Agnes Callard on the Theory of Everything (Ep. 38)
Today, I’m here with Agnes Callard, who is a philosopher at the University of Chicago.
今天，我和芝加哥大学哲学家艾格尼丝·卡拉德在一起。
She has a new book out called Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming, but like a true philosopher, she philosophizes about many things.
她出版了一本新书，名为《渴望：成为的力量》，但像一位真正的哲学家一样，她对许多事情进行了哲学思考。
On Plato and Socrates
论柏拉图和苏格拉底
Let me start with a simple question.
让我从一个简单的问题开始。
Why didn’t Plato just write what he meant?
柏拉图为什么不直接写下他的意思呢？
Why is there the form of a dialogue at all?
为什么会有对话的形式？
I think it’s reasonable to conclude that one thing Plato meant to do was to preserve the memory and the activity of Socrates.
我认为可以合理地得出这样的结论：柏拉图想做的一件事就是保存苏格拉底的记忆和活动。
There was this guy.
有这个人。
There was this amazing guy who walked around asking people questions, and thereby inventing a new way of thinking and a new way of life, but he didn’t write anything down.
有一个了不起的人，他四处走动，向人们提问，从而发明了一种新的思维方式和新的生活方式，但他没有写下任何东西。
Not just Plato, but a lot of people didn’t want that to die with Socrates.
不仅仅是柏拉图，很多人都不希望它和苏格拉底一起消亡。
I think that was one of Plato’s motivations.
我认为这是柏拉图的动机之一。
What he did was a good way of achieving that goal.
他所做的就是实现这一目标的好方法。
But does Plato even like Socrates?
但柏拉图喜欢苏格拉底吗？
If I read these dialogues, it seems to me Socrates is full of fallacies.
如果我读这些对话，我觉得苏格拉底充满了谬论。
I tend to side more with Protagoras and with the Sophists.
我更倾向于普罗泰戈拉和智者派。
You read a dialogue such as Meno, “Oh, learning has to be recollection.” You go through the arguments for that conclusion, they seem absurd.
你读过一段对话，比如梅诺，“哦，学习必须是回忆。”你仔细看看这个结论的论据，它们看起来很荒谬。
So half the time, isn’t Plato making fun of Socrates or really trying to tell us, “I, Plato, am better than Socrates?”
所以有一半的时间，柏拉图不是在取笑苏格拉底，或者真的想告诉我们，“我，柏拉图，比苏格拉底更好？”
I don’t know what Plato’s trying to tell us.
我不知道柏拉图想告诉我们什么。
I don’t think in the Meno, he doesn’t quite come out and say, “Learning is recollection.” Here’s what he does.
我认为在《美诺》中，他并没有明确地说：“学习就是回忆。”这就是他所做的。
He’s faced with a paradox that Meno puts forward, to the effect that there’s no point to try to inquire about anything ever.
他面临着梅诺提出的一个悖论，大意是没有必要试图询问任何事情。
You can’t inquire about what you don’t know because how would you even know how to start?
你无法询问你不知道的事情，因为你怎么知道如何开始呢？
You can’t inquire about what you do know because why would you inquire about what you already know?
你无法询问你所知道的事情，因为你为什么要询问你已经知道的事情呢？
It’s this crossing-the-bridge kind of problem that comes up in your work.
你的工作中会遇到这种过桥问题。
Yeah.
是的。
So why not just give up?
那么为什么不直接放弃呢？
Socrates says, “Well, let me tell you a story.” He tells a long story about the opposite of the afterlife — the pre-life, the lives we had before we were born — and that maybe inquiry can make sense because we’re, in some sense, remembering knowledge we had in the pre-life.
苏格拉底说：“好吧，让我给你讲一个故事。”他讲述了一个关于来世的反面的长篇故事——“前世，我们出生前的生活”——也许探究是有意义的，因为从某种意义上说，我们正在记住我们在前世所拥有的知识。
Then after he says that, he says, “Now, this all might be wrong.
说完之后，他说：“现在，这一切可能都是错的。
I can’t really stand by any of it.
我真的无法忍受其中的任何一个。
Here’s the bit, though, that I’ll stand by: we’ll be better and braver if we inquire than if we don’t.”
不过，我会坚持这一点：如果我们询问，我们会比不询问更好、更勇敢。”
Even Socrates couches the theory of recollection in a similar ethical framework to what he’ll couch later the myths in, at the ends of some of the dialogues.
甚至苏格拉底也在类似的伦理框架中表达了回忆理论，他稍后将在一些对话的结尾处表达神话。
I don’t see where Plato is saying that that’s wrong.
我不明白柏拉图在哪里说这是错误的。
In a way, Socrates is already saying it.
在某种程度上，苏格拉底已经说过了。
Here’s the kind of oversimplifying question that philosophers generally don’t like.
这是哲学家通常不喜欢的那种过于简单化的问题。
But for our readers, if you were to read all the dialogues, which I believe you have, and boil it down into a bottom-line essential takeaway, what’s going on in them as a whole?
但对于我们的读者来说，如果你阅读了所有对话（我相信你已经读过），并将其归结为一个基本要点，那么它们作为一个整体到底发生了什么？
Not the Laws, but the ones with Socrates.
不是法律，而是苏格拉底的法律。
What’s your take?
你怎么看？
Could I give my take on all the dialogues that are conventionally dated before the Republic, say?
例如，我可以对传统上共和国之前的所有对话发表我的看法吗？
Absolutely, yes.
绝对是的。
Including Republic 1.
包括共和国1。
That’s a lot of dialogues.
这是很多对话。
Don’t worry about Timaeus.
别担心蒂迈欧。
Exactly.
确切地。
I think a couple different things, but maybe I’ll give two.
我有一些不同的想法，但也许我会给出两点。
Two things that are going on is, there’s a set of ethical doctrines that are the groundwork of Socrates’s life that are being laid out in those dialogues.
正在发生的两件事是，在这些对话中，有一套伦理学说是苏格拉底生活的基础。
They have slogans, so they’re actually really easy to give you in terms of bullet points.
他们有口号，所以他们实际上很容易给你要点。
There are things like, a good man can’t be harmed.
有些事情，比如，好人不能被伤害。
Weakness of will is impossible.
意志薄弱是不可能的。
Knowledge is virtue.
知识就是美德。
Doing injustice is worse than suffering it.
行不公正的事比遭受不公正的事更糟糕。
Those are sometimes referred to as Socratic intellectualism.
这些有时被称为苏格拉底理智主义。
They’re Socrates’s rules for living.
它们是苏格拉底的生活规则。
One of the things the dialogues are doing is giving you that.
对话所做的事情之一就是给你这个。
The other thing they’re doing is giving you what philosophy is at the time.
他们正在做的另一件事是告诉你当时的哲学是什么。
That is, they’re showing you philosophy where, as I understand it, Socratic philosophy is a solution to a problem — sort of Meno’s problem, but it could be put in a bunch of different ways — about how to acquire knowledge.
也就是说，他们向你展示了哲学，据我所知，苏格拉底哲学是解决问题的方法——有点像美诺的问题，但它可以用多种不同的方式来表达——关于如何获取知识。
How do you acquire knowledge when you don’t have it?
当你没有知识时，如何获取知识？
Socrates came up with a method for doing that.
苏格拉底想出了一个方法来做到这一点。
His method was — I call it the adversarial division of epistemic labor.
他的方法是——我称之为认知劳动的对抗性分工。
If you and I both want to find the truth, we can actually divide up the process of finding the truth or acquiring knowledge into two subordinate jobs.
如果你我都想找到真理，我们其实可以把寻找真理或获取知识的过程分成两个从属的工作。
You do one and I do one.
你做一件，我做一件。
If we each do our job, together we can inquire.
如果我们各司其职，我们就可以一起探究。
That’s what I take Socratic philosophy to be doing, and the dialogues present that to us.
这就是我认为苏格拉底哲学要做的事情，而对话则向我们展示了这一点。
I can’t help but read the dialogues through the lens of Adam Smith.
我情不自禁地通过亚当·斯密的镜头来阅读这些对话。
Let me give you my takeaway message, which may be strange, but tell me what you think.
让我给你我的要点，这可能很奇怪，但请告诉我你的想法。
I read the earlier ones, as a whole, as a fundamental critique of the division of labor.
我把早期的文章作为一个整体来阅读，作为对劳动分工的根本批判。
Even at the end of Euthydemus, there’s the statement, “Well, don’t listen to the philosopher.
即使在《尤西德摩斯》的结尾，也有这样一句话：“好吧，不要听哲学家的。
It’s really about philosophy.” So everyone is a fool, including Socrates who pretends to be so epistemically modest, but every now and then, that is made fun of.
这确实是关于哲学的。”所以每个人都是傻瓜，包括苏格拉底，他假装在认知上很谦虚，但时不时地，这会被人取笑。
Division of labor plays a central role in the Republic.
劳动分工在共和国中发挥着核心作用。
But I think the Republic is ultimately critical of the idea of division of labor.
但我认为共和国最终对劳动分工的理念持批评态度。
People’s professions — they’re either put forward in the dialogues or the Athenians are supposed to know who these people are.
人们的职业 ——他们要么在对话中提出，要么雅典人应该知道这些人是谁。
None of them are, in a way, as reasoners that impressive.
从某种程度上来说，他们作为推理家都没有那么令人印象深刻。
It’s about how there is this virtue to the well-ordered, philosophical mind in the Republic.
这是关于共和国中井然有序的哲学思想如何具有这种美德。
In what was modern society for Athens, this was now impossible.
对于雅典的现代社会来说，这是不可能的。
You have blundering fools walking around who basically you poke fun of by writing up what they said.
到处都是笨手笨脚的傻瓜，你基本上可以通过写下他们所说的话来取笑他们。
I think first that the division of labor, say, between the refuter and the interlocutor — between let’s say Socrates and Meno — that’s quite different.
我首先认为，反驳者和对话者之间的分工——比如说苏格拉底和美诺之间的分工——是完全不同的。
There was a reason why I said that was the moral of everything up to the Republic.
我之所以说这是共和国一切事物的道德是有原因的。
I think in the Republic, you really get Plato’s wheels start turning in a way more than Socrates’s.
我认为在《理想国》中，柏拉图的车轮确实比苏格拉底的车轮开始转动得更多。
What you get is the image, the idea that maybe you don’t need an adversarial division of epistemic labor.
你得到的是图像，即你可能不需要认知劳动的对抗性分工的想法。
Maybe one person, the philosopher, can do it all on his own.
也许一个人，即哲学家，可以独自完成这一切。
The city in which there is this division of labor is being used as an analog for the soul, where all that’s going to be within one person.
存在这种劳动分工的城市被用作灵魂的类比，所有的一切都将集中在一个人身上。
Within one person, you can have all the different jobs.
一个人可以承担所有不同的工作。
You don’t need anybody else.
你不需要其他人。
In a sense, you can do it by yourself.
从某种意义上说，你可以自己做。
I take that to be a Platonic thought rather than a Socratic thought.
我认为这是柏拉图式的思想而不是苏格拉底式的思想。
It’s a Platonic way of deploying a Socratic thought.
这是运用苏格拉底思想的柏拉图式方式。
Let me say something, taking a step back, about your overall approach that I’m hearing coming out in several of these questions.
让我退后一步，谈谈我在其中几个问题中听到的总体方法。
Yes.
是的。
I would say that the dominant reading of Socrates in the literature has always been to think that he is, at least some of the time, either being ironic or being made fun of by Plato.
我想说的是，文献中对苏格拉底的主流解读一直是认为他（至少在某些时候）要么是在讽刺，要么是被柏拉图取笑。
And I don’t share that reading.
我不分享那篇文章。
One thing that’s interesting is that Plato at several points has Socrates’s interlocutors accuse him of irony.
有趣的一件事是，柏拉图多次让苏格拉底的对话者指责他讽刺。
They use the word eironeia, irony, our same word.
他们使用“eironeia”这个词，讽刺，我们同一个词。
Socrates in the Apology says, “Now you guys are going to think .
苏格拉底在《申辩书》中说：“现在你们要思考……。
.
。
.
。
People are always saying this about me.
人们总是这么说我。
They’re always thinking I’m being ironic.” I think that he isn’t.
他们总是认为我是在讽刺。”我认为他不是。
I think that he is serious in everything that he says, but it’s really hard to read him that way.
我认为他说的每件事都很认真，但这样读起来真的很难。
There’s a way in which our tendency to think that Socrates doesn’t really mean it is a way of pulling his words away from us.
在某种程度上，我们倾向于认为苏格拉底并不意味着这是一种将他的话从我们身边夺走的方式。
Because if he doesn’t mean it, it doesn’t have a bearing on us.
因为如果他不是这个意思，那对我们来说就没有影响。
I actually think ethically it’s a reading that we ought to try to resist, that there’s something in the text that’s more difficult and more challenging that we escape from if we think either that Socrates is being ironic or that Plato is being ironic about Socrates.
事实上，我认为从伦理上讲，这是一种我们应该努力抵制的解读，如果我们认为苏格拉底在讽刺，或者柏拉图在讽刺苏格拉底，那么文本中就会有一些更困难、更具挑战性的东西，我们就无法逃避。
Sorry, I should have said, the people who accuse Socrates of being ironic are Versimicus and Callicles.
抱歉，我应该说，指责苏格拉底讽刺的人是维西米库斯和卡里克勒斯。
They’re not the good guys or the friends.
他们不是好人或朋友。
The fact that it’s those people accusing him suggests at least something about how Plato wanted us to think about the charge of Socratic irony.
事实上，正是那些人指控他，这一事实至少表明柏拉图希望我们如何思考苏格拉底式反讽的指控。
Why is it that people read these dialogues?
人们为什么阅读这些对话？
If it’s truly a conversational form, we could listen to them.
如果这确实是一种对话形式，我们可以听他们说。
You could teach your class by having people listen to a podcast of Crito and Socrates, Phaedrus and Socrates, but no one does that.
你可以通过让人们听克里托和苏格拉底、斐德罗和苏格拉底的播客来教授你的课程，但没有人这样做。
You could put them on tape and release it.
你可以把它们录在磁带上然后释放。
I think, actually, more people would listen to us.
我认为，实际上，更多的人会听我们的。
Why is that?
这是为什么？
What does it tell us about the nature of philosophy also?
关于哲学的本质，它还告诉我们什么？
I think that certainly in the ancient world, they would have been spoken.
我认为在古代世界，它们肯定会被口头表达。
But that doesn’t mean that’s the best way to receive them.
但这并不意味着这是接收它们的最佳方式。
It just means that there were certain limits at that time.
只是说明当时有一定的限度。
My own feeling is, the ideal way to engage with the dialogues is to read them and then talk about them with people.
我自己的感觉是，参与对话的理想方式是阅读它们，然后与人们谈论它们。
Ideally, you talk about them with the text in front of you so you can quote bits and read bits out loud.
理想情况下，您可以通过面前的文本来谈论它们，这样您就可以引用一些内容并大声朗读一些内容。
It might depend on personally how you take in information or something.
这可能取决于您个人如何接受信息或其他什么。
But I want to be able to stop, and I want to be in a kind of control over my thinking about the argument.
但我希望能够停下来，并且我希望能够控制自己对争论的思考。
A lot of the time what’s going on in the text is the presentation of an argument.
很多时候，文本中发生的事情是论证的呈现。
One thing that must have appealed to Plato about the dialogue form is that there is no .
关于对话形式一定吸引柏拉图的一件事是对话形式不存在。
.
。
.
。
I can’t think of any more direct way to just put propositions on paper, on parchment, whatever, on papyrus .
我想不出任何更直接的方法来将命题写在纸上，羊皮纸上，无论如何，纸莎草纸上。
.
。
.
。
Doesn’t it cause us to overrate propositions?
这不会导致我们高估命题吗？
But continue your answer.
但继续你的回答。
Oh, I think Plato rated them highly, so there’s the question what rating he had.
哦，我认为柏拉图对他们评价很高，所以问题是他的评价是多少。
You read any philosopher, you read Kant, you read Adam Smith, you read Hume, and you’re looking for the arguments.
你读任何哲学家的书，你读康德的书，你读亚当·斯密的书，你读休谟的书，你都在寻找论据。
But in Plato, you don’t need to look because Socrates was like, so do you think this?
但在柏拉图，你不需要看，因为苏格拉底就像，所以你认为这个？
Yes.
是的。
Do you think this?
你觉得这个吗？
Yes.
是的。
And that just shows you what the argument is.
这只是向你展示了论点是什么。
But I think taking that in, it’s easier to take that in visually than through hearing.
但我认为通过视觉来理解这一点比通过听觉更容易。
On the usefulness of refutation in philosophy
论哲学中反驳的用处
You gave a recent talk, I think at Princeton, as to why philosophers refute each other so much.
我记得你最近在普林斯顿大学做了一次演讲，解释了为什么哲学家们如此互相反驳。
As a method for doing philosophy, is one philosopher trying to refute another, say through the medium of a public talk?
作为研究哲学的一种方法，一位哲学家是否试图反驳另一位哲学家，比如通过公开演讲的方式？
Do we do too much of that or too little in philosophy?
我们在哲学方面做得太多还是太少？
I actually ended up giving a different talk at Princeton, but I did give that talk at Michigan.
事实上，我最终在普林斯顿大学做了不同的演讲，但我确实在密歇根州做了那个演讲。
OK.
好的。
I changed my mind last minute.
我最后一刻改变了主意。
Anyway, I think we do roughly the right amount of it in philosophy.
无论如何，我认为我们在哲学方面做了大致适量的工作。
I wrote that talk because there’s been a lot of discussion about the underrepresentation of certain groups of people in philosophy — women and minorities — and the fact that some practices that we have in philosophy might be contributing to that.
我写这篇演讲是因为人们对哲学中某些群体的代表性不足进行了很多讨论——“女性和少数族裔”——而我们在哲学领域的一些实践可能会导致这种情况。
There can be quite a lot of rudeness and just nastiness in the way that people conduct themselves, and that perhaps that kind of aggression is putting groups of people off of the discipline.
人们的行为方式中可能存在很多粗鲁和肮脏的行为，也许这种攻击性使一群人脱离了纪律。
That’s an important reflection that we’re having.
这是我们正在进行的一个重要反思。
However, in the context of that, I heard several people say, “Yeah, why do we even refute one another?
然而，在这种情况下，我听到有几个人说：“是啊，我们为什么还要互相反驳呢？
Why are we doing it that way?” And that made me think, “Uh-oh, somebody better explain why we’re doing that.” Because that’s really important.
我们为什么要这样做？这让我想，“呃，哦，有人更好地解释我们为什么要这样做。”因为这真的很重要。
We have to do that.
我们必须这样做。
We have to not do it badly.
我们一定不能做得不好。
We have to not do it in an inhumane way, but I think it’s essential to philosophy.
我们不能以不人道的方式去做，但我认为这对哲学至关重要。
It’s sort of what philosophy is, that we refute one another.
这就是哲学，我们互相反驳。
But that’s because, in a sense, I agree with Socrates.
但那是因为，在某种意义上，我同意苏格拉底的观点。
I heard several people say, “Yeah, why do we even refute one another?
我听到有几个人说：“是啊，我们为什么还要互相反驳呢？
Why are we doing it that way?” And that made me think, “Uh-oh, somebody better explain why we’re doing that.” Because that’s really important.
我们为什么要这样做？这让我想，“呃，哦，有人更好地解释我们为什么要这样做。”因为这真的很重要。
We have to not do it badly, but I think it’s essential to philosophy.
我们不能做得不好，但我认为这对哲学至关重要。
It’s sort of what philosophy is, that we refute one another.
这就是哲学，我们互相反驳。
I think we do the right amount of it, though there’s some amount of it’s being threatened right now.
我认为我们做了正确的事情，尽管其中一些现在受到了威胁。
If I look at at least some parts of the American legal system, there’s a kind of adversarial method.
如果我至少看看美国法律体系的某些部分，就会发现有一种对抗方法。
I’m not sure that works well.
我不确定这是否有效。
If I look at many parts of the American private sector, in business meetings, people aren’t focused on refuting each other.
如果我观察美国私营部门的许多部分，在商务会议上，人们并不专注于互相反驳。
They work together in small teams, and they try to improve each other’s arguments.
他们以小团队的形式一起工作，并试图改进彼此的论点。
The private sector, to me, on average seems to work better than the legal system.
对我来说，平均而言，私营部门似乎比法律体系运作得更好。
So why don’t we do more philosophy like this?
那么我们为什么不做更多这样的哲学呢？
Someone presents a paper.
有人提交了一份论文。
You then have seven or eight people stand up.
然后有七八个人站起来。
It’s kind of assumed most arguments are wrong or insufficient.
假设大多数论点都是错误的或不充分的。
Those seven or eight people try to improve on what the person said.
那七八个人试图改进这个人所说的话。
They can only say positive things, only build up the argument in various ways.
他们只能说积极的话，只能用各种方式来建立论据。
Then at the end, everyone goes away.
然后最后，每个人都离开了。
It’s like, “is this project worthwhile?” Almost like venture capitalists, most of the time it’s “no.” But sometimes, the initial talk and those improvements will be so good, people will say, “Oh, if most ideas are wrong to begin with, and this is rationally known, why spend all this time on refutations?”
就像“这个项目值得吗？”几乎就像风险投资家一样，大多数时候都是“不”。但有时，最初的谈话和这些改进会如此之好，人们会说，“哦，如果大多数想法一开始就是错误的，而且这是理性上已知的，为什么要花所有这些时间来反驳呢？”
We all think that our ideas are right, at least at the time that we’re proposing them.
我们都认为我们的想法是正确的，至少在我们提出它们的时候是这样。
But that can’t be rational, right?
但这不可能是理性的，对吧？
It’s actually rationally required in the sense that to believe .
它实际上是理性地需要的，即相信。
.
。
.
。
Say I say, I believe there’s snow on the ground outside.
说我说，我相信外面地上有雪。
That’s a belief of mine.
这是我的一个信念。
Then I also believe that’s true.
那么我也相信这是真的。
Then I can also say, “There’s snow on the ground outside.” Those are just three ways of saying the same thing.
然后我也可以说：“外面地上有雪。”这些只是同一件事的三种说法。
In order to have any beliefs at all, you have to think that those beliefs are true.
为了拥有任何信念，你必须认为这些信念是真实的。
Some beliefs, the snow beliefs.
有些信念，雪的信念。
But the “Is there free will?” beliefs, you figure whatever you think, it’s probably wrong.
但“有自由意志吗？”信念，你认为无论你怎么想，它都可能是错误的。
If you go to a philosophy talk about free will, they’re not going to say that there’s free will or there isn’t.
如果你去参加一个关于自由意志的哲学讲座，他们不会说有或没有自由意志。
Exactly.
确切地。
Complicated.
复杂的。
They’re going to say something much, much smaller and much more complicated, something that they feel they can say.
他们会说一些更小、更复杂的事情，一些他们觉得自己可以说的事情。
We say what we feel we can say, right?
我们说我们认为可以说的话，对吗？
At the very least, we believe it at the time.
至少，我们当时是相信的。
And that’s quite important.
这非常重要。
When you say most arguments are bad arguments or wrong, in a way, that’s right.
当你说大多数论点是糟糕的论点或错误时，在某种程度上，这是对的。
It’s really hard to be Socrates’s interlocutor.
成为苏格拉底的对话者确实很难。
It’s much harder to be the interlocutor than to be Socrates, and I think Socrates very much appreciates that.
成为对话者比成为苏格拉底要困难得多，我认为苏格拉底非常欣赏这一点。
He’s very grateful to his interlocutors, and he praises them constantly.
他非常感谢他的对话者，并不断赞扬他们。
To put something forward is an act of courage, and especially when you know people are going to tear it down.
提出一些东西是一种勇气的行为，尤其是当你知道人们会推翻它时。
But I think tearing it down is the right response.
但我认为拆除它是正确的回应。
So let me defend that, as opposed to the helping.
因此，让我为这一点辩护，而不是提供帮助。
About the justice system versus the private sector: generally speaking, they have different goals.
关于司法系统与私营部门：一般来说，他们有不同的目标。
Generally speaking, most of the private sector is not aiming at justice, and it’s not aiming at the particular form of justice.
一般来说，大多数私营部门并不以正义为目标，也不以特定形式的正义为目标。
But it’s aiming at truth, right?
但它的目标是真理，对吗？
Getting something done by blending synthetic knowledge.
通过融合综合知识来完成某件事。
I don’t know whether it’s aiming at truth either.
我也不知道它是否旨在真相。
What I would mean by aiming at truth is aiming at knowledge.
我所说的以真理为目标的意思就是以知识为目标。
I would think that, most of the time, the knowledge would be, at most, a kind of proximate goal but not an ultimate goal.
我想，很多时候，知识最多只是一种近期目标，而不是最终目标。
The reason why we have adversarial systems for pursuing certain goals is that there’s actually a tension inside the goal itself.
我们之所以采用对抗性系统来追求某些目标，是因为目标本身内部实际上存在着一种张力。
The goal threatens to pull itself apart.
这个目标有可能会分崩离析。
In the case of justice, we have the goal that we want to convict the guilty, and we want to acquit the innocent.
就正义而言，我们的目标是让有罪者有罪，让无辜者无罪。
And those are not the same goal.
这些并不是同一个目标。
They pull apart a little bit because if you’re really, really, really committed to acquitting the innocent, you’ll be like, “Look, if there’s any doubt, if there’s any possible doubt of any kind, we should acquit.” Then you’re not going to get to the other goal.
他们之间的分歧有点大，因为如果你真的、真的、真的致力于无罪释放无辜者，你会说，“听着，如果有任何疑问，如果有任何可能的怀疑，我们应该无罪释放。”那么你就无法实现另一个目标。
It’s that tension inside of the goal itself of justice that’s generating need for the adversarial system.
正是正义目标本身内部的紧张关系产生了对对抗制度的需求。
There’s a similar tension inside the goal of philosophical knowledge.
哲学知识的目标内部也存在类似的张力。
It’s one that I think was best articulated by William James in his famous article, “The Will to Believe.”
我认为威廉·詹姆斯在他的著名文章《信仰的意志》中对此进行了最好的阐述。
There’s the goal of having truths.
目标是掌握真理。
You want to have some truths.
你想要知道一些真相。
You don’t just want to be a skeptic.
你不只是想成为一个怀疑论者。
You want to have some beliefs.
你想要有一些信念。
You need beliefs for living your life and everything like that.
你需要信念来过你的生活以及类似的事情。
On the other hand, you don’t want to believe anything false.
另一方面，你不想相信任何错误的事情。
James thought that the science and epistemology of his time was too obsessed with that second goal: “Well, if there’s any doubt at all, just don’t believe it.” He was pointing out that we had this other goal too.
詹姆斯认为他那个时代的科学和认识论过于痴迷于第二个目标：“好吧，如果有任何疑问，就不要相信它。”他指出我们还有另一个目标。
I don’t agree with James about how we solve the problem, but he’s right that there’s a real problem there, that the goal threatens to pull itself apart.
我不同意詹姆斯关于我们如何解决问题的观点，但他是对的，那里存在一个真正的问题，目标有可能自行分裂。
And it’s in those contexts that the adversarial division of labor makes sense.
正是在这些背景下，对抗性分工才有意义。
On Platonic love
论柏拉图式的爱情
As you know, Plato has a whole work, the Symposium, which is about a number of different — you could say almost competing — speeches about Eros and the nature of love.
如你所知，柏拉图有一整部著作《会饮》，其中讲述了许多不同的——你可以说几乎是相互竞争的——关于爱欲和爱的本质的演讲。
Who has the best speech?
谁的演讲最好？
And why?
为什么？
Of course, I’m going to say either Socrates or Alcibiades.
当然，我会说苏格拉底或阿尔喀比亚德。
I like Aristophanes’s speech, too.
我也喜欢阿里斯托芬的演讲。
It’s beautiful, but Socrates’s speech affects me the most intellectually.
很美，但苏格拉底的演讲对我的理智影响最大。
When I read it, it’s one of the places that I go to for understanding the Theory of the Forms and what it would be like for one to work one’s way up to a Form, something like that.
当我读到它时，它是我去理解形式理论以及一个人如何努力达到形式之类的东西的地方之一。
It’s a short, concentrated bit of text that addresses that issue, so that’s really great.
这是一个简短而集中的文本，解决了这个问题，所以这真的很棒。
But Alcibiades’ speech is more moving to me, and it’s one of the places that I would go to in the corpus for trying to understand what it’s like to meet someone like Socrates, and for him to be in the world with you.
但阿尔喀比亚德的演讲更让我感动，这是我在语料库中去尝试了解遇到像苏格拉底这样的人是什么感觉，以及让他与你一起生活在这个世界上的地方之一。
To be one of the people in the world that’s around Socrates.
成为世界上苏格拉底身边的人之一。
Alcibiades’s speech is the best place for that.
阿尔喀比亚德的演讲是最好的地方。
Those would be my two favorites, for different reasons.
出于不同的原因，这将是我最喜欢的两个。
Let me give you part of my take on Symposium, and then you give me your interpretation, or a better interpretation.
让我给你我对研讨会的部分看法，然后你给我你的解释，或者更好的解释。
I think of the dialogue — much of it is being about people actually aren’t that interested in Eros.
我认为对话 ——大部分内容都是关于人们实际上对爱神并不那么感兴趣。
If you think about Alcibiades, so much of his speech is putting down of Socrates, and keeping him at a length, and saying, “Well, you’re not so great.
如果你想想亚西比德，你会发现他的大部分演讲都是在贬低苏格拉底，并让他保持长篇大论，并说：“好吧，你并不那么伟大。
You’re not as modest as you appear to be.”
你并不像看上去那么谦虚。”
Most of the speeches have these long digressions from the topic of love.
大多数演讲都偏离了爱情的话题。
Most of the speeches, as pure logic, I don’t find very impressive.
大多数演讲，作为纯粹的逻辑，我觉得并不令人印象深刻。
I think the dialogue as a whole is extraordinarily impressive, but it’s through the failings of the speeches.
我认为整个对话令人印象深刻，但这是通过演讲的失败来实现的。
And it’s striking that at the end that what people really just want to do — what Danny Kahneman told me once — is sit around talking to their friends, and they want to get drunk.
令人惊讶的是，到最后，人们真正想做的就是——“丹尼·卡尼曼曾经告诉我的”——就是坐在一起和朋友聊天，他们想喝醉。
So self-intoxication is in some ways a more fundamental concept than Eros, and there’s a complacency.
因此，自我陶醉在某种程度上是比爱欲更基本的概念，并且存在一种自满情绪。
Even at the beginning, people are getting drunk, and the speech of Alcibiades — he’s talking about alcohol early on, multiple times.
即使在一开始，人们就已经喝醉了，而阿尔喀比亚德的演讲——他很早就多次谈论酒精。
The one person who really focuses on love and gives you a compelling vision is Aristophanes.
阿里斯托芬是真正专注于爱并为你提供令人信服的愿景的人。
He exactly is the dramatist.
他确实是剧作家。
He does false things.
他做虚假的事情。
His account of being split from your other half and then reunited is obviously false, but completely wonderful and brilliant and beautiful.
他关于与你的另一半分手然后重聚的描述显然是错误的，但完全精彩、辉煌和美丽。
So we have this myth of love and Eros, which is at the center of society.
所以我们就有了爱情和爱欲的神话，它是社会的中心。
But it’s actually something we pretend we are much more interested in than what we really care about, and that’s talking with our friends, our petty rivalries, getting drunk, and just sitting around.
但实际上，我们假装对自己真正感兴趣的事情比我们真正关心的事情更感兴趣，那就是与朋友交谈、琐碎的竞争、喝醉酒以及无所事事。
What’s your take?
你怎么看？
One bit of textual evidence against at least a part of that is that they decide not to drink, that is they .
至少部分反对这一点的文字证据是他们决定不喝酒，那就是他们。
.
。
.
。
Socrates doesn’t drink.
苏格拉底不喝酒。
No, no, they all actually, early in the dialogue, they say, “What we usually do is get drunk.” They had gotten drunk the night before.
不，不，实际上，他们在对话的早期都说，“我们通常做的就是喝醉。”前一天晚上他们喝醉了。
They’ve got hangovers, and they decide for the purposes .
他们宿醉了，他们为了目的而做出决定。
.
。
.
。
in order to have a more civilized conversation, not to drink.
为了更文明地交谈，不喝酒。
That all gets overturned with the arrival of Alcibiades, but for the first bunch of speeches, actually, there isn’t any drinking, or maybe it’s moderate.
随着阿尔喀比亚德的到来，这一切都被推翻了，但在第一批演讲中，实际上没有喝酒，或者可能是适度的。
I’m actually maybe not remembering, but it’s maybe moderate drinking.
我实际上可能不记得了，但可能是适度饮酒。
In any case, they cut back on the drinking in order to speak, so there’s a sense in which the dialogue presents the kind of friendly conversation that they’re having as being a bit in tension with the drinking.
无论如何，他们为了说话而减少了饮酒，所以从某种意义上说，对话呈现出他们正在进行的那种友好对话，因为喝酒有点紧张。
What do I think the dialogue as a whole is about?
我认为整个对话是关于什么的？
At least one thing it’s about is suggested by the frame and the ending.
框架和结局至少暗示了它的一件事。
It’s about the cult of Socrates.
这是关于苏格拉底的崇拜。
That’s at the very beginning, right?
那是一开始的事，对吗？
Right.
正确的。
People are telling stories about Socrates, and they’re also imitating Socrates.
人们在讲述苏格拉底的故事，同时也在模仿苏格拉底。
They’re walking around barefoot and stuff.
他们赤脚走来走去。
In their idea, he was a bit of a joke.
在他们看来，他就是个笑话。
Socrates gave rise to a whole bunch of Socrates imitators, as well as people who would write what Socrates wrote, like Xenophon and Plato.
苏格拉底造就了一大群苏格拉底的模仿者，以及像色诺芬和柏拉图这样写出苏格拉底作品的人。
Plato’s reflecting on this, on the kind of role of Socrates in the culture.
柏拉图对此进行了反思，反思了苏格拉底在文化中的角色。
And so you start with that, and you end with Alcibiades saying, “Here’s what it’s like to be around Socrates, to be affected by Socrates.”
所以你从这个开始，最后以阿尔喀比亚德的话说，“这就是在苏格拉底身边，受苏格拉底影响的感觉。”
That question, the question of the role of Socrates in the culture — and the place of the kind of speech he gives in the context of the kinds of speeches other people gave — what’s it like for Socrates to be one among many speakers in a group?
这个问题，即苏格拉底在文化中的角色问题——以及他的演讲在其他人的演讲中所处的位置——苏格拉底成为群体中众多演讲者中的一员是什么感觉？
I find it hard not to think that that’s at least in part about the question of, was he guilty?
我发现很难不认为这至少部分涉及到这样的问题：他有罪吗？
Did the Athenians make the correct decision?
雅典人做出了正确的决定吗？
Did he corrupt the youth?
他败坏了青少年吗？
Was he a positive influence in this culture or not?
他对这种文化是否产生了积极的影响？
I do think that’s at least some of what the Symposium is about, and Plato is trying to defend Socrates.
我确实认为这至少是研讨会的一部分内容，柏拉图试图为苏格拉底辩护。
He’s trying to say, “Let’s take Exhibit A for the claim that Socrates corrupted the youth, Alcibiades, and let’s get to the very heart of what Socrates’s effect on Alcibiades, and let’s look at him slipping away from Socrates towards ambition.
他想说的是，“让我们以证据A为例，说明苏格拉底腐蚀了年轻人阿尔喀比亚德，让我们深入了解苏格拉底对阿尔喀比亚德的影响，看看他从苏格拉底走向野心。
Let’s look inside of that and see, whose fault is it?
我们仔细看看，到底是谁的错呢？
Who’s responsible?”
谁负责？”
And I think his answer, in the form of Alcibiades’s speech, is that Alcibiades is responsible.
我认为他的答案，以阿尔西比亚德的演讲形式，是阿尔西比亚德的责任。
But isn’t Alcibiades himself condemning Socrates?
但亚西比德本人不是在谴责苏格拉底吗？
He calls him at least twice a Marsyas, who is pummeled and killed for having hubris, and it’s implied in Greek mythology that he deserves it.
他至少两次称他为马尔西亚斯，后者因狂妄自大而受到殴打和杀害，希腊神话中暗示这是他应得的。
Alcibiades says, “Well, I wouldn’t go near you without a guardian,” almost implying that was the more rational attitude.
阿尔喀比亚德说：“好吧，如果没有监护人，我不会靠近你。”几乎暗示这是更理性的态度。
Whose side is he on?
他站在谁一边？
Oh, I think Alcibiades is blaming Socrates, no question.
哦，毫无疑问，我认为阿尔喀比亚德在指责苏格拉底。
Plato’s not agreeing.
柏拉图不同意。
That is, I think that Socrates has a really interesting response to Alcibiades’s speech.
也就是说，我认为苏格拉底对阿尔喀比亚德的演讲有一个非常有趣的反应。
Alcibiades gives this whole speech about, “It’s horrible to be in love with Socrates.
阿尔喀比亚德的整个演讲是这样说的：“爱上苏格拉底是可怕的。
Look at what he’s done to me.
看看他对我做了什么。
He’s put me in this terrible state.”
他让我陷入了这种可怕的境地。”
Alcibiades, in effect, is making the case against Socrates, and then Socrates says, “It’s really clear what you’ve been doing.
实际上，阿尔喀比亚德是在反对苏格拉底，然后苏格拉底说：“你在做什么真的很清楚。
You’ve been trying to become the lover of Agathon and make me fall in love with you.” Socrates is essentially saying, “Look, you’ve turned away from me, and you hate the fact that you’re in love with me,” i.e., with the philosophical life.
你一直想成为阿伽通的情人，让我爱上你。”苏格拉底本质上是在说，“看，你已经背离了我，你讨厌你爱我的事实”，即爱哲学生活。
It’s sort of up to the reader whose side you’re going to come down on.
这在某种程度上取决于读者，你会站在哪一边。
And whether or not Plato comes down on Socrates’s or Alcibiades’s, I don’t know about that, but at the very least, there are materials in the Symposium for “What is Socrates’s response to the claim that he corrupted Alcibiades?”
至于柏拉图是否贬低苏格拉底或亚西比德，我不知道，但至少，研讨会上有“苏格拉底如何回应他腐蚀亚西比德的说法？”的材料。
Socrates’s response is, “No, Alcibiades didn’t try hard enough.
苏格拉底的回答是：“不，亚西比德不够努力。
He turned away from .
他转身离开。
.
。
.
。
He had the door open to him, and he walked the other way.”
他把门向他敞开，然后他朝另一条路走去。”
On living the good life
关于美好生活
I have a friend who’s interested in longevity research— to switch topics — and he tells me there’s maybe a 10 percent chance that I actually will live forever due to possible scientific advances.
我有一个朋友对长寿研究感兴趣——转换话题——他告诉我，由于可能的科学进步，我实际上有 10% 的机会永远活下去。
I’m skeptical, but let’s just say I were to live forever.
我对此表示怀疑，但我们只能说我会永远活着。
How bored would I end up, and how do you think about this question?
我最终会多么无聊，你如何看待这个问题？
I think it depends on how good of a person you are.
我认为这取决于你是一个多么优秀的人。
And the good people are more or less bored?
而善良的人或多或少都会感到无聊？
Oh, they’re less bored.
哦，他们不那么无聊了。
One thing is that you’re kind of having to live with yourself for a very long time if you’re immortal, or even just live for a couple thousand years, and a bad self, I think, is hard to live with.
有一件事是，如果你是不朽的，你就必须与自己生活很长一段时间，甚至只活几千年，而我认为，一个坏的自我是很难忍受的。
By bad, I don’t just mean sort of, let’s say, cruel to people or unjust.
我所说的“坏”并不仅仅是指对人残忍或不公正。
I also mean not attuned to things of eternal significance.
我的意思还在于不关注具有永恒意义的事物。
I think you can get by in a 100-year life not being too much attuned to things of eternal significance because there’s so much fascinating stuff out there, and one can go from one thing to the next and not get bored.
我认为你可以在 100 年的生活中不必过多关注具有永恒意义的事情，因为那里有很多令人着迷的东西，人们可以从一件事转到另一件事而不会感到无聊。
But if we’re talking about eternity, or even thousands of years, you’d better find something to occupy you that is really riveting in the way that I think only eternal things are.
但如果我们谈论的是永恒，甚至是几千年，你最好找到一些真正吸引你的东西来占据你的注意力，我认为只有永恒的东西才是这样的。
I think that what you’re really asking is something like, “Could I be a god?” And I think, “Well, if you became godlike, you could, and then it would be OK.”
我认为你真正想问的是“我可以成为神吗？”我想，“好吧，如果你变得像神一样，你就可以，那就没问题了。”
I think you can get by in a 100-year life not being too much attuned to things of eternal significance because there’s so much fascinating stuff out there, and one can go from one thing to the next and not get bored.
我认为你可以在 100 年的生活中不必过多关注具有永恒意义的事情，因为那里有很多令人着迷的东西，人们可以从一件事转到另一件事而不会感到无聊。
But if we’re talking about eternity, or even thousands of years, you’d better find something to occupy you that is really riveting in the way that I think only eternal things are.
但如果我们谈论的是永恒，甚至是几千年，你最好找到一些真正吸引你的东西来占据你的注意力，我认为只有永恒的东西才是这样的。
I think that what you’re really asking is something like, “Could I be a god?” And I think, “Well, if you became godlike, you could, and then it would be OK.”
我认为你真正想问的是“我可以成为神吗？”我想，“好吧，如果你变得像神一样，你就可以，那就没问题了。”
Let me give you a hypothesis.
让我给你一个假设。
You can react to it.
你可以对此做出反应。
That which is cultural, say, listening to music, I would get bored with, even though wonderful music maybe continually will be created.
那些文化性的东西，比如听音乐，我会感到厌倦，尽管也许会不断地创造出美妙的音乐。
But those activities which are more primeval, more biological — parenting, sex, food, sleep, maybe taking a wonderful shower — that are quite brute, in a way, maybe I would substitute more into those as an immortal?
但那些更原始、更生物性的活动——“养育孩子、性、食物、睡眠，也许还可以洗个美妙的澡”——在某种程度上，这些活动相当野蛮，也许我会以神仙的身份更多地替代这些活动？
Yes?
是的？
I don’t see why you wouldn’t get just as bored of bodily pleasures.
我不明白为什么你不会对身体的快乐感到厌倦。
You’re programmed for those to be so immediate and riveting, right?
你生来就注定这些事情会如此直接和引人入胜，对吗？
You evolve to be maybe an 80-year-old being, or perhaps even a 33-year-old being, so you are riveted on things like reproduction and getting enough sleep.
你可能会进化到 80 岁，甚至可能是 33 岁，所以你会全神贯注于生育和充足睡眠等事情。
And that stays riveting, even when you’re on this program to live 80,000 years.
即使你参加这个计划可以活到 80,000 岁，这仍然很吸引人。
I think that at least some of those activities stay riveting for us over the course of our lives because their meaning changes — eating, say.
我认为，至少其中一些活动在我们的一生中仍然对我们有吸引力，因为它们的意义发生了变化——比如饮食。
I liked to eat when I was five, and I like to eat now, but I eat very differently than I did then.
我五岁时喜欢吃东西，现在也喜欢吃东西，但我吃的东西和以前很不一样。
If I hadn’t changed and developed how I eat and what I eat, I would have gotten bored of it.
如果我没有改变和发展我的饮食方式和饮食内容，我就会对此感到厌倦。
There’s a question about the limits of that development.
关于这种发展的局限性存在一个问题。
How high up can one go with eating?
一个人吃东西能达到多高？
Won’t hunger always be the best sauce?
饥饿不总是最好的调味品吗？
I think that hunger will always make you want to eat, but is hunger enough to make eating meaningful to you and deserving of your attention in that way?
我认为饥饿总是会让你想吃东西，但是饥饿是否足以让吃对你来说有意义并值得你关注呢？
I think it isn’t.
我认为不是。
Let’s say we felt the world had 30 days left.
假设我们认为世界还剩下 30 天。
An asteroid was coming, a supernova, whatever.
一颗小行星即将来临，一颗超新星，等等。
How would or should we behave then?
那么我们会或应该如何行事？
Are the people who are good — do they have a better time than the people who are not good?
好人是否比坏人过得更好？
Yes, for slightly different reasons, I think.
是的，我认为原因略有不同。
Virtue — the more virtue you have, the more difficult the circumstances can be in which you still act and live well.
美德——你拥有的美德越多，你在越困难的环境中仍能表现得更好、生活得更好。
If you’re in relatively easy circumstances, even just being an OK person is enough.
如果你的环境比较安逸，做一个好人就足够了。
But when you start being in a position .
但当你开始处于一个位置时。
.
。
.
。
Let’s say it’s similar to being in a position of power.
假设这类似于处于权力地位。
I think having power of any kind — wealth, political power — makes life more difficult in the sense that you need more virtue to live well.
我认为拥有任何形式的权力——财富、政治权力——都会让生活变得更加困难，因为你需要更多的美德才能过得更好。
I think in the case where there’s 30 days left, you would need to be a good person to not give in to very human and very understandable panic in order to live well for the remaining 30 days.
我认为，在还剩30天的情况下，你需要成为一个好人，不屈服于非常人性的、非常可以理解的恐慌，才能在剩下的30天里过得很好。
It’s different but not that different from the case in which you find that there’s 30 days left of your life.
这与你发现自己的生命只剩下 30 天的情况有所不同，但并没有太大不同。
Similar issues are going to arise.
类似的问题将会出现。
I think it’s worse in the case where there’s 30 days left for everybody.
我认为如果每个人都还剩下 30 天的话，情况会更糟。
We often describe people in those situations as having courage or being admirable, and it’s because the situation calls up the virtue that’s in them.
我们经常将处于这种情况下的人描述为有勇气或令人钦佩，这是因为这种情况唤起了他们内在的美德。
I have an acquaintance who does high-energy physics, and he told me just about a week ago, “There’s a 98 percent chance the universe is infinite, and there are an infinite number of near copies of me.” I don’t believe that, actually, but he knows more about physics than I do.
我有一个研究高能物理的熟人，大约一周前他告诉我，“宇宙有 98% 的可能性是无限的，并且有无数个我的近似副本。”事实上，我不相信这一点，但他对物理的了解比我多。
Let’s say that were true.
假设这是真的。
Does that, or should that, in some way change the kind of meaning I give my life?
这是否或应该以某种方式改变我赋予生命的意义？
In the background here, I have Samuel Scheffler’s argument, which you know very well.
在此背景下，我有塞缪尔·谢夫勒（Samuel Scheffler）的论点，你对此非常了解。
You studied with him.
你和他一起学习。
That for our individual lives, the notion that civilization continues after us has a truly major significant impact on what we do now, even though we’re gone.
对于我们个人的生活来说，文明在我们身后继续存在的观念对我们现在所做的事情有着真正重大的影响，即使我们已经离开了。
If future civilization matters that much, these near copies of me out there — I’ll never be in their light cone.
如果未来的文明如此重要，那么这些与我相似的复制品就在那里 —— 我永远不会出现在他们的光锥中。
Does or should that matter at all?
这重要吗？或者应该重要吗？
I don’t think Scheffler would say it does or should matter because his thought is that the valuing that I do now is actually predicated on certain assumptions that I make about future generations.
我认为谢夫勒不会说这很重要或应该很重要，因为他的想法是我现在所做的评估实际上是基于我对后代所做的某些假设。
Yes.
是的。
And these other copies — my valuing isn’t predicated on them because I didn’t even know about them until a couple of minutes ago, so I couldn’t have been.
而这些其他副本 —— 我的估值并不基于它们，因为我直到几分钟前才知道它们，所以我不可能知道。
But you can still ask, should they matter?
但你仍然可以问，它们重要吗？
I hadn’t thought about that, but I thought about a related question that comes up with David Lewis’s philosophy.
我没有考虑过这一点，但我想到了一个与大卫·刘易斯的哲学相关的问题。
David Lewis makes a similar point in the field of metaphysics as opposed to physics, saying that there are these possible worlds that are real, though they’re not actual.
大卫·刘易斯在与物理学相反的形而上学领域提出了类似的观点，他说这些可能的世界是真实的，尽管它们不是真实的。
We live in the actual world.
我们生活在现实世界中。
And I have these counterparts in the other possible worlds.
我在其他可能的世界里也有这些对应物。
The part of his theory that I always had the hardest time with is the ethical part because it looks like, if I do a good thing, then in a sense, I know my counterparts — because all the other possibilities have to be, so to speak, saturated — my counterparts are going to do the bad things.
在他的理论中，我一直最难理解的部分是道德部分，因为看起来，如果我做了一件好事，那么从某种意义上说，我就了解我的同行——“因为所有其他的可能性都必须是饱和的”——“我的同行将会做坏事。”
So am I just keeping my corner of the possible world space clean?
那么我只是保持可能世界空间的角落清洁吗？
How could that be?
怎么可能呢？
How could you make sense of the motivation if those worlds are real?
如果这些世界是真实的，你如何理解动机？
There, far from thinking that I ought to take my counterparts into account, I kind of think I’m actually morally obligated not to because I go down a chain of thought that says it doesn’t matter what I do because all the possibilities will be real in any case.
在那里，我根本不认为我应该考虑我的同行，而是认为我实际上在道德上有义务不这样做，因为我的思想链表明我做什么并不重要，因为无论如何所有可能性都是真实的。
The late Derek Parfit, or at least some time slice of the late Derek Parfit, toyed with the hypothesis that if we had a weaker belief in the continuity of self, we would fear death less.
已故的德里克·帕菲特，或者至少是已故的德里克·帕菲特的某个时间片段，曾提出这样一个假设：如果我们对自我连续性的信念较弱，我们就会减少对死亡的恐惧。
There’s a paper I read recently that suggests, at least based on poll evidence, that Tibetan Buddhist monks — who have a pretty weak degree of belief in the continuity of the self and poll as such — that they fear death more than people from other religions.
我最近读到的一篇论文表明，至少基于民意调查证据，藏传佛教僧人——他们对自我连续性和民意调查的信念相当薄弱——他们比其他宗教的人更害怕死亡。
What’s the best philosophical way to think about this question?
思考这个问题的最佳哲学方式是什么？
It seems to me the first question is, ought we to fear death?
在我看来，第一个问题是，我们应该害怕死亡吗？
Because then we can ask, under what system will we fear it less?
因为那时我们可以问，在什么样的制度下我们会更少害怕它？
I think it’s rational to fear death, but I also think that the rationality of that is bound up with the demand for courage in the face of death.
我认为恐惧死亡是有道理的，但我也认为，这种恐惧的合理性与面对死亡时需要勇气有关。
We ought to fear death, and we ought to, in some sense, fight that fear.
我们应该害怕死亡，从某种意义上说，我们应该与这种恐惧作斗争。
One thing that the fear of death can lead you to is to thinking that dying is the worst thing that can happen to you, and that there’s no fate worse than death.
对死亡的恐惧可能导致你想到一件事，那就是认为死亡是发生在你身上最糟糕的事情，没有比死亡更糟糕的命运了。
People can do terrible things if they think that.
如果人们这么想，他们就会做出可怕的事情。
So it’s important to see that one’s life is valuable and has meaning, and therefore to fear death, but it isn’t the most important thing that there is.
因此，重要的是要看到一个人的生命是有价值的、有意义的，因此才会害怕死亡，但这并不是最重要的。
We ought to fear death and we ought to fight that fear.
我们应该害怕死亡，并且应该与这种恐惧作斗争。
One thing that the fear of death can lead you to is to thinking that dying is the worst thing that can happen to you.
对死亡的恐惧可能导致你想到一件事，那就是认为死亡是发生在你身上最糟糕的事情。
People can do terrible things if they think that.
如果人们这么想，他们就会做出可怕的事情。
So it’s important to see that one’s life is valuable and has meaning, and therefore to fear death, but it isn’t the most important thing that there is.
因此，重要的是要看到一个人的生命是有价值的、有意义的，因此才会害怕死亡，但这并不是最重要的。
In terms of which metaphysics of personal identity we adopt, I don’t know.
我不知道我们采用哪种个人身份形而上学。
But if we were just going to let our ethics drive our metaphysics, I would say we should adopt the one that would make death worthy of fear on the one hand, but on the other hand, also make people see that there’s more to the value of their lives than, so to speak, just biological life.
但如果我们只是想让我们的道德观驱动我们的形而上学，我想说我们应该采用一种道德观，一方面让死亡值得恐惧，另一方面也让人们看到生命的价值不仅仅是生物生命。
On aspiration and proleptic reasons
关于愿望和预产的原因
Let’s turn now to your new book, Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming.
现在让我们来看看你的新书《渴望：成为的力量》。
There’s a sentence from the book.
书中有一句话。
Let me read it, and maybe you can explain it.
让我读一下，也许你可以解释一下。
“Proleptic reasons allow you to be rational even when you know that your reasons aren’t exactly the right ones.” What’s a proleptic reason?
“即使你知道自己的理由并不完全正确，预知性的理由也能让你保持理性。”什么是促产原因？
What I’m trying to explain is, how do people get themselves to care about things that they don’t yet care about?
我想解释的是，人们如何让自己去关心他们还不关心的事情？
Suppose that you want to come to appreciate a certain kind of music — that’s the example I use in the book — more than you do.
假设你想要欣赏某种音乐 —— 这就是我在书中使用的例子 —— 比你更想欣赏。
Then there’s the question, why should you do that?
那么问题来了，你为什么要这么做？
Why should you take the music appreciation class?
为什么要参加音乐欣赏课？
You might say, well, the value of music.
你可能会说，嗯，音乐的价值。
Classical music is this great thing, but you don’t see it as valuable, presumably.
古典音乐是一件伟大的事情，但你可能不认为它有价值。
That’s why you have to take a class.
这就是为什么你必须上课。
So there’s a kind of paradox that would suggest we should never try to get ourselves interested or into new things because, in order to have a reason to do that, we’d already have to have the interest.
因此，有一种悖论表明，我们永远不应该试图让自己感兴趣或进入新事物，因为，为了有理由这样做，我们必须已经有兴趣。
Proleptic reasons are supposed to solve this problem.
预谋的原因应该可以解决这个问题。
They are the reasons that you act on when you are working your way into a new domain of value.
当你努力进入一个新的价值领域时，它们是你采取行动的原因。
What I say characterizes these reasons is that they have two faces.
我所说的这些原因的特点是它们有两个面孔。
They’re kind of divided.
他们有点分裂。
They have two parts.
它们有两个部分。
The one part is like if you were to say, “What’s your reason?
一方面，如果你说：“你的理由是什么？
Why are you taking this class?” You might say, “Well, the intrinsic value of classical music is one of the great goods that our civilization has produced.” Something like that.
你为什么要上这门课？”你可能会说，“嗯，古典音乐的内在价值是我们文明所创造的伟大财富之一。”类似的事情。
But when you say that, your words are going to be a little bit hollow.
但当你这么说的时候，你的话就有点空洞了。
If they ask you to say more, you won’t be able to say much.
如果他们要求你多说，你就不能说太多。
That’s not all of your reason.
这还不是你的全部理由。
That’s what I call the distal face of your reason, the face that looks away to the person you’re going to become.
这就是我所说的理性的远端面，即远离你将成为的人的面。
But then there are also going to be bits of your motivation that are a little more embarrassing, like, “A bunch of people I admire are in the class.” Or “I think that people will like me more.” “I have some ideal of, or some image or some fantasy of, a kind of enriched life, and I see classical music as part of that.” I think those are also parts.
但你的动机也会有一些让人尴尬的地方，比如“班上有一群我钦佩的人。”或者“我认为人们会更喜欢我。” “我对一种丰富的生活有某种理想、某种形象或某种幻想，我认为古典音乐是其中的一部分。”我认为这些也是一部分。
That’s the proximate face of the proleptic reason, the part that you can now grasp.
这就是促生原因的最接近的面貌，也是你现在可以掌握的部分。
But you can see that that’s not all of it.
但你会发现这还不是全部。
You’re still working on the classics and Socratic problems, like how is change possible?
你仍在研究经典和苏格拉底问题，比如改变如何可能？
Yes, absolutely.
是的，绝对是。
You give an example of a parent maybe having an aspiration in a particular way, but a gangster cannot have an aspiration in a similar way?
你举个例子，父母可能有某种特定的愿望，但黑帮就不能有类似的愿望？
Correct.
正确的。
Would you explain that briefly?
您能简单解释一下吗？
Yes.
是的。
I didn’t think this when I started writing the book, actually.
事实上，当我开始写这本书时，我并没有想到这一点。
I thought you could aspire to anything that you could value.
我以为你可以追求任何你认为有价值的东西。
Sometimes people value things that aren’t valuable.
有时候，人们会珍惜那些不值钱的东西。
People make mistakes in valuing.
人们在估价时会犯错误。
I thought if aspiration is the acquisition of value, you could acquire false values as well as true ones, and we want to tell the story of how you do that.
我认为，如果愿望是获得价值，那么你可能会获得错误的价值观，也可能获得真实的价值观，我们想讲述你如何做到这一点的故事。
But as I was writing the book and I tried to tell that story, I kept on not being able to tell it.
但当我写这本书并试图讲述这个故事时，我一直无法讲述它。
I tried to use the example of the gangster, someone who aspires to become a gangster.
我试图用黑帮的例子，一个渴望成为黑帮的人。
And the problem that I ran into was that when I would describe the process of the person becoming a gangster, I couldn’t find a way to specify that what was going on there was aspiration as opposed to a phenomenon I wanted to distinguish from aspiration called ambition.
我遇到的问题是，当我描述一个人成为黑帮的过程时，我找不到一种方法来具体说明那里发生的事情是野心，而不是我想将野心与野心区分开来的现象。
OK.
好的。
When you’re ambitious, you’re not trying to come to value something new.
当你雄心勃勃时，你不会试图去重视新事物。
You’re just trying to satisfy desires or values you already have but that are maybe large in scale.
你只是想满足你已有的欲望或价值观，但规模可能很大。
Every time I’d tell the story of the aspiring gangster, I found that it could equally well be read as the story of the ambitious gangster, and there was no way to specify the difference, whereas I didn’t have that kind of problem when I talked about the aspiring student.
每次讲“有抱负的黑帮”的故事时，我都发现它和“雄心勃勃的黑帮”的故事一样可以读，而且无法具体说明区别，而当我讲“有抱负的学生”时，就没有这样的问题。
So what I came to conclude was that the reason I was running into this roadblock is that you can only aspire .
所以我得出的结论是，我遇到这个障碍的原因是你只能渴望。
.
。
.
。
Let me put it this way: If we see someone, we only count them as aspiring if we think that the thing they’re moving towards is, in fact, good.
让我这样说吧：如果我们看到某人，只有当我们认为他们正在走向的事情实际上是好的时，我们才会认为他们有抱负。
We wouldn’t call it aspiration otherwise.
否则我们不会称其为愿望。
If I think of Stephen Dedalus, the main character in James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, that’s often considered a classic novel of aspiration.
如果我想到詹姆斯·乔伊斯（James Joyce）的《青年艺术家的肖像》中的主角斯蒂芬·迪达勒斯（Stephen Dedalus），那通常被认为是一部经典的励志小说。
He seems to me like a jerk.
在我看来，他就像个混蛋。
He’s visiting all these prostitutes.
他正在拜访所有这些妓女。
He’s misogynistic toward women, somewhat uncaring toward his family, wallowing in a kind of Irish misery.
他对女性有厌恶感，对家人也有些漠不关心，沉浸在爱尔兰式的苦难之中。
In a way, he’s maturing, but it seems to me, he’s moving from being one kind of jerk to another kind of jerk.
在某种程度上，他正在成熟，但在我看来，他正在从一种混蛋变成另一种混蛋。
Can aspiration be the province of jerks, even if it cannot be of gangsters?
即使不可能是流氓，但愿望是否可以成为混蛋的领域？
I think that, actually, all aspirants are going to be a little bit jerky.
我认为，事实上，所有有抱负的人都会有点生涩。
It’ll be characteristic of an aspirant that they’re defective, and so the fact that Stephen Dedalus doesn’t instantiate his own ideals is a sign that he is an aspirant.
有抱负者的特征是他们有缺陷，因此斯蒂芬·迪达勒斯没有实现自己的理想这一事实表明他是有抱负者。
The thing is that Stephen’s aspirations pull him away from other people, rather than towards them, and so it’s not actually that clear to me that his jerkiness gets sort of ameliorated over the course of the novel.
问题是，斯蒂芬的抱负使他远离其他人，而不是接近他们，所以我实际上并不清楚他的急躁在小说的过程中是否得到了某种程度的改善。
His aspirations are aesthetic, but I think that .
他的愿望是审美，但我认为。
.
。
.
。
He says.
他说。
Yeah, he says.
是的，他说。
But it’s part of my view that people can’t aspire to something without knowing that they aspire to it.
但我认为，人们不可能在不知道自己渴望某件事的情况下渴望它。
Aspiration has to be as transparent as it can be, given that you only have a partial grasp, right?
发愿必须尽可能透明，因为你只有部分的了解，对吗？
So he couldn’t be aspiring to something else that he is unaware of.
所以他不可能渴望其他他不知道的东西。
Stephen — from the very beginning of the novel, he hears the sounds of words, and he’s interested in their sounds and in the way that they connect up to one another, and he’s asking himself questions about his place in the universe.
斯蒂芬——从小说一开始，他就听到了单词的声音，他对它们的声音以及它们相互联系的方式很感兴趣，他在问自己关于他在宇宙中的位置的问题。
What we see over the course of that is him working towards a kind of self-understanding as an artist, and I think he makes genuine progress there.
在此过程中我们看到的是他作为一名艺术家正在努力实现某种自我理解，我认为他在这方面取得了真正的进步。
But you’re right.
但你是对的。
He doesn’t make a lot of progress with respect to how he treats other people, and that seems to be something that he doesn’t care about that much.
他在对待他人的方式上并没有取得很大的进步，而且这似乎是他不太关心的事情。
And that’s consistent with my view.
这与我的观点一致。
My view is only that when you aspire to something, that thing has to actually be good.
我的观点只是，当你渴望某件事时，那件事实际上必须是好的。
You don’t have to be good in other respects.
你不必在其他方面表现出色。
How much is aspiration the result of a kind of crude mimetic desire as evidenced, say, by Elena and Lila in Ferrante’s My Brilliant Friend?
正如费兰特的《我聪明的朋友》中的埃琳娜和莉拉所证明的那样，渴望在多大程度上是一种原始模仿欲望的结果？
It seems to me, for instance, Lila marries Stefano as part of a somewhat misguided aspiration to be successful and accepted in mainstream.
例如，在我看来，莉拉与斯特凡诺结婚是出于一种有点误导的渴望，即获得成功并被主流接受。
Pretty early on in the marriage, he’s basically beating her and raping her.
在婚姻的早期，他基本上就殴打她并强奸她。
Isn’t this something unhealthy about aspiration?
这难道不是一种不健康的追求吗？
It doesn’t seem there she had ambition.
看来她没有什么野心。
It seems it was aspiration, and she went down this unknown path and did something actually quite desperate.
似乎是一种渴望，她走上了这条未知的道路，做了一件实际上很绝望的事情。
Yes.
是的。
I think that aspirants don’t really know what they’re doing, and so they’re going to make a lot of mistakes, and she definitely makes a mistake with Stefano.
我认为有抱负的人并不真正知道自己在做什么，所以他们会犯很多错误，而她在斯特凡诺身上肯定犯了一个错误。
I think she’s trying to get out of marrying — which one is it?
我认为她正试图摆脱婚姻 —— 是哪一个？
Marcello or Michele?
马塞洛还是米歇尔？
One of the Solara brothers, right?
索拉拉兄弟之一，对吗？
She becomes very enamored with this thought, both her and Elena do, of becoming the kind of machinatrix behind her life, like she’s going to take control of her life.
她变得非常迷恋这个想法，她和埃琳娜都是如此，成为她生活背后的阴谋家，就像她要掌控自己的生活一样。
They think — her and Elena — that they have found a way to be real agents in this world that is pushing them around with respect to marriage.
他们认为——她和埃琳娜——他们已经找到了一种方式，成为这个世界上真正的代理人，在婚姻问题上推动他们。
Now they’re totally wrong about that, and even there’s foreshadowing, even as that’s being told.
现在他们的想法完全错误了，甚至还有伏笔，即使是这样说的。
It turned out only Stefano was the one who was really in charge.
事实证明，只有斯特凡诺才是真正负责的人。
At some point Elena says this.
埃琳娜在某个时候说过这样的话。
So I think you’re right that this was a misstep for Lila, and I also think it was aspiration.
所以我认为你是对的，这对莉拉来说是一个失误，而且我也认为这是一个愿望。
I think that aspiration is mimetic, but I don’t think it’s crudely.
我认为这种愿望是模仿的，但我不认为这是粗糙的。
I just think it is mimetic.
我只是觉得这是模仿而已。
It’s imitative, and when we imitate, we often go wrong and make missteps, but I don’t think there’s any other way to learn.
这是模仿，当我们模仿时，我们经常会出错、犯错，但我认为没有其他学习方法。
One of my favorite sayings is that all thinkers are regional thinkers.
我最喜欢的一句话是，所有的思想家都是区域性的思想家。
When you come to mind, one thing I know about you is you were born in Hungary.
当我想起你时，我对你的了解之一是你出生在匈牙利。
You come from Central European Jewish culture, which has this fantastic 20th century tradition.
你们来自中欧犹太文化，这种文化有着 20 世纪的奇妙传统。
And there’s a kind of stereotype of Hungarian Central European/East European families as being pushing in a certain way, or encouraging their children to aspire, and this being much more central to that culture than it would be to a lot of other regions.
人们对匈牙利中欧/东欧家庭有一种刻板印象，认为他们会以某种方式推动，或鼓励他们的孩子有志向，这对于该文化来说比许多其他地区更为重要。
How has your personal background in that regard fed into this book?
您在这方面的个人背景是如何融入本书的？
And is this a regional book in that sense?
从这个意义上说，这是一本区域性的书吗？
I’ll tell you one story that I haven’t thought of for at least a decade, that that called to mind.
我会告诉你一个我至少十年来没有想到过的、让我想起的故事。
When I was little, I remember this thing that my mother — I have a terrible memory, so I remember very few things from my childhood — but I remember my mom.
小时候，我记得妈妈的这件事 ——“我记性很差，所以我小时候的事情记得很少”—— 但是我记得我的妈妈。
My mom is extremely into classical music.
我妈妈非常喜欢古典音乐。
I’m not at all.
我一点也不。
She was telling me about there are two kinds of people.
她告诉我世界上有两种人。
There’s the Mozart kind and the Beethoven kind.
有莫扎特的和贝多芬的。
Mozart, when he thought of some music, it was just perfect.
莫扎特，当他想到一些音乐时，它就是完美的。
He could just write it down, and it was like he was listening to God.
他可以把它写下来，就像他在听上帝说话一样。
Beethoven would write it and rewrite it and rewrite it and cross it out.
贝多芬会写它，重写它，重写它，然后划掉它。
I don’t remember that she ever said this, but I remember coming away from that thinking, “Oh, I guess I’m the Beethoven kind.” I never had the thought that there was any third choice.
我不记得她曾经说过这句话，但我记得摆脱这种想法后，我想：“哦，我想我是贝多芬那样的人。”我从来没有想过还有第三种选择。
I had to be one of those.
我必须成为其中之一。
Those are the options.
这些就是选项。
Either you’re like Mozart, or you’re like Beethoven.
要么你像莫扎特，要么你像贝多芬。
I do think I sort of came away from my childhood with the expectation like, “You’d better be someone.
我确实认为我带着这样的期望离开了童年：“你最好成为一个人。
You’d better be someone great.
你最好成为一个伟大的人。
Here are the choices for you.
以下是您的选择。
Those are the only choices that there are.”
这些是唯一的选择。”
On aspiration, what do you think of Jordan Peterson?
说到抱负，你觉得乔丹·彼得森怎么样？
I had this odd feeling.
我有这种奇怪的感觉。
He only became known to me quite recently, in the past couple of weeks.
我最近才认识他，也就是过去几周的时间。
I was listening to him talk, and I was thinking he sounds a little bit like Socrates, but not Socrates.
我听他说话，我觉得他听起来有点像苏格拉底，但又不是苏格拉底。
I was like, “Who is that?
我当时想，“那是谁？
Who is he reminding me of?” And it’s Xenophon’s Socrates.
他让我想起了谁？”这是色诺芬笔下的苏格拉底。
I think he’s the best instance of the self-help genre that I’ve ever encountered, in the sense that he has these morals that he puts forward, like tell the truth, keep your room clean, pull yourself together, go for the highest good.
我认为他是我遇到过的自助类型的最佳例子，因为他拥有他提出的这些道德，比如说实话、保持房间干净、振作起来、追求最高的利益。
Those are good morals.
这些都是良好的道德。
My 14-year-old knew about Jordan Peterson before I did and listens to him.
我 14 岁的孩子比我先了解乔丹·彼得森，并且听他讲话。
Listening to him, I was like, “I’m very happy my son is listening to this.
听他说话，我想，“我很高兴我的儿子正在听这个。
This is good for him.
这对他有好处。
This is at least a little bit of the internet that I don’t have to try to pull him away from.”
这至少是互联网的一小部分，我不必试图把他从那里拉开。”
I think it’s characteristic, something like that genre of self-help, that it is part of a larger story and isn’t the whole story in the way that philosophy aims to be.
我认为它的特点是，就像自助类型一样，它是一个更大故事的一部分，而不是哲学所希望的整个故事。
Peterson is pulling against certain cultural trends, and his morals are very good in that context.
彼得森反对某些文化趋势，在这种背景下他的道德非常好。
They pull you away when the culture is pulling you too much in one direction.
当文化将你过度拉向一个方向时，它们就会把你拉开。
He pulls you in the other direction.
他把你拉向另一个方向。
That’s sort of the work that he’s doing.
这就是他正在做的工作。
That’s really valuable, but in another culture, it would be really pernicious because he’s not giving you the whole story.
这确实很有价值，但在另一种文化中，这将是非常有害的，因为他没有向你提供整个故事。
He’s only giving a part of the story, so that’s how I experience him.
他只讲述了故事的一部分，所以这就是我对他的体验。
Jordan Peterson is pulling against certain cultural trends, and his morals are very good in that context.
乔丹·彼得森反对某些文化趋势，在这种背景下他的道德非常好。
They pull you away when the culture is pulling you too much in one direction.
当文化将你过度拉向一个方向时，它们就会把你拉开。
He pulls you in the other direction.
他把你拉向另一个方向。
That’s sort of the work that he’s doing.
这就是他正在做的工作。
That’s really valuable, but in another culture, it would be really pernicious because he’s not giving you the whole story.
这确实很有价值，但在另一种文化中，这将是非常有害的，因为他没有向你提供整个故事。
Given what you understand about aspiration, why are so many young American men apparently not even interested in looking for work?
鉴于您对抱负的理解，为什么这么多美国年轻男性显然对找工作不感兴趣？
I don’t know.
我不知道。
I just don’t know.
我只是不知道。
OK.
好的。
What’s the worst thing to say to infertile couples?
对不孕夫妇最糟糕的一句话是什么？
I think there are so many bad things to say, it’s actually kind of hard to come out with a good thing to say.
我觉得有很多坏话要说，实际上很难说出好话来。
Maybe the best thing to say is to listen and not to say anything because the idea of saying anything at all suggests that you’re giving advice, and that suggests that you’re in a position of knowledge, which you’re probably not until you’ve spent a lot of time listening to them.
也许最好的说法就是倾听，而不是说什么，因为说什么都表明你正在提供建议，这表明你处于知识的位置，而除非你花了很多时间倾听他们的意见，否则你可能无法做到这一点。
I’ve read your book, which I liked and also enjoyed very much, and I have two Straussian readings of your book.
我读过你的书，我很喜欢，也非常喜欢，我还读过两本施特劳斯式的读物。
I’ll present you with each of them.
我将向您介绍它们中的每一个。
Just to be clear to the reader or listener, these are either things you never say, or perhaps even disavow explicitly.
只是为了让读者或听众清楚，这些要么是你从未说过的事情，要么是你明确否认的事情。
So when I say this, reader or listener, don’t think this is what the book is.
因此，当我这么说时，读者或听众，不要认为这就是这本书。
It’s not.
它不是。
It’s my Straussian take on it.
这是我对施特劳斯主义的看法。
The first take is that within the book, you have this big integrated account of much more than just aspiration.
第一个观点是，在这本书中，你有一个大的综合描述，而不仅仅是愿望。
You talk about weakness of will, and you think of that as a way of being able to do something when you don’t really have good enough reasons to do what you ought to do.
你谈到意志薄弱，你认为这是当你没有足够充分的理由去做你应该做的事情时能够做某事的一种方式。
There’s this kind of incompleteness in how you get to the other side.
你到达彼岸的方式存在这种不完整性。
So you’re tying together what you call proleptic desire — akrasia or weakness of the will.
所以你把你所谓的“预欲”与“意志薄弱”联系在一起。
You have this hybrid theory of value about both doing and valuing something, and how both are needed, and how intrinsic conflict ties into that.
你有这种混合的价值理论，关于做某事和评估某事，以及两者如何需要，以及内在冲突如何与之相关。
So the Straussian reading is, you’ve produced this whole big theory of value and decision and choice.
所以施特劳斯式的解读是，你已经产生了整个关于价值、决策和选择的大理论。
You know you can’t get away with claiming that, so you put out this small piece of it.
你知道你无法逃脱这样的说法，所以你把它的一小部分拿出来。
But in fact, since aspiration is a matter of degree, and even small events can trigger big changes, if you have a good theory of aspiration — consumption is aspirational — in a sense you have a theory of everything.
但事实上，由于渴望是一个程度的问题，即使是很小的事件也可能引发大的变化，所以如果你有一个好的渴望理论——“消费是有渴望的”——从某种意义上说，你就拥有了一切的理论。
So this book is like stage one of your theory of everything, but you can’t say it.
所以这本书就像你万有理论的第一阶段，但你不能说出来。
That’s Straussian reading number one.
这是施特劳斯的第一读物。
What’s your response?
你的回应是什么？
I think it’s true that aspiration is step one of the theory of everything, but it isn’t true that the reason .
我认为愿望确实是万有理论的第一步，但原因却不是这样。
.
。
.
。
I can’t say what the theory is, but that’s because I don’t have it, not because I’m hiding it.
我不能说出这个理论是什么，但那是因为我没有它，而不是因为我隐藏它。
What you’ve come away with makes sense to me because essentially what I’m doing is .
你所得到的结果对我来说很有意义，因为本质上我正在做的是。
.
。
.
。
The parts of the book are in different areas of philosophy, in the three major areas of ethics — in decision theory or theory of rationality, in moral psychology, and in moral responsibility.
本书的各个部分涉及哲学的不同领域、伦理学的三个主要领域——决策理论或理性理论、道德心理学和道德责任。
What I’m doing is saying, “Look, if you want to give a theory of aspiration, you have to kind of break the central apparatus that philosophers have been working with in each of these three areas.” If we don’t do that, then aspiration becomes impossible.
我正在做的是说，“听着，如果你想给出一种愿望理论，你就必须打破哲学家在这三个领域中一直使用的中心机构。”如果我们不这样做，那么愿望就不可能实现。
Clearly, it’s possible.
显然，这是可能的。
But if you do that, if you give up on saying the first part of the book — the idea that all reasons are internal, that all of our motivations can be explained in terms of antecedent desires — you get rid of that, then you’re left thinking, “Well, how do we explain decision and choice?”
但如果你这样做，如果你放弃说这本书的第一部分——“所有原因都是内在的，我们所有的动机都可以用先前的欲望来解释”这一观点——你就摆脱了这一点，然后你就会想，“那么，我们如何解释决定和选择呢？”
We’re going to need another new theory.
我们需要另一种新理论。
Your thought is I have it, and I haven’t given it, but the truth is .
你的想法是我拥有它，而我没有给予它，但事实是。
.
。
.
。
No, you have given it, at least part of it.
不，你已经给了，至少是一部分。
I’ve given the part of it that says that it’s going to have to accommodate this phenomenon, but I don’t actually think that you can extrapolate from that the whole theory.
我已经给出了其中的一部分，说它必须适应这种现象，但我实际上并不认为你可以从中推断出整个理论。
And the reason is because aspiration is itself a theory of change, and of how we become someone.
原因是因为愿望本身就是一种改变的理论，以及我们如何成为某人的理论。
But that theory is in a way secondary.
但这个理论在某种程度上是次要的。
The primary theory is going to have to be like, “What’s it like to be someone?
主要理论必须是这样的：“成为某人是什么感觉？
What’s the theory of the endpoint of aspiration?” That’s what I haven’t given, though there are many theories of that that are incompatible with aspiration.
愿望终点的理论是什么？”这就是我没有给出的内容，尽管有许多与愿望不相容的理论。
Those theories, I’ve refuted, I think.
我认为这些理论我已经驳斥了。
That’s not to say that you can use the theory I’ve given of aspiration to generate a theory of, say, what kind of end states are worthwhile to aspire to?
这并不是说你可以使用我给出的愿望理论来生成一个理论，比如说，什么样的最终状态值得追求？
And what is it to be in those states?
那么在这些州会是什么样子呢？
Here’s my second Straussian reading.
这是我的第二本施特劳斯读物。
When I read Plato, it seems obvious to me that one of the most striking features of Socrates is that he has never raised a child.
当我读柏拉图时，我发现苏格拉底最显着的特征之一就是他从未养育过孩子。
Under the second Straussian reading of your book, you’re saying parenting needs to be much more central to ethics and decision theory, and that there’s something badly wrong with philosophy that it isn’t.
在对你的书进行第二次施特劳斯式解读时，你说养育子女需要在伦理学和决策理论中占据更加核心的地位，而哲学却没有做到这一点，这是严重错误的。
Again, you can’t quite come out and say that, but in various indirect ways you say it, or at least you show it.
再说一次，你不能直接说出来，但你可以通过各种间接的方式来表达，或者至少表现出来。
This is, in part, a theory of how so many things in our life are more like parenting than we realize, and if you don’t have the parenting experience, there’s something deficient in your understanding of the world.
在某种程度上，这是一种理论，说明我们生活中的许多事情比我们意识到的更像是养育子女，如果你没有养育经验，那么你对世界的理解就会存在缺陷。
What says you?
你说什么？
I think that Socrates had a very parental relationship — it comes out in Phaedo.
我认为苏格拉底有一种非常亲子关系——这在《斐多篇》中就有体现。
That’s the best place for it — to the young men who were his followers.
对于他的追随者来说，这是最好的地方。
You’re right, that’s not the same thing as raising a young child.
你是对的，这和抚养一个小孩不是一回事。
He did have children but who knows how much .
他确实有孩子，但谁知道有多少。
.
。
.
。
Again, from the Phaedo it suggests .
再次，从《斐多篇》中可以看出。
.
。
.
。
Exactly.
确切地。
CALLARD: I don’t believe that if you haven’t had the experience of parenting yourself, that means you’re necessarily missing something.
卡拉德：我不认为如果你没有养育自己的经历，就意味着你一定会错过一些东西。
I can’t know that, but I do think that philosophy has .
我不知道，但我确实认为哲学有。
.
。
.
。
There are many aspects of the human experience that are undertheorized by philosophers — parenting, but not just parenting, but a whole range of phenomena that go with it.
人类经验的许多方面都没有被哲学家们充分理论化——养育，但不仅仅是养育，而是与之相关的一系列现象。
Basically, a lot of the ethics of sexuality or something — there are bits of that that have been addressed, but there’s a lot of it that hasn’t.
基本上，很多性道德或其他问题——有些已经得到解决，但还有很多还没有解决。
I don’t know that any philosopher before me has ever asked that question that you asked me.
我不知道在我之前有哪个哲学家问过你问我的这个问题。
I asked in my book, “What does one say to infertile couples?” “What is the ethics of how you deal with people who are infertile?”
我在书中问道：“人们会对不孕夫妇说什么？” “你对待不孕不育的人的道德是什么？”
That’s an important ethical question.
这是一个重要的道德问题。
I think that, as far as I can tell, it isn’t a question people have asked before.
我认为，据我所知，这不是人们以前问过的问题。
I do think it’s an important area of human life that hasn’t been sufficiently theorized.
我确实认为这是人类生活的一个重要领域，但尚未得到充分的理论化。
Maybe you’re right that, were we to do so better, that would affect our theory in other areas.
也许你是对的，如果我们做得更好，就会影响我们在其他领域的理论。
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.
莎士比亚的哈姆雷特。
Is he a philosopher?
他是哲学家吗？
If so, is he a Cartesian?
如果是这样，他是笛卡尔主义者吗？
He definitely reminds me a bit of Descartes.
他确实让我想起了笛卡尔。
Not just he, but the whole play is trapped a bit in Hamlet’s head.
不只是他，整个戏剧都有点困在哈姆雷特的脑海里。
I don’t know of any other play where you get this.
我不知道还有什么其他游戏可以让你得到这个。
It’s so relentless because he’s in so many scenes.
这太无情了，因为他出现在很多场景中。
The other characters, as I see them, aren’t very well-developed or well-drawn characters.
在我看来，其他角色都不是很发达或刻画得很好的角色。
And Hamlet — his monologues are meditations on the nature of life and emotion.
而哈姆雷特——他的独白是对生命和情感本质的沉思。
They’re not really speeches about the action or people around him.
它们并不是关于他周围的人或行为的真正演讲。
He seems, in this weird way, apart from the world.
他似乎以一种奇怪的方式远离了这个世界。
He seems trapped inside his own head.
他似乎被困在自己的头脑里了。
Descartes has this thought experiment that he engages in in the Meditations, right?
笛卡尔在《沉思录》中进行了这个思想实验，对吧？
Systematically doubt everything that you believe, and see what you come to.
系统地怀疑你所相信的一切，看看你会得到什么。
What Descartes comes to is a kind of real truth that he can build upon inside of his own mind.
笛卡尔得出的是一种他可以在自己的头脑中建立的真实真理。
Something my students often ask me about that is, “What would happen if you doubted, and you doubted, and you doubted, and you never came to anything?” There wasn’t a stop.
我的学生经常问我的一个问题是，“如果你怀疑、怀疑、怀疑，但你什么也没得到，会发生什么？”没有停留。
What guarantee did Descartes have that it would stop ever, anywhere?
笛卡尔有什么保证它会永远、在任何地方停止呢？
That you wouldn’t become despondent and have nothing you could trust anymore?
你不会变得沮丧，不再有任何可以信任的东西吗？
I think that Hamlet, at least in the early part of the play, that he’s a bit like that.
我认为哈姆雷特，至少在戏剧的早期部分，他有点像那样。
He’s a bit the character of Descartes if he hadn’t found anything like the “I think.”
如果他没有找到像“我认为”这样的东西，他就有点像笛卡尔了。
Did Descartes find something?
笛卡尔发现了什么吗？
Is Descartes an earlier version of the contemporary argument that we’re living in a simulation, where the evil demon is the simulation rather than Bayesian reasoning?
笛卡尔是当代论点的早期版本，即我们生活在模拟中，邪恶的恶魔是模拟而不是贝叶斯推理？
That argument certainly traces to Descartes, but he thought one could get out of it.
这一论点当然可以追溯到笛卡尔，但他认为人们可以摆脱它。
He thought he had refuted that.
他以为他已经反驳了这一点。
He says.
他说。
Right.
正确的。
He says he’s refuted it.
他说他已经反驳了。
Let’s put it that way.
这么说吧。
You can trace it to him.
你可以追踪到他。
But you end up back in the mind of God in a way.
但在某种程度上，你最终又回到了上帝的思想中。
It’s not an evil demon, but you’re living in a universe God has created.
它不是邪恶的恶魔，但你生活在上帝创造的宇宙中。
Sure, but that’s the real world.
当然可以，但这就是现实世界。
The whole question is about being connected to reality as opposed to being a figment.
整个问题是关于与现实的联系，而不是虚构的。
If you’re living in the world God created, God can create real things.
如果你生活在上帝创造的世界里，上帝就能创造真实的事物。
So you’re living in a real world.
所以你生活在一个现实世界中。
Why did Shakespeare tell the story about a royal family that doesn’t matter historically because they all killed each other?
为什么莎士比亚要讲述一个皇室家族的故事，这个故事在历史上并不重要，因为他们都互相残杀？
Why not tell the story of Fortinbras?
为什么不讲述福丁布拉斯的故事呢？
I think one of the things that makes Hamlet so powerful is that it’s about how the inside of an experience — or the first-personal point of view on it — is significant.
我认为《哈姆雷特》之所以如此强大，是因为它讲述了一种体验的内部——或者第一人称的视角——如何具有重要意义。
People are significant not only for what they do but for how they live inside of their skin or something like that.
人们的重要性不仅在于他们所做的事情，还在于他们在皮肤内部的生活方式或类似的东西。
In Hamlet’s first speech .
在哈姆雷特的第一次演讲中。
.
。
.
。
Sorry, it’s not first.
抱歉，这不是第一。
I think it’s the beginning of Act II.
我认为这是第二幕的开始。
He says something like — he’s being criticized for mourning his father too much — “Those are but the trappings and the suits of woe, and I have that within which passes show.”
他说了类似这样的话：“他因过度哀悼父亲而受到批评”“这些不过是悲伤的装饰和外衣，而我已经在通行证中显示了这一点。”
So Hamlet is, from the very beginning, pointing to his inner life.
所以哈姆雷特从一开始就在指向他的内心生活。
The play points us to that, to the reality of the inner life of people, where their royal status and their large actions and their fighting in wars and all that becomes irrelevant, becomes the background.
该剧向我们指出了人们内心生活的现实，他们的皇室地位、他们的大行动、他们在战争中的战斗等等一切都变得无关紧要，成为了背景。
Why, as a philosopher and also a classicist, are you more interested in reading works of fiction now in some ways?
作为一名哲学家和古典学家，为什么你现在在某些方面对阅读小说作品更感兴趣？
That’s what I take away from what I know about what you’re doing.
这就是我从我对你所做的事情的了解中得到的结论。
Am more interested in reading works of fiction now, you mean, than at other times?
你的意思是，我现在比其他时候更喜欢阅读小说作品？
Than might be many other philosophers.
可能比许多其他哲学家更重要。
I think many reasons, but one of them that pops to my head is that often in philosophy, we’re trying to theorize some phenomenon.
我认为原因有很多，但其中一个突然出现在我脑海中的是，在哲学中，我们经常试图将某些现象理论化。
Say we’re trying to theorize aspiration, trying to give a theory of it, or weakness of will.
假设我们试图将愿望理论化，试图给出它的理论，或者意志薄弱。
The way we do it as philosophers is, we often use example at least to lay out the problem: “Here’s an example of such and such.”
作为哲学家，我们经常使用例子来至少阐明问题：“这是一个这样那样的例子。”
The problem with examples, though, is that they can collapse under theoretical pressure.
然而，例子的问题在于它们可能在理论压力下崩溃。
There’s a constant impulse to rewrite the example and to say, “Oh, well, what was really going on was .
人们总是有一种冲动去重写这个例子并说：“哦，好吧，真正发生的事情是……。
.
。
.” Essentially that impulse comes from the fact that there are certain changes you could make to the example that would make it theoretically easier to analyze.
”。从本质上讲，这种冲动来自这样一个事实：您可以对示例进行某些更改，从而使其在理论上更易于分析。
There’s a need, I think, for examples that are going to be a bit tough in response to that kind of pressure.
我认为，有必要采取一些强硬的措施来应对这种压力。
One, it helps if you didn’t make the example, and two, it helps if the person who did really understood the thing that they’re talking about.
第一，如果你没有举这个例子，这会有所帮助；第二，如果举这个例子的人真正理解他们正在谈论的事情，这会有所帮助。
I think literature gives us that.
我认为文学给了我们这一点。
Maybe the third most common question I receive is, what is my — Tyler’s — best defense for reading, and indeed rereading, classic works rather than the latest book that just came out, some kind of smart nonfiction?
也许我收到的第三个最常见的问题是，我的——泰勒的——阅读，甚至是重读经典作品的最佳辩护，而不是刚刚出版的最新书，某种聪明的非小说类作品？
What would you say is your best defense of reading and rereading the classics?
您认为阅读和重读经典的最佳辩护是什么？
Apart from your own professional reasons.
除了你自己的职业原因。
I read new fiction too, so I believe in both.
我也读过新小说，所以我对两者都相信。
One thing that I’ve noticed is that I read the thing differently, having read it multiple times.
我注意到的一件事是，我读了很多遍之后，对这本书的读法有所不同。
For me, I’m a person who is very naturally pulled along by plot.
对我来说，我是一个很自然地被剧情牵引的人。
The first time I read something, I’m very invested in the characters, and I feel bad when things go badly for them.
当我第一次读到一些东西时，我对角色非常投入，当他们的事情变得糟糕时我会感到难过。
A lot of my attention is drawn to that kind of just wanting them to be happy and make money and live well and get married.
我的很多注意力都集中在那种只希望他们快乐、赚钱、生活美好和结婚的愿望上。
It actually often will take me a couple readings before I can set that aside and, in a way, read the work a little bit less diachronically.
实际上，我经常需要读几遍才能把它放在一边，并在某种程度上，不那么历时地阅读这部作品。
On the Agnes Callard production function
关于艾格尼丝·卡拉德生产函数
For our final segment, are you up for a few questions about the Agnes Callard production function?
对于我们的最后一部分，您是否想问一些有关 Agnes Callard 生产函数的问题？
I don’t know what that is.
我不知道那是什么。
Well, you’ll hear the questions.
好吧，你会听到这些问题。
OK.
好的。
As I understand your career — you started actually with physics, moved to classics, and then philosophy.
据我了解，你的职业生涯 ——你实际上是从物理学开始的，然后转向古典学，然后是哲学。
How would you describe that process?
您会如何描述这个过程？
In high school, I was very interested in math and physics.
高中时，我对数学和物理非常感兴趣。
I think it was because there seemed to be truths there.
我认为这是因为那里似乎有真相。
I got to college, and two things happened.
我上了大学，发生了两件事。
First is that the way that my high school offered physics, they offered up through AP a mechanics but not electricity and magnetism, which was not where you usually start at Chicago.
首先是我的高中提供物理的方式，他们通过 AP 提供力学，但不提供电学和磁学，这不是你通常在芝加哥开始的地方。
So I had to start with electricity and magnetism in the fall of my first year.
所以我必须在第一年的秋天开始学习电和磁。
The thing with magnetism is that the force goes in the opposite direction.
磁力的特点是力的方向相反。
It goes at a right angle to what you’d expect, and that didn’t make any sense to me.
它与你的期望成直角，这对我来说没有任何意义。
I remember asking the teacher, “How could the force go that way?” That was not the question you were supposed to be asking.
我记得我问老师：“力怎么会朝那个方向走呢？”这不是你应该问的问题。
You were supposed to just follow the formulas.
你应该只遵循公式。
I was getting that in my physics class, and at the same time, I took a class called Human Being and Citizen in which we read the Odyssey and Genesis and Plato.
我在物理课上学到了这一点，同时，我选修了一门名为“人类与公民”的课程，我们在其中阅读了《奥德赛》、《创世纪》和《柏拉图》。
The teacher of that class got me to see that questions like “Should you be a vegetarian?” — those could be about truths, too.
那个班的老师让我看到诸如“你应该吃素吗？”之类的问题。 ——那些也可能是关于真相的。
It hadn’t really occurred to me that there were truths there.
我并没有真正想到那里有真相。
That’s how I made the transition to, let’s say, the humanities from physics.
这就是我从物理学转向人文学科的方式。
I went to classics grad school because I wanted to read more Greek and Latin.
我去读古典研究生院是因为我想读更多的希腊语和拉丁语。
I loved doing that.
我喜欢这样做。
But at a certain point as you progress, you start to move towards a dissertation.
但当你取得进展的某个时刻，你开始走向论文。
The closer I got, the clearer it was to me that I did not want to write a dissertation in classics.
越接近，我就越清楚我不想写古典学论文。
So I had to get out, get off that train.
所以我必须出去，下了火车。
I went up through taking all the exams, basically, and then I left.
我基本上参加了所有考试，然后就离开了。
The questions that interested me were more like the substantive questions that the writers were talking about rather than something more like a literary question.
我感兴趣的问题更像是作家们谈论的实质性问题，而不是文学问题。
You belong to this discipline called philosophy.
你属于这个叫做哲学的学科。
It puts out a bunch of outputs.
它输出了一堆输出。
There are many journals.
有很多期刊。
People come give talks at your school.
人们来你们学校演讲。
There are working papers.
有工作文件。
What’s your method for sampling the output of philosophy as a discipline?
您对哲学作为一门学科的成果进行抽样的方法是什么？
What’s your strategy for reading or not reading what comes out?
您阅读或不阅读内容的策略是什么？
How would you describe that to us?
您会如何向我们描述这一点？
Mostly my response to your question is guilt.
我对你问题的回答主要是内疚。
I don’t feel I do it very well.
我觉得我做得不太好。
I feel like a lot of what I end up doing is reading new things because my grad students are working on them.
我觉得我最终做的很多事情都是阅读新事物，因为我的研究生正在研究它们。
My grad students will be working on a certain topic, and then there’ll be literature that they’re using, and so I’ll think I better read that.
我的研究生将研究某个主题，然后会有他们正在使用的文献，所以我认为我最好阅读这些文献。
I better get to know it.
我最好去了解一下。
That’s one way that I come to read things.
这是我阅读事物的一种方式。
Yeah, I go to talks, and I go to conferences.
是的，我去参加会谈，我去参加会议。
But I rarely will just read around in journals.
但我很少会只是在期刊上阅读。
I will do that if there’s something I’m working on.
如果我正在做某件事，我就会这么做。
I’ll read what’s most recently been written on the things I’m working on.
我会阅读最近关于我正在做的事情的文章。
This is why it makes me feel guilty is, I know there’s really good stuff that I’m missing because I happen not to be working on it, not to have any students who’re working on it, and not to go to any conferences.
这就是为什么让我感到内疚的是，我知道我错过了很多好东西，因为我碰巧没有在做这件事，没有任何学生在做这件事，也没有参加任何会议。
Occasionally, I’ll hit it anyway, like there’s been a big, recent upswell in literature on grounding, Kit Fine at NYU and a bunch of other people and that.
偶尔，我还是会这么做，就像最近关于接地的文献出现了很大的增长，纽约大学的基特·法恩（Kit Fine）和其他一些人等等。
At a certain point, it seemed to me like it might relate, so I read a bunch of that and learned that literature was very interesting.
在某种程度上，我觉得这可能是有联系的，所以我读了很多，并了解到文学非常有趣。
Again, that was an accident of thinking that I could connect up.
再说一次，我认为我可以联系上是一个意外。
So that’s what I do.
这就是我所做的。
You have a professional reputation for being willing to change your mind, not because someone has refuted you, or maybe you feel you’ve refuted yourself in some way.
你在职业上享有盛誉，因为你愿意改变主意，而不是因为有人反驳了你，或者你觉得自己在某种程度上反驳了自己。
How exactly does that process happen?
这个过程到底是如何发生的？
And how rational do you think it is?
您认为这有多合理？
Oh, it’s pretty much always because someone has refuted me.
噢，这几乎总是因为有人反驳了我。
You think so?
你这么认为吗？
Yes.
是的。
I’ve just been refuted many times.
我刚刚被反驳过很多次了。
When I was in the job market, I’d just gotten my PhD, and I was giving talks.
当我进入就业市场时，我刚刚获得博士学位，正在做演讲。
My entire dissertation was refuted by one of my now colleagues who asked me a question in the job interview that showed me that the central distinction I was using in my dissertation didn’t work.
我的整篇论文被我现在的一位同事反驳了，他在面试中问了我一个问题，这表明我在论文中使用的核心区别并没有起作用。
I then tried to rehabilitate a part of it.
然后我尝试修复其中的一部分。
This is just to give you some example.
这只是给您举一些例子。
I had been working on it for about a year.
我已经为此工作了大约一年。
I gave it as a talk at MIT, and a graduate student there refuted it.
我在麻省理工学院做了一次演讲，那里的一名研究生反驳了它。
This has happened to me a number of times.
这种情况在我身上发生过很多次。
I would say, most of the time, I change my mind because people show me that I’m wrong.
我想说，大多数时候，我改变主意是因为人们告诉我我错了。
Does having studied weakness of will help you better deal with it?
研究了自己的弱点是否能帮助你更好地应对它？
No, I don’t think so.
不，我不这么认为。
Final question of our conversation.
我们谈话的最后一个问题。
What are your own aspirational beliefs?
您自己的理想信念是什么？
Is the question what are my aspirations, that is, to what do I aspire?
问题是我的愿望是什么，即我渴望什么？
Yes.
是的。
That’s constantly changing, of course, the answer to that question.
当然，这个问题的答案在不断变化。
At the moment, I would say I have three areas of aspiration that I’m working on right now.
目前，我想说我现在正在努力实现三个愿望领域。
One is fashion.
一是时尚。
Over the past couple of years, for the first time, I became interested in what I wore.
在过去的几年里，我第一次对自己穿的衣服产生了兴趣。
I just had been indifferent to it for the first 39 years of my life, and then somehow, I became non-indifferent, and I started to care about it.
在我生命的前39年里，我一直对它漠不关心，然后不知何故，我变得不再漠不关心，我开始关心它。
That’s area number one.
这是第一区。
Area number two is religion.
第二个领域是宗教。
I struggle a lot with my belief in God and with giving that a place in my life, and also with my relation to my religious texts.
我对我对上帝的信仰、在我的生活中给予它一席之地以及我与宗教文本的关系进行了很多斗争。
This past summer, I went to a conference on Spinoza and Maimonides that had a big effect on me.
去年夏天，我参加了一次关于斯宾诺莎和迈蒙尼德的会议，这对我产生了很大的影响。
It pushed me to think more in that direction.
它促使我朝这个方向思考更多。
That’s another direction in which I consider myself to be aspiring.
这是我认为自己有抱负的另一个方向。
Then the third one is teaching.
然后第三个就是教学。
There’s a particular context.
有一个特定的背景。
I think I’m a good lecturer, but I struggle in discussion classes to not lecture, to listen to people.
我认为我是一名优秀的讲师，但在讨论课上我很难不去讲课，而是去倾听别人的意见。
Over the past year, really, I’ve been experimenting with how to do that better, how to listen, how to teach people who are very new to the kind of talking and thinking that I’m doing with them.
事实上，在过去的一年里，我一直在尝试如何做得更好，如何倾听，如何教导那些对我与他们所做的谈话和思考方式非常陌生的人。
Agnes Callard, thank you very much.
艾格尼丝·卡拉德，非常感谢你。
Again, her new book is Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming.
同样，她的新书是《渴望：成为的力量》。
Thank you.
谢谢。