Andrew Ross Sorkin on Market Bubbles, Banking Rules, and the Real Lessons of 1929 (Ep. 269)
Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Conversations with Tyler.
大家好，欢迎回到《与泰勒对话》。
Today, I’m chatting with Andrew Ross Sorkin.
今天，我正在与安德鲁·罗斯·索尔金聊天。
He’s an award-winning journalist for the New York Times and a co-anchor at Squawk Box, CNBC’s signature morning program.
他是《纽约时报》屡获殊荣的记者，也是 CNBC 标志性早间节目 Squawk Box 的联合主持人。
He’s also founder and editor-at-large of DealBook, published by the New York Times.
他还是纽约时报出版的 DealBook 的创始人和特约编辑。
He’s the bestselling author of Too Big to Fail, co-producer of a film adaptation of the same, nominated for 11 Emmy Awards.
他是畅销书《太大而不能倒》的作者，也是该书改编电影的联合制片人，并获得 11 项艾美奖提名。
He is also co-creator of the drama series Billions on Showtime, but most importantly, he has a new book out, 1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History — and How It Shattered a Nation.
他还是 Showtime 电视剧《Billions》的共同创作者，但最重要的是，他出版了一本新书《1929：华尔街历史上最伟大的崩盘》——以及《它如何粉碎了一个国家》。
Andrew, welcome.
安德鲁，欢迎。
Thank you so much for having me.
非常感谢你邀请我。
It’s a privilege.
这是一种特权。
The 1929 stock prices right before the crash — were they really a bubble?
1929 年崩盘前的股价 ——它们真的是泡沫吗？
Doesn’t America have an amazing century to come?
美国难道没有一个令人惊奇的世纪吗？
Arguably, those prices were too low, and the so-called speculators are the heroes of this story?
可以说，那些价格太低了，而所谓的投机者才是这个故事的英雄？
Oh goodness, what a place to start.
哦，天哪，这是一个多么好的起点啊。
Yes and no. In some ways, so many of these companies clearly represented the future.
是和不是。在某些方面，许多这样的公司清楚地代表了未来。
You think about an RCA and radio and the future of radio and what that represented, but three years later, I think RCA was sitting at $3.
你会想到 RCA 和收音机、收音机的未来以及它所代表的含义，但三年后，我认为 RCA 的价格为 3 美元。
On a split-adjusted basis, it had been up in multi-hundred dollars.
在分割调整后，它已经上涨了数百美元。
So yes, you could argue that they were betting on a future that truly was better than people thought, but the chasm between 1929 and, frankly, the end of World War II was a long and tortured period.
所以，是的，你可以说他们押注的未来确实比人们想象的要好，但坦率地说，1929 年到第二次世界大战结束之间的鸿沟是一个漫长而痛苦的时期。
No?
不？
Sure, but if we look at 30-year returns, we find in American history, like any 30-year period, stocks do quite well, 6 percent to 7 percent, and most of the gains come just in a few of the years in the 30-year period.
当然，但如果我们看一下 30 年的回报率，我们会发现，在美国历史上，就像任何 30 年时期一样，股票表现相当不错，达到 6% 到 7%，而且大部分收益只出现在 30 年期间的少数几年。
That seems to be the case even if you bought at the peak in 1929.
即使你在 1929 年的最高点买入，情况似乎也是如此。
By 1959, you would have had a real return, something like 6 percent.
到 1959 年，您将获得实际回报，大约 6%。
A lot of the gains coming later, but that’s not unusual.
很多收获都是后来的，但这并不罕见。
Even then, World War II — that it was so bad, seems like a super unlucky event.
即便如此，第二次世界大战——如此糟糕，似乎是一件超级不幸的事件。
So, ex ante, you might have expected something even better.
所以，事前，你可能会期待更好的事情。
Look, for sure, it has paid to be a professional optimist, a professional speculator, if you will, way more over the course of the last hundred years than it has ever paid to be a professional Cassandra or professional skeptic.
当然，如果你愿意的话，在过去的一百年里，成为一名职业乐观主义者、一名职业投机者所付出的代价，远远超过成为一名职业卡桑德拉或职业怀疑论者所付出的代价。
No doubt.
无疑。
The question is what the time horizon is, always.
问题始终是时间范围是多少。
If you are looking out 30 years, Tyler, you’re 100 percent right.
如果你展望 30 年，泰勒，你是百分百正确的。
If you’re looking out 5 years or 18 months or 2 years or even a decade, at least in the context of 1929, you’d look wrong.
如果你展望 5 年、18 个月、2 年甚至 10 年，至少在 1929 年的背景下，你看起来就错了。
Interestingly, in 1928, Charles Merrill, who had founded Merrill Lynch, was telling people to get out of the stock market.
有趣的是，1928年，美林公司的创始人查尔斯·梅里尔(Charles Merrill)告诉人们要退出股市。
By the way, some people thought he was brilliant.
顺便说一句，有些人认为他很聪明。
All of a sudden, the crash happens in 1929, but the truth is, between the beginning of 1928 when he said this and September of 1929, the stock market was up like 90 percent.
突然之间，崩盘发生在 1929 年，但事实是，从 1928 年初他说这句话到 1929 年 9 月，股市上涨了 90%。
You would look at what he said and say what a mistake that was.
你会看看他说的话，然后说这是一个多么错误的错误。
As you point out in the book, people like Irving Fisher, also Herbert Hoover — they said the lower later prices were the ones that were wrong.
正如您在书中指出的那样，像欧文·费希尔（Irving Fisher）和赫伯特·胡佛（Herbert Hoover）这样的人——他们说后来的较低价格是错误的。
No one was denying prices had fallen.
没有人否认价格已经下跌。
I call them the Negative Nellies, the people who get upset.
我称他们为“消极内莉”，即那些心烦意乱的人。
They’re upset for reasons that aren’t good enough.
他们因为不够充分的原因而感到不安。
Why not say the speculators were basically right?
为什么不说投机者基本上是对的呢？
They were the good guys.
他们是好人。
The Negative Nellies were the problem.
消极的内莉就是问题所在。
When Fisher and Hoover criticized them and said we need more confidence, basically, Fisher and Hoover were correct, even though nowadays it’s just standard practice to dump on them.
当费舍尔和胡佛批评他们并说我们需要更多信心时，基本上，费舍尔和胡佛是正确的，尽管现在抛弃他们只是标准做法。
Well, look, I actually have more sympathy and empathy for Herbert Hoover than I think most do.
好吧，看，我实际上比我想象的大多数人对赫伯特·胡佛有更多的同情和同理心。
But I think if you were looking in that moment at some of the policy choices that he made, many of which I would argue were mistaken and actually hastened and made things worse.
但我认为，如果你在那一刻审视他做出的一些政策选择，我认为其中许多政策选择都是错误的，而且实际上加速了事情的发展，并使事情变得更糟。
To me, the crash of ’29 was really the first domino of a series of dominoes that led to the Great Depression.
对我来说，29 年的崩盘实际上是导致大萧条的一系列多米诺骨牌中的第一张多米诺骨牌。
It wasn’t that the crash itself was somehow a straight line.
事故本身并不是一条直线。
It was a series of decisions that were made — in some cases, that weren’t made — by Herbert Hoover, by the Federal Reserve, by a whole bunch of people in Washington and elsewhere that led to, ultimately, unemployment of 25 percent in 1932 and 9,000 banks, I think, by 1933 failing.
赫伯特·胡佛、美联储、华盛顿和其他地方的一大群人做出了一系列决定——在某些情况下，这些决定并不是做出的，最终导致 1932 年失业率达到 25%，我认为到 1933 年有 9,000 家银行倒闭。
Sure, but it’s one thing to say Hoover made some policy mistakes — clearly true, big bad ones — but it doesn’t mean Hoover was wrong in saying that the low prices were caused by too much worry.
当然，但说胡佛犯了一些政策错误是一回事——“显然是真的，而且是严重的错误”——但这并不意味着胡佛所说的低价是由太多担忧造成的错误是错误的。
It seems that the Great Depression was as bad and as international as it was, was quite unusual and surprising, that World War II was so catastrophic, was quite unusual and surprising, and that ex ante, Hoover on that particular point nonetheless was mostly correct.
看来，大萧条是多么糟糕和国际化，是非常不寻常和令人惊讶的，第二次世界大战是如此灾难性的，非常不寻常和令人惊讶的，而事前，胡佛在这一点上仍然大部分是正确的。
Well, but the question .
好吧，但问题是。
.
。
.
。
and I think about this in terms of narrative, and people talk about story stocks.
我从叙事的角度思考这个问题，人们谈论故事股票。
He, in 1930, 1931, 1932, had this view that he could almost jawbone the American public to believe.
他在 1930 年、1931 年、1932 年提出了这种观点，几乎可以让美国公众相信。
He thought that this was a psychological problem and that if he could just tell people to put a smile on their face, that somehow they would put a smile on their face and that they would become believers.
他认为这是一个心理问题，如果他能告诉人们脸上挂着微笑，不知怎的，他们就会脸上挂着微笑，他们就会成为信徒。
I think that’s a very hard thing to persuade an entire country of in these kinds of moments.
我认为在这种时刻说服整个国家是一件非常困难的事情。
Then, when you marry that concept of trying to persuade people to be happy when they’re not happy with some poor policy choices, it becomes very difficult.
然后，当你结合试图说服人们在对一些糟糕的政策选择不满意时感到快乐的概念时，事情就会变得非常困难。
By the way, I think we’re living with this.
顺便说一句，我认为我们正在接受这个。
In the last couple of years, there was a period of time where inflation was super high, and we had a president, President Biden, who used to tell people all the time, “Don’t worry about that.
过去几年，有一段时间通货膨胀非常高，我们有一位总统，拜登总统，他经常告诉人们，“别担心这个。
You shouldn’t be thinking about the inflation.” People would say, “What are you talking about?
你不应该考虑通货膨胀。”人们会说：“你在说什么？
I feel it.
我感觉到了。
You can tell me all day long that things are better than they really are, but I’m the one living with these costs.” I think that’s very similar, in some ways, to what people were feeling, at least back then.
你可以整天告诉我，事情比实际情况要好，但我是承受这些成本的人。”我认为这在某些方面与人们的感受非常相似，至少在当时是这样。
On whether 2008 was a bubble
关于 2008 年是否是泡沫
If we look back to 2007 or 2006, can’t we now today say that in most parts of the country, there was not a housing bubble?
如果我们回顾2007年或2006年，现在我们不能说全国大部分地区没有出现房地产泡沫吗？
The high prices were basically correct, maybe a smidgen ahead of their time, but they’ve come back and then some in most parts of America, maybe not every single part.
高价格基本上是正确的，也许比他们的时代提前了一点点，但他们已经回来了，然后在美国大部分地区，也许不是每个地方。
Again, the people who said there was a housing bubble — they seemed so wise at the time, but now they’re just wrong.
再说一次，那些说存在房地产泡沫的人——他们当时看起来很明智，但现在他们错了。
That’s not even having to wait 30 years.
甚至不用等30年。
Well, yes and no, in that so much of those prices were being inflated with debt, I would argue to you.
好吧，是的，也不是，因为这些价格中有很大一部分因债务而膨胀，我会向你争论。
I would say that if the 2008 financial crisis was a function of too much leverage and debt in the system that effectively brought forward this remarkable growth, a somewhat similar story was taking place in the 1920s in terms of the euphoria around the technology, whether it was automobiles or telecommunications or radio.
我想说的是，如果 2008 年的金融危机是由于系统中杠杆率和债务过多导致了这一显着的增长，那么 1920 年代就发生了一个类似的故事，围绕着技术（无论是汽车、电信还是无线电）的欣欣向荣。
But all that was powered by leverage, and in particular, back then, people buying stock on margin.
但所有这一切都是由杠杆推动的，特别是在当时，人们以保证金购买股票。
It’s the leverage that allows these prices to get ahead of themselves in some ways, even if they are accurate over the longer term.
正是杠杆作用使得这些价格在某些方面超出了自己的预期，即使它们从长远来看是准确的。
This gets to a liquidity story.
这就涉及到流动性的故事了。
But surely, it’s begging the question to say that the debt is inflating the prices.
但可以肯定的是，说债务推高了价格就引出了一个问题。
If the homes really are going to be worth much more, to borrow to buy a house is exactly the thing you ought to do, at least if you don’t have to sell the next year.
如果房子真的会更值钱，那么贷款买房正是你应该做的事情，至少如果你明年不必卖掉的话。
The people who borrowed money were the right ones.
借钱的人都是对的人。
The Negative Nellies who panicked in 2008, 2009 — they were the wrong ones.
那些在 2008 年、2009 年惊慌失措的消极内莉们——他们是错误的。
They got the prices wrong.
他们把价格弄错了。
Still seems true to me.
对我来说仍然如此。
Let me try something out because I feel like I may be losing this debate with you, but I’m going to try.
让我尝试一下，因为我觉得我可能会输掉与你的这场辩论，但我会尝试。
If you go back to 1929, parallel to 2008 is actually, I think, apt. It wasn’t that the people were selling their stocks out of panic or fear.
如果你回到 1929 年，我认为与 2008 年平行实际上是合适的。人们并不是出于恐慌或恐惧而抛售股票。
That’s not what was happening.
事实并非如此。
They were selling the stocks because they had taken out too much money and had too much leverage.
他们出售股票是因为他们拿出了太多的资金并且拥有太多的杠杆。
So, when stocks fell by November 13th of 1929 by 50 percent from their high, it wasn’t just that the equity value had dropped by 50 percent.
因此，当 1929 年 11 月 13 日股市从高点下跌 50% 时，不仅仅是股票价值下跌了 50%。
It was that they were levered 10 to 1.
他们的杠杆比例是 10 比 1。
The bank had called them and said, “Excuse me, you need to pay us.” Therefore, they had to liquidate not just their stocks, but oftentimes their homes.
银行打电话给他们说：“对不起，你们需要付款给我们。”因此，他们不仅要变卖股票，而且常常要变卖房屋。
A very similar kind of scenario played out in some ways in 2008 with the subprime mortgage and loans because people’s homes were underwater.
2008 年，由于人们的房屋被水淹没，次级抵押贷款和贷款在某些方面上演了非常相似的情况。
They didn’t have enough money to pay the mortgages.
他们没有足够的钱来支付抵押贷款。
I think that, again, leverage plays a very unique role in all this.
我认为，杠杆在这一切中再次发挥着非常独特的作用。
The prices may ultimately be right in a long-term way, but how you get to those prices and how people could afford to even pay them the first time around can undermine the value in these temporary moments.
从长远来看，价格最终可能是正确的，但如何获得这些价格以及人们如何负担得起第一次支付这些价格可能会削弱这些暂时时刻的价值。
There’s no doubt particular people were too levered, say, in the ’20s, but the US economy as a whole, it seems, was less levered then than it was in most of the post-war era.
毫无疑问，某些人的杠杆率过高，比如在 20 年代，但美国经济作为一个整体，其杠杆率似乎低于战后大部分时期。
I’ve looked for different estimates of total debt as a percentage of GDP.
我寻找了对总债务占 GDP 百分比的不同估计。
I’m not sure any of these are reliable, but I came up with something like 165 percent — government, private, corporate, everything — which is higher than average for that time but not crazy high.
我不确定这些是否可靠，但我得出了大约 165% 的数字——“政府、私人、企业，一切”——这高于当时的平均水平，但还没有高得离谱。
But again, certainly particular people made big mistakes, as is true all the time.
但同样，某些人肯定会犯下重大错误，这一直都是事实。
No question.
毫无疑问。
Look, I think today, you look at the amount of debt that consumers have taken on, that the government has taken on — it’s just wild on a relative basis to what was happening in 1929, but I think that some of that individual basis drove so much of what was happening in the economy and the Roaring Twenties ethos that it really became almost a generational shock for those ordinary Americans who had played the stock market for the first time and lost.
听着，我想，你看看今天消费者承担的债务数额，政府承担的债务数额——与 1929 年发生的情况相比，这是疯狂的，但我认为，个人基础在很大程度上推动了经济和咆哮的二十年代精神中发生的事情，对于那些第一次参与股市并失败的普通美国人来说，这几乎成为一代人的震惊。
By the way, this is one anecdote.
顺便说一下，这是一则轶事。
It’s not in the book, but it’s a personal one.
书上没有，但这是个人的。
My grandfather happened to be a messenger boy down there in October of 1929, as it happens, with his brother who was 16 years old.
1929 年 10 月，我的祖父碰巧和他 16 岁的弟弟一起在那里当了一名信使。
They watched people.
他们观察人们。
Literally, they watched a person — they used to tell us the story — jump out of a window.
从字面上看，他们看到一个人 ——“他们常常告诉我们这个故事”—— 从窗户跳出去。
I believe this is late October, early November of ’29.
我相信这是 29 年 10 月底、11 月初。
My grandfather lived 91 years and never bought a share of stock his entire life because of that.
我的祖父活了91岁，因此一生都没有买过一股股票。
Now, you could say that that’s just one story and that all these are individual stories.
现在，你可以说这只是一个故事，所有这些都是单独的故事。
I think there were a lot of people who were so scarred by that period of time that it actually did change the trajectory to some degree of even how investments were made, at least for some period of time at that point.
我认为有很多人对那段时期感到如此伤痕累累，以至于它实际上确实在某种程度上改变了投资的轨迹，甚至改变了投资的方式，至少在当时的一段时间内是这样。
On alternate policy responses to the ‘29 crash
关于“29 年崩盘”的替代政策应对措施
Why do you think public utility shares played such a big role in both the run-up and the crash?
您认为为什么公用事业股在上涨和崩盘中都扮演了如此重要的角色？
Is that a sign that it had to do with interest rates, or it means something else?
这是一个与利率有关的迹象，还是有其他含义？
It’s a good question.
这是一个好问题。
The truth is, I don’t have a great answer for you.
事实是，我没有一个很好的答案给你。
To some degree, I wonder whether they were pushed up in large part because people thought that they were reliable.
在某种程度上，我想知道他们被推高的很大程度上是否是因为人们认为他们是可靠的。
They were utilities.
他们是公用事业。
That’s what people thought they were at a time when everything else was sort of go-go, and therefore, they were inflated at the same time.
这就是人们认为自己所处的时代，其他一切都在蓬勃发展，因此，他们同时感到膨胀。
During the stock run-up in the ’20s, should the Fed have had a different interest-rate policy?
在二十世纪二十年代股市上涨期间，美联储是否应该采取不同的利率政策？
Should they have raised rates to supposedly dampen the speculative fervor?
他们是否应该提高利率来抑制投机热情？
This, to me, is so interesting, and I so want to hear what you think about this.
对我来说，这非常有趣，我很想听听您对此的看法。
I actually was thinking about you at one point when I was writing this book, because if you go back and read the diaries of some of the board members of the Fed during this period, two things became apparent.
事实上，当我写这本书时，我曾一度想到过你，因为如果你回去阅读这一时期美联储一些董事会成员的日记，有两件事就会变得显而易见。
One is they were scarred by what they did in 1920–21 because they had raised interest rates, and they had been blamed for effectively upending the market and the economy briefly.
一是他们对 1920-21 年的所作所为感到伤痕累累，因为他们提高了利率，并因短暂地颠覆市场和经济而受到指责。
Of course, it came back, actually, quite quickly.
当然，实际上，它很快就回来了。
They were so new.
他们太新了。
The Fed had just been created in 1913.
美联储于 1913 年刚刚成立。
They used to sometimes call it an “experiment.” It was still an experiment to some of them, that I think that they were very anxious about the political ramifications.
他们有时称之为“实验”。对于他们中的一些人来说，这仍然是一个实验，我认为他们非常担心政治后果。
Benjamin Strong, who was no longer alive by 1929 — he passed away in 1928 — he used to write back in 1925 about the possibility of them getting hauled up in front of Congress and what that would mean if they did something that effectively turned the economy over.
本杰明·斯特朗 (Benjamin Strong) 已于 1929 年去世——“他于 1928 年去世”——他曾在 1925 年写信，谈论他们被拖到国会面前的可能性，以及如果他们做了一些有效扭转经济的事情，这意味着什么。
So, here we are in the spring of 1929.
现在，我们正处于 1929 年春天。
They know that speculation is getting out of control.
他们知道投机行为正在失控。
They desperately want to tamp it down.
他们拼命地想要压制它。
There’s a battle going on about whether to raise interest rates and by how much, but to the extent that they were talking about that, the view, I think, was that they would have to raise them so much that they had almost pretty much convinced themselves that to really tamp speculation down, you have to raise interest rates so much that you, by default, would tip the economy, and they didn’t have the courage to do that.
关于是否加息以及加息多少，正在进行一场争论，但就他们所谈论的程度而言，我认为他们的观点是，他们必须加息太多，以至于他们几乎说服自己，要真正抑制投机，你必须加息太多，默认情况下，你会扭转经济，但他们没有勇气这样做。
If I had been alive back then, I would have agreed with those people, correctly or not.
如果我当时还活着，我就会同意那些人的观点，不管正确与否。
I think that’s a pretty good argument.
我认为这是一个很好的论点。
The notion that 1920 to ’21 saw such a quick recovery — again, one would have been wrong, but the rational thing to have expected would be, once again, the same.
认为 1920 年至 21 年间经济复苏如此之快的观点——再一次，可能是错误的，但理性的预期是，再一次，是一样的。
It’s like, “Oh, let this crash, whatever.
就像是，“哦，让这次事故发生吧，无论如何。
We’ll come back in a year or two.” Now, ex post, you can always say exactly how it should have gone, but ex ante, that would have been my reasoning.
我们一两年后就会回来。”现在，事后，你总是可以准确地说出事情应该如何进行，但事前，这将是我的推理。
That may be, but I think there’re always two issues in a crisis.
也许是这样，但我认为危机中总是存在两个问题。
It’s can you prevent the crisis on the front end?
是你能预防前端的危机吗？
And then what do you do once you’re in a crisis on the back end?
那么一旦后端遇到危机你该怎么办？
It’s interesting that not only did they not choose to try to do something to prevent it, demonstrably, on the front end, and maybe you would have been very rational to have chosen not to do anything.
有趣的是，他们不仅没有选择在前端采取一些措施来阻止这种情况发生，而且也许你选择不做任何事情也是非常理性的。
But on the back end, when there was a debate about could you lower interest rates, flood the system with money?
但在后端，当人们争论是否可以降低利率，向系统注入大量资金？
Obviously, the gold standard comes into play there and becomes very complicated, but there were obviously discussions about moving off of that, and that would have ultimately been the right thing to do, and probably would have been the right thing to do earlier than they did.
显然，金本位在那里发挥作用并变得非常复杂，但显然有人讨论过放弃金本位，这最终是正确的事情，而且可能比他们更早做正确的事情。
For the most part, they sat on their hands.
大多数情况下，他们都坐在手上。
The good news is Ben Bernanke, I think, learned a lot of these lessons when he was doing his PhD at Princeton and took some of those lessons into the 2008 financial crisis, where he did decide to flood the system with money.
我认为，好消息是本·伯南克在普林斯顿大学攻读博士学位时学到了很多这些教训，并将其中一些教训带入了 2008 年金融危机，当时他确实决定向金融体系注入大量资金。
While politically, it might have been a problem insofar as there were a lot of questions about bailouts and what the Fed did in that context, I think on a practical economic basis, it worked.
虽然在政治上，这可能是一个问题，因为人们对救助以及美联储在这种情况下所做的事情存在很多疑问，但我认为在实际的经济基础上，它是有效的。
I think two things I would have done is, have something like deposit insurance to begin with, and then do what Sweden did and get off the gold standard as quickly as is necessary, and then, I think, it would have been quite a mild downturn had one done those two things.
我认为我会做的两件事是，一开始就有存款保险之类的东西，然后像瑞典那样，尽快摆脱金本位制，然后，我认为，如果有人做了这两件事，那将是一场相当温和的衰退。
And the Fed shouldn’t have to be worrying about what’s the right interest rate, because they don’t know, just like they don’t know now.
美联储不应该担心什么是合适的利率，因为他们不知道，就像他们现在不知道一样。
They cut rates again as we’re speaking, what?
在我们说话的时候他们再次降息，什么？
It was yesterday.
那是昨天。
Some people think there is speculative fervor in the stock market.
有人认为股市存在投机热情。
This is debatable, but it might be true, and they’re cutting rates?
这是有争议的，但这可能是真的，而且他们正在降息？
I don’t think they know.
我认为他们不知道。
I’ll just go back to 1929 for a second in terms of, had there been bank capital requirements, for example, that would have changed some of this dynamic.
我想回顾一下 1929 年，例如，如果存在银行资本要求，这将会改变这种动态。
Had there been restrictions on margin loans and maybe the amount of leverage people could capture.
如果对保证金贷款以及人们可以获得的杠杆数额进行限制的话。
People were walking into brokerage houses all over the country, which had sprung up like Starbucks on the corners, and you’d give them $1 and they’d give you $10.
人们走进全国各地的经纪公司，这些经纪公司像街角的星巴克一样涌现，你给他们 1 美元，他们会给你 10 美元。
I always wondered to myself, had somebody just stood up and said, “We’re not doing that anymore.” “Two to one, three to one — we’re good with that.
我总是想知道，是否有人站起来说：“我们不再这样做了。” “二对一，三对一——我们对此很擅长。
After that, this is not allowed.”
在那之后，这是不允许的。”
By the way, Carter Glass — in this book, he’s trying to impose a tax on trades.
顺便说一句，卡特·格拉斯（Carter Glass）——在这本书中，他试图对交易征税。
I’m not saying any or all of these things would have prevented it, but possibly there were measures you could have taken, and for lots of reasons, obviously, they weren’t.
我并不是说任何或所有这些事情都会阻止它，但你可能可以采取一些措施，但出于很多原因，显然，它们没有采取。
It’s hard to know how much to restrict credit, especially in a time when people are realizing the future will be much wealthier, because then, borrowing makes sense.
很难知道要在多大程度上限制信贷，尤其是在人们意识到未来会更加富裕的时候，因为那时借贷才有意义。
I’ve had plenty of mortgages on houses, where the value of the debt was relatively high compared to my academic income.
我有很多房屋抵押贷款，与我的学术收入相比，这些债务的价值相对较高。
But I thought, well, my career will get better.
但我想，好吧，我的事业会变得更好。
It did.
确实如此。
It worked out.
成功了。
I might have been wrong.
我可能错了。
But simply with deposit insurance or something like that, the money supply doesn’t collapse in the sense that Friedman pointed his finger at.
但只要有了存款保险或类似的东西，货币供应量就不会像弗里德曼所指的那样崩溃。
You probably have a recession, but I just think you get through it and the exchange rate floats.
你可能会经历经济衰退，但我只是认为你能度过难关，汇率就会浮动。
You have no international transmission of deflationary pressures.
通货紧缩压力没有国际传导。
Again, things are fine and you leave the credit market alone.
再说一次，一切都很好，你不用管信贷市场了。
I’m not opposed to bank capital requirements, but I don’t know how much capital these small, often non-branched banks could have raised in that environment, so I don’t think that’s the best answer.
我并不反对银行资本要求，但我不知道这些小型、通常无分支机构的银行在这种环境下可以筹集多少资本，所以我认为这不是最好的答案。
Interestingly, Carter Glass and Hoover, and by the way, even Roosevelt did not want to implement the FDIC.
有趣的是，卡特·格拉斯和胡佛，顺便说一句，甚至罗斯福也不想实施 FDIC。
This idea of deposit insurance was super unpopular — both Republicans and Democrats — because they believed that it was going to effectively allow banks to almost become too big to fail in the context that you would basically be supporting everybody, and those that were weaker were going to have the same kind of support that the strong banks had.
这种存款保险的想法非常不受欢迎——“无论是共和党还是民主党”——因为他们相信，这将有效地让银行几乎变得太大而不能倒，因为你基本上会支持所有人，而那些较弱的银行将获得与实力雄厚的银行相同的支持。
The other thing I was going to mention is, we all live with debt today as if it’s water.
我要提到的另一件事是，今天我们都生活在债务之中，就像水一样。
It’s part of our system.
它是我们系统的一部分。
Prior to 1920, 1919, it was a moral sin for many Americans to take on debt.
1920 年和 1919 年之前，对许多美国人来说，负债是一种道德罪恶。
People didn’t do that.
人们没有这样做。
You were sort of the dregs of the universe if you were a debt holder.
如果你是一个债主，那么你就是宇宙中的渣滓。
That really shifted, I think, in 1919 when John Raskob, who was running General Motors at the time, wanted more people to buy cars.
我认为，这种情况真正发生了转变，是在 1919 年，当时通用汽车公司的负责人约翰·拉斯科布 (John Raskob) 希望更多的人购买汽车。
He said, “How are we going to get people to buy more cars?
他说：“我们如何让人们购买更多汽车？
We’re going to lend them the money to buy the cars.” That really shifted the mindset around debt.
我们将借钱给他们买汽车。”这确实改变了人们对债务的看法。
That’s why I think this whole period in the 1920s is such a remarkable decade, because it really was a shift in the way we did everything that, in so many ways, actually represents how we live today.
这就是为什么我认为 20 年代的整个时期是一个非凡的十年，因为这确实是我们做事方式的转变，在很多方面实际上代表了我们今天的生活方式。
Keep in mind, when I say something like deposit insurance, I mean that quite literally.
请记住，当我说存款保险之类的东西时，我的意思是字面意思。
Quite late into the 20th century, a lot of European nations — they don’t have formal deposit insurance.
进入 20 世纪末期，许多欧洲国家 ——他们还没有正式的存款保险。
They have the equivalent of it through different kinds of bank bailouts.
他们通过不同类型的银行救助获得了同等的资金。
They make sure depositors are made whole.
他们确保储户获得完整。
The kind of explicit numerical commitment that the FDIC made, say, even Germany thought was a bad idea until relatively recently, so Roosevelt was not as crazy as he sounded.
联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）做出的那种明确的数字承诺，直到最近，连德国都认为是一个坏主意，所以罗斯福并不像他听起来那么疯狂。
But if you simply have some kind of bank lending and recapitalization program so the money supply doesn’t go bust, that would have been good enough, whether or not it’s exactly the FDIC, at least in my opinion.
但如果你只是有某种银行贷款和资本重组计划，这样货币供应就不会崩溃，那就足够了，不管它是否正是 FDIC，至少在我看来。
On Glass-Steagall
论格拉斯-斯蒂格尔
How is it that, that you were influenced by Alex Tabarrok on Glass-Steagall?
你是如何受到《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》中亚历克斯·塔巴罗克（Alex Tabarrok）的影响的？
I saw that in the notes to your book.
我在你的书的注释中看到了这一点。
Alex and I are co-bloggers, of course, but I’m curious what the exact transmission is.
当然，亚历克斯和我是共同博主，但我很好奇确切的传输是什么。
The transmission was that, as I was really trying to get underneath the construction of the Glass-Steagall bill — this is the bill that was passed in 1933 to effectively break up the banks, the casino side of the bank from the commercial side of the bank.
传达的信息是，我确实想深入了解《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》的结构——这是 1933 年通过的法案，旨在有效地拆分银行，将银行的赌场部分与银行的商业部分分开。
This is what ultimately leads, for example, J.P.
这就是最终导致 J.P.
Morgan to spin off one of its units to become what turns out to be Morgan Stanley in 1935.
1935 年，摩根公司剥离其一个部门，成立了摩根士丹利 (Morgan Stanley)。
I wanted to really understand how that bill was constructed.
我想真正了解该法案是如何制定的。
You would often hear from people like Elizabeth Warren and others about this bill in 2008, which, of course, was upended in the Clinton administration, being responsible for the fact that we even had a crisis.
你经常会听到伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）等人谈论 2008 年的这项法案，当然，该法案在克林顿政府中被推翻，导致我们甚至陷入了危机。
I was trying to really get under the covers of that story and the story of Carter Glass.
我试图真正了解这个故事和卡特·格拉斯的故事。
As I was doing that, I was fascinated to learn that the Glass-Steagall bill was not as pure as I think most people in the public thought it really was.
当我这样做时，我很着迷地发现格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案并不像我认为大多数公众认为的那样纯粹。
It was not that he, unto himself, had decided that this bill was going to look very much like the bill that was put in place in 1933.
这并不是说他自己认为该法案将与 1933 年实施的法案非常相似。
In fact, to some degree, the bill was as corrupted as ever.
事实上，在某种程度上，该法案一如既往地腐败。
Parts of the bill were ultimately written by effectively a member of the Rockefeller family who owned Chase, and it was done in large part to shiv, if you will, J.P.
该法案的部分内容最终实际上是由拥有大通银行的洛克菲勒家族成员撰写的，如果你愿意的话，它在很大程度上是为了消灭 J.P.
Morgan, its competitor.
摩根，它的竞争对手。
Your fellow blogger did some remarkable work and wrote a paper about a bit of this, and it turned out to be a fabulous treasure map for me.
你的博主同事做了一些出色的工作，并写了一篇关于其中一些内容的论文，结果对我来说这是一张神话般的藏宝图。
As I went back to try to excavate some of the archival material — letters, and other things — to really get underneath this, it actually led me to find some fascinating stories about the fact that Carter Glass was not really interested in breaking up banks like J.P.
当我回去尝试挖掘一些档案材料（信件和其他东西）以真正了解这一点时，它实际上让我发现了一些有趣的故事，说明卡特·格拉斯（Carter Glass）对拆分像 J.P. 那样的银行并不真正感兴趣。
Morgan at all.
摩根根本就没有。
In fact, it sided so dearly with J.P.
事实上，它非常支持 J.P.
Morgan, and some people thought that he was in the pocket of the bankers, in fact.
摩根，有些人认为他确实落入了银行家的口袋里。
The whole Glass-Steagall Act seems like a big mistake to me.
整个《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》对我来说似乎是一个大错误。
There’s that paper by Raghuram Rajan — I think it’s 1994 — with Kroszner, where they show the whole conflict-of-interest story was never supported by the data.
Raghuram Rajan 和 Kroszner 撰写的论文（我想那是 1994 年），他们在论文中表明，整个利益冲突故事从未得到数据的支持。
It was basically imagined.
基本上都是想象出来的。
They ran this with controls.
他们通过控制来运行这个。
There’s a later paper by Kroszner and Raghu that shows the same.
Kroszner 和 Raghu 后来发表的一篇论文也表明了同样的观点。
Shouldn’t we just say that was a bad idea based on mistakes?
难道我们不应该因为错误而说这是一个坏主意吗？
Well, look, I have never been convinced by the argument that Glass-Steagall somehow saved us, either saved the banking system or would have saved the banking system in 2008 either.
好吧，听着，我从来不相信格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案以某种方式拯救了我们，要么拯救了银行系统，要么在 2008 年拯救了银行系统。
When you go back and look at the banks that failed first in 2008 — Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns — none of them would have come under the Glass-Steagall bill to begin with.
当你回过头来看看 2008 年首先倒闭的银行时——“雷曼兄弟、贝尔斯登”——他们本来就不会受到格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案的影响。
Now, maybe later down the domino line, when you start to think of Citigroup and Bank of America and some of the others that ran into trouble, you could argue the Glass-Steagall might have made things marginally better, but I never took the position as a reporter writing this and analyzing this at that time.
现在，也许在多米诺骨牌上，当你开始想到花旗集团和美国银行以及其他一些陷入困境的银行时，你可能会说格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案可能会让事情稍微好一点，但我当时从未以记者的身份撰写本文并进行分析。
I remember actually getting into a great debate with Elizabeth Warren about this very topic.
我记得实际上我和伊丽莎白·沃伦就这个话题进行了一场激烈的辩论。
On what else is interesting about the 1920s
关于 20 年代还有哪些有趣的事情
I have a few general questions about the 1920s.
我有几个关于 20 年代的一般性问题。
Obviously, you did an enormous amount of work for this book.
显然，您为这本书做了大量的工作。
Putting aside the Great Crash and the focus of your book, what is it you learned about the 1920s more generally that most surprised you?
撇开大崩盘和你书中的重点不谈，你对 20 年代的普遍了解最令你惊讶的是什么？
Because you learn all this collateral information when you write a book like this, right?
因为当你写这样的书时你会学到所有这些附带信息，对吗？
So many things.
这么多的事情。
The book turned into a bit of a love letter to New York in terms of the architecture of New York.
就纽约的建筑而言，这本书有点像一封写给纽约的情书。
I don’t think I appreciated just how many buildings went up in New York and how they were constructed and what happened.
我不认为我了解纽约有多少建筑物、它们是如何建造的以及发生了什么。
That fascinated me.
这让我着迷。
I think the story of John Raskob, actually, who was, to me, the Elon Musk of his time, somebody who ran General Motors, became a super influential investor.
我认为约翰·拉斯科布（John Raskob）的故事实际上对我来说是他那个时代的埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk），是通用汽车的经营者，后来成为了一位超级有影响力的投资者。
He was a philosopher king that everybody listened to at every given moment.
他是一位哲学家之王，每个人在每个特定时刻都在聆听他的观点。
He ultimately constructs the Empire State Building, which was probably the equivalent of SpaceX at that time.
他最终建造了帝国大厦，这可能相当于当时的 SpaceX。
He had written a paper about creating a five-day workweek back in 1929, November, as all of this is happening.
早在 1929 年 11 月，当这一切发生时，他就写了一篇关于创建每周工作五天的论文。
Not because he wanted people to work less and be nice to them, but because he thought there was an economic argument that if people didn’t have to work on Saturdays, more people would buy cars and gardening equipment, and do all sorts of things on the weekends, and buy different outfits and clothing.
并不是因为他希望人们减少工作并善待他们，而是因为他认为存在一个经济论据，即如果人们不必在周六工作，更多的人会购买汽车和园艺设备，并在周末做各种事情，并购买不同的服装和衣服。
There were so many little things.
有很多小事。
Then, I would argue, actually, his role in taking his fortune — he got involved in politics.
然后，我实际上会争辩说，他在夺取财富方面所扮演的角色——“他参与了政治”。
He was a Republican turned Democrat.
他是一名共和党人，后来变成了民主党人。
He spent an extraordinary amount of money to secretly try to undermine the reputation of Hoover.
他花费巨额资金暗中试图破坏胡佛的声誉。
I would say to you, today, I actually think that part of the reason that Hoover’s reputation is so dim, even today, is a result of this very influential, wealthy individual in America who spent two years paying off journalists and running this secret campaign to do such a thing.
我今天要对你们说，我实际上认为胡佛的声誉即使在今天仍然如此黯淡的部分原因是这个美国非常有影响力的富有的人的结果，他花了两年的时间贿赂记者并开展这场秘密运动来做这样的事情。
You go back and really read the press and try to understand why some of these views were espoused.
你回去认真阅读新闻并尝试理解为什么其中一些观点受到拥护。
By the way, this was before the crash.
顺便说一下，这是事故发生之前的情况。
He started this campaign effectively in May of 1929, just three months after Hoover took office.
他于 1929 年 5 月有效地开始了这场竞选活动，即胡佛上任三个月后。
It’s striking to me how forgotten Raskob is today.
令我惊讶的是，拉斯科布今天被遗忘得如此之多。
There’s a lesson in there about people who think they’re doing something today that will be remembered in a hundred years’ time.
其中有一个教训是关于那些认为自己今天所做的事情将在一百年后被人们记住的人。
It probably won’t be, even if you’re a big, big deal.
即使你是个大人物，也可能不会。
It’s remarkable.
这很了不起。
He was a very big deal.
他是个大人物。
He famously used to tell everybody, “Everybody ought to be rich.” He was trying to develop, back then, what would have been something akin to one of the first mutual funds, levered mutual funds, in fact, because he also wanted to democratize finance.
他曾对所有人说过一句名言：“每个人都应该富有。”当时，他正试图开发类似于最早的共同基金之一的东西，事实上，杠杆共同基金，因为他也想实现金融民主化。
Let’s say you’re back in New York.
假设您回到纽约。
It’s the 1920s; you’re you.
现在是 20 年代；你就是你。
Other than walking around and looking at buildings, what else would you do back then?
那时候除了走走看看建筑，你还会做什么？
I would go to jazz concerts.
我会去听爵士音乐会。
What would you do?
你会怎么办？
Oh my goodness.
哦，我的天啊。
You know what I would do?
你知道我会做什么吗？
But I’m a journalista, so you’ll appreciate this.
但我是一名记者，所以你会欣赏这一点。
Yes.
是的。
I would have been obsessed with magazines.
我会沉迷于杂志。
This was really the first real era of magazines and newspapers and the transmission of media, the sort of mass media in this way.
这确实是第一个真正的杂志、报纸和媒体传播的时代，即大众媒体。
I would have been fascinated by radio.
我会对广播着迷。
I think those things, for me, would have been super exciting.
我认为这些事情对我来说会非常令人兴奋。
The truth is, I imagine I would have gotten caught up in the pastime of stock trading.
事实上，我想我会陷入股票交易的消遣之中。
It is true that all these brokerage houses are just emerging everywhere, and people are going to play them as if it’s a pastime.
确实，所有这些经纪公司都在各地兴起，人们会把它们当作一种消遣。
I always wonder whether prohibition played a role in why so many people were speculating because instead of drinking, what did they do?
我总是想知道禁令是否在为什么这么多人猜测中发挥了作用，因为他们没有喝酒，而是做了什么？
They traded.
他们进行了交易。
On business leaders then and now
关于当时和现在的商业领袖
Sure.
当然。
How were business leaders different back then from the current crop?
当时的商界领袖与现在的商界领袖有何不同？
Clearly, in many, many ways, but what stands out to you, as someone who knows a lot of top business leaders now and who has studied very intensively top business leaders back then?
显然，在很多很多方面，但是作为一个现在认识很多顶级商业领袖并且在当时对顶级商业领袖进行过深入研究的人，什么对你来说是最突出的呢？
Oh goodness, I actually think they’re very similar.
哦天哪，我真的认为它们非常相似。
I actually think they’re shockingly similar.
我实际上认为它们惊人地相似。
Here I am saying that John Raskob feels like Elon Musk.
我在这里想说的是，约翰·拉斯科布（John Raskob）感觉就像埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）。
I think that so many of these individuals feel like modern-day characters.
我认为这些人中有很多人都感觉像是现代人物。
Charlie Mitchell, who ran National City, which becomes Citigroup.
查理·米切尔 (Charlie Mitchell)，他经营纳欣诺城 (National City)，后来成为花旗集团 (Citigroup)。
Charlie was the equivalent of a Jamie Dimon of his time, but maybe looks more akin to a Jensen Huang in terms of just his sunny disposition towards everything all the time.
查理相当于他那个时代的杰米·戴蒙（Jamie Dimon），但就他始终对一切事物的阳光态度而言，也许看起来更像黄仁勋。
I think they’re still driven by the same things, which is, at some level, I’ve always thought that people are driven by an insecurity, a FOMO, a YOLO kind of a hole that they’re all trying to fill.
我认为他们仍然受到相同的事物的驱动，也就是说，在某种程度上，我一直认为人们是被不安全感、FOMO、YOLO 之类的他们都试图填补的漏洞所驱动。
Money is just one example of how they measure it all.
金钱只是他们衡量一切的方式之一。
I don’t think that they’re all that different, in fact.
事实上，我认为它们并没有那么不同。
Do you think they’re even more woke today?
你认为他们今天更清醒了吗？
Are they even more woke today?
他们今天更加清醒了吗？
Or is that also the same, that there’s maybe the appearance of being more woke, but ultimately, attitudes on gender or race are more similar than one might think?
或者这也是一样的，也许表面上看起来更加清醒，但最终，对性别或种族的态度比人们想象的更相似？
Or not?
或不？
Oh goodness.
噢，天啊。
I’m struggling to relate the word wokeness to the 1920s.
我很难将“觉醒”这个词与 20 年代联系起来。
Interestingly, Carter Glass, who I think I told you before was sort of akin to an Elizabeth Warren — the truth is, he would have been a racist Elizabeth Warren because he was from Virginia.
有趣的是，卡特·格拉斯（Carter Glass），我想我之前告诉过你，有点类似于伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）——事实是，他可能是种族主义者伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren），因为他来自弗吉尼亚州。
He was trying to bring segregation back to America, in fact.
事实上，他试图将种族隔离带回美国。
I’m not sure how woke these CEOs were at the time.
我不确定这些首席执行官当时是怎么醒的。
The sort of upstairs-downstairs situation among the elites and the wealth in terms of where they lived and how they lived, and who worked for them and the various servants and others — I don’t think you’d think that they were that woke back then.
精英和财富之间的那种楼上楼下的情况，包括他们住在哪里、如何生活、谁为他们工作以及各种仆人和其他人 —— 我认为你不会认为他们是当时醒来的。
So that’s one difference.
所以这是一个区别。
Did they do philanthropy better?
他们的慈善事业做得更好吗？
You have the Morgan Library in New York, everything Carnegie did, which seems quite remarkable.
纽约有摩根图书馆，卡内基所做的一切，这看起来相当了不起。
Are today’s wealthy business leaders living up to that track record?
当今富有的商界领袖是否达到了这一记录？
Or somehow they’re failing to?
或者不知何故他们没有做到？
That’s a fascinating question, too.
这也是一个有趣的问题。
I think, first of all, a number of those people in the 1920s actually were not that philanthropic yet, and then, of course, lost so much of their fortune that they were really never in a position to be that philanthropic.
我认为，首先，20 年代的许多人实际上还没有那么慈善，然后，当然，他们失去了太多的财富，以至于他们实际上从来没有能力变得那么慈善。
I remember coming across an article as I was working on this book, with the headline — it was in 1929 — “Our Second Billionaire.” That was the title.
我记得在写这本书时看到过一篇文章，标题是 — 那是在 1929 年 — “我们的第二个亿万富翁”。这就是标题。
It was Henry Ford.
这是亨利·福特。
Our first billionaire was Rockefeller.
我们的第一位亿万富翁是洛克菲勒。
These are, of course, not inflation-adjusted figures.
当然，这些不是经过通货膨胀调整的数字。
These are real.
这些都是真实的。
I’m not sure that the actual leaders, whether it was a John Raskob or a Mitchell or any of those characters, frankly, were that philanthropic, in part because they were new money in the 1920s.
坦率地说，我不确定真正的领导人，无论是约翰·拉斯科布 (John Raskob)、米切尔 (Mitchell) 还是这些人物中的任何一个，是否那么慈善，部分原因是他们是 20 年代的新贵。
It was sort of a new thing, and they were not philanthropic yet.
这是一种新事物，而且他们还没有慈善事业。
Maybe they had ambitions at some point to become such, but then the crash happened, and most of them, frankly, lost it all, so I don’t know.
也许他们在某个时候有雄心壮志，但后来崩溃发生了，坦率地说，他们中的大多数人失去了一切，所以我不知道。
You look at, obviously, a Bill Gates — very philanthropic.
显然，你会看到比尔·盖茨（Bill Gates）——非常慈善。
Then you have people like Jeff Bezos, who’s engaged in some philanthropy, and Elon Musk.
还有像杰夫·贝佐斯（Jeff Bezos）这样的人，他从事一些慈善事业，还有埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）。
But both of those — Elon and Jeff Bezos — I think that they’re using their fortune to go to space.
但这两个人——埃隆和杰夫·贝索斯——我认为他们正在利用自己的财富去太空。
While that may turn out to be fabulous business in the end, we’ll see.
虽然这最终可能会成为一笔美妙的生意，但我们拭目以待。
I think they thought of it first, at least, as their own version of helping humanity.
我认为他们首先想到的至少是他们自己的帮助人类的版本。
I know there’re lots of people who have lots of different views of both Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos.
我知道有很多人对埃隆·马斯克和杰夫·贝佐斯有很多不同的看法。
Without speaking for them, I think if you actually talk to them, I remember talking to them years ago, that was at least the initial conceit, that they were helping humanity if they could do this.
在不代表他们说话的情况下，我想如果你真的和他们交谈，我记得几年前和他们交谈过，这至少是最初的想法，如果他们能做到这一点，他们就是在帮助人类。
On rethinking banking regulation
重新思考银行监管
Should we have allowed interstate branch banking back then?
那时我们应该允许州际分行银行业务吗？
The US essentially bans it.
美国基本上禁止它。
Canada has it.
加拿大有。
No Canadian banks fail in the Great Depression.
没有一家加拿大银行在大萧条中倒闭。
Couldn’t we have been in that position?
难道我们就不能处于那样的境地吗？
Oh, it’s sacrilegious to say in America, but if it was left to me, if I was king for the day, I would consolidate most of the banks and make the country look much more like the Canadian banking system.
哦，在美国这样说是亵渎的，但如果留给我，如果我是今天的国王，我会整合大部分银行，让这个国家看起来更像加拿大的银行体系。
I think it is slightly insane that we have allowed local banking to happen at the scale that we do because I do think it presents a risk to the system that’s likely unnecessary.
我认为我们允许本地银行业务以我们的规模发展有点疯狂，因为我确实认为这给系统带来了可能不必要的风险。
I’ve never fully jumped on board with the argument that these local banks can serve their communities so much better than the larger banks.
我从来没有完全同意这些本地银行可以比大型银行更好地为社区服务的论点。
But I also recognize, as you do get banking consolidation and the like, that there will be communities that probably will be underserved.
但我也认识到，当你确实进行银行整合等时，将会有一些社区可能得不到充分的服务。
So, the question is, is there a way to thread that needle to do both?
那么，问题是，有没有一种方法可以同时实现这两个目的？
Let’s say we make you king for 10 years today.
假设今天我们让您成为国王 10 年。
How would you change US banking regulation?
您将如何改变美国银行业监管？
Ooh goodness.
哦天哪。
I probably actually would do just what I said.
我可能实际上会按照我说的去做。
I think that I would probably have more consolidation in the banking space, but as a result of that, I would probably also force some of those banks to effectively serve communities and provide loans and other things that they would otherwise not provide.
我认为我可能会在银行领域进行更多整合，但因此，我可能还会迫使其中一些银行有效地服务社区并提供贷款和其他他们本来不会提供的东西。
Then, of course, I’m sure that you and others would say, “But Andrew, if you put together these types of policies to do things that would otherwise be economically irrational things or things that we can’t conceive of will happen.” I would probably struggle in that regard.
然后，当然，我确信你和其他人会说，“但是安德鲁，如果你把这些类型的政策放在一起来做一些事情，否则经济上不合理的事情或我们无法想象的事情就会发生。”我可能会在这方面挣扎。
What would you do?
你会怎么办？
Well, I’m not sure, but let me first point out, there’s been a lot of consolidation since 2009.
好吧，我不确定，但我首先要指出的是，自 2009 年以来已经进行了大量整合。
There’re hardly any new banks.
几乎没有新银行。
One of them is an Amish bank.
其中之一是阿米什银行。
Very small number of new banks.
新银行数量极少。
The too big to fail doctrine has crowded a lot of deposits into the four biggest banks.
“太大而不能倒”的原则使大量存款挤入四大银行。
Given where we ended up, maybe that’s inevitable, but you want even more consolidation than that?
考虑到我们最终的结果，也许这是不可避免的，但您想要更多的整合吗？
I don’t think I need huge amounts of consolidation to do that, but I think that you look at Silicon Valley Bank as a good example or Signature Bank as a good example of what happens in an environment where you have smaller banks doing things that aren’t necessarily the right things without the backstop that you’d prefer.
我认为我不需要大量的整合来做到这一点，但我认为你可以将硅谷银行视为一个很好的例子，或者将签名银行视为一个很好的例子，说明在小银行做的事情不一定是正确的事情而没有你喜欢的支持的环境中会发生什么。
Now, you could argue that the government turned out to be the backstop.
现在，你可能会说政府实际上是支持者。
The FDIC turned out to be the backstop, and it worked, so maybe we’re in a good position.
事实证明，联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）成为了后盾，并且发挥了作用，所以也许我们处于有利地位。
The other thing, though, that I do worry about — and I’d also be very curious about where you land — is we now are living in a very bifurcated world as it relates to the loan market and credit market in America, which is, really, post–financial crisis 2008.
不过，我确实担心的另一件事————而且我也很好奇你会走向何方————我们现在生活在一个非常分裂的世界，因为它与美国的贷款市场和信贷市场有关，而美国实际上是 2008 年金融危机后的市场。
The private credit business has just exploded.
私人信贷业务刚刚爆发。
If you’re a company seeking credit, you’re oftentimes not getting it from the bank.
如果您是一家寻求信贷的公司，您通常无法从银行获得信贷。
You’re getting it from, effectively, the shadow banking system.
实际上，你是从影子银行系统获得的。
Some of that shadow banking system is attached to the insurance industry in certain ways.
部分影子银行体系以某种方式附属于保险业。
Potentially, it presents all sorts of risks that I’m not sure we all understand.
它可能会带来各种各样的风险，我不确定我们都理解这些风险。
I agree with that.
我同意这一点。
This is my biggest worry.
这是我最大的担心。
I don’t think I know how to solve it.
我想我不知道如何解决它。
Formal banks are about 20 percent of lending, so 80 percent is other stuff.
正规银行大约占贷款的 20%，所以 80% 是其他东西。
It’s regulated in other ways, but it’s not protected by what we would consider our core regulatory structures, and the more you impose capital requirements on banks — FDIC premia, other regulations — you just make that smaller.
它受到其他方式的监管，但它不受我们所认为的核心监管结构的保护，而且你对银行施加的资本要求越多 —— FDIC 溢价、其他监管 ——你只会让它变得更小。
It’s already trending downwards.
已经呈下降趋势。
That’s why I’m reluctant to induce these banks to do more local community lending.
这就是为什么我不愿意引导这些银行为当地社区提供更多贷款。
Ideally, you’d like, maybe, the banking system to shrink more slowly than what it’s doing.
理想情况下，你也许希望银行系统的收缩速度比现在慢。
The stuff you have left — I don’t think you can insure it, really.
你留下的东西 —— 我认为你不能为它投保，真的。
You hope it’s well enough capitalized.
你希望它资本充足。
You can’t bail out everything.
你无法挽救一切。
I don’t think we have any idea what to do about it.
我认为我们不知道该怎么办。
What’s your thought on that dilemma?
你对这个困境有何看法？
This is probably my biggest concern, and I just don’t know what the inflection point would be that could turn it into a problem in a demonstrable way.
这可能是我最关心的问题，我只是不知道什么拐点会以明显的方式将其变成一个问题。
I don’t fully appreciate or understand how connected we think the private credit funds are to the banks themselves.
我并不完全理解或理解我们认为私人信贷基金与银行本身之间的联系有多么紧密。
Some of these funds are effectively leveraged by dint of the banks.
其中一些资金通过银行有效地杠杆化。
Some of them have liquidity lines back to the banks.
其中一些有流动性额度返回银行。
You could argue that the private credit funds should be less risky insofar as there’s a better duration match around those loans.
你可能会说，私人信贷基金的风险应该较小，因为这些贷款的期限匹配更好。
They’re not going to be called by the day.
他们不会在那天被召唤。
You know when they’re going to be called in, hopefully five or ten years or whatever the length of the fund and the loans are, but if it all comes undone at one moment, what happens?
你知道他们什么时候会被召集起来，希望是五年或十年，或者无论基金和贷款的期限有多长，但如果这一切突然全部取消，会发生什么？
That’s like a horror movie to me, but I don’t know the script of that movie or what that book would read like at the moment.
这对我来说就像一部恐怖电影，但我不知道那部电影的剧本，也不知道那本书现在读起来是什么样的。
John Cochrane wants more narrow banks.
约翰·科克伦希望银行规模更小。
Do you agree or disagree with him?
你同意还是不同意他的观点？
It depends.
这取决于。
How would you define more narrow banks?
您如何定义更狭义的银行？
Something like near 100 percent backing with either T-bills or very high-quality commercial paper.
比如接近 100% 的国库券或高质量商业票据的支持。
Well, here’s a different question.
嗯，这是一个不同的问题。
If you do that, what happens to credit in America?
如果你这样做，美国的信贷会发生什么变化？
It dries up at some local points, right?
它在某些地方已经干涸了，对吗？
Right.
正确的。
I think you and I would both agree that credit is the lifeblood of the system.
我想你和我都会同意信用是体系的命脉。
By the way, you want some speculation in the system, going back to where we started this conversation.
顺便说一句，您希望在系统中进行一些猜测，回到我们开始对话的地方。
You need speculation in the system to create that innovation.
你需要对系统进行推测才能创造创新。
I’m not here to tell you that you don’t want that.
我来这里不是为了告诉你你不想要那样。
The question is how do you prevent it from becoming euphoria and crazy and too much?
问题是你如何防止它变得欣快、疯狂和过度？
Now, as you know, through the GENIUS Act, we’re going to run stablecoins through what are, in essence, narrow banks.
现在，如您所知，通过《天才法案》，我们将通过本质上是狭义银行来运营稳定币。
Good idea, bad idea?
好主意，坏主意？
Or should we just let them hold all sorts of other assets and be riskier?
或者我们应该让他们持有各种其他资产并承担更大的风险？
This is a great question.
这是一个很好的问题。
I do worry that, because the stablecoins are going to require the backing of these Treasury bills, that effectively you’re taking that out of the market, which means less credit to the system ultimately, but the alternative also feels risky.
我确实担心，因为稳定币将需要这些国库券的支持，所以实际上你会将其从市场中剔除，这意味着最终对系统的信贷减少，但替代方案也感觉有风险。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
It seems like two choices.
看起来有两个选择。
It’s not a Hobson’s choice.
这不是霍布森的选择。
It’s just a difficult choice.
这只是一个艰难的选择。
I imagine over time that we will loosen those standards.
我想随着时间的推移，我们会放松这些标准。
That’s what I imagine.
这就是我的想象。
I imagine this is the first baby step so that people can say these stablecoins are safe, and then over time, we will maybe shift gears slightly.
我想这是第一步，让人们可以说这些稳定币是安全的，然后随着时间的推移，我们可能会稍微改变方向。
What do you think?
你怎么认为？
I think I agree with that, and it will be necessary.
我想我同意这一点，而且这是必要的。
Even with high debt and deficits, there’s only so many T-bills to go around, and we want to use them for everything So, does the rest of the world.
即使债务和赤字很高，可供流通的国库券也只有这么多，我们想用它们来做一切事情，世界其他地方也是如此。
You don’t want to get into T-bills paying a rate of zero.
你不想购买利率为零的国库券。
The real economy is intrinsically risky for obvious reasons, and financial engineering can only make it so much safer.
出于显而易见的原因，实体经济本质上存在风险，而金融工程只能让它变得更加安全。
That’s the ultimate dilemma.
这是最终的困境。
It seems to me New Deal banking regulation is finally truly obsolete, and we just don’t know what to replace it with.
在我看来，新政银行监管终于真正过时了，我们只是不知道用什么来取代它。
Okay, I got one for you.
好的，我给你准备了一份。
Talking about the GENIUS Act, what do you think of the idea that we’re going to have private credit and venture capital and private equity funds effectively in either retirement accounts or available to retail investors without the commensurate or similar disclosures that we’ve typically had for publicly traded companies, so these are going to be funds that are going to have private assets in them.
谈到《天才法案》，您如何看待这样的想法：我们将在退休账户中有效地拥有私人信贷、风险资本和私募股权基金，或者向散户投资者开放，而无需我们通常对上市公司进行相应或类似的披露，因此这些基金将拥有私人资产。
They’ll have a NAV, a valuation ostensibly — at least in my mind, unfortunately — being measured by the manager of these funds, so I would like to see more disclosure personally and auditing and the like.
他们会有资产净值，表面上的估值——不幸的是，至少在我看来是由这些基金的经理衡量的，所以我希望看到更多的个人披露和审计等。
But there are also going to be these interesting semi-liquid funds, which is to say, it’s going to look like a stock.
但也会有这些有趣的半流动基金，也就是说，它看起来像股票。
You could buy it on any day, but it’s not clear you could sell it on any day.
你可以在任何一天购买它，但不清楚你可以在任何一天出售它。
I think it’s inevitable, and if I invest, which I do only at very modest, diversified, non-stock picking levels, I don’t consider the disclosures to be worth very much at all.
我认为这是不可避免的，如果我只在非常适度、多元化、非选股的水平上进行投资，我认为这些披露根本没有什么价值。
I have some faith in diversifying, and I think markets are not entirely efficient, but to throw darts and diversify, you’ll do almost as well as you can do any other way.
我对多元化有一定的信心，而且我认为市场并不完全有效，但要投掷飞镖和多元化，你几乎会做得和任何其他方式一样好。
We let people bet on football games, right?
我们让人们投注足球比赛，对吧？
A lot of people now are going broke with sports gambling.
现在很多人因体育赌博而破产。
So, to tell people, well, you can bet on football games or you can buy Bitcoin, which at least used to be super volatile, but you can’t own shares in these funds because they don’t meet some — what is obscure to the voter — SEC requirement about disclosure and liquidity.
所以，告诉人们，你可以赌足球比赛，也可以购买比特币，比特币至少在过去波动性很大，但你不能持有这些基金的股票，因为它们不符合一些 —— 选民难以理解的东西 ——SEC关于披露和流动性的要求。
People think you’re crazy, right?
人们认为你疯了，对吧？
Over time, I think that distinction goes away.
随着时间的推移，我认为这种区别会消失。
Yes, but I’ll tell you something interesting that happened to me, and maybe, I don’t know if you’ve had a similar experience.
是的，但是我会告诉你一些发生在我身上的有趣的事情，也许，我不知道你是否有过类似的经历。
In 2020, there was a real phenomenon around SPACs.
2020年，SPAC出现了一个真实的现象。
You remember these blank-check companies?
你还记得这些空白支票公司吗？
Yes.
是的。
Everybody was excited about SPACs.
每个人都对 SPAC 感到兴奋。
They were the new lottery ticket, and I would go on television or write articles almost in a paternalistic way and say, “Folks, be careful.
它们是新的彩票，我几乎以一种家长式的方式上电视或写文章说：“伙计们，要小心。
You may not understand what the sponsors are really getting, the fee structure, what the alignment — or frankly, lack of alignment — was between the promoters of these things and actually the duration which they have to hold them relative to how long you’ll have to hold them, and some of the projections that they’re making, and all these things.”
你可能不明白赞助商真正得到了什么，费用结构，这些东西的发起者之间的一致性——或者坦率地说，缺乏一致性——以及他们必须持有这些东西的持续时间相对于你必须持有它们的时间，以及他们所做的一些预测，以及所有这些东西。”
People would say to me, “Andrew, stop trying to protect me.
人们会对我说：“安德鲁，别再试图保护我了。
I want to buy the lottery ticket, and by the way, you’re not protecting me.
我想买彩票，顺便说一句，你没有保护我。
You’re protecting the man by saying these things.”
你说这些话是在保护这个人。”
And the truth is that they were like lottery tickets in that most lottery players lose.
事实是，它们就像彩票一样，大多数彩票玩家都输了。
So, I recognize that people should have access to the lottery ticket.
所以，我认识到人们应该能够获得彩票。
I get that.
我明白了。
By the way, I often buy lottery tickets, as crazy as that sounds, especially when it’s like Super Powerball, and it’s a billion dollars or something.
顺便说一句，我经常买彩票，这听起来很疯狂，尤其是像超级强力球这样的，而且是十亿美元之类的。
I feel like an idiot that I’m doing it, but I do it anyway because it’s a dollar to dream.
我觉得自己这样做就像个白痴，但我还是这么做了，因为这是梦想的一美元。
But I don’t know what the right answer is in this regard.
但我不知道这方面的正确答案是什么。
You’re making an argument that we don’t need the disclosures, or the disclosures are unimportant, at least on the margin, and I’m concerned that if people don’t understand what’s going on inside these things, they’re going to buy the lottery ticket, and they’re going to lose.
你的论点是我们不需要披露，或者披露并不重要，至少在边际上是这样，我担心如果人们不了解这些事情的内部情况，他们就会买彩票，他们就会输。
I think we need stronger social norms that any new thing, whether it’s sports gambling or something in crypto or whatever, it is gambling of some sort.
我认为我们需要更强有力的社会规范，任何新事物，无论是体育赌博还是加密货币或其他什么东西，都是某种形式的赌博。
People just have to realize that and that we’re going to let people twist in the wind, so to speak.
人们必须意识到这一点，可以这么说，我们会让人们在风中扭曲。
I don’t know any other way to do it.
我不知道还有什么其他方法可以做到这一点。
You’re like Andrew Mellon, Tyler.
你就像安德鲁·梅隆，泰勒。
You’re like Andrew Mellon.
你就像安德鲁·梅隆。
Yes, but there’re so many risky things.
是的，但是有很多危险的事情。
You can’t stop them.
你无法阻止他们。
They’ll go overseas if they have to.
如果有必要，他们会去海外。
Crypto has done that, would do that, could do that.
加密货币已经做到了这一点，将会做到这一点，也可以做到这一点。
I don’t see what the alternative is.
我不知道还有什么选择。
I’m not opposed to these disclosure laws.
我并不反对这些披露法。
I just don’t think that extending them to more parts of the economy is going to make us safer.
我只是不认为将它们扩展到经济的更多领域会让我们更安全。
How do you feel about prediction markets?
您对预测市场有何看法？
People are not just gambling on who’s going to be the next mayor of New York City.
人们不仅仅是在赌博谁将成为纽约市下一任市长。
They’re gambling on where Taylor Swift and Travis Kelce are going to get married.
他们正在赌博泰勒·斯威夫特和特拉维斯·凯尔斯将在哪里结婚。
I can’t figure out whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing.
我不知道这是好事还是坏事。
It’s one way to spread the norm that anything new in finance is like gambling.
这是传播“金融领域的任何新事物都像赌博”这一规范的一种方式。
Treat it as gambling; assume that it is money you are willing to lose.
将其视为赌博；假设这是您愿意损失的钱。
That’s what I would do, just as a matter of stated policy.
这就是我要做的，就像既定政策一样。
You need the private sector to cooperate more, but the government can take some role in simply spreading this message.
你需要私营部门更多地合作，但政府可以在传播这一信息方面发挥一些作用。
Tyler, I will tell you one of the great lessons for me, and this is true of 1929, covering the financial crisis and the like.
泰勒，我将告诉你对我来说最重要的教训之一，这就是 1929 年的情况，涵盖了金融危机等。
We, humanity, us, people — we’re not great at self-regulating ourselves.
我们，人类，我们，人民——我们不擅长自我调节。
We’re not great at control.
我们不擅长控制。
That’s what greed is.
这就是贪婪。
There’s a great line.
有一条很棒的线。
I don’t know if you saw the movie Wall Street 2, not nearly as good as Wall Street 1.
我不知道你是否看过《华尔街2》这部电影，它不如《华尔街1》好看。
There’s a scene in the movie where Shia LaBeouf looks at, I think it’s Josh Brolin, and says, “What’s your number?” As in, what’s your number to feel independent or financial freedom, or when would you stop?
电影中有一个场景，希亚·拉博夫看着我想是乔什·布洛林，然后说：“你的电话号码是多少？”比如，你感到独立或财务自由的程度是多少，或者你什么时候会停止？
When would you feel like you got to the top of the mountain kind of thing?
你什么时候会觉得自己已经到达了山顶？
I remember that, yes.
我记得，是的。
He looks back at him, and he doesn’t give him a number.
他回头看了他一眼，没有给他电话号码。
He says, “More.”
他说：“更多。”
Those are the people we don’t have to worry about, right?
这些是我们不必担心的人，对吗？
If there’s something like a public option, a series of safe assets, T-bills, FDIC-insured checking accounts, or some equivalent thereof, I think that’s the most we can do for people.
如果有像公共期权、一系列安全资产、国库券、联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）保险的支票账户或类似的东西，我认为这就是我们能为人们做的最多的事情。
People can take risky decisions with their careers, with how they drink, with the drugs they use.
人们可能会在职业、饮酒方式和使用药物方面做出冒险的决定。
They do all the time.
他们一直都这样做。
In a way, the financial risks are often the least important of the ones they take.
在某种程度上，金融风险往往是他们所承担的风险中最不重要的。
These people don’t become rational just by electing them to office and putting a hat on them that says “government,” right?
这些人不会仅仅通过选举他们担任公职并给他们戴上写有“政府”的帽子而变得理性，对吗？
If you think people are bad at risk, our government is terrible at risk.
如果你认为人们面临的风险很大，那么我们的政府面临的风险也很严重。
Oh, I completely agree with that assessment.
哦，我完全同意这个评价。
But you go back and look at what happened, frankly, in 1929, and actually, you could look at it in the context of what happened in 2008, too.
但坦率地说，你回头看看 1929 年发生的事情，实际上，你也可以在 2008 年发生的事情的背景下看待它。
Interestingly, to me, in 1929, when people lost money, for the most part, at least initially, they blamed themselves.
有趣的是，对我来说，在 1929 年，当人们赔钱时，在很大程度上，至少在最初，他们会责备自己。
There actually was personal accountability.
实际上存在个人责任。
If you look at Groucho Marx, who famously lost his home during this, he actually had to mortgage his home because of mortgage loans.
如果你看看格劳乔·马克斯(Groucho Marx)，他在这次事件中失去了自己的房子，他实际上不得不因为抵押贷款而抵押自己的房子。
While he blamed the broker, if you will, to some degree for suggesting he buy some of these stocks, he ultimately blamed himself, which I think is a very different approach to life than we have today, where there’s always finger-pointing.
虽然他在某种程度上责怪经纪人，如果你愿意的话，在某种程度上建议他购买其中一些股票，但他最终归咎于自己，我认为这与我们今天的生活方式截然不同，那里总是有人指责。
It’s never our own fault.
这从来不是我们自己的错。
It’s everybody else’s fault.
这是其他人的错。
Now, is that a human condition?
那么，这是人类的状况吗？
What is that?
那是什么？
On how independent the Fed really is
关于美联储的真正独立性
The Fed — has the United States Fed ever been independent as a central bank?
美联储 ——美国美联储曾经作为中央银行独立过吗？
I think the lesson of what was happening in the 1920s and reading all those diaries suggests that they never were, that they were always concerned about the politics in some regard.
我认为 20 年代发生的事情以及阅读所有这些日记的教训表明，他们从来没有关心过政治，他们总是在某些方面关心政治。
Back then, it wasn’t that Hoover was manhandling them per se, but they were conscious of what the political implications would be.
当时，胡佛本身并不是在粗暴地对待他们，而是他们意识到这会产生什么政治影响。
Obviously, we’ve had a whole number of situations over the past 100 years now — or nearly 100 years — where actually, we have had presidents physically manhandle the head of the Fed, and now we have President Trump doing the same.
显然，过去 100 年（或近 100 年）我们遇到过很多情况，实际上，我们曾经历过总统对美联储主席进行粗暴对待，现在特朗普总统也在做同样的事情。
My preference would be that we don’t have those things.
我的偏好是我们没有这些东西。
My preference would be we don’t have those things for a different reason, though, which is that oftentimes you have to make super politically unpopular decisions.
不过，我的偏好是我们没有这些东西是出于不同的原因，那就是你常常必须做出在政治上非常不受欢迎的决定。
If the politics in the moment are going to influence you, you can’t do it.
如果当前的政治要影响你，你就做不到。
This is why I actually give great credit to Ben Bernanke because Ben Bernanke did things in that moment — and frankly, Hank Paulson, too — that were very politically unpopular.
这就是为什么我实际上非常信任本·伯南克，因为本·伯南克在那一刻做了一些在政治上非常不受欢迎的事情——坦率地说，汉克·保尔森也是如此。
They were against everything that any conservative Republican would be doing at that time, and yet they did them anyway.
他们反对当时任何保守派共和党人会做的一切，但他们还是这么做了。
By the way, give credit to President Bush for not pushing them otherwise.
顺便说一下，布什总统没有向他们施加其他压力，这值得赞扬。
Think about what would happen if we had a crisis and either a president or somebody else who had a very different view of how to handle it.
想想如果我们遇到一场危机，而总统或其他人对如何处理危机有截然不同的看法，会发生什么。
I agree with much of what was done, but keep in mind, they’re always sitting down with the Treasury secretary, and these decisions are made jointly, which I would say is inevitable, not a complaint I have.
我同意所做的大部分事情，但请记住，他们总是与财政部长坐下来，这些决定是共同做出的，我想说这是不可避免的，而不是我的抱怨。
But once you see that .
但一旦你看到了。
.
。
.
。
You see the same during COVID.
在新冠疫情期间你也会看到同样的情况。
Treasury, Fed — they work together.
财政部、美联储——他们一起工作。
So, all the hand-wringing over central bank independence, I don’t want Trump being the one who pushes it around, but I find a lot of the hand-wringing a little out of place or not contextualized properly.
因此，对于央行独立性的所有担忧，我不希望特朗普成为推动央行独立性的人，但我发现很多担忧都有点不合时宜，或者没有正确地结合实际情况。
Well, look, the thing that I think is more concerning now, which is slightly different, is that President Trump has talked about having a “majority” on the Federal Reserve as if it’s the Supreme Court.
嗯，你看，我认为现在更令人担忧的是，略有不同的是，特朗普总统谈到了在美联储拥有“多数”，就好像它是最高法院一样。
By the way, even a couple of years ago, we never talked about that in such a political context.
顺便说一句，即使是几年前，我们也从未在这样的政治背景下谈论过这个问题。
Maybe he’s just speaking the quiet part out loud.
也许他只是大声说出了安静的部分。
Maybe that’s what’s really happening here.
也许这就是这里真正发生的事情。
But if you have a political majority on something like the Fed, and then you use that political majority to effectively .
但如果你在美联储这样的事情上拥有政治多数，那么你就可以有效地利用这种政治多数。
.
。
.
。
By the way, you could potentially even replace all of the presidents of the regional feds as well, leveraging that “majority.” It could create a lasting, decades-long generational shift based on politics in terms of what our economic policies are, to some degree.
顺便说一句，你甚至有可能利用“多数”来取代地区联邦储备委员会的所有主席。在某种程度上，就我们的经济政策而言，它可能会基于政治创造持久的、长达数十年的代际转变。
If someone says, “Look, we have $37, $38 trillion in debt, some of that will be inflated away.” None of us like that fact, but it’s inevitable.
如果有人说：“看，我们有 37、38 万亿美元的债务，其中一些会因通货膨胀而消失。”我们谁都不喜欢这个事实，但这是不可避免的。
It probably partly should be inflated away, given that it’s there, and that’s what matters.
鉴于它的存在，它可能部分应该被膨胀消失，这才是重要的。
Trump having the majority, whatever — to me, it’s objectionable, but I just think the fiscal position, which ultimately, at least in theory, is the responsibility of Congress, is the actual villain here.
特朗普拥有多数席位，无论如何——对我来说，这是令人反感的，但我只是认为财政状况，至少在理论上，最终是国会的责任，才是真正的罪魁祸首。
Right.
正确的。
Oh, you and I — if I could high-five you over our link here, I would high-five you because I completely agree that we need to get our house in order, and I have no great optimism that we have any intent to do that anytime soon.
哦，你和我 ——如果我可以通过我们的链接向你击掌，我会向你击掌，因为我完全同意我们需要让我们的房子井然有序，而且我对我们有任何短期内这样做的意图并不乐观。
On Sorkin’s career, fame, and what’s next
关于索金的职业生涯、名誉以及接下来的发展
For our last segment, a few questions about you.
在我们的最后一部分中，有几个关于您的问题。
Do the Knicks have any real chance of winning an NBA title this season?
尼克斯队本赛季真的有机会赢得 NBA 总冠军吗？
I have been a long-suffering Knicks fan back from the age — I don’t know how old I was — back when Patrick Ewing was still playing.
我从那个时候起就是一个长期受苦的尼克斯队球迷——我不知道我多大了——当帕特里克·尤因还在打球的时候。
And I still have great hope, but I have been disappointed too many times to make a prediction at this point.
我仍然抱有很大的希望，但我已经失望了太多次，无法在这一点上做出预测。
We got so close, so close last year.
去年我们的关系如此亲密，如此亲密。
When you were in high school, you started submitting articles, including to the New York Times.
当你在高中时，你开始提交文章，包括向《纽约时报》提交文章。
Yes.
是的。
How did you know to do that?
你怎么知道要这么做？
What led you to that point?
是什么让你走到了这一步？
Because a lot of people would have told the high schooler, “That’s silly, don’t do it.” In fact, you succeeded with it, right?
因为很多人会告诉高中生：“这很愚蠢，不要这样做。”事实上，你成功了，对吧？
Because I didn’t know any better.
因为我不知道更好。
That’s why.
这就是原因。
A little bit of naivete, when you’re young, I think, actually can go very, very far.
我想，年轻的时候天真一点，其实可以走得很远很远。
I had started a sports magazine when I was 15 years old.
我 15 岁时创办了一本体育杂志。
That actually led the New York Times, interestingly, to write a tiny article about me when I was, I think, 16.
有趣的是，这实际上导致《纽约时报》写了一篇关于我的小文章，我想当时我才 16 岁。
I thought anything was possible back then, and so I started writing these letters to this particular reporter at the New York Times, who I desperately wanted to work for when I was 18 years old.
我当时认为一切皆有可能，因此我开始给《纽约时报》的这位记者写这些信，我在 18 岁时就非常想为他工作。
I would call him up on the telephone and leave voicemails and all sorts of things.
我会打电话给他并留下语音邮件和各种事情。
There were people who told me that I was crazy, and it would never work, but somehow, magically, they let me in the building.
有人告诉我，我疯了，这永远行不通，但不知何故，神奇的是，他们让我进入了大楼。
He knew you were 18?
他知道你18岁？
He knew I was 18, but the truth is that the person who assigned me my first article to write .
他知道我已经 18 岁了，但事实是他指派我写第一篇文章。
.
。
.
。
I had gone there planning to Xerox, staple, and get this gentleman a lot of coffee.
我去那里计划复印、订书钉，然后给这位先生喝很多咖啡。
That was what I thought the job was.
这就是我对这份工作的看法。
I had no intention of putting two words together, let alone a sentence.
我无意将两个词放在一起，更不用说一个句子了。
There was a woman there, an editor, who had no idea how old I was.
那里有一位女士，一位编辑，她不知道我多大了。
I had my suit on.
我穿着西装。
I had my tie on.
我系着领带。
She overheard me talking about this thing called the internet back in 1995.
1995 年，她无意中听到我谈论互联网这个东西。
This is back when we would write the word “modem, a device that transmits data over a telephone line.”
这又回到了我们写“调制解调器，一种通过电话线传输数据的设备”这个词的时候。
She thought I was a real person in the building, and she assigned me to Stuart Elliott.
她认为我是大楼里的真人，所以她把我指派给斯图尔特·埃利奥特。
I somehow convinced Stuart Elliott, who was my sponsor and mentor at the time, that I wasn’t going to tell her how old I was and why I was there, that I would just write the article, and we would see where the chips fell.
我以某种方式说服了斯图尔特·埃利奥特（Stuart Elliott），他当时是我的赞助商和导师，我不会告诉她我的年龄以及我为什么在那里，我只会写这篇文章，我们会看看筹码落到哪里。
And the chips broke my way.
筹码断了我的路。
Obviously, you’re a very busy person.
显然，你是一个非常忙碌的人。
Also, you need to imbibe a lot of financial news about many different topics.
此外，您还需要吸收大量有关许多不同主题的财经新闻。
Do you have any tip or advice on how it is you managed to do this, what would seem to be much better than how other people manage?
您对如何做到这一点有什么建议或建议吗？这似乎比其他人的做法要好得多？
Look, I was born curious.
瞧，我生来就好奇。
I am addicted, probably to my great detriment, to X, formerly Twitter.
我对 X（以前的 Twitter）上瘾了，这可能对我造成很大伤害。
I follow all sorts of people.
我关注各种各样的人。
I read the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times and Business Insider.
我阅读《华尔街日报》、《金融时报》和《商业内幕》。
I go to the Drudge Report, and I go here and there.
我去看《德拉吉报告》，到处看看。
I’m just constantly trying to absorb things.
我只是不断地尝试吸收东西。
I’m reading academic papers.
我正在阅读学术论文。
The truth is I do benefit.
事实是我确实受益。
I started this thing called DealBook back in 2001.
我早在 2001 年就开始了这个叫做 DealBook 的事情。
We have a great team, and we live in a Slack channel all day, playing with different stories all day, meaning we’re constantly giving each other new ideas, new things to read.
我们有一个很棒的团队，我们整天都生活在 Slack 频道中，整天玩不同的故事，这意味着我们不断地给彼此新的想法、新的阅读内容。
That’s how I take in the news.
这就是我接收新闻的方式。
Then we have a team of producers at Squawk Box.
我们还有 Squawk Box 的制作团队。
I’m sort of a beneficiary of a whole bunch of systems.
我是一大堆系统的受益者。
How much do you rely on chat groups?
您对聊天群组的依赖程度如何？
Not as much as I should.
没有我应该的那么多。
I know you have a bunch of chat groups.
我知道你们有很多聊天群。
I wish I lived more inside WhatsApp than I do.
我希望我能更多地生活在 WhatsApp 中。
I’ve been invited into a couple of interesting ones, but I’ve never really engaged as much as I should.
我曾受邀参加一些有趣的活动，但我从未真正投入到应有的程度。
That’s maybe because I’ve been trying to finish this book for too long.
这可能是因为我已经尝试完成这本书太久了。
How much do you rely on travel?
你对旅行的依赖程度如何？
Like, “Oh, I want to learn about Japan.
就像，“哦，我想了解日本。
I’m going to get on a plane.
我要去乘飞机。
I’ll spend a week there, meet with people.” Or do you do it more at a distance?
我会在那里待一周，与人们见面。”或者你会在远处做更多的事情吗？
Yes and no. The one real conundrum of my existence is that I’m not as spontaneous as I wish I could be because of the TV show and really feeling like I need to be in New York on the set most days.
是和不是。我存在的一个真正的难题是，我并不像我希望的那样自发，因为电视节目，而且我真的感觉我大部分时间都需要在纽约的片场。
It’s hard for me just to say, “You know what?
我很难说：“你知道吗？
I’m going to go to Japan for a week.” I do try to travel around the world throughout the year.
我要去日本一周。”我确实尝试全年环游世界。
I do make these pilgrimages, but I have to plan them out months and months in advance.
我确实进行了这些朝圣，但我必须提前几个月计划好。
In terms of the question, like how many people recognize you in airports, do you feel you’re more than optimally famous?
就这个问题而言，比如在机场有多少人认出你，你是否觉得自己非常出名？
Fareed Zakaria tells me, in half an hour, 10 people might recognize him.
Fareed Zakaria 告诉我，半小时内，可能有 10 个人认出他。
That, to me, seems like more than optimally famous.
对我来说，这似乎不仅仅是最出名的。
Are you at that level?
你达到那个水平了吗？
You’re optimally famous?
你最出名吗？
You’re not quite yet famous enough?
你还不够出名吗？
How do you view this?
您对此有何看法？
I’m not sure what the great benefit of fame is yet.
我还不知道名气有什么好处。
I find that there’s great joy when people come up to me in the street or on the subway or in the airport and tell me they’ve read a book or they’ve watched Billions or they read an article or something that they loved.
我发现当人们在街上、地铁或机场找到我并告诉我他们读过一本书或看过《亿万》或读过一篇文章或他们喜欢的东西时，我会感到非常高兴。
I love that joy that I get from them having that joy.
我喜欢从他们那里得到的快乐。
I find it more awkward when I’m having dinner with my family and somebody comes up and wants to take a selfie, or if you’re at the gym and people walk over to you, it’s a little awkward.
当我和家人一起吃晚饭时，有人走过来想要自拍，或者如果你在健身房，有人向你走来，我会觉得更尴尬。
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I am not sure if I’m optimally set up or not.
我不确定我的设置是否处于最佳状态。
I love when it’s a high five, and it’s a great moment, and I’m by myself or whatever, great.
我喜欢高五的时候，那是一个伟大的时刻，我一个人或者别的什么，都很棒。
But then there’re other times where it could be a little awkward.
但有时可能会有点尴尬。
The truth is that I always think about myself in these instances.
事实是，在这些情况下我总是想到自己。
They’re people that I admired for whatever reason over time.
随着时间的推移，无论出于何种原因，我都钦佩他们。
I see them in a restaurant myself, or I see them at the airport, and I look at them or want to go over to them.
我自己在餐馆里看到他们，或者在机场看到他们，我看着他们或者想走过去。
I always don’t want that experience to be awkward for the other person, even if it’s awkward for me.
我总是不希望这种经历让别人感到尴尬，即使对我来说也很尴尬。
I feel like I then have to try to make sure that they have a great moment if they can.
我觉得如果可以的话，我必须尽力确保他们度过一个美好的时刻。
With Billions, you had a significant foray into non-news TV.
通过《Billions》，你们大举进军非新闻电视领域。
While it involves finance, it’s not financial in the sense that most of your work is.
虽然它涉及财务，但它并不像你的大部分工作那样是财务的。
What surprised you most about that experience, learning a TV show and how it works?
这次学习电视节目及其运作方式的经历中，最令您惊讶的是什么？
Oh goodness.
噢，天啊。
First of all, enormous credit goes to Brian Koppelman and Dave Levien, who co-created the show with me.
首先，巨大的功劳归功于布莱恩·科佩尔曼和戴夫·莱维恩，他们与我共同创作了这个节目。
They were our showrunners.
他们是我们的节目主持人。
I just marveled at the fact that it’s like a remarkable circus that gets built for six or nine months.
我只是惊叹于它就像一个非凡的马戏团，花了六到九个月的时间才建成。
Hundreds of people are engaged in this creative enterprise, both in terms of writing the scripts, to the acting, to the crews, to the various directors that direct each episode.
数百人参与了这个创意事业，包括剧本编写、表演、工作人员以及指导每集的各个导演。
That was an interesting surprise to me early on, actually, that typically in television, virtually every episode is directed by a different director.
实际上，早期这对我来说是一个有趣的惊喜，通常在电视中，几乎每一集都由不同的导演执导。
The whole experience was actually a great learning experience for me just in terms of how all this can be done.
整个经历对我来说实际上是一次很好的学习经历，就如何完成这一切而言。
I’ll give you one other — how much a story can be changed for the better in an editing room, after it’s shot.
我再给你一个答案——一个故事在拍摄后在剪辑室里可以得到多大程度的改善。
It’s not just what’s shot that day, it’s what can be done and crafted later on in terms of creating that narrative.
这不仅仅是当天拍摄的内容，而是稍后在创建叙事方面可以完成和精心制作的内容。
I think I learned that, actually, when Too Big to Fail was made into a film.
我想，实际上，当《太大而不能倒》被拍成电影时，我就了解到了这一点。
I had an opportunity to sit in the editing room out in LA for a while.
我有机会在洛杉矶的剪辑室坐了一段时间。
I was just mesmerized by how extraordinary things could happen.
我只是对如何发生非凡的事情感到着迷。
Two final questions, a bit of a pair.
最后两个问题，一对。
Your book is out.
你的书已经出版了。
You’ve done plenty of interviews.
你已经做过很多采访了。
First, what do you want to learn about next?
首先，接下来你想了解什么？
Second, what will you do next?
第二，你接下来要做什么？
Oh my goodness.
哦，我的天啊。
I’ve become kind of obsessed, actually, with tulips because of this experience.
事实上，由于这次经历，我对郁金香有点着迷。
No joke, I actually do want to go back to understand exactly what happened.
不是开玩笑，我真的很想回去了解到底发生了什么。
I don’t know if you could recreate a 1929 or Too Big to Fail book about the tulip craze because I don’t know if the archives exist.
我不知道你是否可以重新创作一本 1929 年或《大而不倒》有关郁金香热潮的书，因为我不知道档案是否存在。
What I will do next — I have three children, and my wife has told me that I am not allowed to write another book until they go to college, so I’m going to, hopefully, spend a lot more time with them and maybe I’ll be plotting my tulip story.
我接下来要做什么 —— 我有三个孩子，我的妻子告诉我，在他们上大学之前我不能再写一本书，所以我希望能花更多的时间和他们在一起，也许我会策划我的郁金香故事。
The Peter Garber paper on tulipmania has a lot of data.
彼得·加伯（Peter Garber）关于郁金香狂热的论文有大量数据。
You might want to look at that.
你可能想看看。
I’ll start there.
我将从这里开始。
Your book again, 1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History — and How It Shattered a Nation.
又是你的书，《1929：华尔街历史上最伟大的崩盘》——以及它如何粉碎了一个国家。
Andrew Ross Sorkin, thank you very much.
安德鲁·罗斯·索金，非常感谢你。
This was so much fun.
这太有趣了。
Thank you, Tyler.
谢谢你，泰勒。
Photo Credit: Mike Cohen
照片来源：迈克·科恩