Fundsmith Annual Shareholder Meeting Transcript 2023

March 20, 2023

Reading Time: 66 mins read

Transcript  会议记录

Ian King  00:47  伊恩·金 00:47

Good evening, ladies and gentleman, everyone at Fundsmith is delighted to see you all. For those of you who don’t know me, I’m Ian King on the business presenter of Sky News, I have the pleasure of interviewing Terry and Julian, and hearing what they’ve got to say. Just a reminder for you all about what goes into this process. When the annual letter goes out, you’re all invited to submit questions to Terry and Julian. And then I sit down and decide which of them I’m going to put to them on this occasion. It’s a very independent process. It’s It’s my decision which questions get asked. So if yours hasn’t been asked today, blame me Don’t blame Terry and Julian, rest assured that if your question isn’t answered this evening, or doesn’t get asked, you will get a reply from Fundsmith. So everyone will will be will be dealt with in the in the fullness of time. And declaration for me, as some of you who’ve attended these events, or watch the online presentations in the past or No, I am invested in Fundsmith myself, so is so my kids, and so is Mrs. King, as well. So we are very, very much aligned with all of you. I’m just as interested to hear what Terry and Julian have to say, as all of you in this room. So without further ado, I’m going to hand over to Terry, to kick us off.晚上好，女士们，先生们，Fundsmith 的所有人都非常高兴见到你们。对于不认识我的人来说，我是天空新闻的商业主持人伊恩·金，我有幸采访特里和朱利安，听听他们有什么要说的。提醒一下大家这个过程的细节。当年度信件发出后，你们都可以向特里和朱利安提交问题。然后我坐下来决定这次要问他们哪些问题。这是一个非常独立的过程。这是我的决定哪些问题会被提出。所以如果你们的问题今天没有被问到，请怪我，不要怪特里和朱利安，请放心，如果你们的问题今晚没有得到回答，或者没有被问到，Fundsmith 会给你们回复。所以每个人都会在适当的时候得到处理。关于我自己的声明，对于一些参加过这些活动或过去观看在线演示的人来说，不，我自己也投资了 Fundsmith，我的孩子们也投资了，而且金夫人也投资了。所以我们都与你们非常一致。 我也同样期待听到特里和朱利安要说的内容，就像在场的各位一样。那么，无需多言，我将把发言权交给特里，为我们拉开序幕。

Terry Smith  02:12  特里·史密斯 02:12

Thank you. Here we are, again, after a three year break. And it’s very nice to be here and see you. As you probably know, last year, I managed to get COVID on the eve of the first attempt to do our physical meeting again. But I’ve survived intact while this far anyway, this year. As Ian said, I’m just going to take you through some slides, talk about all the usual things. If you’ve been here before that, you know that we talk about, and then hand back to you. And he’s going to feel to question your questions. Let’s take you on, there we go. There’s a disclaimer, as you know, you should read it, we always show it. And if you’ve been before, you’ll know my paraphrase of this, which is if you trust me and buy the units, then it’s your problem. Basically, that’s what that says, says it was slightly more legal sort of language. But that’s what it says. What I actually want to talk about is the performance of the fund, and the investment strategy.谢谢。经过三年的间隔，我们再次相聚于此。很高兴在这里见到大家。正如你们所知，去年，在我第一次尝试恢复实体会议前夕，我感染了新冠病毒。但无论如何，我今年已经安然无恙。正如伊恩所说，我将带大家浏览一些幻灯片，讨论一些常规内容。如果你们之前来过，就知道我们会谈论这些，然后交还给你们。接下来他将回答你们的问题。让我们开始吧，那里我们走。有一个免责声明，正如你们所知，应该阅读它，我们总是展示它。如果你们之前来过，就会知道我对这个的释义，那就是如果你们信任我并购买份额，那便是你们的问题。基本上，这就是它所说的，说的是稍微正式一些的法律语言。但这就是它所说的。我实际上想谈论的是基金的表现和投资策略。

That’s the two things that I want to cover here. And then we’ll cover other matters when we get to sit down and even put your questions to us performance. First, there’s the performance, not our finest hour last year, as you will know, we were down 13.8% About six points more than the market, which is disappointing. Those of you who’ve been here before or on other occasions, hopefully may recall that we’ve always said that there will come the day when we will either underperform or lose money or quite possibly both. Well, here it is we did it doesn’t make it feel any better does it? But it was inevitable. If you are seeking an investment that will outperform in every market condition and every reporting period, I would suggest that you watch on Netflix the rather fine four part docu-drama on Madoff, which I genuinely do recommend to you, I think I think it’s a very good series, by the way. But it’s the only way you’re ever going to get consistent performance in every period. Until suddenly you don’t. There isn’t anything else. I mean, I’ve known over the years of working in the industry, a number of people who’ve had some pretty good, what they call style rotation products, where they attempt to move from so called values, years to growth years, and so on, and cash and market time and so on. I’ve never seen one that worked. And this certainly isn’t one of them, as you probably gathered. What worked and what didn’t last year.这里要涵盖两点。接下来，当我们坐下来并回答你们的问题时，我们会讨论其他事项。首先，关于业绩，正如你们所知，去年的表现并非我们的最佳时刻，我们下跌了 13.8%，比市场下跌了约 6 个百分点，这令人失望。希望那些曾经在这里或在其他场合听过我们讲话的人，能够回忆起我们一直说，总有一天我们会表现不佳或亏损，甚至可能两者兼有。好吧，现在就是那一天，我们做到了，但这并没有让情况变得更好，对吧？但这不可避免。如果你寻求一种在任何市场条件和报告期内都能表现优异的投资，我建议你观看 Netflix 上相当出色的四部分纪录片《麦道夫》，我真诚地向你们推荐，我认为这是一部非常好的系列剧，顺便说一句。但这是你唯一能获得每个时期持续业绩的方式。直到突然有一天你不再能。没有其他办法。 我意思是，多年来在业内工作，我认识不少人推出过所谓的风格轮动产品，试图从所谓的价值股转向成长股等等，还有现金和市值时间等等。但我从未见过哪个成功了。而正如你可能已经猜到的，这肯定不是其中之一。去年哪些成功了，哪些没成功。

Let’s just go through some of the stocks by way of trying to illustrate what went on so you can see what the sort of fundamental causes of all this work last year. There’s our largest five contributors and our largest five detractors from performance. If you read the annual letter you probably know some of this already. But if you ask for one word to characterise the biggest contributors, the word that sprang to mind for me was defensive. As a drug company and two fast moving consumer goods companies out of those five defensive, that’s what worked last year. As an interesting sort of aside, I would point out that the consumer staples stocks, which were very good defensive stocks last year, on average now valued more highly than tech stocks. It’s worth thinking about that in light of circumstances. Now, what didn’t work? Well, if you look at the stocks on the right, I think the word that most people would would leap for is tech. They would say, well, meta platforms, the old Facebook, Pay Pal, some payment processor, but obviously uses technology, Microsoft, Amazon, I don’t actually think these labels are all that helpful, to be honest with you, you will have read probably in a number of places that we’ve become a tech fund, we haven’t, we’ve got less technology exposure now than we had a half a dozen years ago. And and I don’t think the biggest common denominator in here is necessarily technology, I think there are a number of things that led to this.让我们通过一些股票案例来解释去年发生的情况，以便你们了解这项工作的基本原因。这里有我们表现最好的五家公司和表现最差的五家公司。如果你读过年度信件，可能已经知道其中一些情况了。但如果要用一个词来概括最大的贡献者，在我看来，这个词是防御性的。在这五家防御性公司中，作为一家制药公司和两家快速消费品公司，这就是去年成功的原因。作为有趣的一点补充，我要指出，去年的防御性股票——消费必需品股票，现在平均估值已经高于科技股票。考虑到当前情况，值得思考这一点。那么，什么没有成功呢？嗯，如果你看右边的股票，我认为大多数人会立刻想到科技。 他们可能会说，嗯，元平台，老牌的 Facebook、PayPal、一些支付处理器，但显然都使用技术，微软、亚马逊，老实说，我认为这些标签其实没什么帮助，你大概在许多地方都读到过，我们已经成为了一家科技基金，我们没有，我们现在比六年前技术领域的敞口要小。而且我认为，这里最大的共同点不一定是技术，我认为有诸多因素导致了这一点。

One of them is valuation, a couple of the shares were highly valued Pay Pal and IDEXX. In particular, IDEXX is the Veterinary Diagnostic equipment company that we are. And in periods when we have rising rates, like we had last year, highly rated stocks typically perform worse and lowly rated stocks, just like long dated bonds perform worse than short dated bonds, because you’re looking further into the future for the cash flows in valuing them. So I think valuation was was a factor in here. And I think that incident risk related to individual companies and the way that they were running their business or things that were happening to them extraneous to their business were quite important matter and Pay Pal in particular, I think we’re quite important in that regard. Just to illustrate that, I don’t think the technology label is really all that helpful in deciding what went on last year. If you have a look back to the contributors, you’ll see that automatic data processing is one of the top five contributors. It’s in the tech sector, basically. So I think there are other factors, not just technology at play here.其中之一是估值，有几只股票估值很高，比如 PayPal 和 IDEXX。特别是 IDEXX 是我们从事的兽医诊断设备公司。在我们经历利率上升的时期，比如去年，高评级股票通常表现较差，而低评级股票，就像长期债券表现不如短期债券一样，因为你在评估它们时，会着眼于更远的未来现金流。所以我认为估值是其中的一个因素。我认为与个别公司相关的事件风险以及他们经营业务的方式，或者发生在他们业务之外的事情，都非常重要，特别是 PayPal，我认为在这方面非常重要。为了说明这一点，我认为技术标签在决定去年发生的事情方面并没有太大的帮助。如果你回顾一下贡献者，你会发现自动数据处理是前五大贡献者之一。它基本上属于科技行业。所以我认为这里还有其他因素在起作用，而不仅仅是技术。

Terry Smith  07:08

Investment Strategy. Hopefully by now you’ve figured out that we’ve got a simple three step investment strategy, which we tried to stick to, we try to only invest in good companies, that is the most important thing that we do. We try not to overpay when buying or owning the shares. And then we do the really tricky bit, which is nothing, which is never quite possible. But we endeavour to do it. I’m going to take you through each of those, basically, to try and illustrate whether or not we’re doing what we said, we’re going to do start with investing in good companies. There’s what we call our look through table we every year, we give you this, we look at five of the main operating metrics or measures that our companies produce. We combine them for the whole portfolio using the weightings of the individual companies. And we compare them with two of the main indices, the s&p 500, and the footsie 100, you’ll see on the right hand side of the slide their return on capital employed or Roc II the top line, you’ll see last year, the return on capital employed in our portfolio was 32%. That’s an all time high. Basically, nothing fundamentally wrong with that.投资策略。希望到如今你已经明白，我们有一个简单的三步投资策略，我们尽量坚持这个策略，我们只投资于优秀公司，这是我们最重要的事情。我们尽量避免在购买或持有股票时支付过高的价格。然后我们做真正棘手的事情，那就是什么也不做，这永远不可能完全实现。但我们努力去做。我将逐一带你们了解这些，基本上，试图说明我们是否在做我们所说的，我们将从投资于优秀公司开始。这是我们称之为的审查表，我们每年都提供给你们，我们查看公司产生的五个主要运营指标或衡量标准。我们使用个别公司的权重将它们结合起来，用于整个投资组合，并将它们与两个主要指数进行比较，标普 500 和富时 100，你会在幻灯片的右侧看到它们的资本回报率或 ROC II，最上面一行，去年，我们投资组合的资本回报率是 32%。这是一个历史新高。基本上，没有根本性的问题。

If you look over at the index, you’ll see 18 16% Our companies are making close to twice what the index companies make in terms of return on capital employed nothing wrong. Gross Margin. This is I think, an often overlooked measure by analysts. This is the difference between company’s sales revenues and the cost of the inputs that they get to make their product or service, the components, the ingredients, and the services that go into the company so that they can do something with them and make a product or service and sell it to you at a markup 64%. Last year, in our portfolio, rock solid, basically, it’s been on the average really, for the last six or seven years, you’ll see that it’s significantly higher than the indices, which are 45 42%. To put it in English, our companies make things for 3.6 and seven for 10. That’s what they do.如果你看看指数，你会发现 18 16%。我们的公司资本回报率几乎是指数公司的一倍，这没什么问题。毛利率。我认为，这是分析师们经常忽视的一个指标。这是公司销售收入与生产产品或服务所需投入成本之间的差额，包括零部件、原料和服务，公司利用这些投入进行生产，并以加价 64%的价格将产品或服务销售给你。去年，在我们的投资组合中，非常稳健，基本上，过去六七年来的平均情况是，你会发现它显著高于指数，指数为 45 42%。用英语来说，我们的公司生产的东西是 3.6 比 10。这就是他们的做法。

Whereas companies in the index, on average, make things for 5.5 and seven for 10. It’s better to make things for 3.6 and seven for 10. That is meant for five point failures, I’m sure you can figure that out. This also tells you a couple of other things. However, this ratio, it tells you something about your defences against inflation, because clearly we’ve in a period of hot, much higher inflation than we’ve experienced for decades. And when you get inflation in input costs into companies, clearly, the smaller the percentage of sales that those input costs occupy, the easier it is for them to still remain profitable in those circumstances. The gross margin also tells you something about their pricing power. Basically they’re taking in these inputs a marking them up to sell them on. And essentially the high gross margin tells you that companies have got quite strong pricing power compared to people with low gross margins out there. And in fact, if you looked at our companies and what they did last year, you’ll find that particularly consumer companies it was a story about them, raising prices and maintaining sales revenue growth by raise In prices now, Julian and I don’t particularly like that as a way of growing a company. But it’s better than not being able to do it, it’s better than the alternative.而指数中的公司平均利润率为 5.5 比 10，更理想的是 3.6 比 10。这意味着五点失败率，我确信你们能理解。这也告诉你们其他一些事情。然而，这个比率告诉你们关于你们对抗通胀的防御能力，因为显然我们已经经历了几十年来更高的通胀时期。当企业面临输入成本通胀时，显然，输入成本占销售额的百分比越小，它们在这些情况下更容易保持盈利。毛利率也告诉你们关于他们的定价能力。基本上他们获取这些输入并将其加价销售。而高毛利率实际上告诉你们，与低毛利率的公司相比，这些公司拥有相当强的定价能力。 事实上，如果您看看我们公司去年的表现，您会发现，尤其是消费类公司，它们的故事是关于提价，通过提价来维持销售收入增长。现在，朱利安和我并不特别喜欢以这种方式来发展公司。但与无法做到相比，这要好得多，与替代方案相比，这也更好。

Take out all the other costs that companies incur, you get to the operating profit margin, which is the one that most people focus on. And you’ll see that it was 28% last year as high as it’s been in the last few years, compared to 18% on the index. So again, we’re much better than the index, cash conversion bit of a tricky one this last year, you’ll see that was just 88% Last year, which is the lowest that I think we’ve reported in line with the s&p still much higher than the footsie, I wouldn’t get too worked up about it. Cash flow is a very good acid test of a business. But it’s also much more volatile than reported profits. The whole thing about so called accrual profits is that they spread cash flows across reporting periods, you buy something, plant equipment, machinery, you spread the cost across periods and depreciate over time. For example, what we had was some very strange effects in companies last year, caused by the pandemic companies have had problems during the pandemic with their supply chain, they’d had stock outs, they couldn’t get the ingredients or manufacture things ranging from Bleach through to semiconductors. And as a result, when they could get some last year as the pandemic effects began to unwind in the supply chain, reverse back to normal, they bought everything that they possibly could basically, they they moved from just in time to just in case in terms of stock holding in their company.扣除公司所承担的其他成本，即可得到营业利润率，这也是大多数人关注的指标。你会发现，去年的营业利润率高达 28%，是近几年来的最高水平，而指数仅为 18%。因此，我们再次优于指数。现金转换率是去年的一个难题，你会发现仅为 88%，这是我们报告以来的最低水平。虽然仍高于富时指数，但对此不必过于担心。现金流是检验企业健康状况的重要指标，但它比报告利润波动性更大。所谓权责发生制利润的整个概念在于，它们将现金流分摊到不同的报告期。例如，购买设备、机械时，会将成本分摊到各个时期并随时间进行折旧。以我们去年遇到的情况为例，由于疫情，许多公司面临供应链问题，导致缺货，无法获得原料或制造产品，从消毒剂到半导体，范围广泛。 因此，当供应链中的疫情效应开始缓解，逐渐恢复常态时，他们去年基本上买下了所有他们能够买到的产品。在库存方面，他们的公司从“准时制”转变为“以防万一”。

So depressed cash flow last year, I think the probability is it will rebound quite sharply this year. So I’m not too worked up about it. Finally, interest cover, take the amount of the company’s paying interest and rent and compare it with their profitability. What’s the cover? How far would their profits have to fall before they weren’t able to pay the interest on the loans and the rent on the properties that they leased? And the answer is 20 times nearly as high as it’s ever been twice the index 10 or 11 times. These are very conservatively finance companies. Basically, they’re not making those great operating ratios by financial engineering. That’s not what they’re doing here. And look Taken as a whole. I think we got a portfolio of good companies, there are a couple of problems in there. There probably always are a couple of problems that just I don’t know which ones they are, that’s the only problem. I probably got the wrong ones now. Which ones especially. And I think we’ve tried to be very honest with you about those problems, whether they’re problems that we caused, or the company has caused and what we think about them and what we’re doing about them, ranging from engaging with the companies to flogging the shares. Basically, they’re always on problems, actually, you get more problems in circumstances such as we’ve now got because they it’s almost like putting penetrating oil in an engine. You find the klaxon cracks in the engine Brock, you know, certainly, that’s what circumstances like this are like they, they throw up more of the problems in companies. And we’ve got a couple. But it is a couple. It’s not more than a couple one taken as a whole.去年的现金流太令人沮丧了，我认为今年反弹的可能性会相当大。所以我对这点并不太在意。最后，关于利息保障倍数，将公司支付利息和租金的金额与其盈利能力进行比较。保障倍数是多少？他们的利润需要下降到什么程度才无法支付贷款利息和租赁房产的租金？答案是，这个保障倍数几乎是历史上最高的两倍，达到了指数的 10 倍或 11 倍。这些是非常保守的金融机构。基本上，他们并不是通过金融工程来获得那些出色的运营比率。他们在这里不是在这样做。再看整体情况。我认为我们得到了一个由优秀公司组成的投资组合，其中存在一些问题。可能总是会有那么几个问题，我只是不知道是哪些，那才是唯一的问题。我现在可能选错了。特别是哪些。 我认为我们已经非常诚实地向你们说明了这些问题，无论是我们造成的问题，还是公司造成的问题，以及我们对它们的看法和正在采取的措施，从与公司合作到抛售股票。基本上，它们总是关注问题，实际上，在当前情况下，你们会遇到更多问题，因为它们几乎就像在发动机中注入渗透油。你发现发动机的警报器发出裂纹，你知道，当然，这种情况就像这样，它们会引发公司中更多的问题。我们确实有几个问题，但只是一两个。整体来看，问题并不多。

This is still a very, very, very good group of companies, I would suggest. And hold that in mind now where he talks about the second point, which is don’t overpay This is often the most vexed part of the strategy, where people worry whether we’re overpaying or less to worry about now you’ll see the free cash flow yield. So the cash flows that the companies produce divided by their market value. Last year was 3.2%. Now, low is expensive and high is cheap in this is much more expensive or lower than the footsie. But frankly, forget the footsie I’m putting it in there for completeness. The type of companies that dominate the footsie are not the sort of companies that we’re ever going to own, they simply aren’t good enough. Basically, the real comparison is the s&p where but by the way, most of our companies are also quoted. So it’s a real comparison, you’ll see that we’re quite close to the same valuation as the s&p at the end of last year is slightly more expensive. But you know, when you get to do spot valuations at the end of the year, 3.2 versus 3.4 is well within the margin of error. And so I will suggest to you that at the moment, we’ve got a bunch of companies, which are very high quality, which are valued close to the average for the market, which is not a bad place to be.这仍然是一个非常、非常、非常好的公司群体，我建议。现在，在他谈到第二点时，即不要支付过高的价格。这通常是策略中最令人困扰的部分，人们担心我们是否支付了过高的价格，或者不必过于担心。你会看到自由现金流收益率。这是公司产生的现金流与其市场价值的比率。去年是 3.2%。现在，低意味着贵，高意味着便宜。这个（收益率）比富时指数要贵得多，或者比富时指数低。但坦率地说，忘掉富时指数吧，我把它放进去是为了完整性。主导富时指数的公司类型并不是我们将来会拥有的那种公司，它们根本不够好。基本上，真正的比较是标普指数，不过话说回来，我们大多数公司也在上市。所以这是一个真正的比较，你会发现我们在去年年底的估值与标普指数非常接近，标普指数略贵一些。但你知道，在年底进行现货估值时，3.2 与 3.4 的差距在误差范围内。 因此，我建议目前我们拥有一批非常优质的公司，其估值接近市场平均水平，这并非一个坏位置。

The last thing to say is free cash flow growth last year was just 1%. And I mentioned this in my letter in a throwaway comment, I’m trying to learn not to make throwaway comments, because people take them a bit seriously. Sometimes I said, if you if you’re if you’re worried by 1%, which is the lowest growth we’ve ever seen, you might not want to read the coming years letter basically. Because of course I don’t know what’s going to happen in the in the economy any more than anybody else does. But actually, I’m not making a prediction here. I’m not predicting Armageddon, Julian and the team’s current guesstimate for what it’s worth on free cash flow growth is about 11% This year, basically, which by the way, corresponds quite neatly to the fact that the cash flow conversion, the amount of profits converted to cash was low last year, it probably will rebound. So I wasn’t making a prediction of Armageddon. I was just trying to be funny. Not gonna do that again. Do nothing. Again, this year, I think a more of x part of the strategy than normal, because we were a bit more active than normal, there’s the list of buys and sells last year looks like a hell of a lot, doesn’t it? There’s certainly a lot of names up there, it doesn’t amount to an awful lot of turnover, I’ll show you the turnover in a moment, it still actually is a very small percentage turnover, for the simple reason that quite a lot of the things that we sell, we are that haven’t been adding to for some time. And or they haven’t performed very well. And so when we sell them, they’re not a big part of the portfolio. And actually, when we buy things, we quite often don’t get a total weighting at the beginning, either because we’re being cautious, or simply because the share price moves away from us. So let me briefly take you through each of those. Just to explain the rationale. We sold our stake in Johnson and Johnson,最后要说的就是，去年的自由现金流增长仅为 1%。我在信中提到了这一点，但那只是随口一提，我正努力不再做这种随口一提的事情，因为人们可能会对此比较重视。有时候我说，如果你对 1%感到担忧——这是我们见过的最低增长——你可能就不想读接下来的信了。当然，我并不比其他人更清楚经济将发生什么。但实际上，我这里并不是在作预测。我并没有预言世界末日。Julian 和团队目前对自由现金流增长的估计大约是 11%，这是今年的基本预测。顺便说一句，这与去年利润转化为现金的金额较低的情况相吻合，今年可能会反弹。所以，我并没有预言世界末日，我只是在开玩笑。我不会再这样做了。什么也不做。今年，我认为比平时更多的战略部分，因为我们的活动比平时更积极，去年的买卖清单看起来确实很多，不是吗？ 那里的名字确实很多，但交易量并不算太大，我稍后会展示交易量，实际上仍然是一个非常小的百分比交易量，原因很简单，因为我们销售的东西中，有很多我们已经很长时间没有增加了。或者它们的表现并不好。所以当我们销售它们时，它们并不是投资组合中很大的一部分。而且实际上，当我们购买东西时，我们并不总是从一开始就获得总权重，要么因为我们谨慎，要么仅仅因为股价偏离了我们。所以让我简要地逐一为您解释这些，以说明其合理性。 我们出售了我们在强生公司的股份。

Terry Smith  15:49  特里·史密斯 15:49

the largest healthcare business in the world, basically, we bought this business, it’s got three parts. It’s got a drugs, business, a medical equipment and devices business and an over the counter metals, medicines business, basically. And we bought this business for the medical devices and equipment and an over the counter medicine business, which had performed terribly. And and what really bailed us out was the drugs business. Now, we don’t like that we don’t like owning businesses, even if they perform Okay? When the reasons wrong, you can get into a lot of trouble, I think good investment, convincing yourself that you really, you really were right in the first place, even when the reasons were wrong. And then add to that the fact that the drug portfolio which is performed well is facing quite an uphill, sort of run now in terms of drug expires. And it’s one of the problems with drugs is the patents expire, and they’ve got quite big patent expires Stelara being the one at the moment that’s coming up for expiry, which is a Crohn’s disease medication. And add to that the fact that the one of the two businesses that we really didn’t want to in the first place, the consumer business is being spun out. So it wasn’t really a good idea. We thought to stick around.全球最大的医疗健康企业，基本上，我们收购了这家企业，它包含三个部分：药品业务、医疗器械和设备业务，以及非处方金属和药品业务。我们收购这家企业主要是为了其医疗器械和设备业务以及非处方药品业务，这些业务表现非常糟糕。真正帮助我们的是药品业务。现在，我们不喜欢拥有企业，即使它们表现尚可，当理由不正确时，可能会陷入很多麻烦。我认为好的投资是说服自己，在最初真的正确，即使理由是错误的。再加上药品组合表现良好，但现在正面临药品过期的问题。药品的一个问题是专利过期，他们有相当大的专利即将到期，Stelara 目前即将到期，这是一种治疗克罗恩病的药物。 再加上，我们原本就不太想做的两家业务中，一家消费业务正在被剥离。所以这实在不是一个好主意。我们曾想继续留下。

So we sold it. We sold our Starbucks very recent purchase. We purchased it at the bottom of the market roughly in the pandemic. It was okay for us. We did quite well. It rebounded, Mark, we bought it partly for the opportunity in China, its biggest growth markets China, China is a very big growth market potentially for coffee consumption versus tea. They had a bit of an open goal in front of them. We thought with the fact that their biggest competitor in China Luckin coffee was a fraud. And we thought, Well, that’s it and they managed to capitalise on that. Not one jot during the period. And the management descended into turmoil. We’re now got Howard Schultz back for his third spell as CEO, which in our view is not a good look at this company. Various other things have happened as well. We’re not a big fan of the incoming new CEO who will replace Howard for the third time. And also they one of the one of the points about the Starbucks experience was the the people who serve the coffee the partners as I would say, they I think because of the problems that they face. They ran into a unionisation drive in the staff which was handled very badly, essentially. So we sold them.所以我们卖掉了。我们最近卖掉了星巴克。我们在疫情最严重的时候以市场最低价收购了它。这对我们来说还不错。我们做得相当好。它反弹了，马克，我们购买它的部分原因是中国市场的机遇，中国是其最大的增长市场。中国是咖啡消费相对于茶的一个非常大的潜在增长市场。他们面前有一个很大的目标。我们认为，考虑到他们在中国最大的竞争对手瑞幸咖啡是一个骗局，我们认为，好吧，那就是它，他们成功地利用了这一点。在期间，他们一点都没做。管理层陷入混乱。我们现在请回了霍华德·舒尔茨，他担任第三任 CEO，在我们看来，这对公司来说不是什么好兆头。还发生了其他各种事情。我们不太喜欢接替霍华德第三次的新 CEO。此外，关于星巴克的经历，有一点是那些服务咖啡的员工，也就是合作伙伴，我认为由于他们面临的问题，他们遇到了员工工会化运动，处理得非常糟糕。所以我们卖掉了他们。

We sold Kone Finnish elevator and escalator business. We liked the elevator and escalator business. It’s an installed base of equipment that’s a team market for spares and service and so on. We still like the sector, we just took the opportunity to switch into Otis. Otis as the biggest manufacturer in the world of elevators and escalators. We didn’t want to own it in years gone by because it was part of a conglomerate called United technology, which did a lot of things that we don’t like, as well as elevators and escalators. But when it was spun out, we had the opportunity to own it on its own. So we just switched to Otis.我们出售了 Kone 芬兰的电梯和自动扶梯业务。我们喜欢电梯和自动扶梯业务。这是一个设备安装基础，是一个备件和服务等的团队市场。我们仍然喜欢这个领域，只是抓住了机会转向 Otis。Otis 是全球电梯和自动扶梯制造行业的最大制造商。在过去我们不想拥有它，因为它属于一个名为联合技术的大型企业集团，该集团做了很多我们不喜欢的事情，除了电梯和自动扶梯。但当它被分拆出来后，我们有机会独立拥有它。所以我们转向了 Otis。

We sold Intuit, I wrote quite a lot in our annual letter about share based compensation intuits a accounting and tax software business. It’s been using a lot of share based compensation. But it’s not uncommon amongst technology based companies, we don’t mind that it adjusts its earnings from a GAAP generally accepted accounting principles basis to a non GAAP basis by taking out the costs from the p&l account of the share based compensation. We think that’s Baloney, frankly, this if it’s not a cost, what is it, basically, and then the market has accepted that and started to rate the company on these adjusted earnings. So it’s got to quite a big rating, compared to other companies, which we own like Microsoft, which also use share based compensation, but don’t adjust for it. These people have gone to quite a big rating on these adjusted earnings that we don’t like. And then finally, they’ve started to use this strange methodology of accounting as a yardstick for acquisitions. So they’ve been buying things they bought a couple of things, the most recent of which was an online marketing business called MailChimp. And we don’t like that acquisition for a number of reasons.我们出售了 Intuit，我在我们的年度信中写了很多关于基于股份的薪酬。Intuit 是一家会计和税务软件公司，它大量使用基于股份的薪酬。但这在技术型公司中并不常见，我们并不介意它将 GAAP（公认会计原则）基础上的收益调整为非 GAAP 基础，通过从基于股份的薪酬的损益账户中扣除成本。坦白说，我们认为这是胡说八道，如果不是成本，那它是什么？然后市场接受了这一点，并开始根据这些调整后的收益来评估该公司。与其他我们拥有的公司相比，如使用基于股份的薪酬但进行调整的 Microsoft，它的评级相当高。这些公司根据调整后的收益给出了相当高的评级，而我们并不喜欢。最后，他们开始使用这种奇怪的会计方法作为收购的衡量标准。所以他们一直在购买一些东西，最近的一次购买是一家名为 MailChimp 的在线营销公司。我们不喜欢这次收购，原因有很多。

One, it’s not in their core business area. It’s not in the accounting tax software and we generally find when people people don’t normally have multiple good businesses, they usually have one at most two. Once they start investing outside those one or two It usually goes wrong. And this is outside their main area. And we reckon that based upon the brilliant share based compensation, adjusted earnings, and so on, they probably paid somewhere around three to four times the right price for this business, and when Julian and I and the team were having a conversation about this with them, the thing that they said when we said we think you paid too much for this much, much too much is it? Hey, it’s okay. Half of half of the price was in cat was in shares. Like so you think your shares are overvalued, that’s sorry.一，这并非其核心业务领域。这不在其会计税务软件业务范围内，而且我们通常发现，当人们通常不会拥有多个优秀业务时，他们最多只有一到两个。一旦他们开始投资于这些核心业务之外，通常就会出问题。而且这超出了他们的主要业务范围。我们根据其卓越的股权薪酬、调整后的收益等估计，他们可能为这笔业务支付了大约三到四倍的合理价格。当朱利安和我以及团队与他们就此进行对话时，当我们说我们认为你们为这笔业务支付的价格太高，高得离谱时，他们所说的东西是，嘿，这没关系。一半的价格是用股份支付的。比如，你们认为你们的股份被高估了，对不起。

Pay Pal. We sold I wrote a bit about this in the lecture as well. It’s an example of a company we think, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. This was the number one company in online payments outside China. But through a combination of pie in the sky targets for for customer acquisition, based upon extrapolating the experience in the pandemic, they may came out with unrealistic client acquisition targets that about 300 million clients at the beginning of the pandemic, about 425 million at the end. And so they’re going to have 750 million, and then withdrew the target within one year, we’re not keen on people who withdraw targets within one year, but then thought about one very carefully, lack of engagement with the customers. Before the pandemic, the average customer dealt in their PayPal account 40 to 50 times a year, once a week.PayPal。我们之前在讲座中也稍微提过这个。我们认为这是一家从胜利中夺走失败的公司的例子。这是中国以外在线支付领域的头号公司。但由于一系列不切实际的客户获取目标，基于对疫情期间经验的推断，他们可能制定了不切实际的客户获取目标——疫情初期约为 3 亿客户，疫情结束时约为 4.25 亿。因此他们计划达到 7.5 亿，但一年内又撤回了这个目标。我们不倾向于那些在一年内撤回目标的人，但经过仔细考虑，发现他们缺乏与客户的互动。疫情前，平均每个 PayPal 账户每年处理 40 到 50 次交易，每周一次。

By the end of the pandemic, they dealt with their PayPal account 40 or 50 times a year, once a week, you need to deal with your customers more if you’re going to grow a business rather light stores need to have more stores, same store sales, costs, we thought were out of control. And rather like Intuit, we then seemed seem to set off on a path of we think, Ill judged and expensive acquisitions buying things like Isetan, which is a point of sale, business for payments. So the whole point of this business was it was in the online digital payments space. And it’s now backing up into that which is the fastest growing part of it, versus the point of sale stuff where you pay for your car in a store or restaurant or whatever. They’re backing up into the slower growth part of it. And paying too much we thought so those are our sales.疫情结束后，他们每年处理 PayPal 账户 40 到 50 次，每周一次。如果你要发展业务，就需要更多地处理客户。轻资产店铺需要开设更多店铺，同店销售额和成本，我们认为是失控的。与 Intuit 类似，我们似乎走上了我们认为判断失误且昂贵的收购之路，收购了如伊势丹这样的支付业务点。这个业务的整个重点是在在线数字支付领域。而现在，它正在回归这个增长最快的部分，而不是支付点销售业务，比如你在商店或餐馆买车时支付的。他们正在回归增长较慢的部分。而且我们认为支付过多。这就是我们的销售。

What did we buy? We’ve already dealt with Otis, we bought Adobe, the leader in creative and graphic software in the world, you will most certainly all use Adobe products. It’s a very good business. We bought it very well on this occasion after the tech companies had had a rather bad spell. And then they announced the acquisition of a thing called Figma, which allows people to collaborate on the web in the use of creative software. This is problematic. They’re almost certainly paying too much. And it almost certainly reveals a view on their part of a competitive weakness in their business. At the moment, I can’t work out whether I’ll be happy or sad if they don’t get it because the competition authorities ruled it out. And you can imagine what happens to a share where I can’t figure out whether I’m happy or sad. If they if they fail with something. We’re not not very happy with that purchase at the moment. I’ve got to be honest with you.我们买了什么？我们已经处理了奥蒂斯，我们收购了全球创意和图形软件的领导者——Adobe，你们几乎都会使用 Adobe 的产品。这是一家非常好的企业。在科技公司经历了一段相当糟糕的时期后，我们很好地收购了它。然后他们宣布收购了一款名为 Figma 的产品，它允许人们在网上协作使用创意软件。这有问题。他们几乎肯定是支付了过多的价格。而且几乎肯定地暴露了他们在业务中的一种竞争弱点。目前，我无法确定如果他们因为监管机构否决而没有得到它，我会是高兴还是悲伤。你可以想象，一只让我无法判断是高兴还是悲伤的股票会发生什么。如果他们失败了。我们目前对这笔收购并不太满意。我必须对你们坦白。

Mettler Toledo, we bought we’ve waited several years where Mettler Toledo is a fine business. It’s the world leader in weighing equipment. Equipment that’s used to weigh things in food processing, drug development, drug put and bio processing, a mix other laboratory and manufacturing equipment as well multi pipetting equipment brilliantly one business in our view, you could set your watch by it. We were really impressed on a factory visit when one of our team went on a factory visit and found that the company had a methodology for monitoring the progress of projects. And it was a whiteboard with the project names at the top and some lines drawn down the board and a post it note that they moved across as the project progresses. That’s, that’s that kind of business. Otis, hopefully I’ve dealt with Apple we started to buy I’m pretty sure there’s a question later on Apple. So I’ll probably deal with it a little more then. But as you know, it’s something that we’ve shied away from buying, we started buying it towards the end of the year, we’ve got a tiny amount of stock and the share price ran away from us. We bought a little bit more in the new year during the weekdays that we’ve had in the market. And I think guided by Ian’s questioning will probably say a bit more about why we’ve had a change of opinion on that. At the moment, I said that there’s a lot of names on there, but it didn’t amount to an awful lot. There’s the actual portfolio turnover. You can see here our portfolio turnover last year was 7.4%. It’s a bit higher than their average obviously, although we have had higher turnover and some comparable figures. Compare that with the statistics last year we show that the average mutual fund manager in the UK turned over his or her portfolio 60% . Six zero, right. This is still very low turnover. We’re not very active and preferably wouldn’t do anything at all.梅特勒托利多，我们等待了好几年，因为我们认为梅特勒托利多是一家优秀的公司。它是全球称重设备的领导者，其设备用于食品加工、药物研发、药物投放和生物加工等领域，还包括其他实验室和制造设备，以及多通道移液设备。在我们看来，这是一家值得信赖的企业。我们团队在工厂参观时印象深刻，发现该公司有监控项目进度的方法。他们使用一块白板，顶部写着项目名称，白板上画着线条，并用便利贴标记项目进展。这就是那种企业。奥蒂斯，我希望我之前已经处理过苹果的问题，我们开始购买苹果时，我确信后面会有关于苹果的问题。我可能会在那时再详细处理。但正如你所知，我们一直回避购买它，我们在年底开始购买，只获得了一小部分库存，而股价却远远超过了我们的预期。 我们在新年市场开盘的几个工作日里买入了一些。我认为，在伊恩的提问指导下，我们可能会更多地说明为什么我们对这个问题的看法有所改变。目前，我说过名单上有很多人，但并没有多少实际意义。还有实际的投资组合周转率。你可以看到，我们去年的投资组合周转率是 7.4%。这显然比他们的平均水平高一些，尽管我们曾经有过更高的周转率，也有一些可比数据。与去年我们展示的统计数据相比，英国的平均共同基金经理将其投资组合周转了 60%。六零，对吧。这仍然是非常低的周转率。我们并不活跃，而且最好什么也不做。

And you can see in terms of what we spent in terms of dealing costs last year, we spent point 003 of a percent we spent 777,000 pounds stealing on a 22 billion pound fund. And you can see in terms of our activity, nevermind the percentages, which are a formula we’re given and need to calculate on that which can sometimes produce slightly nonsensical things like negative turnover. Compare that number with these numbers over the year. This was not, in fact, a high turnover year, it was quite a low turnover year. And with that, I’m gonna hand you back to Ian, and let him questions.您可以看到，就我们去年处理成本而言，我们花费了 0.003 个百分点，花费了 77.7 万英镑来管理一个 220 亿英镑的基金。就我们的活动而言，暂且不论百分比，这些是我们获得的公式，需要计算，有时会产生一些不太合理的结果，比如负周转率。将这个数字与今年这些数字进行比较。事实上，这并不是一个高周转率的年份，而是一个相当低周转率的年份。有了这些，我将把话筒交还给伊恩，让他来回答问题。

Ian King  25:28  伊恩·金 25:28

Thank you, Terry. So the first one, there are actually a couple here the wrong quarter related theme. So we’re gonna go with these from David pergola, who says, What is the best business you want to buy at the moment that you think the price is still too high? And associated question comes from Jane Patel. If you’re in the audience, thank you, Jay. Of all the stocks that the hold funds, have fun told, which is the one that you feel is the most undervalued,谢谢，Terry。第一个问题，这里有几个与错误季度相关的话题。所以我们来看看大卫·佩尔戈拉提出的问题，他说：“目前你认为最好的生意是什么，你觉得价格仍然过高？”相关的问题来自简·帕特尔。如果你在观众席上，谢谢，Jay。在所有持有基金中，哪一只股票你觉得最被低估？

Terry Smith  26:00

I’m having a glass of water so he could stop.我正在喝水，所以他可以停一下。

Julian Robins  26:04

Even though, so you get a lot of presentations in America where people give you their, which is where I live, which is where people give you their idea of their best stock, probably because they presumably own it. And they’re trying to give it a little bit of a path. So when I mentioned the stock I’m about to mention, which is the best stock that we’d like to buy, but we think it’s too expensive. I’m not giving it, we don’t own it, we genuinely would like to own it, but it’s still quite a ways off. And it is just an example. It’s not the example we’ve got quite a few stocks that we would like to buy at the best price of the stock is Adyen. It is a Dutch company, it’s got a market cap of 42 billion euros. It was doing in the year before. It’s a payments processor. So it basically enables companies to accept and process their payments. It does it both online and offline. So it does it for Nike, but it also does it for Domino’s, or McDonald’s. It is unlike PayPal, which we think has slightly gone off the reservation in terms of trying to focus on trying to move into other things like crypto trading and savings products and personal financial management. Adyen is laser focused on doing what I’m doing the payments situation well. It was doing 2.7 billion of turnover before COVID is now doing 8.9 billion. So that’s more than trebled in the space of three years, it was doing four euros of earnings, a bit over four euros of earnings before COVID is now doing 18. So it makes a 30% return on capital, everything we see about it is good. It operates in an area online payments, which we think is something which is likely to have a lot of natural growth, the only real barrier to entry is that it’s trading on on 60 times earnings. So this is an example of an even, you know, thinking fairly expansively, and even with sort of any kind of projections that, you know, we might put in the Terry probably wouldn’t believe anyway. But even with any projections that we might put in, it’s difficult to pay that price. And I think one one area or one one reason why we have sort of achieved what we what we have achieved is that we have been good at being patient with these expensive stocks, and waiting for glitches. So I think we waited four years to buy colour plants, which has been a fantastic stock for us. We waited five and in some cases six years to buy IDEXX, which has been a fantastic stock for us. So you know we It’s funny how we do get these opportunities, but you have to be patient and we’re going to still we’re going to try and stay patient in this case.尽管如此，在美国你会收到很多演示，人们向你展示他们认为最好的股票，这大概是因为他们假定自己持有该股票。他们试图为它描绘一条发展路径。所以当我要提到即将提到的股票——我们希望购买的最佳股票，但我们认为它太贵了。我们并没有持有它，我们真心想持有它，但还有很长的路要走。这只是一个例子。我们确实有相当数量的股票，我们希望以最佳价格购买，其中之一是 Adyen。Adyen 是一家荷兰公司，市值达 420 亿欧元。它在去年表现良好。它是一家支付处理商，基本上使公司能够接受和处理支付。它既支持线上也支持线下支付。它为耐克提供服务，也为多米诺骨牌或麦当劳提供服务。这与 PayPal 不同，我们认为 PayPal 在试图专注于其他领域，如加密货币交易、储蓄产品和个人财务管理方面，稍微偏离了轨道。 Adyen 专注于做好支付领域，在新冠疫情前年交易额达 27 亿欧元，如今已增至 89 亿欧元。三年间交易额增长超过三倍，盈利从疫情前的 4 欧元增至 18 欧元，资本回报率达 30%。我们看到的一切都表明其表现良好。Adyen 运营于在线支付领域，我们认为这是一个具有大量自然增长潜力的领域，唯一的真正进入壁垒是其市盈率高达 60 倍。这是一个很好的例子，即使我们进行相当广泛的思考，甚至提出任何种类的预测，Terry 可能也不会相信。但即使我们提出任何预测，也难以支付这个价格。我认为我们取得的成绩之一或原因之一在于，我们擅长对这类高价股票保持耐心，等待其出现波动。因此我认为我们花了四年时间才买入 Color Plants，这是一支对我们来说表现极佳的股票。 我们等待了五年，在某些情况下是六年，才买入 IDEXX，这只股票对我们来说一直表现非常出色。所以你知道我们，我们得到这些机会的方式很奇怪，但你必须要有耐心，我们在这个情况下仍然会保持耐心。

Terry Smith  28:59  特里·史密斯 28:59

I was hoping when Jr started speaking that he was going to answer that question. In a way that’s reminiscent of a story about Charlie Munger, Warren Buffett’s sidekick, there’s a story about somebody who was standing by an elevator and Charlie Munger was in there. And as the elevator door closed, that guy heard of Charlie Munger say there are only three things you need to know about the stock market. I was hoping he was going to tell you all the characteristics of the company and forget to mention the name.我希望当小罗开始发言时，他能回答那个问题。在某种意义上，这让人想起了关于查理·芒格（沃伦·巴菲特的助手）的故事。有一个故事是关于一个人站在电梯旁，查理·芒格在电梯里。当电梯门关闭时，那个人听到查理·芒格说，关于股市你需要知道的只有三件事。我希望他会告诉你公司的所有特点，而忘记提及公司名称。

Julian Robins  29:27  朱利安·罗宾斯 29:27

I did have this routine set up with actually another stock where I was going to say I was going to introduce it in terms of what it did, what the numbers were, what the attractions of the business and how it’s gonna go and you’re probably all wanting to know what the name of the stock is. And it’s people in the back. We’re gonna go Can’t hear that anyway.我确实为另一只股票设定了一个流程，我打算通过它做什么、数字是多少、业务的吸引力以及它将如何发展来介绍它。你们可能都想知道这只股票的名称。在后面的人。我们无法听到。

Terry Smith  29:45  特里·史密斯 29:45

Anyway, did. So I’m on the second part. Okay, good. What’s the stock that we hold that we think is the most undervalued? This is going to be a shocker. And it I know it happens to sashet into another question or ten more out there, Meta platforms. I think it’s the cheapest stock that we own.无论如何，是的。所以我现在在第二部分。好的，很好。我们持有且认为最被低估的股票是什么？这会让人震惊。我知道这会引出另一个问题或十个更多的问题，比如 Meta 平台。我认为这是我们拥有的最便宜的股票。

Ian King  30:06  伊恩·金 30:06

And the reason?  原因是什么？

Terry Smith  30:08  特里·史密斯 30:08

Well, it’s I don’t want to tread on too much. So I know you’ve got a question waiting for us on this. It’s on a PE of about 15. Notwithstanding all of the bad vibe that some people have got about this, it’s still one of the two leading digital advertising businesses in the world. It has 2 billion users, the users are still rising in number. I mean, I’ve lost count of the number of questions we get, including some tonight. But in general, for people who say, My children don’t use Facebook anymore, do children live in Indonesia, then? I mean, do you think it might be a wider world than Tunbridge Wells? So apologies to anybody from China? We need to think about in this regard. I mean, some of this is masked at the moment by the noise surrounding the metaverse and we probably should talk about the noise surrounding the metaverse because we can wax lyrical about that to a degree even though we don’t know the answer, but I almost feel we don’t need to know the answer. Because if they stopped spending on the metaverse today spent $13.7 billion on spending on the metaverse today, we would have a business on a single figure PE that’s one of the two top digital advertising businesses in the world. Now, I’m not sure that’s a really good thing for them to do, by the way. I’m uncertain about that. But I do know that they could just stop it. And I think if they just stopped that the share price would would roof it. Actually, I’m not sure it’s a good thing. But I think that’s what would happen.嗯，我不想过多地谈论。我知道你有一个问题等着我们。这是关于 15 倍的市盈率。尽管有些人对此持有负面看法，但它仍然是全球两大领先的数字广告业务之一。它拥有 20 亿用户，用户数量仍在增长。我们的问题数量多得数不清，包括今晚的一些问题。但一般来说，对于那些说“我的孩子不再使用 Facebook 了”的人，你们的孩子生活在印度尼西亚吗？我的意思是，你们认为这个世界可能比坦布里奇韦尔更广阔吗？因此，对中国读者表示歉意，我们需要从这方面考虑。目前，元宇宙的喧嚣掩盖了这一点，我们可能应该谈谈元宇宙周围的喧嚣，尽管我们不知道答案，但我们可以在一定程度上畅所欲言，尽管我们几乎觉得不需要知道答案。因为如果他们今天停止在元宇宙上消费，花费 13 亿美元。目前 7 亿用于元宇宙的投入，我们就能拥有一家单一数字 PE 值的企业，它是全球两家顶尖数字广告企业之一。不过，我倒不确定他们这样做是否真的对他们有好处。我不确定这一点。但我确实知道他们可以停止。我认为如果他们停止，股价会大幅上涨。实际上，我倒不确定这是否是好事。但我认为这就是会发生的情况。

Ian King  31:30  伊恩·金 31:30

Well, I mean, that segues into the next question, which comes from Jack Newton, Nugent. Thank you, Jack. And he says, Do you regret buying meta?嗯，我的意思是，这自然过渡到下一个问题，这个问题来自杰克·牛顿·纽根特。谢谢，杰克。他说，你后悔买入 Meta 吗？

Terry Smith  31:40  特里·史密斯 31:40

For suddenly regret buying it at the time I bought it? That’s for sure. Because we could have bought it a lot more cheaply. But let’s let’s just put it in context, shall we? And I regret buying it for the standpoint of it’s a pain in the ass to work, because people keep shouting out an awful lot about it, as predicted by Julian, who is now known on the team as the Nostradamus of Westport, which is a really, because he said it’s a different one. But it’s what I love. Yes, it’s where you live in. And, and he’s able to predict chief executives quitting to within the month, basically, it’s frozen for him. But he, he said, When we were debating whether to own it, it will be a difficult stock to own and then he came back after we bought it. So maybe it was too difficult to stop, too. It’s a real pain in the ass to own. And we could have bought it. But but let’s put it in context, I think we’re actually in profit at the moment.对于在我买入时突然后悔这件事？那肯定的。因为我们本可以更便宜地买入它。但让我们把它放在背景下考虑，好吗？从它让我头疼的角度来说，我后悔买入它，因为人们不停地大肆谈论它，正如朱利安所预测的那样，现在团队里都知道他是西港的诺斯特拉达穆斯，这确实是真的，因为他曾说它是个不同的东西。但它是我所爱的。是的，那是你生活的所在。并且，他能够预测首席执行官辞职的时间，基本上对他来说已经冻结了。但他，他说，在我们讨论是否要持有它时，它将是一支难以持有的股票，然后在我们买入它之后他回来了。所以也许它太难停止了。拥有它真是个头疼事。但我们本可以买入。但但让我们放在背景下考虑，我认为我们目前实际上是盈利的。

I mean, it’s up over 40% year to date. So we’re not sitting here having lost you some large percentage of your money in major platforms, we’re actually very slightly in profit. It’s also a few sort of characteristics of it. If you look at the numbers up there, you will see what we’re trying to put in context for this is a business which in the last year had $116 billion of of revenues, it doesn’t get a single penny, of course, from the people that use the platforms from people use Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, it gets it from the advertisers, it’s got about 12 million advertisers, which by the way, in terms of growth, I’m since that’s where the revenue, I would say is not a particularly high number. Actually, you can see it’s got gross margins of 78%.我的意思是，今年到目前为止已经增长了 40%以上。所以我们并没有在这里让你在主要平台上损失了大量的资金，实际上我们略有盈利。此外，它还有一些特点。如果你看看上面的数字，你会看到我们试图为这个背景提供的信息是：这家公司在过去一年中拥有 1160 亿美元的营收，当然，它并没有从使用平台的用户那里获得一分钱——无论是 Facebook、Instagram 还是 WhatsApp 的用户，它从广告商那里获得收入，大约有 1200 万广告商，顺便说一句，就增长而言，我不得不说，由于收入来自那里，这个数字并不是特别高。实际上，你可以看到它的毛利率高达 78%。

That’s the kind of business we like, you know, makes things for 22 sales and for 100. Basically, it comes down to operating margin at 25%. And return on capital employed, which admittedly has been going down as it’s been rolling in an awful lot of spending to 23% Return on capital employed. So that’s the past, not the future. But it is it’s a pretty strong business. As I said earlier on, it’s on a PE at the moment of 15.3. For what it’s worth, these are not our numbers, these are consensus numbers. So I’m 12.7 times. So it says For on Bloomberg, which is pretty cheap. Considering what it’s doing in terms of spending at the moment, you can see the S&P is on about 20 times. So there’s quite a lot of scope for things to go wrong here before this were to look expensive. And there’s the daily average active users on on the platform, you can see, it’s about 2 billion and still rising gently. I mean, just talk about things rising and rising gently in particular, in relation to things like this.那就是我们喜欢的类型，你知道，为 22 家销售和 100 家销售服务。基本上，这归结于 25%的运营利润率。而资本回报率，诚然有所下降，因为公司投入了大量支出，资本回报率从 23%下降。所以这是过去的情况，不是未来的情况。但这是一家相当强大的企业。正如我之前所说，目前市盈率为 15.3。就其价值而言，这些不是我们的数据，而是市场共识数据。所以我给出 12.7 倍。所以它说在彭博上，这相当便宜。考虑到公司目前的支出情况，你可以看到标普为 20 倍。所以在这变得昂贵之前，这里还有相当大的出错空间。而且，你可以看到平台上的日活跃用户平均数约为 20 亿，仍在温和增长。我意思是，特别是关于这类事物，谈论持续温和增长。

Most people seem to deal with it anecdotally and say, Well, I mean, it’s not great, because nobody uses it anymore, but demonstrably isn’t the case, then there’s a subset of that where people say but it’s only growing at 4% per annum when you’ve got 2 billion users and you’re not allowed to operate in China. So your your effective, your effective market is already a bit over 5 billion human beings. And you’ve got an x out the ones in Africa because quite a lot of member any access to broadband. You’ve probably got almost all the people in the world who can use your product on there. So isn’t gonna be growing at 20% per annum is it? So the fact that it’s still growing at all, I think is quite impressive.大多数人似乎都是通过轶事来处理这个问题，并说，嗯，我的意思是，这并不好，因为现在没人再用了，但显然情况并非如此。然后，有一部分人会说，但它的年增长率只有 4%的时候，你拥有 20 亿用户，而且还不允许在中国运营。所以你的有效市场已经超过 5 亿人。而且，非洲地区的人由于相当多的人无法接入宽带，所以你几乎拥有世界上所有能够使用你产品的人。所以它不太可能每年增长 20%，对吧？所以，它仍然在增长这一事实，我认为相当令人印象深刻。

Ian King  34:43  伊恩·金 34 分 43 秒

You don’t worry about the competitive landscape. I’m going to notice that Facebook and Google meta of Google, their share of the US online mall advertising market actually fell below 50% last month for the first time ever he don’t worry about the competition.您不必担心竞争格局。我会注意到，Facebook 和谷歌的元数据，它们在美国在线商场广告市场的份额实际上首次低于 50%，这已经持续了一个月。您不必担心竞争。

Terry Smith  34:59

We worry about everything else. Sure. I think they’re facing a couple of things in the advertising market, one of which you describe, which is the competitive landscape, which has moved against them, it’s moved against them with the iOS operating system change at Apple, where they can’t actually follow the, the data, as well as they used to in terms of the effectiveness of advertising. And it’s moved against them in terms of people who are coming up developing advertising. So people, like Amazon, for example, are moving into the advertising space quite effectively. But I still think they are actually a very, very big influence. And even though these two are only 50%, the ubiquity of the communications platform, and in Google, the search platform, I still think is an enormous grab, in terms of advertising for我们担心其他一切。当然。我认为它们在广告市场面临一些问题，其中之一是您描述的竞争格局，它已经对它们不利，随着苹果 iOS 操作系统的变化，它们无法像过去那样有效地跟踪广告数据。它还因为新兴的广告开发人员而对它们不利。例如，亚马逊等公司正在有效地进入广告领域。但我仍然认为它们实际上是一个非常、非常大的影响。尽管这两个公司的市场份额只有 50%，但通讯平台的普遍性和谷歌的搜索平台，我认为在广告方面仍然是一个巨大的优势。

Julian Robins  35:47

you probably want to make the point that the I mean, one thing we’re going to find is that is that these companies are now so big, that they’re just going to be a lot more cyclical than they were before.你可能想指出的是，我的意思是，我们会发现这些公司现在变得如此之大，它们将比以前更具周期性。

Terry Smith  35:56  特里·史密斯 35:56

I think that’s an there’s an inevitability that if you look back in history, Tech was always relatively non cyclical. And relative because it was on a secular growth trend, although I think it’s still on a secular growth trend. I don’t think there’s any doubt about that. But it’s such a much bigger part of what we spend now that it can’t avoid being a bit cynical. Now, I don’t think that’s, that’s possible. I said, we’re talking about the metaverse, people, they’re spending a lot of money on it. What is it? Well, it’s obviously a form of enhanced stroke virtual reality product. Since we haven’t actually mostly seen it is difficult to tell you exactly what it is, how do we attempt to approach that then, we attempt to approach it by talking to people who we think might understand it in other companies, or might be users of it, people like Microsoft and Apple and Estee Lauder, and L’Oreal and so on. And what we get from that is a sense that as much as we find it difficult to envisage what this is, because we haven’t seen it, there is a reality behind it, and it will emerge, of course, so doesn’t mean that that Meta is going to be the leader or a leader in it. They may, they may emerge and they may fail. But I don’t think we should think that we’re talking about something which is science fiction, a pipe dream here.我认为，纵观历史，科技始终相对非周期性。之所以相对，是因为它处于世俗增长趋势，尽管我认为它仍然处于世俗增长趋势，这一点毫无疑问。但现在科技已成为我们支出的一个如此大的部分，以至于它不可避免地会让人有些悲观。现在，我不认为这是可能的。我说，我们谈论的是元宇宙，人们在这个上面花费了大量的金钱。它是什么？嗯，它显然是一种增强型虚拟现实产品。由于我们还没有主要看到它，很难确切地告诉你它是什么，那么我们如何尝试接近它呢？我们尝试通过与其他公司中可能理解它的人或可能是其用户的人交谈来接近它，比如微软、苹果、雅诗兰黛、欧莱雅等等。我们从这些交谈中得到的印象是，尽管我们难以想象它是什么，因为我们还没有看到它，但背后确实存在现实，它当然会出现的，这意味着 Meta 不一定会成为其领导者或领导者。 它们可能会出现，也可能会失败。但我认为我们不应该认为我们谈论的是科幻小说，是空中楼阁。

I think it’s a lot more than that. I mean, to give you a couple of thoughts on that. I mean, the the people that we talked to in the consumer companies are absolutely clear. And things like cosmetics, that this is going to be a part of the future for it. The Koreans just announced for what it’s worth, that they think they’re going to create one and a half million jobs from it. Basically, people who’ve got some grasp of technology, in terms of national direction of their economy, and so on. So when when people poopoo it, it’s easy to do next, we don’t know what it is. But bear in mind the following, you can make big mistakes Pooh poohing these things. Larry Ellison, the founder of Oracle, I can’t remember which your dude is better on these things. And I said, the cloud cloud computing, what is it? That’s it’s gonna, nothing important is going to emerge from him. What is it within the last 10 years? Yeah, yeah. I mean, as a result of him taking that stance, they’re now number four in cloud computing, a distant fourth in cloud computing. And it’s a bit like the problems that we do have some of which do relate to technology stocks in our portfolio or thinking about things like the metaverse, it’s not a comfortable place to be. I’ll tell you that in terms of owning things like this, but the way I look at it is the other way up. Let’s imagine that we just ran our portfolio for so all time now with only consumer and medical stocks. And would you be happy? Would we be happy that we had no exposure to technology? Do we think that would work? Well? It didn’t work very well, last year, clearly. But do we think in most years in the market cycle, it’d be a really good idea not to have anything? I don’t think it would choose, you know, Okay.我认为这远不止于此。我的意思是，想就这个问题给你提供几点看法。我的意思是，我们与消费品公司交谈过的人对此非常明确。比如化妆品，这将是它未来的一个组成部分。韩国人刚刚宣布，无论怎么说，他们认为这将创造 150 万个工作岗位。基本上，这些人是懂一些技术的，从国家经济方向等方面来看。所以当人们轻视它时，很容易这样做，我们不知道那是什么。但请记住以下几点，轻视这些事情可能会犯大错。甲骨文公司的创始人拉里·埃利森，我记不清哪个小子在这些事情上更好。我说云计算，那是什么？那将不会从他那里出现任何重要的事物。在过去 10 年里，那是什么？是的，是的。我的意思是，由于他采取这种立场，他们现在在云计算中排名第四，在云计算中远远落后于第四。 这有点像我们所面临的问题，其中一些确实与我们的投资组合中的科技股有关，或者是在思考诸如元宇宙之类的事物，这并不是一个舒适的位置。我会告诉你们，在拥有这类东西方面，但我的看法是相反的。让我们想象一下，如果我们现在一直只运行我们的投资组合，只有消费品和医疗股。你们会开心吗？我们会满意自己没有科技股的敞口吗？我们觉得这样会有效吗？好吧？显然，去年并没有很好地奏效。但我们认为在市场周期的大多数年份里，没有任何敞口会是一个真正的好主意吗？我不认为它会这样选择，你知道的。好吧。

Ian King  38:48  伊恩·金 38 分 48 秒

Very good. Right. So this next one, you’ve kind of headed it off at the passage from Maria Messerly. Thanks, Maria. Since the inception of value, 2022 years seems to be the most eventful in terms of stock rotation. I mean, you’ve kind of addressed that in the presentation. But she goes on to say, what can justify such a high flow of businesses in the portfolio? And here’s the key question, I think, is there any shift to a more frequent trading strategy? Long term?非常好。对。那么下一个，你基本上已经从玛丽亚·梅瑟利的发言中开始了。谢谢玛丽亚。自价值理念诞生以来，2022 年似乎在股票轮动方面是最多事的。我的意思是，你基本上在演示中已经提到了这一点。但她接着说，什么可以证明投资组合中如此高的企业流动？而我认为，关键的问题是，是否有向更频繁的交易策略转变？长期来看？

Terry Smith  39:16  特里·史密斯 39 分 16 秒

No, not a shift in strategy. And we’re still aiming to be very long term shareholders, ideally, forever if we get the opportunity to do so I, I wrote to a company this week, pointing out that we’ve owned them since inception, and have never sold a share. And that’s kind of a position we’d like to be in. Particularly, you know, if it’s a good business, and we think they’re doing things roughly right. What causes change is events, basically, you know, we have to sometimes react to events and that’s, that’s a fact of life. The other thing I would say is, this is not a change of strategy, but our, we’re going to talk about okay, you got a question about engagement with companies later on. One of the things that we’ve tried to operate on as a mantra over years, which we didn’t invent, because we didn’t actually invent anything. We tried to copy people who are quite clever with it, that’s the way forward is always invest in a business that can be run by an idiot, because sooner or later they all are. And, and the fact of the matter is, it’s an awful lot better to invest in certain businesses that are run by idiots than others.不，不是策略的转变。我们仍然致力于成为长期股东，理想情况下是永远，如果我们有机会做到的话。本周，我给一家公司写了封信，指出我们自公司创立以来就一直持有股份，从未出售过任何股票。这大概是我们希望所处的位置。特别是，你知道，如果是一家好企业，而且我们认为他们大致做得很对。导致变化的是事件，基本上，我们知道，有时我们必须对事件做出反应，这是生活的现实。我还要说的是，这不是策略的转变，而是，我们将讨论关于稍后对公司参与的问题。多年来，我们一直试图遵循一个信条，这个信条并非我们首创，因为我们实际上什么都没首创。我们试图效仿那些相当聪明的人，前进的道路永远是投资于一个可以由傻瓜经营的企业，因为迟早他们都会变成傻瓜。事实上，投资于某些由傻瓜经营的企业，比投资于其他企业要好得多。

And so, you know, things like consumer products companies, most it’s not ideal to have the media in charge, you’re probably going to survive, right? But when you get into certain areas, like technology, it’s a lot less easy to survive. It’s not impossible. It’s just less easy. I mean, some would say, and I don’t want to call anybody an idiot, for obvious reasons. So I know how boomerangs work. But I know, we bought our holding in Microsoft when it was run by Steve Ballmer, who lots of other people have certainly described in that manner. And I don’t have I don’t know Mr. Ballmer. And I try not to draw such conclusions on people I’ve never met. But certainly the Microsoft business survived that, that episode very well. But it’s equally true to say, the real impact of Microsoft was setting and Nadella coming on and grasping the business. So I think what I’m trying to say is, the difference between a very bad performance and a good performance is not as wide in in the more stable sectors that we invest in like food and consumer products, as it is in technology. And that’s that makes us I think, going forward a little more cautious from the experience that we’ve had about holding on sometimes.所以，众所周知，像消费品公司这样的行业，大多数情况下媒体掌权并非理想状态，你们可能仍然能够生存，对吧？但当你进入某些特定领域，比如科技行业，生存就困难得多。并非不可能，只是更难。我意思是，有些人可能会说——我不想因为明显的原因称任何人为傻瓜。我知道回旋镖的运作方式。但我清楚，我们是在史蒂夫·鲍尔默掌管微软时买入的微软股份，很多人确实用类似的方式描述过他。我并不认识鲍尔默先生，我也不想对从未见过的人妄下结论。但微软的业务显然在那段时期生存得很好。但同样真实的是，微软真正的影响力在于设定方向以及纳德拉接手并掌控了业务。所以我想说的是，在我们投资的食物和消费品等更稳定行业里，糟糕表现和良好表现之间的差距，远不如在科技行业那么大。 而这就是我认为，从我们过去的经验中，在持有有时时，让我们在今后稍微谨慎一些。

Julian Robins  41:32  朱利安·罗宾斯 41:32

I’ve just added another couple of things, which is not withstanding the tremendous loyalty of the people in the room. We have had outflows over the last year. And and when you if you’ve got no inflows, and you have a stock you really want to buy, then the only way to raise money to buy it is to actually sell something else sell something else. So that’s certainly something that we’ve addressed. The other thing is that, I mean, I think that I mean, 2020, I thought was a fascinating year, because obviously, because of COVID, the market crashed, and there were lots of opportunities to buy things. Not a generational opportunity. But there were good opportunities. And I think that and we somewhat lucked out, because we own records since the start.我刚刚又补充了另外几点，这并不妨碍在场的各位的巨大忠诚度。我们过去一年出现了资金流出。而且，如果你没有资金流入，而你想购买某只股票，那么唯一筹集资金购买它的方法就是出售其他东西。所以，这确实是我们已经解决的问题。另一件事是，我想，我认为，2020 年是一个引人入胜的年份，因为显然由于新冠疫情，市场崩盘，有很多购买的机会。这不是一个世代级别的机会。但确实有好的机会。而且，我认为，我们算是走运了，因为我们自一开始就拥有记录。

And we bought Clorox in 2019. And us we own the world’s two preeminent cleaning stocks at a time when demand for cleaning products was obviously very high. And we saw the stocks go up a lot, they doubled when a lot of other stocks had halved. And we were able to sell those and buy things which was significantly high quality. So I mean, that was a moment. And it was interesting that in the US companies publish what’s called sorry, fund managers published what’s called a 13 F, which gives their quarterly trades. And I was kind of mystified by how some of the big value funds were very, very inactive during that year. And I would have thought that a test of a fund manager or a value fund manager was that they would have been very active during 2020 because of the opportunities. And so I think, not as that I mean, we’re not trying to be more active or we don’t have any change in strategy. But there are moments when I think it’s right to be more active because rare opportunities present themselves.我们于 2019 年买入宝洁公司。当时，清洁产品的需求显然非常高，而我们持有的两家全球顶尖的清洁股票实现了大幅上涨，当许多其他股票下跌一半时，它们的股价翻了一番。我们能够卖出这些股票，并买入一些质量显著更高的资产。所以，我认为那是一个关键时刻。有趣的是，在美国，公司会发布所谓的 13F 文件，即基金经理发布的季度交易报告。我对一些大型价值基金在那一年表现得非常不活跃感到困惑。我以为，对基金经理或价值基金经理的考验应该是他们在 2020 年因为机会而非常活跃。所以我认为，并非我们试图更加活跃，也不是我们的策略有任何改变。但我想，在某些时刻，采取更积极的态度是正确的，因为罕见的机会出现了。

Ian King  43:22  伊恩·金 43 分 22 秒

Good stuff. Thank you. This next one is from Paul adult, Paul. Frank, if you’re wondering, Paul is whether he’s actually a personal finance journalist, because this is a question I’ve seen thrown at various fund managers over the years such as Anthony Bolton at fidelity. Paul’s question is this does the size of the fund now effectively limits the investable universe for funds myth making it difficult to be as successful as the fund has been in the past?好东西。谢谢。接下来这个来自保罗·亚当斯，保罗。如果你想知道，保罗是否真的是一位个人金融记者，因为这是多年来我见过各种基金经理被问到的问题，比如富达的安东尼·博尔顿。保罗的问题是：现在基金规模是否有效地限制了基金神话的投资范围，使其难以像过去那样成功？

Terry Smith  43:49  特里·史密斯 43:49

We’ve done your slide on this with some numbers on it. Just to give you an illustration, it’s it’s easy to, I think, fall into the trap. But it is a bit of a trap of thinking, Well, when you started fund Smith, you own Domino’s Pizza, and it did very well. And it was a $1.8 billion company. And you couldn’t own a $1.8 billion company today, could you? And the answer is no, we couldn’t not unless we wanted to own 25% or something. And we don’t want to own 25% of anything, basically. Because, you know, other people in the fund management industry have experimented with limited liquidity in open ended funds. And it’s a rather like, you know, playing with sort of fireworks does work for well, we’re not gonna do that. So the thing that people miss is the companies don’t stand still, you know, the fund has grown in size, yes, but quite a lot of the companies have performed pretty well as well. So we’ve given you a table here, which shows you the companies we just smallest by market capitalization that we either own or have owned, and we show you in there, what the size of the company is in terms of its market value.我们已经为您制作了包含一些数据的幻灯片。为了给您一个说明，我认为很容易陷入这个陷阱。但这确实是一个思维陷阱。比如说，当您创办 Fundsmith 时，您拥有 Domino's Pizza，而且经营得非常成功。当时它是一家价值 18 亿美元的公司。如今您不可能再拥有这样一家 18 亿美元的公司，对吧？答案是肯定的，我们不可能拥有，除非我们愿意持有 25%或更多的股份。基本上，我们并不想持有任何公司的 25%股份。因为您知道，基金管理行业的其他人已经尝试在开放式基金中引入有限流动性。这有点像，您知道，玩烟花，虽然看起来不错，但我们不会这样做。人们忽略的是，公司不会停滞不前，您知道，基金确实在增长，但很多公司也表现相当出色。所以我们在这里提供了一个表格，展示了我们目前持有或曾经持有的市值最小的公司，并显示了这些公司的市值规模。

In 2010, when we started, what the market value is today, and what percentage of the company we would have to own In order to get a 3% position in our fund 3% position would mean we’d have 30 stocks in round number terms. And I think you can see, but basically, even when we get to the very smallest of these, which are the bottom end of the footsie, these are not numbers where we say we’ll call them whenever that is terribly liquid seven or 8%. which funnily enough, I think the short answer is no, and it’s because the company is to a considerable degree, keep pace, because these are companies that are not just companies on average sitting out there, you know, so it’s not sort of take today’s example Accardo, where, you know, don’t blind when or if you own, you know, sort of 3% of your funding Accardo, five years ago, and you wanted 3%. Now, you know, most of the company, no, that’s not what we’re talking about here. We’re talking about our investable universe of companies where whether we own them or not, they’ve usually performed pretty well. Just out2010 年，当我们开始时，今天的市值是多少，以及我们需要持有公司多少股份才能在基金中获得 3%的份额。3%的份额意味着我们会持有大约 30 只股票。我想你们可以看到，基本上，即使是我们持有这些最小规模的股票——这些是富时 100 指数的最低端——这些数字也不是我们所说的那种流动性极差的数字，大约在 7%或 8%。有趣的是，我认为简短的答案是否定的，原因在于，公司在很大程度上保持着同步，因为这些公司不仅仅是平均水平的公司，你知道，所以它不是像今天这个例子 Accardo 那样，你知道，不要盲目地在你持有基金 Accardo 的 3%时，五年前你想要 3%，现在你知道，公司的大部分不是我们谈论的内容。我们谈论的是我们可投资的公司范围，无论我们是否持有它们，它们通常表现都相当好。刚刚

Julian Robins  45:49

the simple point that that. I mean, it’s clearly obviously the case that, that there is more there is more percentage upside in, in smaller market cap companies as a general rule, but but one of the most successful companies that we’ve bought, where we’ve made 10 times our money as a company that you might have heard of called Microsoft. So it’s not only I mean, you know, we, I think the first price we bought Domino’s Pizza was $15. And at the peak, it was $500. So we might have made 30 times, you know, and you can see IDEXX was a $4 billion company there, and we’ve made six or seven times our money, but we’ve made 10 times our money in Microsoft. So again, if you’re patient, you do tend to get opportunities in in, in, in market caps of all sizes. Yeah.一个简单的观点是，我的意思是，显然很明显的情况是，存在更多的百分比上涨空间，在较小的市值公司中，作为一般规则，但是我们在购买的最成功的公司之一，我们赚了 10 倍的回报，你可能听说过叫做微软的公司。所以，这不仅仅是我的意思，你知道，我们，我认为我们第一次购买多米诺比萨的价格是 15 美元。在顶峰时，它达到了 500 美元。所以，我们可能赚了 30 倍，你知道，你可以看到 IDEXX 当时是一家 40 亿美元的公司，我们赚了六七倍，但我们赚了微软的 10 倍。所以，再次，如果你有耐心，你往往会在各种市值的公司中获得机会。是的。

Ian King  46:39

Great stuff. Right. This next one is on the investment process. So it’s a kind of related theme here from Peter Mitchell. Thanks for your question, Peter. And he asks, With the projected trends in ageing populations, what are the reasons behind there being no pure plays on eye care? Or hearing devices in the portfolio?很棒的内容。对。下一个是关于投资过程的话题。所以这是来自 Peter Mitchell 的一个相关主题。感谢你的问题，Peter。他问，随着人口老龄化的预期趋势，为什么投资组合中没有纯粹的视力护理或听力设备公司？

Terry Smith  46:59  特里·史密斯 46:59

You ever go? You ever got the point? Yes, that’s the point. I’m sorry.你曾经去过吗？你有没有明白这个点？是的，这就是重点。抱歉。

Julian Robins  47:10  朱利安·罗宾斯 47:10

Right. So we have you probably heard us talk about our investable universe, which is 80 companies and within our investable universe, we actually do have two companies, which are pure plays on eye care and hearing devices. So the first one is the French company or French Italian company, EssilorLuxottica, we had originally SLR in the in the investable universe, French company, it’s the dominant player in the lenses that go into glasses, the big brands, big brands was Carrizal. And then it merged with Luxottica. And it started loading brands, and also retailers like Sunglass Hut, except you can see out there. It’s a $78 billion dollar company, we’ve we’ve had slo in the investable Universe since day one. One of the factoids that we used to produce quite often back in the day was that was that this was a good company, because there’s the question of said the wrong thing, or 4.2 billion people in the world who need corrective vision, only, and only about 1.8 billion have access to it. So it seems like a pretty good market. The it’s always been pretty expensive.对。所以我们可能听说过我们谈论我们的可投资宇宙，其中包括 80 家公司。在我们的可投资宇宙中，我们实际上有两家公司，它们是专注于眼科和听力设备领域的纯粹投资。第一家公司是法国公司或法意合资公司 EssilorLuxottica，我们最初在可投资宇宙中将其列为 SLR，一家法国公司，它是眼镜镜片市场的领导者，大品牌如 Carrizal。然后它与 Luxottica 合并，开始收购品牌，以及像 Sunglass Hut 这样的零售商，你可以在外面看到。它是一家价值 780 亿美元的公司，我们自一开始就将其纳入可投资宇宙。我们过去经常使用的一个事实是，这是一家好公司，因为有一个问题，即全球有 42 亿人需要矫正视力，而只有 18 亿人能够获得这种服务。所以这似乎是一个相当好的市场。它一直都很昂贵。

And then when they merged with Essilor, or when they merged with Luxottica, there was quite a lot of complications around the deal around who was gonna manage the business around other other acquisitions they were trying to do. And we’re gonna go on to a couple of slides time. Yeah, the other thing was that the return on capital, as you see was, was sort of slightly iffy to begin with and is now as a result of that deal gone down to a pretty small number. So it’s still in our investable universe. We’re still following it. Every set of results we still write up religiously was the model it we sort of we we listened to everything I’ve got to say but it’s on the watch list at the moment. And then the other company is a Swiss company called Sonova. As I said, It traces its origins back to a company called Electro acoustique. Founded in 1947. Some of you might notice Phonak ware which was renamed in 1977. And then it was renamed Sonova in 2007. Phone X is the best known brands. It is the world leader in hearing aids and in hearing implants. Again, if we go back to the slide again, used to have pretty good returns on capital. These are now still okay but less good. It’s had some problems with it had it had a history not hysterical is probably the wrong word. But it had a bizarre instance with insider trading and with back in the day and we follow it. It’s always been on our watch list. It, it’s never, it’s never grown quite as much as we thought it would.然后，当他们与依视路合并，或者与 Luxottica 合并时，围绕交易出现了许多复杂问题，涉及如何管理其他收购业务。接下来我们将继续展示几张幻灯片。是的，另一件事是资本回报率，如您所见，起初有些不稳定，由于该交易，现在已降至一个相当小的数字。因此，它仍然在我们的可投资范围内。我们仍在关注它。每一份业绩报告，我们仍然严格撰写。我们听取了所有我要说的话，但目前它处于观察名单上。然后另一家公司是瑞士公司 Sonova。正如我所说，它起源于 1947 年成立的 Electroacoustique 公司。有些人可能注意到，Phonak 品牌在 1977 年更名，然后在 2007 年更名为 Sonova。Phonak 是知名度最高的品牌。它是助听器和助听植入设备的世界领导者。再次回到幻灯片，过去资本回报率相当不错。现在这些回报率仍然可以，但不如以前好。 它在历史上确实遇到过一些问题，但并非歇斯底里，或许用词不当。但它在过去曾发生过一起内幕交易事件，我们一直关注着它。它始终在我们的观察名单上。它从未像我们预期的那样增长。

Terry Smith  50:13  特里·史密斯 50:13

To the performance slide, yeah. This is the acid test.关于业绩幻灯片，是的。这是关键测试。

Julian Robins  50:16  朱利安·罗宾斯 50:16

And I mean, I think I’d also I’d also use this point, although there’s not in the question wishes to say that these stocks are in our investable universe, but not in the portfolio, but even even the things which haven’t done as well in the investable universe, you know, it’s still done. Okay, so as long exhausting, there’s that 335% Since we started against the found that 486% and turnovers up 252%. So they still don’t, okay, we’ve done better. So I guess we’ve done well by not only them, but they are pretty decent businesses, and we continue to follow them.而且，我想我还会用这一点，尽管问题中并没有表示这些股票在我们可投资范围内，但不在投资组合中，即使是那些在我们可投资范围内表现不佳的东西，你知道，它们仍然有所表现。好吧，所以只要我们持续努力，就有那 335%的回报，自开始以来，与基准的 486%相比，周转率上升了 252%。所以它们仍然表现不错，好吧，我们已经做得更好。所以我想我们不仅为它们做得好，而且它们也是相当不错的公司，我们继续关注它们。

Ian King  50:51  伊恩·金 50:51

Right. This next one comes from Manish Gupta. Thank you, Manish for your question. Terry, your public comments on Unilever did create a lot of discussion. And I would believe did not go unnoticed by management’s. Would you take a similarly vocal approach on any other underperforming companies?好的。接下来是 Manish Gupta 的提问。感谢 Manish 您的问题。Terry，您对联合利华的公开评论确实引发了广泛讨论。我相信管理层也注意到了。您会对其他表现不佳的公司采取同样直言不讳的态度吗？

Terry Smith  51:12

Yes, if we had to. But frankly, it’s not our preferred route. Or even if we feel that we’ve got to engage with somebody, because we think things are not going right. By far our preferred route is to do it in private, we think most discussions where people are going to discuss something’s going to be difficult, because after all, you’re going to tell them, I don’t think you’re doing this very well. And not best performed with a megaphone in a public arena. So you know, we’re likely to start with just talking to them about it. And then if that doesn’t work, is to write them a letter I’m usually write them in and something saying what we think it’s not right and what we think should be done. And it’s only really when we think we’ve been completely ignored, that we reach for the lever and go public on the whole thing. And so I’m sure we could end up in exactly the same position, but it wouldn’t be our first or even our second stage of trying to alter what’s going on.是的，如果不得不这么做的话。但坦白说，这并非我们的首选方案。即便我们觉得有必要与某人接触，因为我们认为事情进展不顺利。到目前为止，我们更倾向于私下解决。我们认为大多数讨论都会很困难，因为毕竟你要告诉他们：“我认为你们做得不太好。”这种情况下，用扩音器在公共场合大声宣扬绝非最佳选择。所以，我们通常会先与他们私下谈谈。如果这行不通，我们会给他们写信，信中说明我们认为哪些地方不对，以及我们建议如何改进。只有当我们觉得完全被忽视时，才会动用“杠杆”，将整个事情公开化。因此，我确信我们可能会陷入同样的境地，但这不会是我们试图改变现状的第一步，甚至也不会是第二步。

I mean, just one I’ve got the point. I mean, one of the things I would say is, a number of people have said to us look, if you don’t like Unilever, because after all, you keep talking about it, why don’t you sell the shares to which I reply, it’s not Unilever that we don’t like it’s the management, actually, within Unilever is fine. Unilever hasn’t changed that much. Unilever is still potentially a fine business. I mean, he’s got some very strong brands, it’s got things like dove and norlane got more than 4 billion euros in sales per brand powerful brands. It’s got arguably unparalleled distribution into the emerging world. I mean, it’s vice for being the largest, fast moving consumer, this company what it is in India, definitely. And also in Nigeria, and Indonesia. So we’re talking about three of the five most populous countries in the world, two of which will be amongst the three most populous countries of the world, in the middle of century by most people’s reckoning. That’s a powerful position. And we look back at the unilevel, we bought in 2010, which had 18 20%, or even in the low 20s percent return on capital. And now that’s 10%.我的意思是，我明白这一点。我的意思是，我要说的是，很多人告诉我们，如果你不喜欢联合利华，毕竟你一直在谈论它，为什么不卖掉这些股票。我回答说，我们不喜欢的是联合利华的管理层，实际上，联合利华内部还不错。联合利华并没有发生太大变化。联合利华仍然可能是一个不错的业务。我的意思是，它拥有一些非常强大的品牌，比如多芬和诺兰，每个品牌每年的销售额都超过 40 亿欧元，这些品牌非常强大。它还拥有无可匹敌的渠道进入新兴市场。我的意思是，它是世界上最大的快速消费品公司之一，在印度、尼日利亚和印度尼西亚，这绝对是事实。我们谈论的是世界上人口最多的五个国家中的三个，其中两个将在本世纪中叶成为世界上人口最多的三个国家。这是一个强大的地位。我们回顾一下 2010 年买入的联合利华，当时它的资本回报率在 18%到 20%甚至低 20%左右。而现在，这个数字是 10%。

Less than that we think, Well, what’s changed? And I don’t think the answer is Unilever. And so, you know, it’s just to clarify a lot more, it’s not that we don’t like Unilever, we think Unilever still has the potential to be a very good business. But we think it needs to be managed in a manner that brings that out that doesn’t involve a lot of other things. And obviously, I’ve been extensively quoted on mayonnaise and soap and all kinds of things. But But let’s get back to something more basic than that, you know, they’ve sold the tea business, and they sold the spreads business, and they tried to buy the GlaxoSmithKline over the counter health business, we don’t think they should be doing things like that, mostly, we think what they should spend their time on doing is trying to make Unilever as good as it can possibly be in terms of how it compares with other really good businesses in cleaning products, and personal care products and food products. And, and once they’ve actually got the business to perform as well as it possibly can be the best example of it. So then we might ever think about doing something else. But until you get to that stage, I’m not quite sure why we’d let you out to play games with buying and selling.我们想的还不到那个程度，那么，到底发生了什么变化呢？我认为答案并不是联合利华。所以，你知道，我们只是需要澄清更多，并不是我们不喜欢单一利华，我们认为单一利华仍然有潜力成为一个非常好的企业。但我们认为它需要以一种能够发掘这种潜力而不涉及太多其他事务的方式进行管理。显然，我在蛋黄酱、肥皂和各种事物上被广泛引用。但是，让我们回到比这更基本的事情上，你知道，他们卖掉了茶叶业务，卖掉了涂抹酱业务，还试图场外购买葛兰素史克保健品业务，我们认为他们不应该做这些事情。主要我们认为他们应该花时间做的事情是，努力使联合利华在与其他真正优秀的清洁产品、个人护理产品和食品产品企业相比时，尽可能好。并且，一旦他们使业务表现达到尽可能好的水平，那就是最好的例子。那么，我们也许才会考虑做其他事情。 但直到你达到那个阶段我不太清楚为什么我们要让你去玩买卖游戏。

Ian King  54:15  伊恩·金 54:15

I mean, you’ll you’ll this is all addressed in the annual letter, of course, I mean, I was quite amazed by the table that you had in there about the number of acquisitions that they’ve done.我的意思是，你你将会看到，这当然都在年度信中有所提及，我的意思是，我对你们在那里的表格印象深刻，关于他们已经完成收购的数量。

Terry Smith  54:22  泰瑞·史密斯 54:22

But um, for some reason, it’s it’s regarded as a state secret, knowing how these things occurred. And I don’t you know, call me old fashioned. I don’t suppose that’s because they’ve done so well that they’re embarrassed by it, right. I mean, you know, the example I gave in the annual letter in particular of Carver, Korea, which they bought, I mean, they bought this business, from Goldman Sachs and Bain Capital, and with apologies to anyone in the room who works for either of those two organisations, this is a compliment by the way, buying things from them might not go well. They’re quite good at it. Another clue to what might happen is they bought it one year after Bain Capital and Goldman Sachs had invested for six times what they paid for it. This was built in the Korean press as a landmark in private equity in Korea, the steel. And then the final frontier is is we don’t think fast moving consumer goods companies like Unilever are all that good at the cosmetics business. We think it’s family controlled businesses, which only do cosmetics that are really good at cosmetics businesses, people like Estee Lauder and Lorell requires a completely different approach to the profitability and spending in terms of advertising promotion, packaging, then the consumer goods companies have got Procter and Gamble walked away from our soldiers cosmetics, Mr. Cote, they realise I can’t do this.但是，不知何故，这些事情是如何发生的，被视为国家机密。我不知道，叫我老派吧。我不认为这是因为它们做得这么好，以至于感到尴尬，对吧。我的意思是，你知道，我在年度信中特别提到的韩国卡弗的例子，他们收购了这家公司，我是说，他们从高盛和贝恩资本收购了这家企业。在此向在场的为这两家机构工作的任何人士表示歉意，但这是赞美之意，因为从他们那里购买可能不会顺利。他们在这方面相当擅长。另一个可能发生的情况的线索是，他们在贝恩资本和高盛投资了六倍的收购价格后一年收购了它。这在韩国媒体中被建立为韩国私募股权的里程碑，钢铁。最后的前沿是，我们认为像联合利华这样快速消费品公司并不擅长化妆品业务。 我们认为，那些只做化妆品且真正擅长化妆品业务的家族控制企业，比如雅诗兰黛和洛莱尔，在广告推广、包装等方面的盈利能力和支出需要完全不同的策略。而宝洁等消费品公司已经退出化妆品领域，科特先生意识到他们无法继续这一业务。

Ian King  55:40  伊恩·金 55:40

You made clear in the shareholder letter in the annual letter that you were disappointed at the lack of communication have? Have you heard from them since it was announced that Alan job’s going yeah, we’re no good您在年度股东信中明确表示，对缺乏沟通感到失望，对吗？自艾伦·乔布斯宣布离职以来，您是否收到过他们的消息？我们可不行。

Terry Smith  55:51  特里·史密斯 55:51

success. We aren’t yet we are talking to them. We had a chat with the chairman about the new CEO appointment. And I would say at the moment, we are kind of mildly encouraged. What are we mildly encouraged about? Well, first, we did talk to us, that’s quite a good start. But then secondly, you know, he said something that sounded a bit like what I said earlier, which is, he thinks the priority is to get the business to perform as well as it can perform. And the M&A is not really a focus for this at all. And assuming that they actually mean what they say, I think that’s exactly the right way to approach this, that they should be trying to benchmark Unilever against its peers out there against Nestle and in food and beverage against Procter and Gamble in household cleaning products, and personal care products, etc, etc, etc. And so right well, what sort of margins returns and growth rates are they able to generate? Why can’t we do the same. And then when you’ve actually had a go at that, then maybe we can have a chat about whether you’re capable of doing more exciting things.成功。我们还没有和他们谈。我们和董事长谈了关于新 CEO 的任命。我可以说，目前，我们有点轻微的鼓励。我们轻微鼓励的是什么？首先，我们确实和他们谈了，这是个不错的开始。但其次，你知道，他说了一些听起来有点像我所说的内容，他认为优先事项是让业务尽可能表现出色。并购并不是这个阶段的重点。如果他们确实说到做到，我认为这正是正确的方法，他们应该尝试将联合利华与它的竞争对手比较，比如雀巢在食品饮料领域，以及宝洁在家用清洁产品和个人护理产品等。那么，他们能够产生什么样的利润率、回报率和增长率？我们为什么不能做到同样的事情。然后当你尝试过之后，我们也许可以谈谈你是否能够做更令人兴奋的事情。

Julian Robins  56:49  朱利安·罗宾斯 56:49

I just keep thinking back, some of you may remember the Henry Rude letters. Henry Rude was a fictional character who sent amusing letters to people. And he sent as I recall, a letter to Esther ransom, which was sort of mildly positive and nice. And he got what he what he thought was a bit of a brush off, you know, Dear Mr. Root, you know, thank you so much for your Lhasa, your kind letter, you know, Miss rounds and appreciates all the feedback from her sort of loyal followers. So having felt rather brushed off, he then sent her something utterly abusive, which I don’t think I can’t even repeat on this stage. And he got family show, family show. And he got a letter back saying, Dear Mr. Rude, thank you, for you so much for your kind comments, Miss Ramsey. Appreciate? And I think that that’s some sometimes what we feel我一直在回想，你们中有些人可能还记得亨利·鲁德信件。亨利·鲁德是一个虚构角色，他给人们写有趣的信。据我回忆，他给伊莎贝尔·兰森写了一封信，信中带点温和的积极和友好。而他得到了他自认为有点被忽视的回应，你知道，亲爱的鲁德先生，非常感谢你的拉萨，你的友好信件，你知道，兰森小姐感谢她所有忠实追随者的所有反馈。所以感到相当被忽视后，他随后给她寄了些完全侮辱性的东西，我觉得我甚至不能在这个舞台上重复。然后他得到了家庭秀，家庭秀。他收到一封信，信中说：亲爱的鲁德先生，非常感谢你的友好评论，兰森小姐。感谢？我想，那有时是我们感受到的。

Terry Smith  57:40  特里·史密斯 57:40

Yeah, we do feel like that sometimes, we do feel that we might be talking to the weighing machine sometimes rather than speak your weight machine. Right. So是的，我们有时确实有这样的感觉，我们感觉我们可能是在和称重机说话，而不是和你的称重机说话。对。

Ian King  57:51  伊恩·金 57:51

as you rightly surmised, in your presentation, we do have an Apple related question. This comes from Joe Hadfield. Joe, thank you for your question. When asked about owning Apple during the 2014 annual shareholders meeting, Terry stated, we would never own a fashion business. And in our view, this is exactly what Apple has become. What shift in Apple’s business model over the last nine years, made you change your mind about the company.正如您正确推测的，在您的演讲中，我们确实有一个与苹果相关的问题。这个问题来自乔·哈菲尔德。乔，感谢您的问题。在 2014 年年度股东大会上被问及是否持有苹果时，特里表示，我们永远不会拥有一家时尚业务。而我们认为，这正是苹果已成为的样子。在过去九年中，苹果的业务模式发生了怎样的转变，使您改变了对该公司的看法？

Terry Smith  58:15  特里·史密斯 58:15

I really don’t like these people who can remember what I said it’s so it’s so distressing.我真的很不喜欢那些能记住我说的话的人，这太让人困扰了。

Ian King  58:21  伊恩·金 58:21

on the internet. So在网上。所以

Terry Smith  58:23  特里·史密斯 58:23

I’d like to back up a bit, actually and explain why I think we took the stance we did and why we’ve now and then why we’ve now changed it to answer the question. Back in the dot com boom, when we were working in the in the broken pieces on the so called sell side of the industry, we used to market a product called Quest, which was a database system that had all the data on companies over about a billion dollars market value in the world, to institutions around the world. And looking at things it very much the same way as we look at them now, actually, in terms of whether companies great value or not, whether they’re good businesses. So we were asked for a presentation. And I was asked with Greg from here somewhere with us tonight. And we were asked for a presentation to a fund in Boston who had back to back presentations by yours truly. And and a gentleman called Michael Mobisoft, who’s a strategist. And they were puzzled about what to do about the dot com era. And Michael’s view was its quotes Columbus in the new world. Don’t worry about any of the normal metrics of cash flows and so on his eyeballs and clicks and buy everything roughly. I mean, I’ll paraphrase probably horribly. He’s a good guy. So don’t wonder. But yours truly said, Well, you don’t go to cash flow is not a business seller. And so by the end of this, they were even more confusing they were to begin with. So they said, Well, let’s talk about an individual stocks if we narrow down if they chose Nokia, and I using my cash flow system at the time, Nokia was trading at about 60 A share at the time. And my cash flow system that I presented it said it’s worth 12 Which of course people don’t normally do normally if people think something’s and silver says worth 50 Not 60 At 12, I was too bullish, by the way it went to three. Which was obviously a shock to people. The reason put forward on why we were wrong, why this consumer electronics products business making handsets basically wasn’t going to follow the path that we predicted in terms of cash returns and valuation was because it was an I hated this word ever since had an ecosystem.我想稍微倒退一下，实际上解释一下为什么我认为我们采取了这样的立场，以及为什么我们现在有时改变了它来回答问题。在互联网泡沫时期，当我们从事所谓的卖方行业时，我们曾推广一款名为 Quest 的产品，这是一套数据库系统，包含了全球市值超过 10 亿美元的公司数据，向世界各地的机构推广。实际上，我们看待这些公司的方式与现在非常相似，无论是公司的价值如何，它们是否是好的企业。因此，我们被要求做一个演示。我和 Greg（今晚与我们一起的这位）被要求向波士顿的一家基金做演示，这家基金紧接着听取了您的演讲和我本人的演讲，以及一位名为 Michael Mobisoft 的策略师的演讲。他们对于如何应对互联网时代感到困惑。Michael 的观点是引用哥伦布在新大陆上的话：“不要担心任何正常的现金流等指标，关注眼球和点击，大致买下所有东西。”我可能概括得非常糟糕。 他是个好人。所以不要奇怪。但本人说，嗯，你不去现金流不是商业卖家。所以到这个结束时，他们甚至比一开始更加令人困惑。所以他们说，嗯，让我们谈谈个别股票，如果我们缩小范围，如果他们选择了诺基亚，并且我当时使用我的现金流系统，诺基亚当时的股价约为每股 60 元。并且我展示的现金流系统说它值 12 元，当然人们通常不会这样做，如果人们认为某物值 50 元而不是 60 元，在 12 元时，我过于乐观，顺便说一句它涨到了 3 元，这显然让人们对之感到震惊。 我们之所以出错的原因，为什么这个消费电子产品业务制造手机基本上不会按照我们预测的现金流回报和估值路径发展，是因为它有一个生态系统。

People were tied into the Nokia ecosystem, and they couldn’t ever get out, they were always gonna have to buy new Nokia equipment. And so this proved to be absolute eyewash. And, of course, what’s happened over time is I’ve been so pumped up with my sagacity is result this, I’ve missed the Apple situation, I’m sorry. But anyway, one of the things we tried to do it because people have told us Apples, don’t worry about the devices business. Yes, you’re right, they’re on. They’re on a treadmill with regard to your iPhone in particular, which is obviously the biggest product by considerable margin. But it’s got an ecosystem. And the very use of that term and the way people talked about it led us to believe that we knew what we were doing. Our first mistake. And, but one thing we do, is we go back over things that we reject regularly, and blow the dust off. And metaphorically, they’re obviously an electronic file, so no real does and and see whether we’re right or wrong. And we try and get different members of the team to look at it each time to see whether anything new comes out of it. And when they did this, we noticed this, which is Apple’s revenues for the last few years, you’ll see up there. And the big orange bar is the iPhone sales, which as I said, is the largest segment of it. But this is the thing that was really striking, particularly once you started to get about here, this blue bar services over here, you know, the service part of this product is now about 25% of the revenues approximately, it encompasses things like music, TV, payments, so on, it’s clearly growing at about twice the rate of the handset business as well, which is interesting, and I think it is an ecosystem.人们被绑定在诺基亚生态系统中，而且他们永远无法摆脱，总是不得不购买新的诺基亚设备。因此，这被证明是一场彻底的虚假宣传。当然，随着时间的推移，我因为过于自信而错失了苹果的情况，我很抱歉。但无论如何，我们尝试做的一件事是，因为人们告诉我们苹果，不用担心设备业务。是的，你是对的，他们很活跃。他们正处在关于你的 iPhone 的跑步机上，这显然是最大的产品，差距相当大。但它有一个生态系统。而且，这个词的用法以及人们谈论它的方式让我们相信我们知道自己该做什么。我们的第一个错误。但我们确实做的一件事是，我们定期回顾那些我们拒绝的事物，拂去灰尘。从比喻的角度来看，它们显然是电子文件，所以没有真正做和做，看看我们是对是错。我们尝试每次让团队的不同成员来看它，看看是否会从中出现新的东西。 当他们这样做的时候，我们注意到了这一点，这是苹果公司过去几年的收入，你上面可以看到。那个大的橙色条是 iPhone 的销售量，正如我所说，这是最大的部分。 但真正引人注目的是，尤其是从这里开始，这个蓝色条是服务，你知道，这个产品的服务部分现在大约占收入的 25%，它包括音乐、电视、支付等等，它显然以大约是手机业务两倍的速度在增长，这很有趣，我认为这是一个生态系统。

Julian Robins  1:02:04

And it’s extremely  而且它极其

Terry Smith  1:02:05

profitable. It’s twice, it’s got profitability, like a software business, whereas the handset business, the hardware business has got fairly, you know, not ordinary margins, good margins, but not like a software. But it’s got fantastic returns and margins as far as we can determine for it. And it’s a service business, which is being sold to a very good socio economic group, your investors in our fund, thank you very much. And I can tell you from statistics that we collect on you, that three out of every four of you is got an iPhone, and you’re quite well off, you’re not basically, you’re quite good to sell Pete things do for a simple reason, you’ve got money.盈利。它的盈利能力是双倍，就像软件业务一样，而手机业务、硬件业务则相对普通，你知道，不是普通的利润率，有不错的利润率，但不像软件那样。但就我们所确定而言，它有惊人的回报和利润率。它是一个服务业务，被销售给一个非常好的社会经济群体，我们的基金投资者，非常感谢。我可以告诉你，根据我们收集的关于你们的统计数据，你们中四分之三的人拥有 iPhone，你们相当富裕，基本上，你们相当适合销售 Pete 的东西，原因很简单，你们有钱。

If you look at operating systems amongst the database of our investors, and this is pretty, pretty typical in the world. It’s three to one in terms of IRS systems, Apple systems versus Android systems, they basically got a very large, very good demographic and a fast growing services business. And that’s it basically, folks, we started buying at the end of last year, but got a tiny amount, because my target price was about $125. And it quickly went $250. So my reasoning was if I’m gonna $125 If you do the arithmetic, it’s about the same return as the s&p index. And this is a better business and the s&p index, in my view, of course, it quickly took off. And we bought a bit more now in the new year when it got back down towards our target price, but it’s taken off again. But as Julian’s said more than once in this, we will be patient. We don’t want to make compound previous errors by diving in. So we will be patient and you know, there’s a reasonable chance that the market will give us further opportunity to capitalise on that.如果你查看我们投资者的操作系统数据库，这在世界上非常典型。在 IRS 系统和苹果系统与安卓系统方面，比例大约是三比一。他们基本上拥有一个非常庞大、非常好的用户群体和快速发展的服务业务。基本上就是这样，各位，我们去年年底开始购买，但只买到了一小部分，因为我的目标价格大约是 125 美元。然后它很快就涨到了 250 美元。所以我的理由是，如果我要以 125 美元的价格购买，那么从数学上来说，它的回报率大约与标普指数相同。在我看来，这是一个更好的业务，当然，标普指数很快就涨了。我们在新年时又买了一些，因为它的价格回落到我们的目标价格附近，但它又涨了。但正如朱利安在这里不止一次所说的，我们会保持耐心。我们不想通过盲目投资来重复复合错误。所以我们会保持耐心，你知道，市场有合理的可能性给我们进一步的机会来利用这一点。

Ian King  1:03:51  伊恩·金 1:03:51

Very good. Now, well, we’ve talked a lot in the past about market timing. I know it’s something that you’ve always set to your face against. And this next question is on that theme. It comes from Charles Douglas Charles, thank you. Do you have your in the room for your question? And he asks, Is there room for a portion of the portfolio to be more dynamic and responsive to market changes?非常好。现在，我们过去经常谈论市场时机。我知道这是你一直坚决反对的事情。接下来的问题是关于这个主题的。它来自查尔斯·道格拉斯·查尔斯，谢谢。你在现场有问题吗？他问，投资组合的一部分是否有空间变得更加动态和响应市场变化？

Terry Smith  1:04:13  特里·史密斯 1:04:13

I first of all, I’d like Mr. Douglas to meet Maria, whose question we answered earlier, who said we’re training too much or something like that they could meet let me know what they’ve what their combined opinion is on what we should do. It’d be good. You can’t please everybody is one of the things you find in here. Yeah, well, I think to some degree, we’ve hopefully answered this in what I’ve been saying so far, which is, there’s no massive change here. And and we’re certainly not going to market time. I don’t know anyone who can do it really. And I certainly know without any doubt that I can’t do it or we can’t do it. So we’re not going to do that. I think probably we’ve learned a little more, as I said about the necessity to not remain engaged in long term shareholders in businesses that can’t be run by the proverbial idiot that requires has slightly more of an itchy finger on the trigger than people who are selling soap and and household cleaning products. Basically, the capacity for damage is greater. So that’s that’s where I would have said the responsiveness will be.首先，我想让道格拉斯先生认识玛丽亚，我们之前回答过她的问题，她说我们培训太多或诸如此类，他们可以见面让我知道他们综合意见是什么。这会很好。取悦所有人是不可能的，这是我们在这里发现的事情之一。是的，嗯，我想在一定程度上，我希望我在之前所说的已经回答了这个问题，那就是这里没有重大变化。而且我们当然不会去市场时间。我不知道有谁能做到。而且我确信无疑地知道我不能做，或者我们不能做。所以我们不会做。我认为我们可能学到了更多，就像我说的，不参与那些不能由所谓的傻瓜经营的企业，这些企业需要比那些销售肥皂和家庭清洁产品的人更有触发手指的冲动。基本上，破坏的能力更大。所以这就是我认为响应将在哪里的地方。

Julian Robins  1:05:13  朱利安·罗宾斯 1:05:13

Also, forgive me if I’ve got this wrong, but I’ve a feeling that the word a portion of the portfolio means that means that we might be the meat of it because I think the question I’ve got here is, is there a room for a portion of the portfolio to be more dynamic? And I think that’s talking to some portfolios where they have their kind of the core element and then they have the kind of more tactical elements and I don’t think we don’t have one of those. No, we don’t want to lose no,此外，如果我说错了请原谅，但我感觉“投资组合的一部分”这个词意味着我们可能是其中最重要的部分，因为我想问的问题是，投资组合的一部分是否有更多动态的空间？我认为这指的是一些投资组合，它们有核心要素，然后还有一些更策略性的要素，而我认为我们没有那种。不，我们不想失去，不，

Terry Smith  1:05:39  特里·史密斯 1:05:39

no, that’s too complicated for us. We can’t do that.不，那对我们来说太复杂了。我们做不到。

Ian King  1:05:45  伊恩·金 1:05:45

Right to two questions. Next on a related theme, they come from Aiden Mackay, and Gabrielle Jeffery or Gabriel. Jeffrey, thank you for those. First one, is actually a reference to feet, the funds with emerging equities Trust, which obviously you pulled down the shutters on that last year. And Aiden asks, why a feat companies had a better return on capital than the main Fund and the s&p 500, MSCI index, etc. Why did it not perform better or comparatively with funds with equity over a five year period? Another related emerging markets question comes from Gabriel. To what degree is the fund exposed to emerging markets through its companies? And to what degree do you see the success of emerging markets been crucial to such companies? Long term growth?有权利提两个问题。接下来，在相关主题上，他们来自艾登·麦凯，以及加布里埃尔·杰弗里或加布里埃尔·杰弗里。谢谢你们。第一个问题实际上是关于新兴股票信托基金，显然你们去年关闭了这家公司。艾登问，为什么这些公司的资本回报率比主要基金和标普 500、MSCI 指数等更好？为什么在五年比较期内，它们的表现没有更好或相对地与股票基金相比？另一个相关的新兴市场问题是来自加布里埃尔。基金通过其公司对新兴市场的敞口程度有多大？你认为新兴市场的成功对这类公司有多关键？长期增长？

Terry Smith  1:06:35  特里·史密斯 1:06:35

Yeah, okay. Yes, feet? The answer is currency. Basically, if you own companies in something like the emerging markets fund, you can find very, very good consumer companies in for example, India, but they are in India. And they are subject therefore, in terms of what they produce for us in return in hard currency to the macroeconomics of India. And, and it’s and it and its currency movements. So that’s the Indian rupee from the Foundation have feet to the to when we left it, that’s, we were basically, in terms of the performance of the company is running up that down escalator. And before anybody thinks it, no, you can’t hedge the currency, it’s just not feasible. You can’t hedge for any kind of period ahead with any liquidity. And with an even if you do, it’s got massive cost associated with it. The emerging markets, currencies do not have the kind of liquidity that hard currencies have got, they don’t have the kind of hedging capability that currencies have got, you are basically locked into the currency risk of the country concerned. And that is not an atypical job. It’s also, of course, a bizarrely difficult area to try and predict, you know, we didn’t own anything in Russia. But if we were trying to predict what was happening in Russia as a result of the events of the Ukraine, the ruble has, of course, been very strong. It’s like I give up right on this, I’m not equipped to make these kinds of judgments is my view on it? And so we gave up basically, on the second part of the question, do we think that this is an important element?好的，是的。脚？答案是货币。基本上，如果你持有新兴市场基金等公司的股份，你可以在例如印度找到非常好的消费公司，但它们在印度。因此，就它们为我们生产硬通货的回报而言，它们受印度宏观经济的影响。还有，还有，还有其货币波动。所以，这就是基金从我们离开时的印度卢比，我们基本上，就公司业绩而言，在上下自动扶梯上。在任何人认为之前，不，你不能对冲货币，这并不可行。你不能用任何流动性对冲任何时间段。即使你这样做，它也伴随着巨大的成本。新兴市场货币没有硬通货那样的流动性，它们没有货币那样的对冲能力，你基本上被锁定在相关国家的货币风险中。这不是一个典型的工作。当然，这也是一个极其难以预测的领域，你知道，我们没有在俄罗斯持有任何资产。 但如果我们要预测乌克兰事件对俄罗斯造成的影响，卢布当然表现得非常强势。在我看来，我几乎放弃了这个判断，我没有能力做出这类判断。因此，我们基本上放弃了问题的第二部分，即我们认为这是否是一个重要因素？

Yes, most certainly, it is the breakdown of our country companies by listing on the on the left of the slide, you’ll see. But more importantly, there’s a breakdown by revenue. And you’ll see, whereas nearly 70% of our companies are listed in the United States of America, less than half of their revenues are actually from North America, taken as a whole. And in fact, we have one company that’s listed in the United States, which has zero revenue in America as we speak. Which is kind of interesting, though. It’s not when people talk about where’s the exposure, it certainly isn’t in America. It’s in other places. In fact, it’s in Indonesia, Turkey, and Philippines and places like that. And if you look down the table on the right, you’ll see Asia, Pacific Eurasia, Middle East Africa and Latin America there. If you sum those together, it’s about 30% of the revenues, the reality is clipping on towards a third of the revenues of our companies are from emerging markets, basically. And because they don’t suffer the same kind of things that we’re suffering in feet on the whole, which is quite a lot of what they do is made locally and sold locally. And they really only have translational effects to worry about in relation to that business. So they’ve not got the same kind of gross impacts that we had in there. They’re better able to manage it. They’re just better at it as well, frankly, than we were. And I think yes, this is an important part of it. If we to be overly simplistic.是的，当然，这是我们国家公司按上市情况进行的分解，您可以在幻灯片左侧看到。但更重要的是，这是按收入进行的分解。您会看到，虽然我们近 70%的公司在美国上市，但它们不到一半的收入实际上来自北美。事实上，我们有一家在美国上市的公司，目前在美国的收入为零。这有点有趣。当人们谈论在哪里有风险敞口时，当然不是在美国，而是在其他地方。事实上，是在印度尼西亚、土耳其、菲律宾等地。如果您看右侧的表格，您会看到亚洲、太平洋、欧亚、中东、非洲和拉丁美洲。如果把这些加起来，大约占 30%的收入。实际上，我们公司收入的近三分之一来自新兴市场。因为它们没有我们正在遭受的同样的问题，它们做的大部分事情都是本地生产、本地销售。 他们真正需要担心的是与该业务相关的翻译影响。因此，他们没有我们曾经面临的同样严重的总体影响。他们能更好地管理它。坦白说，他们在这方面也比我们做得更好。我认为，是的，这是其中重要的一部分。如果我们过于简单化。

I think if you look at the companies that we’ve got, selling more in the developed world is mainly about getting people to pay more and drink and eat better, and have things that relate to so called premiumization. Whereas in the developing world, it’s about developing utilisation is what Julian touched upon in terms of eye care and vision correction, which is most of the people he’s talking about who require the vision correction, don’t have it are in the developing world. So yes, I think it’s up very important part of what these companies do. I’ll come back to the Unilever comment, Unilever, we think about oh, yeah, he’s got very good brands. And so how about the distribution, the distribution capabilities is formidable in those areas.我认为，如果我们看看我们拥有的公司，在发达国家销售更多主要是让人们支付更多费用，享受更好的饮食，拥有所谓的优质化产品。而在发展中国家，它关乎于利用率的开发，就像朱利安提到的关于眼部护理和视力矫正，他谈论的大多数需要视力矫正的人都没有，他们大多在发展中国家。所以是的，我认为这是这些公司所做的重要部分。我会回到联合利华的评论上，联合利华，我们认为哦，是的，他拥有非常好的品牌。那么在那些地区的分销能力怎么样呢？分销能力非常强大。

Ian King  1:10:13  伊恩·金 1:10:13

I always remember the chief executive, Diageo, Paul Walsh, when he was who was used to say that the US was his biggest emerging market, because there was emerging middle class buying and premium rising. Yeah,我总是记得迪 ageo 的首席执行官，保罗·沃尔什，当他是谁时，他习惯于说美国是他最大的新兴市场，因为那里有新兴的中产阶级在购买，并且优质化在上升。是的，

Julian Robins  1:10:24  朱利安·罗宾斯 1:10:24

and I mean, this is, this is what I was gonna say was exactly the same point, which is emerging markets are different things to different people. So we own the three airline reservation companies or IT companies that between us and Smith’s and we follow, which is, so we own Amadeus, and then which is came out of the three, four European airlines, Iberia, and Lufthansa, Air France and somebody else. And so all their business historically was in Europe, and then they’ve moved to Asia. And then there are two companies called Travelport and Sabre, which are the US equivalent. So if you so they came out of united and American Airlines, and so Amadeus historically, did all of its revenues in the in Europe and Asia, and I think literally zero in the US, whereas now it’s starting to win business in the US. So it’s exactly the same point. Yeah.我的意思是，这就是我想说的完全相同的观点，即新兴市场对不同的人来说是不同的。因此，我们拥有三家航空公司预订公司或 IT 公司，它们在我们和史密斯之间，我们跟踪，所以我们拥有阿ما迪斯，然后它是从三家、四家欧洲航空公司，伊比利亚、汉莎、法国航空和另一家公司出来的。因此，他们所有的业务在历史上都在欧洲，然后他们移到了亚洲。然后有两家公司，名为 Travelport 和 Sabre，它们是美国同等地位的公司。所以如果你，它们来自于联合航空公司和美国航空公司，因此阿玛迪斯在历史上，它的所有收入都在欧洲和亚洲，我想在美国实际上为零，而现在它开始在美国赢得业务。所以这是完全相同的观点。是的。

Ian King  1:11:19  伊恩·金 1:11:19

Very good. i For those of you gasping for drink, we’re, we’re into the home straight now. We haven’t really talked about macro this evening. And I’m afraid your luck’s just run out. This one comes from Peter bow. And like this one, Peter, thank you very much indeed for your question. And he asks, simply, has the Great Moderation gone for good?非常好。对于那些渴望解渴的朋友们，我们现在进入最后一阶段了。今晚我们其实并没有真正讨论宏观问题。恐怕你们的运气已经用完了。这个观点来自彼得·鲍。和这个一样，彼得，非常感谢你的问题。他简单地问道，伟大的缓和是否已经彻底结束？

Terry Smith  1:11:42  特里·史密斯 1:11:42

Yeah, probably the Great Moderation. So a period when we had low interest rates, but also low inflation, and the economy grew. Yeah, I mean, that was kind of sort of, if you think about it, it’s like one of those trick of the ice things where you’ve got some cricket stumps and, or castles where everything you walk up into Yeah, you can’t have that indefinitely, can you? And, of course, you know, the thing that helped us to have this rather strange confluence of low interest rates. Government spending more than they were fiscal stimulus, like government spending more than they were, they were getting in revenues. Debt being financed by Central Bank buying and not having inflation was a call to the great financial crisis, which helped with this, you know, the huge balance sheet recession that we had as a result of the damage to the banking system meant that we could operate for a period where all of those things could happen. Because we had very strong deflationary influences of what happened in the banking system and, and that was built on the back of other strong deflationary influences from the rise of China as a manufacturing power.是的，可能是“大缓和”时期。那是一个低利率、低通胀，同时经济也在增长的时期。是的，我的意思是，如果你仔细想想，那就像是一种冰上的把戏，你有一些板球桩或者城堡，你走进去就出不来了。是的，你不可能永远这样下去，对吧？当然，你知道，帮助我们实现这种低利率、政府支出超过收入、财政刺激等奇特巧合的东西，是中央银行购买债务，没有通货膨胀，这最终导致了大金融危机，这帮助我们应对了由此造成的巨大资产负债表衰退。由于银行系统的损害，我们能够在一个时期内让所有这些事情发生。因为银行系统发生了非常强烈的通缩影响，而且这种通缩影响建立在其他强烈的通缩影响之上，比如中国崛起为制造业强国所带来的影响。

Probably that’s gone now, I think. But I was always taught when I was studying, to never if you want to pass an exam, don’t answer the question asked the question you wish they’d asked. I famously managed to have a famously however, I managed to answer a question on in my English history exam on the intellectual revolution of the early 17th century and its influence on the English to war by saying, well, there was no it was all caused by this, which I lecture after I said, brilliant, I’ve never seen anyone answer a question as well, when he clearly didn’t have any clue about the subject. I took it as a compliment. And the question, I guess, that I wish they’d asked. So I’m gonna answer anyway, is, how will we fare? How will fund Smith fair, right. And, I mean, obviously, your guest is at least as good as mine. But here’s a couple of clues. We’ve gone back. And we’ve done some work by looking at how the stocks of the salt we have performed versus the market in similar circumstances to the ones we’re now with. So with us, rates, just about four and a half percent, the short end. And in doing that work, my colleagues who did the work I congratulate because if you try and look this up on Bloomberg, you’ll find it’s hopeless, because the data only starts in the mid 1990s, which, of course, was the beginning of the Great Moderation. So working out what growth stocks versus growth, quality stocks did versus value, still absolutely hopeless, because you’re actually in the centre of the problem. So what we did is we went back and re recreated the data for the s&p, and for our own investable universe, and for the portfolio, back from the period from 1980 to 2001, when interest rates in the US averaged about four and a half percent. So the nearest comparator we can get, it’s not perfect. It’s not perfect either a number of stocks because not all of our stocks even existed back then, is not perfect in terms of data. But I can tell you the two things, which I find quite interesting in relation to it, fortunately, are one we are performed. If you look back on the stocks out, our investable years outperformed the s&p and our portfolio outperformed both of them. And the second thing was they managed to outperform both the falling and rising rate periods in that period in the in the rising rate periods. You’ll see that over here, and in the falling rate periods are clearly the falling rate periods produced bigger absolute returns because they do. The the valuation of things goes up more. But the good news, if there is any good news is if we are living through a repeat of that, and I don’t know whether we are, we should be alright. And strategic terms. I mean,恐怕现在已经过去了，我想。但在我学习时，我总是被教导，如果你想要通过考试，就不要回答问题，而要回答你希望他们问的问题。我著名地做到了这一点，我著名地回答了英语历史考试中关于 17 世纪初知识革命及其对英国战争影响的问题，我说，嗯，没有，这一切都是由这个引起的，这是我讲完课之后，他说，太棒了，我从未见过有人回答问题如此之好，当他显然对这个问题一无所知时。我将其视为一种赞美。而我想，他们应该问的问题，所以我还是要回答，我们将如何发展？Fund Smith 将如何发展，对吧。而且，我的意思是，显然，你的嘉宾至少和我一样好。但这里有一些线索。我们已经回去了，我们通过查看我们拥有的盐股票在类似我们现在面临的情况下的表现与市场进行了工作。所以，对我们来说，利率差不多是百分之四点五，短期。 在进行这项工作时，我要祝贺我的同事完成了这项工作，因为如果你尝试在彭博上查找这些信息，你会发现这几乎不可能，因为数据只从 1990 年代中期开始，而当然，那正是“大缓和”时期的开始。因此，要弄清楚增长型股票与增长型优质股票、价值型股票的表现差异，仍然非常困难，因为你实际上处于问题的中心。所以我们做了什么？我们回溯并重新创建了标准普尔指数、我们自己的可投资股票池以及投资组合从 1980 年到 2001 年的数据，当时美国的平均利率约为 4.5%。所以，我们能够找到的最接近的参照物并不完美。在股票数量上也不完美，因为并非我们所有的股票在当时都存在，在数据方面也不完美。但我可以告诉你，有两件事让我觉得相当有趣，幸运的是，第一件事是我们的表现。如果你回顾我们的投资股票，我们的可投资股票池的表现优于标准普尔指数，我们的投资组合的表现也优于两者。 而且在那个时期，他们成功地在利率上升和利率下降的时期都取得了优异表现。您会看到这一点，而在利率下降的时期，显然是利率下降时期产生了更大的绝对回报，因为确实如此。事物的估值上升得更多。但如果是重复了那种情况，如果有任何好消息，那就是我们正在经历重复，我不知道是否正在经历，我们应该会没事的。从战略角度来看。 我是说，

Ian King  1:15:13

obviously, you began your career when inflation was in the 20显然，您开始您的职业生涯时，通货膨胀率正处于 20%。

Terry Smith  1:15:18  特里·史密斯 1:15:18

to 24.2% a year at my first full year in work, inflation, I think the all share index got to 108, or something like that my entire net worth was 132 pounds.在我工作的第一年，通货膨胀率达到了 24.2%，我认为所有股票指数达到了 108，或者类似那个数字，我的整个净资产是 132 英镑。

Julian Robins  1:15:29  朱利安·罗宾斯 1:15:29

And my first year in work was actually I think, the first year of the Great Moderation, which was 8485. Yeah. I thought when I read this question, this was a question about my drinking habits has the Great Moderation gone for good. But I also, one of the things I always sort of urge people to think about is, is that, you know, when we’re talking about inflation, and interest rates, and recessions, and growth rates and volatility, think about a great company, and then write down the top five or 10 reasons as to what made it a good company. And you know, you probably get great products, products that people love, great brands, great distribution, a succession of sort of decent managers who’ve done well, the company has tapped into a secular theme. If you’re looking for good companies, you shouldn’t be worried about this type of stuff.我工作的第一年实际上是我想，是“大缓和”的第一年，即 1985 年。是的。当我读到这个问题时，我认为这是一个关于我的饮酒习惯的问题，“大缓和”是否已经彻底结束。但我总是鼓励人们思考的是，当我们在谈论通货膨胀、利率、衰退、增长率和波动性时，应该考虑一家伟大的公司，并写下使其成为好公司的前五或十个原因。你知道，你可能会得到优秀的产品，深受人们喜爱的产品，伟大的品牌，优秀的分销渠道，一系列表现不错的经理，公司把握了长期趋势。如果你在寻找好公司，你就不应该担心这类事情。

Terry Smith  1:16:16  特里·史密斯 1:16:16

I mean, the likelihood they’re gonna sit there and describe interest rates has been the reason for their multi decade success is not high read, is it? I would have said, currency exchange rates it is it’s just not not very likely that that’s where they’re going to go in, in describing what this is. I haven’t got it with me now. So I’ll paraphrase. But there’s a wonderful quote, which says every year, profound fund managers and investors say they shouldn’t be investing in Coca Cola, because the the soft drinks market is pretty tapped out, the growth will be miserable. And, and consistently, they’ve been proved wrong. And of course, this is a quote in Berkshire Hathaway’s annual report from about 1994, I think. But he’s actually quoting Forbes from 1938. You know, people thinking that this stuff that’s really good is going to stop performing isn’t new, you know, they’ve been going at it since before World War Two, in fact, probably forever.我的意思是，他们很可能会坐下来描述利率是他们数十年成功的理由的可能性并不高，对吧？我认为，是汇率，这不太可能是他们描述这个问题的方向。我现在没有笔记。所以我将概括一下。但有一句很棒的话，说的是每年，深刻的价值基金经理和投资者都说他们不应该投资可口可乐，因为软饮料市场已经相当饱和，增长会很惨淡。而且，他们一直被证明是错的。当然，这是一句来自伯克希尔·哈撒韦 1994 年左右年度报告中的话，我想。但他实际上是在引用 1938 年的《福布斯》。你知道，人们认为这种真正好的东西会停止表现的想法并不是新的，你知道，他们从二战前就开始这么做了，事实上，可能永远如此。

Ian King  1:17:09  伊恩·金 1:17:09

We surprised at all, how in the US, in particular, at the beginning of this year, though, they the market got it wrong in terms of anticipating where the Fed would go. You have people even talking about the Fed cutting rates before the year end? Obviously the very thing that我们都感到惊讶，特别是在美国，今年年初，尽管市场在预测美联储将走向何方方面出了错。甚至有人谈论美联储在年底前降息？显然，这正是

Terry Smith  1:17:24

yes, yeah, I was a bit surprised. But I think an awful lot of people that we come up into contact with one sort or another in relation to these events that were going on, remind me if any of you have had young children had to go on a car journey. Right? What’s the phrase that you hear very early on in the journey? Yeah. Right. And it’s like, well, I don’t know whether we nearly got a clue, frankly. But, but I do know that keeping asking isn’t going to make it happen. And it isn’t going to make us all feel any better. Who knows whether we’re nearly there? Yeah. And I think that’s it was born of that we must be nearly there. After all, this has been horrible this year. So we must be we might be needed, then we might be not? I don’t know. I mean, you look at the history of bear markets, this would be a very unusual bear market, if it extended beyond two years. Very, very unusual indeed. And that means we’re, we’re probably looking at a long stop date of somewhere around November for these kinds of events out there. And, you know, the lots of people one could quote on this, I put in our, our annual letter, and one of the things that gives me comfort, one of the two things, one of them is if there is going to be macroeconomic difficulty, I think what we’ve got is relatively well placed relatively first thing, do you think anything else is not well placed? I hate to think what some of the so called Value stuffs gonna do. We’ll see what happens there. And the other thing is, there’s only one sort of market that ends in a recession. It’s a bear market. Market is a discounting mechanism. And it’s probably discounting something quite bad. And if something bad happens, then it will be relieved and we can get back to business, as it were, but I don’t know whether we’re there yet. And, and it’s you know, I think people should stop thinking like that. It doesn’t help.是的，我确实有点惊讶。但我想，我们与这些正在发生的事件有关联的许多接触者，如果你们中有年轻孩子的，是否有过不得不坐车的经历？对吧？旅程一开始你们会听到什么话？对。对。就像，老实说，我不知道我们是否几乎有点线索。但是，但是我知道，不断追问不会让它发生。也不会让我们感觉更好。谁知道我们是否快到了？对。我想，那是因为我们觉得我们快到了。毕竟，今年很糟糕。所以我们必须是，我们可能需要，然后我们可能不需要？我不知道。我的意思是，你看看熊市的历史，如果它持续超过两年，那将是一个非常不寻常的熊市。确实非常不寻常。这意味着我们，我们可能正在看着这些事件在某个时候结束，大约在 11 月左右。 而且，你知道，可以引用许多人的观点，我已将他们列入我们的年度信函中。这让我感到安慰的一件事，也是两件事之一，其中之一是，如果将要出现宏观经济困难，我认为我们所处的位置相对较好。第一件事，你认为还有其他什么位置不佳吗？我真不敢想一些所谓的价值股会怎样。我们看看会发生什么。另一件事是，只有一种市场会陷入衰退，那就是熊市。市场是一个折价机制。它可能正在折价一些相当糟糕的东西。如果发生了不好的事情，那么它将得到缓解，我们可以恢复业务，如此一来，但我不知道我们是否已经到达那里。而且，你知道，我认为人们应该停止那样思考。这没有帮助。