的，即当你在五角大楼时，你就在遵循这个系统。
Often, not always, but often — I’ve interviewed many more CIA operators than analysts, people who are out there on the ground — it seems to be about individual course of action.
通常，并非总是，但经常 —— 我采访过的中央情报局特工比分析师和实地人员要多得多 ——这似乎与个人的行动方针有关。
Which is better?
哪个更好？
I think you need both.
我认为你两者都需要。
Certainly, in our own human lives, I want to have order and discipline and work from a system, whether it’s in my professional life or my family life, my community.
当然，在我们自己的人类生活中，我希望有秩序、有纪律、有系统地工作，无论是在我的职业生活还是我的家庭生活、我的社区中。
But I also want to have individuality and make decisions.
但我也想要有个性并做出决定。
In a strange way, I think that the intelligence community and the military community work hand and glove.
以一种奇怪的方式，我认为情报界和军事界密切合作。
Are they perfect?
他们完美吗？
Of course not.
当然不是。
Am I perfect?
我完美吗？
Of course not.
当然不是。
I think of the Pentagon as being one of the worst run and parts of the deep state as being relatively well run.
我认为五角大楼是运行最差的机构之一，而部分深层政府的运行相对较好。
That’s my personal impression.
这是我个人的印象。
You differ from that?
你与此不同吗？
Interesting.
有趣的。
When you say deep state, you mean the intelligence community?
当你说深层国家时，你指的是情报界吗？
Yes, especially the consultants who are attached and the way in which they really bring very high intelligence and analytic powers to bear on questions.
是的，尤其是那些附属的顾问以及他们真正带来非常高的智慧和分析能力来解决问题的方式。
It may not survive the passage of a memo to the presidency, but still, I think they’re quite on the ball.
它可能无法在向总统提交备忘录后继续存在，但我仍然认为他们很机敏。
We probably agree in that regard, that if discipline and system is important — again, I’m just using myself like a personal example, but what you really want to lead with is your own character and your own decision.
在这方面我们可能会同意，如果纪律和制度很重要的话，我只是用自己作为个人榜样，但你真正想要领导的是你自己的性格和你自己的决定。
I would probably agree with you, but the government is such a .
我可能会同意你的观点，但政府就是这样一个。
.
。
.
。
I’m also fascinated that most people just think the government is one whole thing.
我也很着迷的是，大多数人只是认为政府是一个整体。
As you and I both know from looking at this, that couldn’t be further from the truth.
正如你和我通过观察都知道的那样，这与事实相去甚远。
The people you’ve worked with who were part of the secret or semi-secret deep state — overall, what do you think they’re like as people or what motivates them?
与你共事过的那些属于秘密或半秘密深层政府的人 ——总的来说，你认为他们作为人是什么样的，或者他们的动机是什么？
Or what have you observed?
或者说你观察到了什么？
What has occurred to you?
你发生了什么事情？
I’m fascinated that you call them the “deep state.” Again, that’s like loaded nomenclature.
我很感兴趣你称他们为“深层政府”。再说一遍，这就像加载的术语。
It’s right there with conspiracy.
它就在那里，充满了阴谋。
No, I’m fine with deep state.
不，我对深层政府很满意。
It’s this negative thing, but a lot of these words get inverted.
这是消极的事情，但很多这些词都被颠倒了。
Let’s just call them the deep state.
我们就称他们为“深层政府”吧。
I don’t mind.
我不介意。
Some of it’s bad, but some of it’s good.
有些是不好的，但有些是好的。
Listen, I spend time with people who others view as everything from a twirling-mustache bad guy to a savior.
听着，我花时间和那些在别人眼中从卷着小胡子的坏人到救世主的人在一起。
And I’m not dodging the question here; I’m trying to be earnest in my reportage, how I work with people.
我并不是在这里回避这个问题；我努力认真地对待我的报道，以及我如何与人合作。
That has to do with the fact that I try to be agnostic going into interviews, as I would wish one would be with me, meaning not .
这与我在接受采访时试图保持不可知论有关，因为我希望有人能和我在一起，但事实并非如此。
.
。
.
。
Because if you’re going to prejudge someone based on what you “read” or heard on a podcast, that is dangerous.
因为如果你要根据你在播客上“读到”或听到的内容来预先判断某人，那是很危险的。
Yes, but I want your post judgment, right?
是的，但我想要你的事后判断，对吗？
Okay, but be specific.
好的，但要具体一点。
Tell me —
告诉我 —
The people you’ve met from the deep state — what’s your overall impression?
你遇到的来自深层政府的人 ——你的总体印象是什么？
Some mix of what they’re like, what motivates them, what surprised you.
他们的性格、激励他们的因素以及让你感到惊讶的因素的一些组合。
Any impressions you’ve had about these people.
您对这些人的任何印象。
When you say deep state, do you mean specifically intelligence community?
当你说深层国家时，你指的是情报界吗？
Absolutely.
绝对地。
So, you mean former operators for the CIA that I worked with?
那么，你是指与我共事的中央情报局前干员吗？
Former, current, whatever you’ve met.
以前的，现在的，无论你遇到过什么。
Yes.
是的。
I’m trying to wrap my head around the actual question so I can answer it.
我正在努力思考实际问题，以便能够回答它。
What are they like?
他们是什么样的人？
What struck you?
是什么让你印象深刻？
Everybody’s different.
每个人都不同。
I don’t think you could put people into a box.
我不认为你可以把人放进一个盒子里。
I am astonished.
我很惊讶。
Look, one of the things about being a reporter is that you allegedly are objective.
听着，作为一名记者的好处之一就是你据称是客观的。
I think the past 10 years have shown us that that is actually not true, yet you should strive to be.
我认为过去的十年已经向我们表明，这实际上是不正确的，但你应该努力做到这一点。
So, when I’m reporting books, I aim to be objective so that I can gather agnostic details and come to a conclusion.
因此，当我报告书籍时，我的目标是客观，以便我可以收集不可知的细节并得出结论。
Sometimes afterwards, having spent a lot of time with a person, then they might even become a friend.
有时候，和一个人相处了很多时间之后，他们甚至可能会成为朋友。
The book’s out, and that is maybe where I would get to know someone even better.
这本书出版了，也许我可以在那里更好地了解某人。
Who’s coming to mind is Billy Waugh who became a friend of mine after I reported.
我想到的人是比利·沃（Billy Waugh），在我举报后他成为了我的朋友。
He was the main character in my book about the CIA’s paramilitary called Surprise, Kill, Vanish.
他是我关于中央情报局准军事部队的书《惊喜、杀戮、消失》中的主角。
Billy was extremely complicated.
比利的心情极其复杂。
After the book published and we became friends, he shared with me a lot of things that were deeply personal, that are not to be on the public record, but made me realize — and you are going to say this is a cliché, but I’m going to say it anyways — we are all so much more alike than we are different.
这本书出版后，我们成为了朋友，他与我分享了很多非常私人的事情，这些事情不会公开，但让我意识到 ——你会说这是陈词滥调，但无论如何我还是要说——我们所有人的相似之处远多于我们的不同之处。
That would be my answer, in fact.
事实上，这就是我的答案。
I don’t mind if it’s a cliché.
我不介意这是否是陈词滥调。
I would agree with you.
我同意你的看法。
I think they’re more analytic than other individuals I meet on average, just as you might say, “Well, the Swiss are more orderly,” but they’re not that different deep down.
我认为他们比我遇到的其他人平均更具分析能力，就像你可能会说的那样，“嗯，瑞士人更有秩序”，但他们内心深处并没有那么不同。
Incredibly.
难以置信。
My husband’s Norwegian, and the Norwegian word is coming to mind, flink, like clever, like really clever and always operating on 10 frequencies.
我丈夫是挪威人，脑海中浮现出挪威语单词“flink”，“flink”，“聪明”，“非常聪明”，并且总是在 10 个频率上运行。
I went to Vietnam with Billy Waugh, to Hanoi when he was 87 and a half years old.
我和比利·沃一起去了越南，去河内的时候他已经87岁半了。
I’m telling you, the things that happened.
我告诉你，发生的事情。
We could do a three-hour podcast on some of the things that occurred, that made me say, “How is an 87-year-old firing on so many circuits all at once?” But he was, because he was trained that way.
我们可以就所发生的一些事情做一个三小时的播客，这让我不禁问道：“一个 87 岁的老人怎么会同时在这么多赛道上开枪呢？”但他确实如此，因为他受过这样的训练。
He was always used to having someone on his tail, trying to kill him.
他总是习惯有人尾随他，想要杀他。
On Uri Gellar and ESP
关于尤里·盖拉 (Uri Gellar) 和 ESP
What did you think when you met Uri Geller, which you relate in one of your books?
当你遇到尤里·盖勒（你在你的一本书中提到的）时，你有什么想法？
Uri was fascinating.
乌里很迷人。
Uri is another person — talk about beliefs.
乌里是另一个人 —— 谈论信仰。
I met with Uri at his home outside London, and I traveled to Israel to meet with Uri there.
我在乌里伦敦郊外的家中会见了他，然后我前往以色列在那里与乌里会面。
What comes to mind is Uri, the person, who I spent time with — this was now nine years ago or something — was most certainly different than the public persona that he pushes forth.
我想到的是乌里，那个和我共度时光的人——“现在已经是九年前了”——肯定与他所展现的公众形象不同。
I believe that in my book, Phenomena, I capture the person, not the pretense.
我相信在我的《现象》一书中，我捕捉的是人，而不是伪装。
A lot of people — and I think Uri among them — become like a figure, and then they work to hold up that figure.
很多人——我想尤里就是其中之一——变得像一个人物，然后他们努力支撑这个人物。
If ESP is true or can work, why isn’t it relatively easy to show that in the laboratory?
如果 ESP 是正确的或者可以发挥作用，为什么在实验室中证明这一点不是相对容易的呢？
I believe the takeaway from my book on that subject is that it’s a fleeting technique.
我相信我关于这个主题的书的要点是，这是一种转瞬即逝的技术。
It definitely, to my eye, falls into the basket of belief.
在我看来，它绝对落入了信念的篮子里。
I saw things, as I report, that were inexplicable.
正如我所报告的，我看到了一些令人费解的事情。
You couldn’t really explain them by logic or science, but you can’t repeat that behavior, and so it’s not science.
你无法真正用逻辑或科学来解释它们，但你无法重复这种行为，所以它不是科学。
I don’t think you can “use it.” I think that’s what the CIA spent a long time trying to prove.
我不认为你可以“使用它”。我认为这就是中央情报局花了很长时间试图证明的事情。
I think the Defense Department made the mistake of believing that perhaps you could use it.
我认为国防部错误地认为也许你可以使用它。
To what extent do government bodies still use self-proclaimed psychics?
政府机构在多大程度上仍然使用自称的通灵者？
Currently?
现在？
Currently, yes.
目前，是的。
Oh, I don’t know.
哦，我不知道。
I don’t know, but I’m almost certain that that program is still continuing.
我不知道，但我几乎可以肯定该计划仍在继续。
You see on TV shows, local sheriffs — a young girl disappears, they bring in a psychic.
你在电视节目中看到，当地治安官——一个年轻女孩失踪了，他们带来了通灵者。
Does that happen in real life?
现实生活中会发生这种情况吗？
Or it’s only on TV?
还是只在电视上出现？
I think we all know examples of that happening in real life, which is why the polls — although now we know you can’t even trust polls anymore — but many polls suggest that an extraordinary majority of Americans believe in psychic functioning.
我想我们都知道现实生活中发生这种情况的例子，这就是为什么民意调查 ——“尽管现在我们知道你甚至不能再相信民意调查了”——但许多民意调查表明，绝大多数美国人相信心理功能。
It’s why they will, on occasion, “go see a psychic,” because everybody has a story of, “So and so said this, and then it happened.”
这就是为什么他们有时会“去看通灵者”，因为每个人都有这样的故事：“某某这么说，然后事情就发生了。”
Again, a great way for me to think about belief and desire.
这又是我思考信仰和欲望的好方法。
Wouldn’t it be amazing if there was a magical force that was guiding us?
如果有一种神奇的力量在引导我们，那不是很神奇吗？
I think that’s why people believe in psychic functioning.
我认为这就是人们相信心灵功能的原因。
Maybe the placebo effect is true.
也许安慰剂效应是真的。
Interestingly, placebo is, of course, a concept originated by a CIA doctor named Henry Beecher.
有趣的是，安慰剂的概念当然是由一位名叫亨利·比彻（Henry Beecher）的中央情报局医生提出的。
Do you believe in ESP?
你相信ESP吗？
Do I believe in extrasensory perception?
我相信超感官知觉吗？
Yes.
是的。
Individuals have told me things that, “Wow.
人们告诉我一些事情，“哇。
Oh, my God, that person said that to me, and that came true.” Is that extrasensory perception?
天哪，那个人对我这么说，结果果然如此。”这就是超感官知觉吗？
I’ll leave you to decide.
我会让你自己决定。
I’ll say it’s random, that a lot of things happen that are coincidences.
我会说这是随机的，很多事情的发生都是巧合。
I don’t believe in it.
我不相信它。
Of course.
当然。
Are you willing to say the same?
你也愿意这么说吗？
Of course.
当然。
I think I believe more in .
我想我更相信。
.
。
.
。
Someone said it to me this way.
有人这样对我说。
You know the red Rambler theory?
你知道红色漫步者理论吗？
No.
不。
Neither did I.
我也没有。
I said, “Well, what’s the red Rambler theory?” They said, “Okay, now watch.
我说：“那么，红色漫步者理论是什么？”他们说：“好吧，现在看。
Now that I’ve said the red Rambler theory, you will end up seeing a red Rambler — one of those cars from the ’70s or ’80s — drive by.” That is that idea, like you just shared, that once something is in your consciousness, the chances of you seeing it are much greater.
现在我已经说了红色 Rambler 理论，你最终会看到一辆红色 Rambler —— 一辆 70 年代或 80 年代的汽车 —— 驶过。”这就是这个想法，就像你刚才分享的那样，一旦某件事进入你的意识，你看到它的机会就会更大。
Is that ESP?
那是ESP吗？
It’s the red Rambler theory.
这就是红色漫步者理论。
I would say confirmation bias, but I don’t believe in ESP, do I?
我会说确认偏差，但我不相信 ESP，不是吗？
What is it you read, say in science fiction or detective novels or genre fiction that has influenced you?
您读过的科幻小说、侦探小说或类型小说中的哪些内容对您产生了影响？
I love reading.
我喜欢读书。
I was doing an interview recently in Europe, and someone asked me, or rather stated that my book, Nuclear War: A Scenario, was clearly influenced by John Hersey’s Hiroshima and Cormac McCarthy’s The Road.
我最近在欧洲接受采访，有人问我，或者更确切地说，我的书《核战争：一个场景》显然受到约翰·赫西的《广岛》和科马克·麦卡锡的《道路》的影响。
I thought, absolutely, each of those books, I have read more than once.
我想，绝对的，每一本书我都读过不止一次。
I think I’m the kind of author and reporter that just reads, reads, reads, reads, reads, reads, reads, and then things quibble up in your subconscious and become manifest.
我认为我是那种不断阅读、阅读、阅读、阅读、阅读、阅读、阅读的作家和记者，然后事情就会在你的潜意识中狡辩并变得明显。
What is it in your formative years, do you think, led you to take interest in the topics you’ve written books about?
您认为在您的成长岁月中，是什么让您对您所写书籍的主题产生兴趣？
When I was a young girl?
当我还是个小女孩的时候？
Teenager, young woman, whatever it was, yes.
青少年，年轻女子，无论是什么，是的。
That is a mystery to me.
这对我来说是个谜。
We’ll have to leave that to the psychics.
我们必须把它留给通灵者。
Really and truly, because I don’t have a military family.
确实如此，因为我没有军人家庭。
My training was not in war.
我的训练不是在战争中。
I would most definitely say it was fate and circumstance.
我肯定会说这是命运和环境。
I really believe in that, just like — what’s the expression?
我真的很相信这一点，就像 —— 表达什么？
Maybe it’s Bob Dylan, “Ride the horse in the direction it’s moving.”
也许是鲍勃·迪伦（Bob Dylan），“沿着马移动的方向骑行。”
I just began writing about war and weapons and national security, and secrets as a younger reporter, and it just took off from there.
作为一名年轻的记者，我刚刚开始撰写有关战争、武器、国家安全和秘密的文章，然后就从那时起开始了。
These subjects are absolutely life-and-death dramatic.
这些主题绝对是生死攸关的戏剧性。
They make me feel like I want to keep writing.
他们让我觉得我想继续写作。
What’s your favorite novel?
你最喜欢的小说是什么？
What’s your favorite novel?
你最喜欢的小说是什么？
Moby-Dick or Bleak House.
《白鲸》或《荒凉山庄》。
Moby-Dick!
白鲸！
Yes.
是的。
I’m not going to say one.
我不会说一个。
Favorite movie?
最喜欢的电影？
Gladiator.
角斗士。
Best movie about nuclear war?
关于核战争的最佳电影？
Hopefully, Denis Villeneuve’s Nuclear War: A Scenario, forthcoming.
希望丹尼斯·维伦纽夫的《核战争：一个场景》即将出版。
Any idea when it’s coming out?
知道什么时候出来吗？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
These things, they’re like the CIA.
这些东西，就像中央情报局一样。
They’re secret and hidden.
它们是秘密且隐藏的。
That’s right.
这是正确的。
I like the old, not well-known movie, Miracle Mile, which is about a pending nuclear holocaust and a couple in LA that fall in love with each other.
我喜欢一部不太出名的老电影《奇迹一英里》，它讲述的是一场悬而未决的核浩劫和洛杉矶一对相爱的情侣的故事。
Wow, I don’t know that one.
哇，我不认识那个。
Miracle Mile?
奇迹一英里？
It’s from, I think, the late 1980s.
我想，这是 20 世纪 80 年代末的事。
It’s a fun movie.
这是一部有趣的电影。
Great.
伟大的。
Great recommendation.
很棒的推荐。
Thank you.
谢谢。
Last question.
最后一个问题。
What will you do next?
接下来你会做什么？
I have a new book due on August 1.
我有一本新书将于 8 月 1 日到期。
Are you allowed to tell us what it is?
您可以告诉我们它是什么吗？
No. That I take a page out of the CIA’s playbook: secret until revealed.
不，我借鉴了中央情报局的做法：秘密直到揭晓。
So, it’s not on Amazon yet?
那么，它还没有在亚马逊上销售吗？
No, it’s not.
不，不是。
My manuscript is due August 1.
我的稿件截止日期为 8 月 1 日。
Oh, I see.
哦，我明白了。
It’s not coming out August 1.
它不会在 8 月 1 日发布。
No, no, no.
不，不，不。
It’s close to finished, then?
那么就快完成了吧？
Yes.
是的。
It is, shall we say, same cookie sheet.
我们可以说，这是同一个饼干片。
Great.
伟大的。
Awesome.
惊人的。
Annie Jacobsen, it’s been a real pleasure chatting.
安妮·雅各布森，聊天真的很愉快。
Thank you very much.
非常感谢。
Thank you so much.
太感谢了。